Memorandum submitted by the UCL Institute
for Risk & Disaster Reduction (SAGE 17)
1. ABOUT UCL
AND THE
IRDR
University College London (UCL) (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/)
is an academic powerhouse and one of the world's leading multidisciplinary
universities. It is ranked fourth in the 2010 QS World University
Rankings, second only to Cambridge of the UK universities. UCL
is a world leader in the fields of hazard, risk and disaster reduction,
with at least 70 academics across 12 departments and seven faculties
involved in world-class research and practice in these areas.
The UCL Institute for Risk & Disaster Reduction (IRDR) (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/rdr/)
was launched in 2010 with the aim of maximising the impact and
value of UCL activities in risk and disaster reduction, and to
increase and enhance interdisciplinary collaboration and cooperation.
As part of UCL's commitment to addressing global issues and global
problems, the IRDR also seeks to contribute to the UCL Grand Challenges
of Global Health, Sustainable Cities, Intercultural Interaction
and Human Wellbeing.
2. PREAMBLE
Researchers and practitioners at UCL were involved
to some degree in the responses to both the Icelandic ash crisis
and the swine flu epidemic. Submissions from individuals, guided
by the questions raised in the Committee's enquiry announcement,
are provided in the relevant sections below. Additionally, submissions
are provided from UCL experts in relation to the potential threats
presented by cyber attacks and solar storms. General issues, relating—in
particular—to threat recognition, preparedness and the importance
of international coordination, are addressed separately.
3. THE ICELANDIC
ASH ERUPTIONS
Submission from Professor Bill McGuire. Co-director
of the UCL Institute for Risk & Disaster Reduction & Co-director
of the UCL Environment Institute.
During the 2010 Icelandic ash eruption crisis,
I was a Member of the UK Government Scientific Advisory Group
for Emergencies (SAGE), established within a few days of the effects
of ash being felt in UK airspace.
Iceland is home to 18 volcanoes that have erupted—some
of them many times—since the island was settled in 874AD.
Volcanic activity in Iceland is typically effusive (in other words
is dominated by the production of lava flows), but more explosive
events are not uncommon. In this sense the 2010 activity of Eyjafjallajökull
cannot be regarded as unusual and volcanic events comparable to
this occur in Iceland every 20-40 years. The questions posed by
the enquiry are particularly pertinent to the exposure and vulnerability
of the (volcano-free) UK to volcanic activity beyond the country's
borders. My views, in response, are provided below:
What are the potential hazards and risks and how
were they identified?
While many UK volcanologists and others in the
UK scientific community are and were aware of the potential hazard
presented to the UK and UK air-space by eruptions in Iceland,
knowledge of this hazard, and associated risks, do not appear
to have penetrated government circles. Notably, the threat from
remote volcanic eruptions was not included on the National Risk
Register, although I am given to understand that this situation
will now been remedied.
The generation of an ash cloud across the UK
and much of Europe as a consequence of an eruption in Iceland
is far from unprecedented. A number of ash horizons preserved
in the peat-lands of Scotland and northern England, testify to
Icelandic eruptions around 4300, 2176, 1150, and 500 years ago
that deposited ash across parts of the UK, while Iceland-sourced
ash layers are also found in Ireland, Germany and elsewhere in
Europe. In 1875, the explosive eruption of Askja, resulted in
visible ash falls across Norway and Sweden, and most recently,
in 1947, a moderate eruption of Hekla produced significant ash
across the region. In the context of aviation safety, the critical
difference between 1947 and 2010 was the advent and rapid expansion
of mass air transport.
The danger presented by ash clouds to jet aircraft
has been recognised for more than 30 years, and following two
near-fatal encounters between ash and large, passenger aircraft
in the 1980s, an international protocol was established that required
air traffic managers to divert aircraft if a discernable ash cloud
was evident. While this protocol functioned well in the open skies
of regions of high volcanic hazard, such as South East Asia and
Alaska, across the crowded and confined UK and European airspaces,
enforcement of the protocol required the closure of air space
while there was discernable ash in the atmosphere. The reason
for this was primarily the fault of the airline community, which
had failed to agree a safe, lower limit of ash in the atmosphere
that would allow aircraft to continue to fly in dilute ash clouds
remote from the erupting volcanoes. In this context, the opening
up of airspace was only permitted following the establishment
of ad hoc ash safety limits, drawn up by the airlines and
aircraft manufacturers.
How prepared is/was the Government for the emergency?
