House of Commons - Science and Technology Committee

Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies - Science and Technology Committee Contents

Memorandum submitted by the Research Councils UK (SAGE 22)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This response makes a number of general introductory points about the wider role of the Research Councils in providing scientific advice and evidence in emergencies, and responds to case study questions relating to swine flu, the Icelandic volcanic ash eruptions and solar storms.

2. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic potentially posed a major challenge to public health. RCUK considers that the Government was well prepared for the emergence of H1N1 in terms of planning for vaccine development and provision and an established antiviral stockpile. Research funders and the research community responded jointly and swiftly to the emergency. However, securing necessary approvals for clinical studies and staff recruitment in academic institutions presented challenges.

3. UK research particularly that supported by national capability was central to assessing the threats posed by volcanic ash, including that to airspace. UK scientists provided crucial evidence to inform policy decisions, necessary liaison with Icelandic authorities, and continue to work with aviation authorities globally. Whilst the UK was able to dispatch aircraft to carry out investigative flights in the immediate aftermath of the eruptions, a better coordinated approach to such flights at a domestic and international level is recommended.

4. Advisory structures, such as the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), which was initially established during the H1N1 pandemic, played an important role in the response to both of these emergencies. Effective information sharing and additional subgroups to consider the consequences of specific threats would further enhance this capability.

5. Space weather events today would have far greater implications on society, due to our greater reliance on technology, than past events. The UK Research Councils are the significant funders of relevant research and investment programmes. Unlike international partners, the UK lacks national coordination on space weather, although the flow of advice from the solar-terrestrial physics community to Government is growing. The establishment of the UK Space Agency could have significant bearing over the direction of the UK's strategic investment in space weather preparedness and related areas.

INTRODUCTION

6. Research Councils UK (RCUK) is a strategic partnership set up to champion the research supported by the seven UK Research Councils. RCUK was established in 2002 to enable the Councils to work together more effectively to enhance the overall impact and effectiveness of their research, training and innovation activities, contributing to the delivery of the Government's objectives for science and innovation. Further details are available at www.rcuk.ac.uk.

7. This evidence is submitted by RCUK on behalf of the Research Councils listed below and represents their independent views. It does not include or necessarily reflect the views of the Science and Research Group in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. The submission is made on behalf of the following Councils:

— Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC).

— Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC).

— Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).

— Medical Research Council (MRC).

— Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).

— Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC).

8. The Research Councils play a key role in ensuring the long-term health of inter-related but distinct disciplines over long timescales. By building national capability RCUK ensures that the UK is equipped to respond to and research both known, developing and unknown challenges and potential threats.

9. The importance of maintaining a publicly-funded research base and ensuring a suitable structure through which policymakers can elicit and assess evidence drawn from academic research cannot be underestimated, both in terms of advance warning of potential emergencies and in times of crisis. Applicants for Research Council funding are required to indicate how their research may be relevant to others and how they plan to help those others to be aware of this.

10. Mechanisms for dialogue already exist between Research Councils and Government departments and agencies, such as regular concordat meetings to discuss arrangements for liaison and collaboration. RCUK-funded researchers have given expert scientific advice to advisory groups, such as the Scientific Advisory Groups for Emergencies (SAGE), which ensure that the UK has on-going consortia of experts providing reliable, timely scientific advice to inform policy decisions and identify research priorities. Effective information sharing and additional subgroups to consider the consequences of specific threats would further enhance this capability.

11. RCUK considers that there is a need to examine how research in priority areas with small research bases can be activated in response to new or emerging threats. Furthermore, it is important to ensure that sufficient resources are identified and available to Research Councils to continue to be able to rapidly fund high quality research during emergencies to inform policy decisions.

12. In times of crisis the processes used to develop scientific advice should be made clear, as should the policymakers' assessment of the robustness of the available evidence. To the extent that those policy decisions remain in place beyond the crisis, steps should be taken to re-visit and revise the evidence and scientific advice, and to make adjustments to the policy if appropriate. Principles of quality, engagement and transparency should still be followed as far as is practicable.

13. The importance of transparent and accountable scientific advice without compromising conflicts of interest needs to be recognised so that interactions between co-operating bodies do not suffer problems with real or perceived conflicts of interest.

