Memorandum submitted by the Royal Aeronautical
Society (SAGE 10)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano
had a big impact on the Air Transport industry, causing considerable
disruption and economic cost. There are recognised international
procedures for avoiding flight in ash clouds, which were followed
by UK and European regulators. Monitoring and evaluating the progress,
extent and danger of the cloud often entailed taking decisions
with partial data and imperfect models. The UK professional agencies
in the main responded appropriately and well; some of the UK governmental
structures responded less well. However, the UK in general was
able to lead Europe in coping with the crisis.
An intense period of solar storms is likely,
and will have the potential to cause considerable disruption to
space-based hardware and especially communications on which many
key terrestrial services have come to depend. The ability of the
UK and Europe to assess and to respond to the resultant crisis
is currently limited. However, steps are being taken to increase
understanding of solar storm risks and to establish appropriate
procedures.
INTRODUCTION
1. The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS)
is the world's only professional body dedicated to the entire
aerospace community. Established in 1866, the Society has 17,000
members in over 100 countries (including 3,500 classified as young
members), and is a leader and provider of foresight within the
aerospace community. The work of the Society is supported by a
number of specialist groups including a Flight Operations Group
and a Space Group. The Society's response focuses on two of the
case studies—the impact of volcanic ash on air transport
and solar storms.
VOLCANIC ASH
2. The affects of volcanic ash clouds on
civil aircraft have been recognised for some time. These primarily
relate to the dangers of material ingested into jet engines leading
to immediate loss of power, or a cumulative effect on engine performance
and durability as a result of chemical bonding on fan and turbine
blades and blockage of inlets. In at least one well known incident,
a BA Boeing 747 lost power from all four engines over Indonesia,
but recovered after an emergency restart to make an emergency
landing.
Detection and monitoring of the eruption
3. Detecting and monitoring of the eruption
including quantitative information on the size, composition and
other physical features of the ash cloud, plus forecasting the
movement of the ash and gas clouds into the future.
4. The first step (detection, monitoring
and forecasting) is coordinated under the auspices of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Nine Volcanic Ash Advisory
Centres (VAACs) are located around the world, each responsible
for providing the information on eruptions in a defined geographical
region—see map. Approximately 60 volcanic eruptions occur
each year many close to well travelled air routes, for example
across the North Pacific and in South-East Asia, the Caribbean
and South America. For the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, the
UK Met Office was the responsible VAAC. Data from a mix of ground,
air and space platforms was used by the UK Met Office together
with its Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment
(NAME) computer model.
5. On 26-27 May 2010, following the eruption,
a workshop in Frascati Italy took stock of Europe's remote sensing
capabilities to address the impact of the Eyjafjallajökull
eruption.[15]
The recommendations of the Frascati and an earlier meeting prior
to the Icelandic eruption in Chile, provide an authoritative and
up-to-the-minute view of what actions can and should be taken
to improve the detection and monitoring of eruptions as concerns
our ability to cope with the consequences of future events for
air transport.
6. The Chilean workshop noted that instrumentation
on the European Meteosat Second Generation (MSG) weather satellite
offers superior spectral, spatial, and temporal capabilities compared
to the other geostationary instruments currently in orbit. MSG
covers Europe, Africa, and the Atlantic as far as the Lesser Antilles,
which means that significant improvement in satellite ash detection
for Europe and Africa is already in place that will not be available
in the Americas for example until after 2015 when the GOES-R satellite
is due to be launched.
7. The Frascati workshop concluded that
"the London VAAC did an excellent job on the monitoring and
forecasting of the movement of the volcanic ash during the Eyjafjallajökull
eruption" and noted that "the collection of remote sensing
data, acquired over the period of the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull
l, presents a remarkably rich source of information for studying
this event".
8. The workshop summarised the two major
lessons learned from the experience:
— One of the largest uncertainties was
information on the eruption source parameters for model initialisation
which leads to discrepancies in model outputs. Action is needed
to ensure that accurate and timely data are available from volcano
observatories or monitoring stations situated near volcanoes.
In addition to monitoring the eruptions as they progress, satellites
are recognised as able to provide early warning, ie: advance notice,
of volcanic eruptions by detecting hot spots or sulphur dioxide
emissions.