The government was not at all prepared for the
emergency, and as pointed out above, the threat from Icelandic
ash is not included in the 2010 National Risk Register. Whether
or not specific departments (for example, the Department of Transport),
or individuals within departments, were aware of the threat is
not known. Certainly, in a report that I wrote in 2007 for the
Ministry of Defence, on future geophysical threats in Europe and
its neighbours, the potential threat to aviation from Icelandic
eruptions was mentioned.
The Eyjafjallajökull volcano is currently
quiet, but the potential threat from ash and volcanic gases from
Iceland and elsewhere remains. For Iceland, there is good evidence
to suggest that volcanic activity since AD1200 has a 130-140 year
periodicity, with intervals of lesser activity lasting 50-80 years
alternating with higher activity of similar duration. Since 1980
Iceland may have entered a new cycle of more frequent activity,
which could equate to 6-11 eruptions per 40 years. The sources
of future ash hazard across the UK and Europe may be volcanoes
located outside Iceland. Within the north Atlantic and the western
half of Europe there are a number of volcanic regions that have
the potential to produce highly voluminous ash plumes that reach
high altitude. In particular the Azores (eg, Furnas), the Canary
Islands (eg, Tenerife), Italy (eg,Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and
Etna) and the Aegean (eg, Santorini) are worthy of mention.
Coupled with appropriate meteorological conditions,
there is no doubt that future explosive eruptions in Iceland and
elsewhere have the potential to cause further disruption to air
transport. It is not possible, however, to predict either when
this will occur, or at what scale. A worst-case scenario, however,
could be provided by the 1783 Laki eruption in Iceland.
The Laki event lasted for over six months, ejected
more than 15 km3 of lava, and produced more than eight
million tonnes of fluorine, which resulted in the deaths of 50%
of the island's livestock. This, in turn, led to serious famine
and the deaths of between a quarter and a third of Iceland's inhabitants.
In the UK and Europe, the 120 million tonnes of sulphur gases
ejected into the atmosphere led to a persistent sulphurous haze
that resulted in widespread respiratory problems and many thousands
of excess deaths—perhaps up to 23,000 in the UK alone. The
sulphur haze also affected the European and North American climate
for several years, leading to an extremely cold winter in 1783-84.
In North America, the Mississippi froze at New Orleans and ice
was reported in the Gulf of Mexico. A repeat of the Laki eruption
could again have serious health consequences for the very old,
very young and infirm, result in weather conditions detrimental
to UK industry, and generate ash clouds capable of closing UK
airspace and, potentially, curtailing or stopping air traffic
on the polar routes, perhaps for months.
How does/did the Government use scientific advice
and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?
As the threat was not identified in advance,
the government's response to the emergency was purely reactive.
In relation to geological and meteorological aspects of the crisis,
individual scientists were invited to join SAGE, under the leadership
of Government Chief Scientific Advisor, John Beddington. The nature
of the invitation process was not clear, but appears to have been
focused on scientists already known to the government and to the
Office of the Chief Scientific Advisor (for example, I was a member
of the Natural Hazards Working Group, established in the wake
of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami under the leadership of David
King). During the course of the crisis, the SAGE grew by the addition
of further scientists on the recommendation of those already on-board.
What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies?
Access to reliable and timely scientific advise
during an emergency, such as presented by the Icelandic ash, is
hamstrung to a considerable degree by the failure to recognise
in advance the cause of the emergency and—therefore—by
a complete absence of preparedness. As a consequence, particularly
in a rapid-onset emergency such as that triggered by the Icelandic
ash, the government is always playing catch-up. It takes days
to establish a SAGE to address the problem, and longer for its
members and associated government officials to come up to speed
in relation to the characteristics of the emergency. Consequently,
it is possible for an emergency to come and go with such rapidity
that advising scientists have little or no role to play. This
problem can only be solved by: (i) making concerted efforts to
identify and evaluate all possible threats; (ii) establishing
for each, and in advance, groups of relevant scientists who have
given a commitment to provide advice; (iii) ensuring that communication
mechanisms are established that permit advising scientists to
be contacted rapidly.
Has the Government sufficient powers and resources
to overcome the obstacles?
In principle, yes. As mentioned above, the Icelandic
crisis arose primarily from the failure to recognise the threat
in advance, which resulted in the absence of any real effective
preparedness. Had the threat been recognised and considered prior
to the arrival of the ash, then the opportunity would have existed
for government to talk with scientists, airlines and aircraft
manufacturers to identify potential obstacles and to plan for
how these could be overcome. In such circumstances it is highly
likely that the absence of a safe ash limit would have been identified
as a problem and addressed in good time.
For case study (ii) was there sufficient and timely
scientific evidence to inform policy decisions?