14. RCUK recognises the tensions which can arise between implementing measured scientific and operational activities and the pressure that governments are under to appear to respond immediately to emergencies.[27] However, it remains vital that relevant scientific advice and evidence should be sought and acted upon as appropriate with clear lines of communication open between policymakers and Government and that the strengths and limitations of any evidence or models are fully understood. Research Council-funded knowledge exchange has led to the publication in May 2009 of evidence-based guidance for policymakers on the communication of risk taking into account available evidence and acknowledged public perspectives.[28]

15. RCUK welcomes the publication in July 2010 of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser's Guidelines on the Use of Scientific and Engineering Advice in Policy Making,[29] in particular the statement that: "Departmental guidance should consider how advice is provided in an emergency, including clear designation of responsibility, the processes to be employed and the sources of advice".

16. Many of the threats faced today cross national borders and so international coordination and collaboration is essential for an appropriate response to emerging threats. For known and developing threats, RCUK considers it advisable to improve current international dialogue in order to establish better operational mechanisms to deal with future events.

CASE STUDY (I): SWINE FLU PANDEMIC IN 2009

1. What are the potential hazards and risks and how were they identified? How prepared is/was the Government for the emergency?

17. Influenza pandemics of the 20th century have resulted in global fatalities of over 53 million people. As the question of severity is one that cannot be gauged ahead of an actual outbreak the 2009 H1N1 pandemic potentially posed a major challenge to public health. However, the outbreak was not as severe as previous pandemics as the virus did not evolve into a more transmissible or more virulent virus, or gain resistance to antiviral drugs, and resulted in only in an estimated 450 deaths in the UK and around 20,000 world-wide.

18. The risks were identified by normal public health procedures, enhanced for the pandemic. These measures were able to confirm cases and monitor sensitivity of virus isolates to antiviral compounds. Normal capability was enhanced through increased genetic analysis of viruses isolated in UK based on pre-pandemic research initiatives designed to be used during a pandemic.

19. The perceived threat from avian influenza, particularly the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, over the last decade resulted in enhanced preparedness plans and a good level of public awareness. The Government was both well briefed and well prepared for the emergence of H1N1 in 2009 and plans included vaccine development and the purchase of large supplies of antiviral drugs.

20. A number of Research Council initiatives, some undertaken jointly with other funders supported government planning in anticipation of a possible pandemic and increased capacity and infrastructure. Notable amongst these were MRC FluWatch;[30] increased infrastructure at the MRC National Institute for Medical Research (also home to one of the WHO World Collaborating Centres on Influenza (WHO CC)); the establishment of the MRC Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Modelling;[31] BBSRC's Combating Avian Influenza Initiative;[32] and the NERC PREPARE initiative, funded in 2008 to examine issues posed by widespread use of antiviral drugs during a pandemic which included the risks of environmental pollution caused by the release of biologically-active forms of the drugs into sewage works and rivers, and increased risk of antiviral resistance and genetic exchange between influenza viruses in wildfowl. BBSRC has been planning new avian facilities at the Institute of Animal Health, Pirbright (although the scale of development depends on support from the Large Facilities Capital Fund).

2. How does/did the Government use scientific advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?

21. The options for controlling a pandemic considered by the Government as part of preparedness planning were based on advice from advisory groups such as SAGE (and its predecessors) and the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, Government agencies, the Research Councils and other bodies. These included isolation, social distancing, restriction of movement, availability of antivirals and the development and roll-out of vaccines.

22. Two main areas where scientific advice was crucial to planning were the composition of the antiviral stockpile and the choice of vaccine. These were also topics highlighted in a Royal Society/Academy of Medical Sciences report on pandemic influenza[33] and following its publication Government subsequently enhanced its antiviral stockpile adding a second antiviral drug, zanamivir, in addition to oseltamivir. Initial planning on the choice of vaccine was not as transparent as some might have wished due to issues of commercial confidentiality.

23. Mathematical modelling of outbreaks had been a major feature of the pre-pandemic planning and continued to play a role as the pandemic emerged, providing advice on numbers of cases, transmission parameters and efficacy of antiviral treatments. It is important for the future that strengths and limitations of modelling are fully understood, and that changes in human behaviour are understood so as to be factored into models.[34]

3. What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable, timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions in emergencies? Has the Government sufficient powers and resources to overcome the obstacles? For case studies (i) and (ii) was there sufficient and timely scientific evidence to inform policy decisions?

24. The potential for a virus to evolve during its global spread presents particular difficulties during the emergence of an influenza pandemic. Reliable data on early cases and their contacts is essential to understand the transmission dynamics and disease severity. The low virulence of the H1N1 virus was not fully recognised as information first emerged from cases in Mexico, and the age profile of those infected and those suffering more severe infection could only be reliably deduced as cases increased.

