Memorandum submitted by the Research Councils
UK (SAGE 22)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This response makes a number of general
introductory points about the wider role of the Research Councils
in providing scientific advice and evidence in emergencies, and
responds to case study questions relating to swine flu, the Icelandic
volcanic ash eruptions and solar storms.
2. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic potentially posed
a major challenge to public health. RCUK considers that the Government
was well prepared for the emergence of H1N1 in terms of planning
for vaccine development and provision and an established antiviral
stockpile. Research funders and the research community responded
jointly and swiftly to the emergency. However, securing necessary
approvals for clinical studies and staff recruitment in academic
institutions presented challenges.
3. UK research particularly that supported
by national capability was central to assessing the threats posed
by volcanic ash, including that to airspace. UK scientists provided
crucial evidence to inform policy decisions, necessary liaison
with Icelandic authorities, and continue to work with aviation
authorities globally. Whilst the UK was able to dispatch aircraft
to carry out investigative flights in the immediate aftermath
of the eruptions, a better coordinated approach to such flights
at a domestic and international level is recommended.
4. Advisory structures, such as the Scientific
Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), which was initially established
during the H1N1 pandemic, played an important role in the response
to both of these emergencies. Effective information sharing and
additional subgroups to consider the consequences of specific
threats would further enhance this capability.
5. Space weather events today would have
far greater implications on society, due to our greater reliance
on technology, than past events. The UK Research Councils are
the significant funders of relevant research and investment programmes.
Unlike international partners, the UK lacks national coordination
on space weather, although the flow of advice from the solar-terrestrial
physics community to Government is growing. The establishment
of the UK Space Agency could have significant bearing over the
direction of the UK's strategic investment in space weather preparedness
and related areas.
INTRODUCTION
6. Research Councils UK (RCUK) is a strategic
partnership set up to champion the research supported by the seven
UK Research Councils. RCUK was established in 2002 to enable the
Councils to work together more effectively to enhance the overall
impact and effectiveness of their research, training and innovation
activities, contributing to the delivery of the Government's objectives
for science and innovation. Further details are available at www.rcuk.ac.uk.
7. This evidence is submitted by RCUK on
behalf of the Research Councils listed below and represents their
independent views. It does not include or necessarily reflect
the views of the Science and Research Group in the Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills. The submission is made on
behalf of the following Councils:
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences
Research Council (BBSRC).
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC).
Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC).
Medical Research Council (MRC).
Natural Environment Research Council
(NERC).
Science and Technology Facilities Council
(STFC).
8. The Research Councils play a key role
in ensuring the long-term health of inter-related but distinct
disciplines over long timescales. By building national capability
RCUK ensures that the UK is equipped to respond to and research
both known, developing and unknown challenges and potential threats.
9. The importance of maintaining a publicly-funded
research base and ensuring a suitable structure through which
policymakers can elicit and assess evidence drawn from academic
research cannot be underestimated, both in terms of advance warning
of potential emergencies and in times of crisis. Applicants for
Research Council funding are required to indicate how their research
may be relevant to others and how they plan to help those others
to be aware of this.
10. Mechanisms for dialogue already exist
between Research Councils and Government departments and agencies,
such as regular concordat meetings to discuss arrangements for
liaison and collaboration. RCUK-funded researchers have given
expert scientific advice to advisory groups, such as the Scientific
Advisory Groups for Emergencies (SAGE), which ensure that the
UK has on-going consortia of experts providing reliable, timely
scientific advice to inform policy decisions and identify research
priorities. Effective information sharing and additional subgroups
to consider the consequences of specific threats would further
enhance this capability.
11. RCUK considers that there is a need
to examine how research in priority areas with small research
bases can be activated in response to new or emerging threats.
Furthermore, it is important to ensure that sufficient resources
are identified and available to Research Councils to continue
to be able to rapidly fund high quality research during emergencies
to inform policy decisions.
12. In times of crisis the processes used
to develop scientific advice should be made clear, as should the
policymakers' assessment of the robustness of the available evidence.
To the extent that those policy decisions remain in place beyond
the crisis, steps should be taken to re-visit and revise the evidence
and scientific advice, and to make adjustments to the policy if
appropriate. Principles of quality, engagement and transparency
should still be followed as far as is practicable.