My opinion is that the scientific advice provided
via SAGE was sufficient to inform policy decisions during the
crisis. In terms of timeliness, however, such advice would have
been far more useful in advance of the event.
How effective is the strategic coordination between
Government departments, public bodies, private bodies, sources
of scientific advice and the research base in preparing for and
reacting to emergencies?
In relation to volcanic threats, the strategic
coordination between government departments, the scientific community
and research base and private bodies (in the latter case the airlines
and aircraft manufacturers) was poor to non-existent prior to
the Icelandic ash crisis. Links have now been developed, however,
which—if built upon—can support a pro-active approach
towards managing such hazards in future. Since volcanic threats
to the UK are sourced outside national boundaries, cooperation
with relevant organisations in those countries that host volcanoes
that are potentially hazardous to the UK is particularly critical
(see below).
How important is international coordination and
how could it be strengthened?
International coordination is critical to reducing
the risks presented by volcanic eruptions in other countries to
the UK, its business sector and its population. Firstly, links
need to be improved with the relevant scientific bodies (volcano
observatories and national weather services), so as to improve
provision of notice of unrest at volcanoes that may present a
threat to the UK. At the same time, communication mechanisms should
be established that ensure that this information reaches those
in government who need to know. Secondly, international coordination
is required in order to establish safe ash thresholds that permit
commercial flights to continue where dilute ash clouds are present.
In this regard, the current ad hoc limits, established
in the heat of the crisis, need to be re-evaluated, and limits
set that are based upon considered scientific and engineering
studies. While this should be the responsibility of the international
airline community, evidence of the past slow response to the problem
suggests that "encouragement" from national governments
may be required.
NB. The UCL IRDR report:
Volcanic Hazard from Iceland: Analysis and Implications of
the Eyjafjallajökull Eruption (eds: Sammonds, P, McGuire,
W J & Edwards, S) can be downloaded at:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/rdr/publications/iceland
4. THE SWINE
FLU PANDEMIC
Submission from Professor Martin Utley. Director,
UCL Clinical Operational Research Unit.
During the 2009 swine flu pandemic I served
on the Critical Care Working Group convened by the Department
of Health. My involvement stemmed from work that I'd been doing
since late 2008 with intensive care consultants at Great Ormond
Street Hospital on the topic of triage in the context of an influenza
pandemic. Reflections below represent a personal view and I'd
not claim any authority on these matters. I work closely with
the Health Protection Analytical Team within DH so have some (limited)
insight into what was going on behind scenes.
How were potential hazards and risks identified?
Pandemic influenza was reasonably prominent
in the National Risk Register.
The clinical community was making its own preparations,
in part stimulated by development of the national plan.
How prepared was/is the government?
Well prepared, but it is probably fair to say
that the planned response was geared to a more severe avian flu
scenario.
How does/did the government use scientific advice
and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?
A considerable amount of work had been done
by DH/HPA linking with mathematical epidemiologists and others,
which is hardly surprising given SARS and previous avian flu outbreaks.
Emerging advice was assimilated reasonably well as far as I can
tell—the decision to go against the reported advice to close
all schools seemed carefully considered (and with hindsight vindicated).
What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely, scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies?
Analytical capacity within Government departments
is severely stretched, despite the fact that these are the people
with the skills and experience of interpreting/packaging scientific
advice in a way that can inform policy.
For case studies 1. and 2. was there sufficient
and timely scientific evidence to inform policy decisions?
In relation to swine flu (case study 1), my
view is that most policy decisions were evidence based, albeit
geared to a more severe pandemic.
How effective is the strategic coordination between
government departments, public bodies, private bodies, sources
of scientific advice and the research base, in preparing for and
reacting to emergencies?
One point I'd make here is that there are/were
problems around the interpretation of model output and public
bodies had difficulties interpreting/using the "worst case
scenarios", which DH decided (correctly in my view) were
the only estimates worth sharing.
5. CYBER ATTACKS
Submission from Dr. Peter Trim. Centre for Advanced
Management & Interdisciplinary Studies, Birkbeck College.
Dr. Trim is co-author of: Strategizing Resilience
and Reducing Vulnerability (ISBN: 978-60741-693-7). He is
a member of the Information Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC)
Academic Liaison Panel and has contributed to the Global Forum
for Law Enforcement and National Security and contributed to a
security agenda for the Prime Minister. One of his areas of expertise
is in reducing organizational vulnerability through countering
cyber attacks. Dr. Trim makes the following points in relation
to the cyber attack threat:
— At present, it can be argued that governments
are not engaging with the private sector (which owns a high percentage
of the nation's critical information infrastructure) as fully
as they should and that much more needs to be done to advise society
of the potential risks associated with cyber crime. Issues such
as identity fraud, social networking activities and the international
dimensions of cyber crime all need further attention.