25. Government should plan for early and later phases of a pandemic concurrently including the following influenza season, and recognise key parameters such as the proportion of the population still at risk. These data are routinely reported by HPA and with mathematical modelling can inform policy.

26. Increasing, or changing, research resources can also provide more detailed information as pandemics emerge. In 2009 £4.8 million was awarded to two collaborative research initiatives established rapidly by the MRC, Wellcome Trust and the National Institute for Health Research: MOSAIC, a study of hospitalised patients with severe infection which examined factors contributing to severity; and an extension of the existing MRC FluWatch surveillance programme which provided monthly estimates of population infection rates in different subgroups throughout the pandemic. A further £1.7 million initiative funded by BBRSC, MRC, Wellcome Trust and Defra, the Combating Swine Influenza, aimed to develop an understanding of how the virus behaves in the pig population and how interaction with farm workers may help it evolve and spread in both pig herds and the human population which will help to develop strategies to combat future outbreaks.

27. The calls for proposals were launched rapidly, but the recruitment of patients to the clinical studies was delayed, due to in part the requirements of setting up necessary ethical approvals and a delay in academic institutions recruiting the necessary staff for the studies. In the case of future pandemics, mechanisms that ensure necessary approvals are agreed swiftly, and studies are fully staffed, should be considered.

4. How effective is the strategic coordination between Government departments, public bodies, private bodies, sources of scientific advice and the research base in preparing for and reacting to emergencies?

28. During the pandemic the advisory function was effective with the Chief Scientist and others in direct contact with SAGE presenting advice to Ministers. However, it is not clear that SAGE's composition and internal structures covered all aspects and key questions most effectively as the pandemic emerged. For instance the international perspective might be enhanced by including representation from the WHO CCs, in addition to the European Centre for Disease Control.

29. Key interactions between Government and private bodies appeared to be on the composition of the antiviral stockpile and the timely procurement and supply of vaccine. While vaccine supply is constrained by the nature and time-lines of production, it was available for those at risk during the autumn phase of the pandemic. Should the pandemic have been more serious the inevitable delay in vaccine availability would have been a challenge to Government.

5. How important is international coordination and how could it be strengthened?

30. International collaboration is essential for the timely delivery of scientific advice on the risk of influenza, monitoring the evolution of the virus as it spreads around the globe and the development of a vaccine. The pandemic vaccine was produced to the anticipated time-lines through a highly effective international collaboration involving the WHO CCs with statutory National Control Laboratories in UK (National Institute for Biological Standards and Control), USA and Australia. All parties combined their information, viruses and reagents to enable vaccine production as soon as possible. Over the period of the pandemic the London WHO CC received clinical samples and virus isolates from over 50 countries including the UK, creating an integrated picture of the virus evolution worldwide. It also assisted countries with less capability with virus characterization, sharing protocols and providing training, and by examining viruses from numerous countries for changes in antigenicity, virulence and drug resistance. In addition, the European ERA-NET on Emerging and Major Infectious Diseases of Livestock and GLOBAL-NET—Global Strategic Alliance for the Coordination of Research on the Major Infectious Diseases of Animals and Zoonoses provide ideal platforms to promote coordination and cooperation of research programmes to combat global infectious diseases at the European and international level respectively.

31. The Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) also plays an important role in supporting international coordination in identifying newly emerging strains of influenza virus and monitoring human infections caused by animal influenza viruses, the emergence of new strains of human influenza viruses that necessitate a new vaccine, the emergence of drug resistant strains of virus and to survey the general threat of influenza to global public health. The network is coordinated by WHO and currently comprises 134 laboratories in 104 countries.

CASE STUDY (II): ICELANDIC VOLCANIC ASH ERUPTIONS IN 2010

1. What are the potential hazards and risks and how were they identified? How prepared is/was the Government for the emergency?

32. Particles in volcanic ash are highly abrasive to aircraft moving parts and windows, with glass shards potentially fusing to engine-interiors causing engine failure. The London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (UK Met Office) identified the hazard and the decision to stop air traffic was taken, based on international regulations. A NERC research aircraft—a Dornier 228[35]—was diverted from planned science work and converted at three hours notice on 15 April to provide interim sampling capability, flying daily until 21 April to assess the location and nature of the emissions. A NERC-Met Office BAe146[36], which due to maintenance work was not flown until the morning of 20 April, mapped the cloud from above and observed the plume from within. The Dornier 228 was the only aircraft permitted to operate in UK airspace above 2500ft until 20 April.