— The second big uncertainty was obtaining
information on ash cloud concentrations. There is pressing need
for further development and application of techniques for incorporating
satellite data in forecast models in order to provide quantified
ash cloud advisory information including height.
9. The space community is already responding
to the recommendations of the Frascati workshop, with studies
to be made of potential new satellites and instruments dedicated
to monitoring volcanic ash plumes and eruptions. The European
Space Agency has already adjusted an ongoing study on a class
of sensors called lidars to address this question.[16]
The hazard and standard procedures
10. There are established procedures to
cope with eruptions. ICAO rules are clear: any flight in known
volcanic ash is to be prohibited.[17]
This ruling was followed in the case of the Eyjafjallajökull
eruption defaulting to the safe condition of grounding of most
flights over the United Kingdom and Northern Europe. This was
at some cost to the European transport industry, estimated to
be in the order of £100-£200 million (US$150-300 million)
per day (with doubtless greater losses to the rest of the economy).[18]
The Eyjafjallajökull eruption was especially disruptive due
to unseasonable weather conditions and the fact that this eruption
covered a particularly intense part of the global air transport
network.
11. The hazards presented by the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull
(E15) eruption were the potential damage that volcanic residues
(ash and chemical aerosol) could cause to flying aircraft, in
particular jet aircraft carrying passengers. The presence of this
hazard was identified by the United Kingdom VAAC operated on behalf
of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) by the
Met Office (a trading fund of the Ministry of Defence). These
hazards were identified from local reports of volcanic eruptions,
then forecast models run at Met Office's headquarters in Exeter.
This information was then supplied to the UK's Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) and National Air Traffic Services (NATS).
Government preparations for the emergency and
use of scientific advice
12. Some parts of UK government handled
this emergency extremely well, others less so. It must also be
recognised that the lack of elected leadership through this crisis
was particularly unfortunate, coinciding as it did with the general
election campaign. Senior participants were aware in the early
part of the crisis of the considerable intellectual leadership
of Lord Andrew Adonis as both transport and science minister;
but once the election campaign was under way this leadership was
not apparently replaced by a single either elected or appointed
official or by a defined group. The main agencies involved were:
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
13. The CAA initially closed UK airspace,
appropriately and promptly, in accordance with ICAO procedures.
There was an expectation that leadership in these issues would
be taken by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); once this
was not forthcoming from EASA, the CAA through its Head of Airworthiness
rapidly created a working conference of all available national
and international experts which subsequently steered UK (and through
example, Europe) to timely solutions.
Met Office
14. The Met Office, acting as an agency
of the MoD, has a role in providing support to the UK in cases
of civil contingency. In this case, it was the UK VAAC and provided
regularly updated information to CAA on the status of the ash
cloud.
15. The Met Office rapidly redirected the
available scientific resources to develop an under standing of
the problems and to provide advice to central government. However
in the early stages of the crisis there appears to have been a
deterioration in communications, which led other organisations
to question the Met Office's role and competence. Later in the
crisis, the Met Office more effectively took on a scientific leadership
role.
Department for Transport (DfT)
16. A few days into the crisis, the DfT
attempted to assume a leadership role. However, this largely confused
issues rather than helping, tending to interfere with the work
of the CAA and other scientific actors who by that time already
had a better appreciation of the situation and scientific competence
and were far better placed to lead the response.
The Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)
17. The Natural Environment Research Council
(NERC) is operator of the Dornier 228 Airborne Research and Surveying
Facility (ARSF), and 50% owner with the Met Office of the Facility
for Airborne Atmospheric Measurements (FAAM), operating the BAe-146-301
large Atmospheric Research Aircraft (ARA).
18. NERC reconfigured ARSF using instruments
from FAAM and was obtaining airborne data to supply CAA and the
Met Office within 11 hours of the initial airspace closure. Once
it was realised that this emergency was not short term, NERC worked
with the Met Office to make the ARA available within six days
of the initial airspace closure. NERC's National Centre for Atmospheric
Sciences (NCAS) and British Geological Survey (BGS) took an immediate
national lead in providing expert advice as required on the non-engineering
scientific issues that became live. Subsequently, NERC's British
Atmospheric Data Centre (BADC) took the European lead in collating
all data that was collected by various means.