— Law enforcement agencies need greater
powers and more resources in order to effectively tackle cyber
crime.
— Universities need to be investing in
facilities and staff to provide increasing numbers of skilled
graduates that are better able to deal with cyber attacks than
is the case at present.
— There needs to be greater cooperation
between national governments and more active participation between
the private and public sectors (eg sharing information and knowledge
in relation to trends, threats and solutions).
— Society in general needs to be educated
to appreciate what security is and in particular needs to better
understand what information security and information assurance
entail.
— It is frustrating and worrying that some
criminal acts do not carry sufficient penalties to deter people
from undertaking internally orchestrated fraud.
— More attention needs to be paid to rogue
governments and how they aid terrorist networks and organized
criminal syndicates.
6. SOLAR STORMS
Submission from Professor Christopher Owen. Head
of Space Plasma Physics Group, UCL Mullard Space Science Laboratory,
and colleagues.
This submission deals specifically with the
potential threat of solar storms to the UK. Herein, the term "solar
storm" is used to mean all phenomena driven by enhanced activity
at the Sun that can have a measureable effect on the Earth environment,
specifically in terms of space-based infrastructure (eg GPS and
communication satellites), other navigation systems, power transmission
systems, trans-polar airline flights, etc. Members of the UCL/Mullard
Space Science Laboratory (Department of Space and Climate Physics)
have much accumulated scientific experience of these phenomena,
specifically in the areas of the origin of solar activity (within
the Solar Physics Group) and its effect on the near-Earth space
environment (within the Space Plasmas Group). Most recently, joint
efforts between the groups have been aimed at understanding how
phenomena originating at the Sun evolve as they propagate out
through interplanetary space and towards the Earth. In this document
we attempt briefly to indicate where this expertise may be put
to use in understanding the risks to UK society and infrastructure
that are associated with enhanced solar activity or solar storms.
Defining the problem: solar storms: phenomena and
associated risks
Solar activity affecting the near-Earth Space
environment can be classified in three main ways. Firstly, Solar
Energetic Particle (SEP) events occur when penetrating high energy
particles (a form of radiation) are expelled from the Sun during
solar flares and fill much of interplanetary space, including
that near the Earth. Secondly, the Sun sporadically expels vast
amounts of hot, dense plasma, together with its associated magnetic
field, sometimes at speeds in excess of 1000 kilometres per second.
Such events are termed "Coronal Mass Ejections" (CMEs)
and, although many head harmlessly away from the Earth, those
that are Earth-directed are capable of inducing major and damaging
changes to the Earth Space environment. Finally, extended periods
of particularly fast solar wind flows are known to be a major
contributor to enhancement of dangerous fluxes of radiation belt
electrons and can persist much longer than CMEs.
The magnetic field of the Earth provides a "bubble"
around the planet, known as the magnetosphere, which in some circumstances
is able to mitigate, but not completely eliminate, the effects
of solar activity from those parts of space that currently host
significant levels of human activity (eg the geosynchronous orbits
that hold telecommunications satellites or low-Earth orbits used
by the space shuttle, surveyor satellites (eg climate change)
and navigation (GPS) satellites). For example, energetic particles
from SEP events are largely excluded from the magnetosphere and
have a limited number of entry routes, which are generally confined
along the magnetic field lines descending into the polar ionosphere
and atmosphere. These can, however, provide undesirable radiation
doses to passengers, and particularly crew, flying frequently
on transpolar airline routes. They may also damage electronic
systems and stored software codes on polar orbiting satellites.
Knock-on effects from such damage have the potential to severely
damage or destroy the spacecraft if critical systems are affected.
Secondly, CMEs that encounter the Earth system
also have the potential to disrupt infrastructure through the
coupling of the magnetic fields of the CME with that of the Earth
itself. In some circumstances, this can result in a "stirring"
of the terrestrial magnetic field, which may cause very high voltages
to build up within the magnetosphere and ionosphere, and a very
significant build up of energy within the night-side magnetosphere.
Ultimately, this energy has to be shed by the magnetosphere, resulting
in intense electric currents flowing in the magnetosphere and
auroral-zone ionosphere (under these circumstances the auroral
zone often descends to UK latitudes), in disturbances to the terrestrial
magnetic field and in the acceleration of particles to very high
energies. Many of these particles subsequently can be trapped
within the Earths radiation belt regions for many weeks after
the passage of the initial solar disturbance, and can readily
affect space-based electronic systems and software throughout
that period.