33. NERC's British Geological Survey (BGS) supplied information about the volcano and interpretation of Icelandic Met Office geophysical monitoring data to the Civil Contingency Secretariat from 15 April.

34. NERC's National Centre for Atmospheric Science (NCAS) led the analysis of the airborne sampling of the volcanic plume (ash, gases and aerosols, including sulphuric acid which is potentially highly hazardous to airframes). Aircraft provide the only means of determining the ash properties, which vary between different volcanoes. Without accurate constraints on these properties, more comprehensive satellite and ground-based remote sensing data cannot be interpreted. Dispersion modelling of the ash plume, carried out by NCAS in collaboration with the Met Office, enabled the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to introduce new regulations, based on Met Office forecasts, for flying in volcanic ash.

35. NCAS and STFC's Chilbolton Observatory supplied the Met Office with LIDAR[37] and sun photometer measurements revealing when the volcanic ash layers were above each of the instrumented sites, the altitude of those layers, and their depth. The measurements also provided an estimate of ash particle size.[38]

36. To identify the risk to the UK from sulphur, chlorine, fluorine and other elements entering the atmosphere, terrestrial freshwater and marine environments, the NERC Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) increased[39] sampling rates at its long-term monitoring programme sites.[40] Research cruises involving staff from the NERC National Oceanography Centre continue to investigate longer-term effects of the ash on marine ecosystems.

37. NERC funded five urgency research grant applications relating to the volcanic eruption.

2. How does/did the Government use scientific advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?

38. BGS and NCAS secondees to the Chief Scientist's Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE) group provided crucial scientific advice for policy decisions concerning the aviation industry. BGS and NCAS led liaison with Icelandic authorities.

39. BGS scientists assisted with daily briefings of the Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) and with colleagues in SAGE and developed scenarios and the case for including volcanic eruptions in the UK National Risk Register.

40. Data collected by NERC-supported aircraft informed the civil aviation industry's decision to resume air traffic in UK airspace on 19 April and helped the CAA and Department for Transport (DfT) assess aviation hazards and manage civil airspace.

41. Members of NCAS, the Facility for Airborne Atmospheric Measurements (FAAM)[41] and the Met Office contributed daily during the emergency to the CAA's International Teleconferences on Volcanic Ash, alongside representatives of the aircraft manufacturers and airlines. These meetings identified how to resume flight operations after six days of the emergency.

42. The Airborne Research and Survey Facility (ARSF)[42] is working closely with aviation authorities globally and engine and airframe manufacturers to assess damage caused by flights, to ascertain safe levels of exposure for civil aircraft. This is the first time aerosol and gas measurements can be directly related to the condition of aircraft components. The Royal Air Force, Fleet Air Arm, British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, BMI and Iceland Air contacted NERC (via ARSF) for advice on operating conditions and safety.

43. CEH, BGS and NERC provided scientists and data to inform Defra, by participating in Defra's Volcanic Ash Network[43] and providing scientific advice regarding health and environmental impacts.

44. The CAA's International Teleconferences on Volcanic Ash were a particularly effective means to develop new regulations for flying in volcanic ash during the first six days of the emergency.

45. Early Dornier 228 flights were limited by the emergency nature of the reconfiguration and installation of un-calibrated instruments. Nevertheless, qualitative data verified there was significant contamination risk, provided validation for Met Office dispersion forecasts and demonstrated catastrophic engine failure was not inevitable.

46. A reduction in vital public data and information flowing from the Icelandic Met Office and University of Iceland, occurring when Icelandic scientists feared misuse of data, was partially rectified by a reassurance visit by BGS and NCAS. BGS and NCAS assisted in drafting an MoU between Iceland and UK at Government level.

47. Detailed and timely data and observations of the source of a volcanic plume are essential in real time. During an eruption, scientists in Iceland will have significant local hazards to deal with so UK must ensure it has ready access to data. To ensure such information is available in future eruptions, investment in observation and monitoring equipment would be required.

48. BGS is well-linked to UK Higher Education Institutes and individuals specialising in volcanology and was able to put relevant experts in contact with each other and Government throughout the crisis (eg Met Office and volcanic plume modellers).