13. The importance of transparent and accountable
scientific advice without compromising conflicts of interest needs
to be recognised so that interactions between co-operating bodies
do not suffer problems with real or perceived conflicts of interest.
14. RCUK recognises the tensions which can
arise between implementing measured scientific and operational
activities and the pressure that governments are under to appear
to respond immediately to emergencies.[27]
However, it remains vital that relevant scientific advice and
evidence should be sought and acted upon as appropriate with clear
lines of communication open between policymakers and Government
and that the strengths and limitations of any evidence or models
are fully understood. Research Council-funded knowledge exchange
has led to the publication in May 2009 of evidence-based guidance
for policymakers on the communication of risk taking into account
available evidence and acknowledged public perspectives.[28]
15. RCUK welcomes the publication in July
2010 of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser's Guidelines
on the Use of Scientific and Engineering Advice in Policy Making,[29]
in particular the statement that: "Departmental guidance
should consider how advice is provided in an emergency, including
clear designation of responsibility, the processes to be employed
and the sources of advice".
16. Many of the threats faced today cross
national borders and so international coordination and collaboration
is essential for an appropriate response to emerging threats.
For known and developing threats, RCUK considers it advisable
to improve current international dialogue in order to establish
better operational mechanisms to deal with future events.
CASE STUDY
(I): SWINE
FLU PANDEMIC
IN 2009
1. What are the potential hazards and risks
and how were they identified? How prepared is/was the Government
for the emergency?
17. Influenza pandemics of the 20th century
have resulted in global fatalities of over 53 million people.
As the question of severity is one that cannot be gauged ahead
of an actual outbreak the 2009 H1N1 pandemic potentially posed
a major challenge to public health. However, the outbreak was
not as severe as previous pandemics as the virus did not evolve
into a more transmissible or more virulent virus, or gain resistance
to antiviral drugs, and resulted in only in an estimated 450 deaths
in the UK and around 20,000 world-wide.
18. The risks were identified by normal
public health procedures, enhanced for the pandemic. These measures
were able to confirm cases and monitor sensitivity of virus isolates
to antiviral compounds. Normal capability was enhanced through
increased genetic analysis of viruses isolated in UK based on
pre-pandemic research initiatives designed to be used during a
pandemic.
19. The perceived threat from avian influenza,
particularly the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, over the last decade
resulted in enhanced preparedness plans and a good level of public
awareness. The Government was both well briefed and well prepared
for the emergence of H1N1 in 2009 and plans included vaccine development
and the purchase of large supplies of antiviral drugs.
20. A number of Research Council initiatives,
some undertaken jointly with other funders supported government
planning in anticipation of a possible pandemic and increased
capacity and infrastructure. Notable amongst these were MRC FluWatch;[30]
increased infrastructure at the MRC National Institute for Medical
Research (also home to one of the WHO World Collaborating Centres
on Influenza (WHO CC)); the establishment of the MRC Centre for
Outbreak Analysis and Modelling;[31]
BBSRC's Combating Avian Influenza Initiative;[32]
and the NERC PREPARE initiative, funded in 2008 to examine issues
posed by widespread use of antiviral drugs during a pandemic which
included the risks of environmental pollution caused by the release
of biologically-active forms of the drugs into sewage works and
rivers, and increased risk of antiviral resistance and genetic
exchange between influenza viruses in wildfowl. BBSRC has been
planning new avian facilities at the Institute of Animal Health,
Pirbright (although the scale of development depends on support
from the Large Facilities Capital Fund).
2. How does/did the Government use scientific
advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?
21. The options for controlling a pandemic
considered by the Government as part of preparedness planning
were based on advice from advisory groups such as SAGE (and its
predecessors) and the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation,
Government agencies, the Research Councils and other bodies. These
included isolation, social distancing, restriction of movement,
availability of antivirals and the development and roll-out of
vaccines.
22. Two main areas where scientific advice
was crucial to planning were the composition of the antiviral
stockpile and the choice of vaccine. These were also topics highlighted
in a Royal Society/Academy of Medical Sciences report on pandemic
influenza[33]
and following its publication Government subsequently enhanced
its antiviral stockpile adding a second antiviral drug, zanamivir,
in addition to oseltamivir. Initial planning on the choice of
vaccine was not as transparent as some might have wished due to
issues of commercial confidentiality.