Some of the risks to human technology and society
are:
— Loss of spacecraft due to effects of
enhanced levels of penetrating radiation (eg deep dielectric charging
within semiconductors and single event upsets within memory chips).
Loss of individual spacecraft due to such effects is known to
have occurred in the past, with consequent loss of capability,
or the necessity to re-assign that functionality to other spacecraft,
or to replace the spacecraft completely. However, a major "storm"
has the potential to knock out networks of satellites, such as
those involved in the delivery of GPS, communications, TV and
telephone signals. Modern society's dependence on satellite infrastructure
is very extensive and pervasive—much of it is taken for
granted. Solar Storms have the potential to be a common-mode failure
for many of these space assets with dire consequences to transportation,
defence, telecoms, etc. Replacing key elements of this infrastructure
would take months or years, which could have long-term effects
on our defence and navigation systems, and our general society,
while expensive spacecraft are built and launched. More often
temporary losses of service will occur when spacecraft operations
are interrupted by radiation induced anomalies. This is naturally
less expensive than a defunct spacecraft, but still may have significant
commercial impact for the operator and users. High radiation belt
particle fluxes (especially protons) and SEP's will also damage
solar arrays and thus reduce spacecraft lifetimes accordingly.
— Large voltages being induced in power
lines and pipelines beneath the current systems driven in the
ionosphere. Again there are documented cases of large areas (eg
most of Quebec during a storm in 1989) being left without power
after these induced voltages knocked out power substations, transformers
and relays during a solar/magnetic storm. During large storms
these current systems, and associated auroral activity, can descend
to UK latitudes, and thus provide a potential risk to UK infrastructure.
Although such damage to the national power grid may not immediately
seem as expensive to repair than damage to satellites, even several
days power outage during repairs is likely to be both very costly
to the economy and very inconvenient to the populace.
— To date the risks associated with solar
storms have been realised only in confined instances. The last
recognised "perfect storm" occurred in 1859, which,
of course, predated the current technological and space age and
before the development of national scale power grids. However,
there were recorded problems with the then nascent telegraph systems
at that time. Moreover, solar activity is known to strongly vary
during an approximately 11 year cycle, with the next "solar
maximum" predicted to occur in mid-2013. It should be noted
that the Sun has recently come out of an unexpectedly prolonged
and particularly deep minimum, in which there was almost no solar
activity for several years. This was both unpredicted and unprecedented
in the space age, indicating that despite experiencing several
solar cycles during this era, our ability to predict the general
level of solar activity across this cycle is rather poor. In particular
we have yet to gain the "prior experience" on which
to base our expectations for activity as the Sun rises from the
current deep "minimum" to "maximum" over the
next few years.
Responses to questions posed by the Committee:
How are potential hazards and risks identified?
As documented above, the potential hazards and
risks associated with solar activity are, in general terms, understood
on the basis of scientific study and limited previous experience.
The general conditions which lead to solar activity having a significant
effect on the Earth are understood, and there have been a number
of examples of spacecraft being lost and power systems being destroyed
by these effects. The times of heightened risk can generally be
identified as those years in which the Sun passes through the
solar maxima (although there is no guarantee of only low-activity
at other times). What is lacking is the ability to specifically
identify a period of particular risk with more than a few days
notice. A fleet of scientific spacecraft continues to monitor
the Sun, and can provide an identification of, for example, a
potentially hazardous CME leaving the Sun a few days before it
will reach the Earth. We cannot yet determine, however, the likely
level of coupling of such a CME with the Earth system until it
reaches our most Sunward satellites, about an hour before reaching
Earth. Thus the knowledge of whether this will pass harmlessly
or initiate a major magnetic storm within the Earth system can
currently only be established about one hour before the event.
We continue to study this scientifically, in an ongoing effort
to understand and predict both the timing and nature of CMEs and
their coupling to the Earth system. For example, better understanding
how regions of solar activity evolve towards eruption could lead
to warnings about a month ahead of time through identification
of potential "problem" regions during their previous
rotation across the face of the Sun. In addition, understanding
how the magnetic orientation of the ejecta relates to the observed
conditions in the solar active region would allow a better prediction
about how effectively these ejecta will disrupt the near-Earth
space environment, and thus the level of the potential hazard
to spacecraft and power systems.
How prepared is the government? How does/did the
government use scientific advice and evidence to identify, prepare
for and react to an emergency?
The UK government does not currently support
a coherent civilian program to identify and assess near-term risks
associated with solar activity (given the risks to satellite technology
and navigation systems it would be understandable if there existed
a military capability in this area, but we are not aware of this).