49. The Met Office has lead agency status on airborne Civil Contingency (CC) operations using the BAe146, with NERC providing technical and scientific staff. Scenarios qualifying deployment of the BAe146 in a CC role had been agreed informally by the Met Office with the Cabinet Office, though volcanic eruptions were not covered by this.

50. Flights of the BAe146 nullified insurance cover held by the operators of the aircraft (Direct flight Ltd), and contractual obligations of the owners (BAESYSTEMS) to NERC and Met Office. It was difficult to persuade DfT to provide appropriate indemnification, causing delays and preventing some flights.

51. Planning of Dornier 228 flights was sometimes compromised by conflicting views of their purpose by CAA, DfT, and at times the Met Office resulting in some sub-optimal missions. Although commitment to use assets such as aircraft during the emergency existed, it was sometimes unclear where responsibility—especially financial—lay.

52. Met Office, NERC, and BAES have agreed a clearer and more robust mechanism for assessing future CC work and establishing a firm basis for committing to such tasks, including payment arrangements, for approval by the Cabinet Office.

53. NERC expects costs of flights to date (approximately £500K), anticipated cost of repairs to the Dornier engines (estimated £300K) and consequential losses (approximately £450K, from a 12 month delay to committed overseas scientific programmes displaced during the emergency) to be refunded, and is awaiting confirmation.

5. How important is international coordination and how could it be strengthened?

54. International co-ordination is very important as ash plumes nearly always have a cross-border impact and infrastructure and capability is not held by all nations. Such co-ordination is being strengthened in numerous ways.

55. Most European countries capable of operating suitable research aircraft were not as well prepared as the UK with sorties not flown until several days had elapsed. Most European aircraft operators belong to the EC FP7 funded initiative "European fleet for Airborne Research (EUFAR)". EUFAR initiated dialogue between research teams, implemented a database (hosted by NERC) for archiving ash data (although no data was loaded by the aircraft operators) and held regular teleconferences to exchange information. The international civil aviation authorities are working towards better management of future volcanic events via EUFAR, which could be achieved by i) a more coordinated approach to investigative flights ii) agreeing on instrument deployment iii) speedy exchange of flight results and analyses.

56. Representatives of ARSF, FAAM and NCAS continue to contribute to the International Airworthiness Task Force (Volcanic Ash), chaired by the UK CAA, which is working towards developing and implementing a mechanism for better managing UK and European airspace in the event of another volcanic eruption.

57. BGS prompted a Memo from Iceland Met Office to SAGE identifying areas (including equipment and expertise) where UK could potentially support their volcano monitoring. A Memorandum of Understanding formalised co-operation between the Icelandic Met Office, BGS, NCAS and the UK Met Office on 26 May 2010. BGS has since provided six new seismic stations to supplement the Icelandic Met Office's seismic network and NCAS has supplied a LIDAR and radiosonde station. This addresses the IUGG statement[44] published in June 2010 urging international scientific communities to support volcano monitoring.

58. BGS staff are on the organising committee of the WMO-sponsored "Ash dispersal forecast and civil aviation" workshop in Geneva (October 2010). BGS are members of the IAVCEI working group on Ash Fall Impacts. International coordination and collaboration of volcanologists and atmospheric scientists is critical both in provision of advice to VAACs and plume dispersion modelling. Volcanic ash plumes nearly always have a cross-border impact.

CASE STUDY (III): SOLAR STORMS

We note that the term "Space Weather" is used to describe the conditions in space that impact on the Earth. Solar storms are the source of Space weather disturbances and the two terms can be taken to refer to the same phenomena for the purposes of this submission. A description of the nature and effects of space weather can be found in the POSTnote 261 (July 2010) "Space Weather".[45] An important form of "solar storms" are coronal mass ejections (CMEs) which can cause bursts of intense radiation and geomagnetic storms.

1. What are the potential hazards and risks and how were they identified? How prepared is/was the Government for the emergency?

59. Space weather is a natural occurrence. Its primary impact is its effects on the technological systems upon which society is increasingly reliant. Major events have been recorded in the past (eg 1859 and 1921) but had relatively minor impact, disrupting telegraph and telephone communications. An equivalent event today could be dangerous due to our greater reliance on technology.

60. Examples of the hazards and risks associated with Space Weather include:

(a) Damage to Space-based infrastructure (satellites) by energetic particles and radiation.

(b) Disturbance of the ionosphere degrading communication and navigation signals (including GPS) with particular impacts on aviation and shipping.