National Air Traffic Services (NATS)
19. National Air Traffic Services (NATS)
ensured timely closure of airspace once volcanic ash was known
to be present, subsequently taking instruction from the CAA.
Ministry of Defence (MoD)
20. MoD was heavily affected, primarily
as a large operator of aeroplanes. It was able rapidly to take
appropriate advice and decided that flying would only be authorised
for lifesaving purposes, whilst keeping the situation under review.
Appropriate MoD laboratories were also rapidly redirected to investigating
necessary airworthiness issues. There was to some extent a failure
on the part of MoD to ensure adequate coordination with the airworthiness
efforts centre on the CAA. Better coordination between MoD and
CAA would have been beneficial.
Cabinet Office Civil Contingency Office
21. The Cabinet Office's Civil Contingency
Office co-ordinated with the Department for Transport and others,
but like DfT, it came relatively late to the event and failed
to recognise the leadership already assumed by other actors, particular
by the CAA, Met Office and NERC.
The Government Chief Scientist
22. The Government Chief Scientist formed
a Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), which brought
together a wide group of appropriate scientists—albeit under
some secrecy. SAGE appears to have acted as a useful co-ordination
medium for those senior scientists, but the lack of visibility
of its existence and membership perhaps degraded its usefulness,
since other players within the emergency could otherwise have
perhaps been able to contact individual members with requests
that SAGE acted as a co-ordinator for other critical communications.
Government agencies' understanding of the crisis—a
summary
23. There were clear differences between
government organisations in the degree of scientific and situational
understanding of the crisis. The CAA, with the Met Office and
NERC close behind had the clearest understanding of a difficult
and complex problem where data and scientific modelling were often
uncertain. The MoD had good scientific appreciation but did not
heavily engage with the civil efforts. The DfT and the Cabinet
Office had a poor scientific understanding for much of the time;
this weakened their situational appreciation, rendering their
attempts to adopt leadership roles often ill-judged. SAGE clearly
had good scientific literacy, but the relative secrecy of its
operation was an obvious weakness.
Obstacles to obtaining reliable, timely scientific
advice and evidence to inform policy decisions in emergencies
24. However, it is clear that, despite some
problems, the UK agencies worked very well together—certainly
far more coherently than any other country in Europe. Decision
makers had access very rapidly to high quality scientific advice,
which was freely given.
25. There were occasions where this advice
was not adequately used; the most obvious of these being that
considerable resources were expended on the problem of flying
research aircraft into the core of the ash plume. Scientific advice
was that this was both unnecessary to achieve a good understanding
of the situation, and endangered vital national assets. For example,
the USA withdrew an offer to lend aircraft because they, like
the UK aircraft operators, were unprepared to fly into the core
of the ash plume—indeed a NASA DC8 did so in 2000 and suffered
US3.2 million of damage. Despite these strong caveats from expert
bodies, senior management in several organisations pursued this
course of action, distracting them from more important issues.
Government powers and resources
26. In most cases, the Government had sufficient
power resources to get to grips with the problem. The largest
obstacle was financial commitment—the DfT were particularly
very reluctant to underwrite the cost of damage to, or to pay
for the use of airborne resources committed by NERC and the Met
Office. The DfT still has not done so, with the risk that these
resources will not be available be in a future emergency.
The adequacy and timeliness of scientific evidence
informing policy decisions
27. Scientific evidence was available from
various sources—universities, NERC and the Met Office worked
together to provide geological and atmospheric science advice
freely available as and when required by decision makers. The
CAA worked with aircraft and engine manufacturers to ensure a
high level of understanding of the engineering science problems
and thus the airworthiness implications.
Strategic coordination
28. Strategic coordination between Government
departments, public bodies, private bodies, sources of scientific
advice and the research base in preparing for and reacting to
emergencies was less effective Preparation for this emergency
was essentially non-existent and almost all coordination occurred
ad-hoc. Nonetheless, the quality of this ad-hoc
decision making structure turned out to be very good, and served
the UK very well.