Currently warnings of increased risk come from the agencies of
other governments (eg NASA and NOAA in the USA, see eg http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/)
or through the actions of individual scientists who are engaged
in the ad hoc monitoring of the Sun for research purposes.
No formal channels of communication for warnings exist, however,
and no strategy for government action in the event of an identified
high-risk period has been developed. At present satellite operators
and power companies either ignore the potential problem, or have
their own bespoke solution to monitor and assess the risk. Moreover,
little work has been done in fully assessing our dependency on
space assets and how this might be mitigated in the case of a
major failure. For instance, it is difficult to answer the question
"what would be the consequences of losing GPS for six months?"
What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely, scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies?
The biggest obstacles in obtaining scientific
advice during emergencies associated with solar storms are the
lack of dedicated real-time monitoring and the short timescales
involved. Monitoring could be achieved semi-automatically if relevant
and currently existing observational datasets could be assembled
at a single location and routine algorithms developed to test
for potentially hazardous conditions. An automated alert to a
duty officer or scientist would initiate human assessment of the
situation until the alert is past or until a formal warning to
interested parties (eg satellite operators, power companies, and
even members of the public wishing to observe the aurora in the
UK) needs to be issued to initiate implementation of contingency
plans. However, even if continuous monitoring identified each
potential solar storm, we currently expect only to be able to
provide accurate warnings of its geo-effective coupling with about
1 hour notice. Hence policy decisions and these contingency plans
need to be prepared in advance, such that a coherent response
can be initiated immediately the occurrence of a significant and
geo-effective storm is confirmed.
Has the government sufficient powers and resources
to overcome the obstacles?
In principle, yes. Real-time monitoring of solar
activity and its effects on interplanetary and near-Earth space,
specifically for the benefit of the UK, could be undertaken using
currently available international scientific assets. A small team
would need to be established to set-up and run the monitoring
centre, and would need to be resourced sufficiently in order to
routinely gather and assess available data sets. Since the activity
would be sporadic, with several alerts per month at solar maximum,
this team could usefully be drawn from the pool of current UK
researchers in this field and/or attached to a University group
engaged in research into solar activity and its effect on the
Earth system, perhaps using PhD students as duty scientists in
the first instance. Lines of communication to potentially vulnerable
parties would need to be established for rapidly distributing
information about alerts.
Reducing the obstacle of short lead-times for
accurate predictions of hazardous events can only be achieved
through dedicated research into the detailed nature of solar activity,
its evolution through interplanetary space and its effect on the
Earth environment. Although the UK is already strong in science
related to this field, we have yet to generate the detailed level
of understanding required to make sufficiently accurate predictions
in the days or weeks ahead of a hazardous event. Indeed the focus
of this research has been to understand the underlying science
rather than to predict and identify mitigating actions. The government
currently funds such research through the UK Research Councils,
but could usefully increase funding to research specifically related
to enhancing our predictive capability, perhaps through a programme
which specifically links researchers with the monitoring centre
for the duration of their funded project. This research effort
should also address the likely degree and probability of extreme
events. An example of extremes is the biggest solar flare on record,
which occurred in 2003 and had a massive CME. This was significantly
bigger than the 1989 events that affected Quebec, but fortunately
was not Earth-directed and did not affect us.
(see http://sohowww.nascom.nasa.gov/hotshots/X17/).
As, in absolute terms, we have not been monitoring
solar activity for very long (only a few decades), we most likely
do not yet know the full range of behaviour within the capability
of our Sun.
Development of a mature and accurate monitoring
and prediction system could in time provide a financial return
on the investment as interested parties (satellite operators,
power companies and their insurers) learn that valuable assets
can be protected from damage and loss through the use of these
predictions to initiate contingency plans. This could perhaps
be done through the introduction of a subscription system for
alerts.
How effective is the strategic coordination between
government departments, public bodies, private bodies, sources
of scientific advice and the research base, in preparing for and
reacting to emergencies?
At present there is little coordination within
the UK in relation to preparations for a "perfect" solar
storm. The UK has no dedicated monitoring of solar activity in
the civilian arena. The UK has no assessment of potential damage
to its assets should a storm of the 1859-class occur during the
next solar maximum. The UK has no strategic line of investment
aimed at developing a useful prediction capability, nor in providing
support for the sciences that underpin the understanding of these
phenomena and thus offer the path to better predictive capability.