(c) Electricity distribution grids extending over long distances experiencing geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) which can cause blackouts and damage.

We have never experienced a 1-in-100 year space weather event to test the vulnerability of space technology and the susceptibility of electricity power systems. There is growing evidence that such events pose a major threat to economies around the world, as shown by the June 2010 report of the North American Reliability Corporation.[46]

61. The UK has over 100 years' leadership in the science underpinning our understanding of space weather. This continues today with the UK Research Councils, NERC and STFC, as the significant funders of relevant research programmes.[47]

62. Research Council commitment to researching the effects of solar activity is split between ground-based studies (eg using the EISCAT radars) and space-based (eg using STEREO, SoHo, Hinode, SDO and other missions). There are many inter-relationships between the various areas of research. UK scientists are world leaders at combining data from ground—and space-based studies.

63. Annex 1[48] provides an audit of potential UK based space weather assets, prepared recently (November 2009) as an input to ESA's Space Situational Awareness programme.[49] It can be seen as one measure of the UK's "preparedness" to predict, monitor and analyse the effects of space weather, or more loosely the UK's "National Capability" in respect to space weather and solar storms.

64. The UK currently has no single funding stream to provide a National Capability (measurement and predictive systems) that can respond to a space weather emergency. No single scientific community, group, individual or institute is equipped to address all of the challenges in isolation, and nor does any single body have exclusive interest in any single aspect. For example:

(a) understanding the effects of space weather on technical equipment and hardware;

(b) studying the behaviour of the Sun and the impacts of its variation on the Earth;

can all involve an array of national and international collaborators including academia, standards authorities, funding agencies, industry, individual eminent scientists and others.

2. How does/did the Government use scientific advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?

65. The Government has recently started to develop better links with the UK space weather science community, eg through work on the National Risk Register. This involves expertise from both NERC and STFC as well as universities.

66. Until recently space weather was not recognised as an issue for which the Government needed scientific advice. This is now changing and should be facilitated by the transfer of responsibility for earth-orientated solar-terrestrial physics (STP) to NERC. NERC experience will facilitate the flow of advice from the STP community to Government.

67. The UK lacks any national coordination on space weather unlike our international partners. A coordination mechanism will help government access scientific resources (both people and instruments) and also enable the scientific community to understand what government needs. This coordination should also to assess what financial support is needed to ensure resources remain available to Government when needed.

68. This is a developing area and it is too soon for definitive comment. However, we suggest that the proposed national coordination is a key factor in achieving this goal.

5. How important is international coordination and how could it be strengthened?

69. Space weather is a global problem so international coordination is critical. This is increasingly focused through Space Situational Awareness programmes in Europe and the US. The UK needs to make the most of its membership of the ESA SSA programme. The UK contributions to the global networks that monitor space weather (eg the magnetic observatories operated by NERC) are a key input to international coordination, including the SSA programmes.

70. EU FP7 recently allocated approximately EU22 million to space hazards including Space Weather, and the UK is involved in projects funded under this line. Discussions about bidding for FP8 programme content are starting and UK scientists are leading efforts to lobby for space weather studies in economically important areas.

71. The establishment of the UK Space Agency could have significant bearing over the direction of the UK's strategic investment in space weather preparedness and related areas through its leadership role and by potentially bringing together the themes and capabilities at hand (eg by providing a single voice at the ESA negotiating table).

Research Councils UK

14 September 2010

28 ESRC Placement Fellowship in partnership with the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council and the Government Office for Science: A practical guide to public risk communication: the five essentials of good practice, http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file51458.pdf Back

29 http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/goscience/docs/g/10-669-gcsa-guidelines-scientific-engineering-advice-policy-making.pdf Back

30 http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Newspublications/News/MRC006480 Back

31 http://www1.imperial.ac.uk/medicine/about/institutes/outbreaks/ Back

32 http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/funding/opportunities/2006/avian-influenza.aspx Back

33 http://royalsociety.org/Pandemic-influenza-science-to-policy Back

34 Modelled Encounters with Public Health Risks: How Do We Predict the "Unpredictable"? Erika Mansnerus, CARR Discussion Paper 56. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper56.pdf Back

35 http://arsf.nerc.ac.uk/aircraft/ Back

36 operated by the joint NERC-Met Office Facility for Airborne Atmospheric Measurements Back

37 Light Detection And Ranging is an optical remote sensing technology that measures properties of scattered light to find range and/or other information of a distant target. Back