23. Mathematical modelling of outbreaks
had been a major feature of the pre-pandemic planning and continued
to play a role as the pandemic emerged, providing advice on numbers
of cases, transmission parameters and efficacy of antiviral treatments.
It is important for the future that strengths and limitations
of modelling are fully understood, and that changes in human behaviour
are understood so as to be factored into models.[34]
3. What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies? Has the Government sufficient powers and resources
to overcome the obstacles? For case studies (i) and (ii) was there
sufficient and timely scientific evidence to inform policy decisions?
24. The potential for a virus to evolve
during its global spread presents particular difficulties during
the emergence of an influenza pandemic. Reliable data on early
cases and their contacts is essential to understand the transmission
dynamics and disease severity. The low virulence of the H1N1 virus
was not fully recognised as information first emerged from cases
in Mexico, and the age profile of those infected and those suffering
more severe infection could only be reliably deduced as cases
increased.
25. Government should plan for early and
later phases of a pandemic concurrently including the following
influenza season, and recognise key parameters such as the proportion
of the population still at risk. These data are routinely reported
by HPA and with mathematical modelling can inform policy.
26. Increasing, or changing, research resources
can also provide more detailed information as pandemics emerge.
In 2009 £4.8 million was awarded to two collaborative research
initiatives established rapidly by the MRC, Wellcome Trust and
the National Institute for Health Research: MOSAIC, a study of
hospitalised patients with severe infection which examined factors
contributing to severity; and an extension of the existing MRC
FluWatch surveillance programme which provided monthly estimates
of population infection rates in different subgroups throughout
the pandemic. A further £1.7 million initiative funded by
BBRSC, MRC, Wellcome Trust and Defra, the Combating Swine Influenza,
aimed to develop an understanding of how the virus behaves in
the pig population and how interaction with farm workers may help
it evolve and spread in both pig herds and the human population
which will help to develop strategies to combat future outbreaks.
27. The calls for proposals were launched
rapidly, but the recruitment of patients to the clinical studies
was delayed, due to in part the requirements of setting up necessary
ethical approvals and a delay in academic institutions recruiting
the necessary staff for the studies. In the case of future pandemics,
mechanisms that ensure necessary approvals are agreed swiftly,
and studies are fully staffed, should be considered.
4. How effective is the strategic coordination
between Government departments, public bodies, private bodies,
sources of scientific advice and the research base in preparing
for and reacting to emergencies?
28. During the pandemic the advisory function
was effective with the Chief Scientist and others in direct contact
with SAGE presenting advice to Ministers. However, it is not clear
that SAGE's composition and internal structures covered all aspects
and key questions most effectively as the pandemic emerged. For
instance the international perspective might be enhanced by including
representation from the WHO CCs, in addition to the European Centre
for Disease Control.
29. Key interactions between Government
and private bodies appeared to be on the composition of the antiviral
stockpile and the timely procurement and supply of vaccine. While
vaccine supply is constrained by the nature and time-lines of
production, it was available for those at risk during the autumn
phase of the pandemic. Should the pandemic have been more serious
the inevitable delay in vaccine availability would have been a
challenge to Government.
5. How important is international coordination
and how could it be strengthened?
30. International collaboration is essential
for the timely delivery of scientific advice on the risk of influenza,
monitoring the evolution of the virus as it spreads around the
globe and the development of a vaccine. The pandemic vaccine was
produced to the anticipated time-lines through a highly effective
international collaboration involving the WHO CCs with statutory
National Control Laboratories in UK (National Institute for Biological
Standards and Control), USA and Australia. All parties combined
their information, viruses and reagents to enable vaccine production
as soon as possible. Over the period of the pandemic the London
WHO CC received clinical samples and virus isolates from over
50 countries including the UK, creating an integrated picture
of the virus evolution worldwide. It also assisted countries with
less capability with virus characterization, sharing protocols
and providing training, and by examining viruses from numerous
countries for changes in antigenicity, virulence and drug resistance.
In addition, the European ERA-NET on Emerging and Major Infectious
Diseases of Livestock and GLOBAL-NETGlobal Strategic Alliance
for the Coordination of Research on the Major Infectious Diseases
of Animals and Zoonoses provide ideal platforms to promote coordination
and cooperation of research programmes to combat global infectious
diseases at the European and international level respectively.