Despite an increased emphasis on "impact", the UK research
councils currently spend considerably less money on understanding
our local star, the Sun, and its effects on Earth, than they do
on understanding phenomena far beyond the solar system. This is
despite the fact that the former could potentially have a devastating
effect on our economy and lifestyle tomorrow, whereas the astrophysical
phenomena we are so interested in occurred long, long ago. We
thus conclude that the UK is not at all prepared to deal with
a major solar storm and will have to assume the full risk of a
potentially costly aftermath unless it is prepared to support
some disaster preparations in this area.
How important is international coordination and
how could it be strengthened?
At present international coordination is critical
to this area. The observations and data sets necessary to monitor
and predict the effects of solar activity are largely derived
from a wide variety of scientific spacecraft which are either
assets of another country (eg NASA missions) or are only partly
supported by the UK (eg ESA missions and bi-lateral missions).
Withdrawal of access to these observations by international partners
would leave the UK vulnerable to unmonitored solar activity. Although
such withdrawal would seem unlikely at present, the UK could act
to secure its position through the deployment of its own monitoring
satellite(s) or by sponsoring development of small monitoring
packages which could be deployed "piggyback" on larger
commercial spacecraft. Investment in the development of miniaturised
sensor packages would be an important step in establishing this
latter capability. This would also provide the UK with a more
significant contribution to bring to the table when considering
the international collection of assets required to fully monitor
solar activity and understand and predict its effect on the Earth
and its technology systems.
It should also be noted, in terms of providing
an improved national or international effort in this area, that
ESA have a growing "space situational awareness" activity
(http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/index.html) which the UK has not
yet signed up to, as we understand it. Given that the UK already
invests heavily in ESA, this may be a cost-effective collaboration
in which the country could participate.
Summary
The increased reliance of UK society on high-tech
space-based assets for communications, navigation, defence and
information gathering creates a greater risk of disaster should
these assets be lost or significantly damaged by the effects of
solar activity on the near-Earth space environment. Isolated examples
of such losses have occurred in recent decades through the loss
of power grids and individual satellites. We have not, however,
suffered a storm of the 1859-class during the space age, so the
losses have been relatively light. Over the last few years the
Sun has unexpectedly been extremely quiet, indicating that we
really have little idea how active it might become as it rises
to "solar maximum" over the next three to four years,
or what extremes of behaviour we might see as we experience the
effects of future solar cycles. A "perfect storm", which
will result in significant loss of UK and other assets, is a possibility.
Developing a strategy for enhancing our predictive capability
and establishing a system to recognise hazardous periods and initiate
contingency plans requires modest investment, but given the relative
cost of replacing just one satellite in space (>>£100
million), has a very high probability of significant value returned
on that investment. The UK government would be well advised to
consider investment in such capability.
Footnote: A report of the results of a recent
US National Academies workshop on the societal and economic impacts
of extreme magnetic storms is available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12507.
Submission from Professor Alan Aylward. Head of
the UCL Atmospheric Physics Laboratory.
Professor Aylward's expertise lies in so-called
"space weather" (changing environmental conditions in
near-Earth space, governed to a large degree by changes in solar
activity) rather than in preparedness in relation to extreme space
weather events. Nevertheless, he makes the following points in
response to the Committee's request:
— I don't think there is a specific government
organisation that would have responsibility to respond to a serious
solar storm—or who would have responsibility for effecting
a warning and distributing it to relevant bodies. The Met Office
has taken some initiatives in this area, but has not been very
successful in getting funding. As such, the Met office is following
the US Model, within which space weather forecasts are seen as
logical extensions of terrestrial weather forecasts.
— The fact the Sun seems to be very quiet
at the moment doesn't necessarily mean that a "big"
event couldn't happen. The great solar storm of 1859 (sometimes
known as the Carrington storm), which was so intense that the
current induced in telegraph wires almost electrocuted some of
the operators, actually occurred in the middle of a rather unexceptional
solar cycle.
— Our communications and power systems
are probably more susceptible to big current surges now than they
were in Carrington's time. There are unlikely to be events that
we couldn't deal with as long as we were prepared (the event that
"killed" the Canadian grid in the `80's is unlikely
to have the same effect again because the Canadians have upgraded
their systems)—but new and critical technologies, such as
the GPS system have never been effectively tested for such contingences.
— There is a new European Space Agency
initiative on Space Weather (or Space Situational Awareness as
the current buzz phrase goes: http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/index.html
) but the UK has not bought into this at the level of other countries
and our contribution—despite historic strength in this area—is
minimal. It should be possible to set up warning systems for intense
CMEs or growing solar strength but the UK government is not likely
to be a priority recipient of the necessary data at its current
level of interest.