29. It could be argued that a scientifically
and managerial competent "national emergency co-ordinating
body" could have provided better leadership—although
in this instance this might have been doubtful given the special
circumstances surrounding this crisis. However, it was clear that
the required leadership ultimately came down to a small number
of key individuals who might not be present in a comparable emergency
in the future.
International coordination
30. International coordination was necessary
on two levels; sharing of information and the coordination of
resources.
31. The sharing of information worked extremely
well; aeronautical engineering data exchange was coordinated through
the CAA's airworthiness/volcanic ash teleconferences and supporting
communication. Such sharing was probably unprecedented in the
history of aeronautics.
32. International (as opposed to British
national) coordination of resources was often very poor. US Government
offers of resources were wasted through lack of understanding
in the senior ranks of HMG organisations. The Spanish government
requested a one-day "hire" of the ARA to try and unlock
Spanish airspace, which was refused by HMG in order to hold the
aircraft in reserve when it was clear that it was not going to
be required at the time.
SOLAR STORMS
33. The volcanic ash crisis was an unusually
disruptive event but in all probability volcanic eruptions will
occur again in the European area. Solar storms are also regular
natural phenomena, but we have yet to experience a major event
that has the potential to have a disruptive global impact on satellite-based
or dependent services. There have been a number of serious local
disruptive events.
34. In the USA, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is mandated to provide space
weather information. In the same way that NOAA supplies information
freely about earth-bound weather, anyone interested in the subject
of space weather can obtain it from the NOAA Space Weather Prediction
Centre (SWPC).[19]
There is no equivalent arrangement or organisation in the UK,
although there has been some discussion about the Met Office setting
up a UK Natural Hazards centre to cover all aspects of natural
hazards including space weather.
35. In 2009, the European Space Agency began
a Space Weather activity within its broader Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) programme. During the first three years, that
is until 2011, ESA is consolidating the requirements for SSA information,
and performing architectural design studies of the complete SSA
system. SSA is an optional ESA programme[20]
and the UK has opted not to fund any activity in the space weather
area.
Effects of Solar Storms
36. Space weather is driven by the sun which
experiences outbursts (solar storms) from time to time. The consequences
of severe solar storms can be significant. Anecdotal evidence
mentioned in a US National Research Council (NRC) report[21]
and the recent POST leaflet includes:
— the collapse within 90 seconds of north-eastern
Canada's Hydro-Quebec power grid during the geomagnetic storm
of March 1989 affecting several million people for nine hours;
— the outage in January 1994 of two Canadian
satellites during a period of enhanced energetic electron flux;
recovery of the 2nd satellite took six months and cost $50-70
million;
— the diversion of 26 scheduled airline
flights to less-than-optimum routes during disturbed space weather
in January 2005 resulting in increased costs and journey times
and disrupted flight connections;
— disabling of part of the US Federal Aviation
Administration's air traffic management infrastructure for 30
hours during severe space weather in October-November 2003; and
— an hour-long power outage in Sweden and
permanent disabling of a $640 million Japanese satellite during
those same autumn 2003 solar storms.
37. The historical record contains descriptions
of solar storms much more severe than anything experienced in
the past 30 years. By several measures, the most severe space
weather event recorded was the so-called Carrington event of 1859
which disrupted telegraph services and produced spectacular aurora
displays. Another extreme event occurred in 1921. The impact of
an event similar to the 1859 or 1921 events today is likely to
be much greater due to our increased reliance on electricity-based
technology. The NRC report mentions "an estimate of $1-2
trillion during the first year alone for the societal and economic
impact of a severe geomagnetic storm scenario with recovery times
of four to 10 years".
Information sources
38. Information about solar storms comes
from ground-based and space-based sensors. Two examples illustrate
the importance of spacecraft in this context:
— STEREO: NASA's two STEREO spacecraft,
each carrying a UK-built Heliospheric Imager, are giving us the
first 3-D view of solar storms, allowing us for the first time
to track solar outbursts while they are in transit to Earth.[22]
— ACE: NASA's ACE spacecraft is located
1.5 million km closer to the sun than Earth, and is thus the only
means of measuring material ejected by the sun before it reaches
the Earth.[23]
UK Initiatives and Research
39. The UK Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI) "provides integrated security
advice (combining information, personnel and physical) to the
businesses and organisations which make up the national infrastructure.