31. The Global Influenza Surveillance Network
(GISN) also plays an important role in supporting international
coordination in identifying newly emerging strains of influenza
virus and monitoring human infections caused by animal influenza
viruses, the emergence of new strains of human influenza viruses
that necessitate a new vaccine, the emergence of drug resistant
strains of virus and to survey the general threat of influenza
to global public health. The network is coordinated by WHO and
currently comprises 134 laboratories in 104 countries.
CASE STUDY
(II): ICELANDIC
VOLCANIC ASH
ERUPTIONS IN
2010
1. What are the potential hazards and risks
and how were they identified? How prepared is/was the Government
for the emergency?
32. Particles in volcanic ash are highly
abrasive to aircraft moving parts and windows, with glass shards
potentially fusing to engine-interiors causing engine failure.
The London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (UK Met Office) identified
the hazard and the decision to stop air traffic was taken, based
on international regulations. A NERC research aircrafta
Dornier 228[35]was
diverted from planned science work and converted at three hours
notice on 15 April to provide interim sampling capability, flying
daily until 21 April to assess the location and nature of the
emissions. A NERC-Met Office BAe146[36],
which due to maintenance work was not flown until the morning
of 20 April, mapped the cloud from above and observed the plume
from within. The Dornier 228 was the only aircraft permitted to
operate in UK airspace above 2500ft until 20 April.
33. NERC's British Geological Survey (BGS)
supplied information about the volcano and interpretation of Icelandic
Met Office geophysical monitoring data to the Civil Contingency
Secretariat from 15 April.
34. NERC's National Centre for Atmospheric
Science (NCAS) led the analysis of the airborne sampling of the
volcanic plume (ash, gases and aerosols, including sulphuric acid
which is potentially highly hazardous to airframes). Aircraft
provide the only means of determining the ash properties, which
vary between different volcanoes. Without accurate constraints
on these properties, more comprehensive satellite and ground-based
remote sensing data cannot be interpreted. Dispersion modelling
of the ash plume, carried out by NCAS in collaboration with the
Met Office, enabled the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to introduce
new regulations, based on Met Office forecasts, for flying in
volcanic ash.
35. NCAS and STFC's Chilbolton Observatory
supplied the Met Office with LIDAR[37]
and sun photometer measurements revealing when the volcanic ash
layers were above each of the instrumented sites, the altitude
of those layers, and their depth. The measurements also provided
an estimate of ash particle size.[38]
36. To identify the risk to the UK from
sulphur, chlorine, fluorine and other elements entering the atmosphere,
terrestrial freshwater and marine environments, the NERC Centre
for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) increased[39]
sampling rates at its long-term monitoring programme sites.[40]
Research cruises involving staff from the NERC National Oceanography
Centre continue to investigate longer-term effects of the ash
on marine ecosystems.
37. NERC funded five urgency research grant
applications relating to the volcanic eruption.
2. How does/did the Government use scientific
advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?
38. BGS and NCAS secondees to the Chief
Scientist's Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE) group
provided crucial scientific advice for policy decisions concerning
the aviation industry. BGS and NCAS led liaison with Icelandic
authorities.
39. BGS scientists assisted with daily briefings
of the Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) and with colleagues
in SAGE and developed scenarios and the case for including volcanic
eruptions in the UK National Risk Register.
40. Data collected by NERC-supported aircraft
informed the civil aviation industry's decision to resume air
traffic in UK airspace on 19 April and helped the CAA and Department
for Transport (DfT) assess aviation hazards and manage civil airspace.
41. Members of NCAS, the Facility for Airborne
Atmospheric Measurements (FAAM)[41]
and the Met Office contributed daily during the emergency to the
CAA's International Teleconferences on Volcanic Ash, alongside
representatives of the aircraft manufacturers and airlines. These
meetings identified how to resume flight operations after six
days of the emergency.
42. The Airborne Research and Survey Facility
(ARSF)[42]
is working closely with aviation authorities globally and engine
and airframe manufacturers to assess damage caused by flights,
to ascertain safe levels of exposure for civil aircraft. This
is the first time aerosol and gas measurements can be directly
related to the condition of aircraft components. The Royal Air
Force, Fleet Air Arm, British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, BMI and
Iceland Air contacted NERC (via ARSF) for advice on operating
conditions and safety.