— By subscribing to the ESA Space Situational
Awareness programme (which is fairly low cost and could be done
fairly cheaply, especially if we insisted on getting our "juste
retour" from it) we would have access to a great deal of
data needed to make decisions. Then the possibility of having
a nominated Space Weather Awareness Centre (or whatever you may
want to call it) comes into play. This could be set up in the
Met Office or in one of the major research groups where a lot
of the expertise would be to hand and where the monitoring could
be done cheaply using research students.
— As with (terrestrial) weather prediction
models can play an important part and continual forecast models
could be run to try out different scenarios and try to "nowcast"
the space weather. While it is true we currently only get an hour's
warning of the most geoeffective CMEs, work with the STEREO space
mission (to which the UK contributes) has begun to show ways that
we may get some warning of what is going on once a CME leaves
the Sun. Predicting a CME's path is currently very inaccurate,
but some warning is better than none. Also modelling of different
scenarios (including those that have not yet occurred since the
start of the "Space Age") will help to build up a portfolio
of predictions about how bad things could be, with suggestions
for mitigation procedures that could be enacted immediately a
situation arose. For example, tabulating the area affected by
solar proton events could produce a "safe latitudes"
and "safe altitudes" guide for aircraft operators: modelling
of induced currents under a range of input and response conditions
could inform power companies as to where their major vulnerabilities
lie, and whether mitigating procedures could be brought into play
when large events were predicted. The British Geological Survey
already sends out warnings to oil companies and others about disturbances
to the geomagnetic field (the oil companies use the field direction
to guide their drilling rigs) but I am unaware that they have
a predictive capability or have done work on "Perfect Storm"
type conditions.
— A lot of work has been done in a research
capacity that addresses some of these issues, but what is needed
is a government initiative to establish a commercially and societally
aware infrastructure designed to use this knowledge. I would have
thought the MoD would have already been switched on to this since
they could lose security capability if a Skynet or other military
satellite was crippled. There is a reluctance of commercial companies
to contribute to the infrastructure as long as the government
is paying. The data from the ionosonde chain was used by the MoD
and companies like BAe and the aircraft companies, but they would
not contribute to the cost of running them until PPARC/STFC decided
to close them as national facilities. Reluctantly some users have
now started to contribute, though not at the level that is needed
to continue a full service, but it may be possible to boost this
if government guidance is issued.
7. GENERAL ISSUES
In relation to the government's use of scientific
advice and evidence in emergency situations, four general points
seem to merit highlighting:
1. Threat identification. While some threats
that are capable of leading to emergency situations are widely
recognised in advance (eg swine flu), and possible consequences
reasonably well constrained, others (eg Icelandic ash) are not.
Threat awareness is critical if there is to be effective preparedness.
This, in turn, is crucial, if an emergency situation is to be
handled effectively and in a reasoned manner, as opposed to in
a purely reactive and ad hoc way. It is recommended, therefore,
that the National Risk Register is re-evaluated, and scientific
advice sought in order to ensure that—in future—it
is far more inclusive in relation to potential threats to the
nation. Such an evaluation may be undertaken by a panel along
the lines of the Natural Hazards Working Group, which reported
to the government in 2005 a strategy for addressing the global
threat of extreme geophysical hazards.
2. Scientific advisory panels. Because
some emergency situations may be very short-lived, consideration
should be given to establishing—in advance—appropriate
advisory panels and determining their composition. Some thought
should also be given, perhaps, to the mechanism by which panels
are filled which, currently, appears to be pretty ad hoc.
3. Channels of communication. By their
very nature, advisory panels have to be small. As a consequence,
however, they are exclusive, with most scientists in the relevant
field having no involvement. There may be an argument for providing
a mechanism whereby scientists in the field are able to communicate
their ideas and concerns to the panel and, through it, the government.
4. International cooperation. As many
of the threats to the UK have an international dimension, international
collaboration and cooperation would seem to be of critical importance.
Through limiting engagement with initiatives designed to address
future threats that have the potential to be particularly damaging
to the UK, notably in the case of solar storms, the government
may be making it more difficult for future emergencies to be tackled
effectively.
EDITOR: Professor
Bill McGuire. Co-director, UCL Institute for Risk & Disaster
Reduction & Co-director, UCL Environment Institute
CONTRIBUTORS: Professor
Alan Aylward. Head of the UCL Atmospheric Physics Laboratory
Professor Christopher Owen. Head of Space Plasma
Physics Group, UCL Mullard Space Science Laboratory
Dr. Peter Trim. Centre for Advanced Management
& Interdisciplinary Studies, Birkbeck College
Professor Martin Utley. Director, UCL Clinical
Operational Research Unit.
UCL Institute for Risk & Disaster Reduction
13 September 2010
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