Through the delivery of this advice, CPNI protects national security
by helping to reduce the vulnerability of the national infrastructure
to terrorism and other threats."[24]
The CPNI has also placed a contract with Logica to study reliance
on satellite technology in a number of key sectors of the UK economy.
While the affects of solar storms are not explicitly identified
as one of the threats, they will be considered. The study is due
to be published early in 2011.
40. The Royal Astronomical Society sponsors
an initiative called MIST to coordinate the science community
"with interests in physical processes within the Sun-Earth
system and other planets".[25]
Research into solar weather was until recently funded primarily
by the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC), but parts
of that responsibility have now been given to the Natural Environment
Research Council (NERC) and the new UK Space Agency. It is too
soon to say what effects this change will have.
41. A particularly interesting initiative
is that by the University of Strathclyde in defining a highly
innovative concept to place a space probe even closer to the sun
than the ACE spacecraft mentioned above.[26]
The result would be a tripling of the warning time afforded by
ACE and much of the key technology underpinning the concept was
developed in UK industry.
Conclusion
42. Solar storms of the severity of those
experienced in 1921 and 1859 could cause severe economic damage.
The degree to which such an event will impact on the UK is not
clear, but future studies may provide better understanding of
the scope and potential costs.
FINAL WORDS
43. The Icelandic eruption caused considerable
disruption to European air transport, with significant economic
cost and inconvenience to a large number of people. Severe solar
storms may have the capacity to inflict even more disruption to
services on which global society has come to depend. In the case
of the latter, it is imperative that the UK government uses scientific
expertise early to anticipate the likely effects on the UK and
to propose ameliorative strategies.
44. A volcanic incident on the scale of
the Eyjafjallajökull eruption is likely to reoccur somewhere
else in Europe, and a repeat event is predicted for Iceland. In
the latter case, the UK will again be in the forefront of any
response. While on balance the system worked reasonably well under
a severe test—particularly the agencies tasked to evaluate
and assess the situation as it evolved—it is to be hoped
that the appropriate lessons will have been learned from recent
events. This applies particularly in the way in which central
government institutions might work better to use the scientific
advice that was available. However, the Society does commend the
political leadership of Lord Adonis for resisting pressure from
commercial interests to open airspace without confirmation by
evidence.
Royal Aeronautical Society
September 2010
15 ESA/Eumetsat workshop on Volcanic Ash Monitoring,
26-27 May 2010 at ESA/ESRIN in Frascati (Italy) involving 53 invited
scientists from Universities, Meteorological Offices, Research
Laboratories, national and international Agencies (eg DLR, EC,
ECMWF, NASA, USGS) from Europe and the United States; the draft
report is available at: http://earth.eo.esa.int/workshops/Volcano/files/STM_280_ash100801_2v.pdf
and is provided as part of this evidence. Back
16
Lidar: loosely derived from "Light Detection And Ranging" Back
17
ICAO, Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan: EUR Region, 2nd Edition
September 2009 (available at http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/357.pdf) Back
18
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/7641020/Volcanic-ash-cloud-cost-air-industry-2bn.html
[accessed 13 August 2010] Back
19
http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/ Back
20
Each Member State chooses how much to subscribe to the programme
and in which of three broad areas: space weather, space debris
and Near Earth Objects (asteroids) Back
21
Severe Space Weather Events-Understanding Societal and Economic
Impacts; a workshop report; National Research Council, 2008.
Summary: http://www.nap.edu/nap-cgi/report.cgi?record_id=12507&type=pdfxsum Back
22
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/stereo/main/index.html Back
23
http://www.srl.caltech.edu/ACE/ACE is located close to the L1
Lagrange point where sun and Earth gravity cancel each other out. Back
24
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/aboutcpni188.aspx Back
25
www.mist.ac.uk Back
26
McKay, R J, et al (2009) Non-Keplerian orbits using low thrust,
high ISP propulsion systems. In: 60th International Astronautical
Congress, 12-16 October 2009, Daejeon, Korea; available from:
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/12919/ Back
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