43. CEH, BGS and NERC provided scientists
and data to inform Defra, by participating in Defra's Volcanic
Ash Network[43]
and providing scientific advice regarding health and environmental
impacts.
3. What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies? Has the Government sufficient powers and resources
to overcome the obstacles? For case studies (i) and (ii) was there
sufficient and timely scientific evidence to inform policy decisions?
44. The CAA's International Teleconferences
on Volcanic Ash were a particularly effective means to develop
new regulations for flying in volcanic ash during the first six
days of the emergency.
45. Early Dornier 228 flights were limited
by the emergency nature of the reconfiguration and installation
of un-calibrated instruments. Nevertheless, qualitative data verified
there was significant contamination risk, provided validation
for Met Office dispersion forecasts and demonstrated catastrophic
engine failure was not inevitable.
46. A reduction in vital public data and
information flowing from the Icelandic Met Office and University
of Iceland, occurring when Icelandic scientists feared misuse
of data, was partially rectified by a reassurance visit by BGS
and NCAS. BGS and NCAS assisted in drafting an MoU between Iceland
and UK at Government level.
47. Detailed and timely data and observations
of the source of a volcanic plume are essential in real time.
During an eruption, scientists in Iceland will have significant
local hazards to deal with so UK must ensure it has ready access
to data. To ensure such information is available in future eruptions,
investment in observation and monitoring equipment would be required.
4. How effective is the strategic coordination
between Government departments, public bodies, private bodies,
sources of scientific advice and the research base in preparing
for and reacting to emergencies?
48. BGS is well-linked to UK Higher Education
Institutes and individuals specialising in volcanology and was
able to put relevant experts in contact with each other and Government
throughout the crisis (eg Met Office and volcanic plume modellers).
49. The Met Office has lead agency status
on airborne Civil Contingency (CC) operations using the BAe146,
with NERC providing technical and scientific staff. Scenarios
qualifying deployment of the BAe146 in a CC role had been agreed
informally by the Met Office with the Cabinet Office, though volcanic
eruptions were not covered by this.
50. Flights of the BAe146 nullified insurance
cover held by the operators of the aircraft (Direct flight Ltd),
and contractual obligations of the owners (BAESYSTEMS) to NERC
and Met Office. It was difficult to persuade DfT to provide appropriate
indemnification, causing delays and preventing some flights.
51. Planning of Dornier 228 flights was
sometimes compromised by conflicting views of their purpose by
CAA, DfT, and at times the Met Office resulting in some sub-optimal
missions. Although commitment to use assets such as aircraft during
the emergency existed, it was sometimes unclear where responsibilityespecially
financiallay.
52. Met Office, NERC, and BAES have agreed
a clearer and more robust mechanism for assessing future CC work
and establishing a firm basis for committing to such tasks, including
payment arrangements, for approval by the Cabinet Office.
53. NERC expects costs of flights to date
(approximately £500K), anticipated cost of repairs to the
Dornier engines (estimated £300K) and consequential losses
(approximately £450K, from a 12 month delay to committed
overseas scientific programmes displaced during the emergency)
to be refunded, and is awaiting confirmation.
5. How important is international coordination
and how could it be strengthened?
54. International co-ordination is very
important as ash plumes nearly always have a cross-border impact
and infrastructure and capability is not held by all nations.
Such co-ordination is being strengthened in numerous ways.
55. Most European countries capable of operating
suitable research aircraft were not as well prepared as the UK
with sorties not flown until several days had elapsed. Most European
aircraft operators belong to the EC FP7 funded initiative "European
fleet for Airborne Research (EUFAR)". EUFAR initiated dialogue
between research teams, implemented a database (hosted by NERC)
for archiving ash data (although no data was loaded by the aircraft
operators) and held regular teleconferences to exchange information.
The international civil aviation authorities are working towards
better management of future volcanic events via EUFAR, which could
be achieved by i) a more coordinated approach to investigative
flights ii) agreeing on instrument deployment iii)
speedy exchange of flight results and analyses.
56. Representatives of ARSF, FAAM and NCAS
continue to contribute to the International Airworthiness Task
Force (Volcanic Ash), chaired by the UK CAA, which is working
towards developing and implementing a mechanism for better managing
UK and European airspace in the event of another volcanic eruption.
57. BGS prompted a Memo from Iceland Met
Office to SAGE identifying areas (including equipment and expertise)
where UK could potentially support their volcano monitoring. A
Memorandum of Understanding formalised co-operation between the
Icelandic Met Office, BGS, NCAS and the UK Met Office on 26 May
2010. BGS has since provided six new seismic stations to supplement
the Icelandic Met Office's seismic network and NCAS has supplied
a LIDAR and radiosonde station. This addresses the IUGG statement[44]
published in June 2010 urging international scientific communities
to support volcano monitoring.
58. BGS staff are on the organising committee
of the WMO-sponsored "Ash dispersal forecast and civil aviation"
workshop in Geneva (October 2010). BGS are members of the IAVCEI
working group on Ash Fall Impacts. International coordination
and collaboration of volcanologists and atmospheric scientists
is critical both in provision of advice to VAACs and plume dispersion
modelling. Volcanic ash plumes nearly always have a cross-border
impact.
CASE STUDY
(III): SOLAR
STORMS
We note that the term "Space Weather"
is used to describe the conditions in space that impact on the
Earth. Solar storms are the source of Space weather disturbances
and the two terms can be taken to refer to the same phenomena
for the purposes of this submission. A description of the nature
and effects of space weather can be found in the POSTnote 261
(July 2010) "Space Weather".[45]
An important form of "solar storms" are coronal mass
ejections (CMEs) which can cause bursts of intense radiation and
geomagnetic storms.
1. What are the potential hazards and risks
and how were they identified? How prepared is/was the Government
for the emergency?
59. Space weather is a natural occurrence.
Its primary impact is its effects on the technological systems
upon which society is increasingly reliant. Major events have
been recorded in the past (eg 1859 and 1921) but had relatively
minor impact, disrupting telegraph and telephone communications.
An equivalent event today could be dangerous due to our greater
reliance on technology.
60. Examples of the hazards and risks associated
with Space Weather include:
(a) Damage to Space-based infrastructure (satellites)
by energetic particles and radiation.
(b) Disturbance of the ionosphere degrading communication
and navigation signals (including GPS) with particular impacts
on aviation and shipping.
(c) Electricity distribution grids extending
over long distances experiencing geomagnetically induced currents
(GICs) which can cause blackouts and damage.
We have never experienced a 1-in-100 year space
weather event to test the vulnerability of space technology and
the susceptibility of electricity power systems. There is growing
evidence that such events pose a major threat to economies around
the world, as shown by the June 2010 report of the North American
Reliability Corporation.[46]
61. The UK has over 100 years' leadership
in the science underpinning our understanding of space weather.
This continues today with the UK Research Councils, NERC and STFC,
as the significant funders of relevant research programmes.[47]
62. Research Council commitment to researching
the effects of solar activity is split between ground-based studies
(eg using the EISCAT radars) and space-based (eg using STEREO,
SoHo, Hinode, SDO and other missions). There are many inter-relationships
between the various areas of research. UK scientists are world
leaders at combining data from groundand space-based studies.
63. Annex 1[48]
provides an audit of potential UK based space weather assets,
prepared recently (November 2009) as an input to ESA's Space Situational
Awareness programme.[49]
It can be seen as one measure of the UK's "preparedness"
to predict, monitor and analyse the effects of space weather,
or more loosely the UK's "National Capability" in respect
to space weather and solar storms.
64. The UK currently has no single funding
stream to provide a National Capability (measurement and predictive
systems) that can respond to a space weather emergency. No single
scientific community, group, individual or institute is equipped
to address all of the challenges in isolation, and nor does any
single body have exclusive interest in any single aspect. For
example:
(a) understanding the effects of space weather
on technical equipment and hardware;
(b) studying the behaviour of the Sun and the
impacts of its variation on the Earth;
(c) requirements from and provision of early
warning systems;
can all involve an array of national and international
collaborators including academia, standards authorities, funding
agencies, industry, individual eminent scientists and others.
2. How does/did the Government use scientific
advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?
65. The Government has recently started
to develop better links with the UK space weather science community,
eg through work on the National Risk Register. This involves expertise
from both NERC and STFC as well as universities.
3. What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies? Has the Government sufficient powers and resources
to overcome the obstacles? For case studies (i) and (ii) was there
sufficient and timely scientific evidence to inform policy decisions?
66. Until recently space weather was not
recognised as an issue for which the Government needed scientific
advice. This is now changing and should be facilitated by the
transfer of responsibility for earth-orientated solar-terrestrial
physics (STP) to NERC. NERC experience will facilitate the flow
of advice from the STP community to Government.
67. The UK lacks any national coordination
on space weather unlike our international partners. A coordination
mechanism will help government access scientific resources (both
people and instruments) and also enable the scientific community
to understand what government needs. This coordination should
also to assess what financial support is needed to ensure resources
remain available to Government when needed.
4. How effective is the strategic coordination
between Government departments, public bodies, private bodies,
sources of scientific advice and the research base in preparing
for and reacting to emergencies?
68. This is a developing area and it is
too soon for definitive comment. However, we suggest that the
proposed national coordination is a key factor in achieving this
goal.
5. How important is international coordination
and how could it be strengthened?
69. Space weather is a global problem so
international coordination is critical. This is increasingly focused
through Space Situational Awareness programmes in Europe and the
US. The UK needs to make the most of its membership of the ESA
SSA programme. The UK contributions to the global networks that
monitor space weather (eg the magnetic observatories operated
by NERC) are a key input to international coordination, including
the SSA programmes.
70. EU FP7 recently allocated approximately
EU22 million to space hazards including Space Weather, and the
UK is involved in projects funded under this line. Discussions
about bidding for FP8 programme content are starting and UK scientists
are leading efforts to lobby for space weather studies in economically
important areas.
71. The establishment of the UK Space Agency
could have significant bearing over the direction of the UK's
strategic investment in space weather preparedness and related
areas through its leadership role and by potentially bringing
together the themes and capabilities at hand (eg by providing
a single voice at the ESA negotiating table).
Research Councils UK
14 September 2010
27 See also Hutter, Bridget M. (2009) "The Role
of Risk Regulation in Mitigating Natural Disasters" in Learning
from Catastrophes: Strategies for Reaction and Response, Wharton
School Publishing Back
28
ESRC Placement Fellowship in partnership with the Risk and Regulation
Advisory Council and the Government Office for Science: A practical
guide to public risk communication: the five essentials of good
practice, http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file51458.pdf Back
29
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/goscience/docs/g/10-669-gcsa-guidelines-scientific-engineering-advice-policy-making.pdf Back
30
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Newspublications/News/MRC006480 Back
31
http://www1.imperial.ac.uk/medicine/about/institutes/outbreaks/ Back
32
http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/funding/opportunities/2006/avian-influenza.aspx Back
33
http://royalsociety.org/Pandemic-influenza-science-to-policy Back
34
Modelled Encounters with Public Health Risks: How Do We Predict
the "Unpredictable"? Erika Mansnerus, CARR Discussion
Paper 56. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper56.pdf Back
35
http://arsf.nerc.ac.uk/aircraft/ Back
36
operated by the joint NERC-Met Office Facility for Airborne Atmospheric
Measurements Back
37
Light Detection And Ranging is an optical remote sensing technology
that measures properties of scattered light to find range and/or
other information of a distant target. Back
38
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/corporate/pressoffice/2010/volcano/verification/ Back
39
http://www.ceh.ac.uk/news/news_archive/2010_news_item_12.html Back
40
http://www.ceh.ac.uk/science/EnvironmentalMonitoring.html Back
41
http://www.faam.ac.uk/ Back
42
http://arsf.nerc.ac.uk/ Back
43
http://www.uk-pollutantdeposition.ceh.ac.uk/monitoring_deposition_eyjafjallaj%C3%B6kull_volcano Back
44
http://www.iugg.org/publications/ejournals/IUGGej1006.pdf Back
45
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn361-space-weather.pdf Back
46
http://www.nerc.com/files/HILF.pdf Back
47
From 2008 responsibility for ground based research transferred
from STFC to NERC and amounted to approximately £2.7 million
per annum. The space-based research programme funded by STFC currently
amounts to approximately £1 million per annum, but is difficult
to accurately define given the many crossovers. These figures
do not include spend on post-launch support or new mission development
(eg ESA's Cosmic Vision Solar Orbiter mission) and this aspect
is now managed by the UK Space Agency. Back
48
Annex 1: UK space weather assets as published by ESA in tender
2010 (pdf). Not published. Back
49
ibid Back
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