Memorandum submitted by The Royal Academy
of Engineering (SAGE 33)
INTRODUCTION
The Academy welcomes the inquiry into Scientific
advice and evidence in emergencies and has previously responded
to the Government Chief Scientific Officer's consultation on Guidelines
on scientific advice in policy making in February 2010.[53]
In the Guidelines on scientific advice in
policy making response, the Academy made the point that while
it is important that the scientific and engineering advice used
by government should be independent, at the height of a crisis,
the level of independence could be less of a priority as expert
knowledge becomes more important. To take the example of BSE,
at the inception of the crisis, it would have been unhelpful not
to use the expertise of stakeholders such as farmers and vets
directly involved, despite their having a direct interest in the
issues. Later, as the issues become clearer, a broader group of
experts with fewer direct interests would be appropriate to advise
on mitigation and recovery.
In this response, we have tackled two of the
four case studies the Committee has chosen to cover: solar events
and cyber security. These differ in important aspects: space weather
is a natural phenomenon, whereas an attack on cyber infrastructure
is likely to be a deliberate act. The emphasis in terms of space
weather events is therefore resilience and recovery where as the
emphasis for cyber attacks is prevention ahead of resilience and
recovery.
SOLAR STORMS
1. What are the potential hazards and risks
and how would they be identified? How prepared is the Government
for the emergency?
Extreme solar storms can knock out space craft
and affect passengers' health on transpolar air flights through
the effects of high energy particles and radiation. They can also
cause long lasting problems if physical damage or data corruption
occurs in space to ground radio communication, radio navigation
or radio surveillance systems. Furthermore, such storms can damage
electrical transformers and thus cause outages on the electricity
network. These extreme events, sometimes known as Carrington Events
(after British astronomer Richard Carrington), probably occur
once every century or two.
Many critical infrastructure systems rely on
timing signals derived from the GPS system to manage date transfers
over networks and synchronisation. In the event of the loss of
that timing signal, for what ever reason, most systems can "free
wheel" with marginally reduced efficiency for a number of
hours or days on less accurate internal clocks. Alternatively,
highly accurate timing signals could be derived from ground based
navigation systems such as eLORAN which would be significantly
more robust to space weather events than the GPS satellite constellation.
In the event of the loss of external timing signals, new innovations
such as chip scale atomic clocks (CSACs) will reduce this vulnerability
further. It is expected that such systems would be able to "free
wheel" for the duration of any space weather event, re-synchronising
their clocks when timing signals from the GPS system become available
again.
Very much less extreme solar storms occur much
more frequently and mitigation is largely provided through good
engineering practice; for example by designing well protected
spacecraft and using suitably rated transformers on the electricity
network. Through strong engineering in place already, the UK infrastructure
is generally well protected with long lasting problems being most
unusual. Somewhat more problematical is dealing with the variability
of signals caused by day-to-day space weather. For such radio
systems, the national need is generally focused on defence systems
which require higher signal integrity rather than civilian applications.
2. How does the Government use scientific
advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to an emergency?
There are three types of space weather effects
that need to be considered, each with differing warning periods
from observation and duration. Because of the topology of the
earth's magnetic field, the effects of radiation and geomagnetic
storms are felt more acutely near the poles.
— Electromagnetic radiation:
— Arrival: eight minutes.
— Duration: one to two hours.
— Effects: Dayside high frequency (HF)
radio blackout, radio noise bursts causing interference on some
satcom, navigation and radar systems.
— High-energy charged particles—direct
effects:
— Arrival: 15 minutes to days.
— Duration: hours to days.
— Effects: Satellite anomalies, passenger
radiation exposure, avionic glitches.
— High-energy charged particles—indirect
effects:
— Arrival: one to four days.
— Duration: hours to days.
— Effects: Severe HF radio blackout in
polar regions (including polar HF communications to aircraft),
suppression of HF capability at all latitudes, GPS/Galileo accuracy
degradation, potential for power grid problems.
The quantification of the risk associated with
major storm events is not a simple matter and can only be achieved
through the combined study of both engineers and space scientists.
Many studies of this type have been conducted by various agencies,
but the majority fail to consider both the engineering and scientific
solutions. In principle, it is best, where possible, to engineer
out the risk at the design stage if this can be achieved at acceptable
cost.
There have been no extreme solar storm events
in the UK since the start of the space era, but lesser storms
have caused problems on European Space Agency (ESA) satellites
and on HF communication systems amongst others. Lesser storms
have also caused minor perturbations to the electricity network
in the UK.
Scientific and engineering advice on space weather
effects has been used and applied by operators to safeguard the
services they provide and ensure a certain level of system resilience.
Space weather events are transient and most effects are transient
as well. Where there are longer term effects and where risks have
not been successfully engineered out of systems, the recovery
and resilience of affected systems are, to a large extent, independent
of the cause of the failure. Where it is applicable, Government
should use scientific and engineering advice to ensure the resilience
or quick recovery of critical systems in the event of a serious
space weather event.
3. What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies?
The UK has no central coordinating agency for
these events. One clear candidate is the Centre for the Protection
of National Infrastructure (CPNI). Another is Defence Intelligence
(DI) Intelligence Collection Strategy and Plans (ICSP) in the
MOD. This Department has responsibility for the Defence Meteorological
Programme and the MOD embryonic Space Weather programme. Wherever
in Government this capability is located, it should have the ability
to deal with classified material.
4. How effective is the strategic coordination
between Government departments, public bodies, sources of scientific
advice and the research base in preparing for and reacting to
emergencies.
There have been no major storm events since
the start of the space era but in the context of lesser storm
events there is little indication of any coordination across government.
However, the MOD recognised some years ago that the response to
impact of space weather on radio systems must be unified. Consequently,
it contracted QinetiQ to develop a space-weather mitigation model
with real-time capability which can be used operationally to support
radio systems, where engineering mitigation is not possible.
How important is international coordination and
how could it be strengthened?
International coordination is critical. Space
weather sensors and predictions are an international endeavour;
moreover the impact of extreme solar storms will be global. Realistically,
the US will be a focus for space weather monitoring and notification
as US society and defence are highly reliant on space assets.
The US electricity network is also located at a higher geomagnetic
latitude than the UK system making it more susceptible to such
events. The European Space Agency (ESA) has the remit to provide
the civilian focus for solar storm monitoring and space weather
in Europe and will develop high level links into the US programme.
In the UK and in the defence domain, linkages have been developed
between MOD and DoD, resulting in a series of US-UK MOU Project
Arrangements in this topic area.
CYBER ATTACKS
1. What are the potential hazards and risks
surrounding cyber attacks and how are they identified? How prepared
is the Government for an emergency in this area? What kind of
systems are the most likely targets and what would the impact
be?
The risk of serious cyber attack is perhaps
somewhat hyped in the media, and in reality it is small; there
is no known looming threat of an "internet 9/11". However,
the risk is not zero and is likely to be increasing. Nation states
have developed and will develop a cyber warfare capability—the
attacks on Estonia in 2007 are evidence of this.
There is no single scenario to prepare for—different
individuals, organisations or countries will attack different
targets for their particular reasons. Cyber attacks can be used
by criminals to make money or gain information; be undertaken
purely as an exercise in hubris or with malign intent by hackers;
or by nations to cripple another's critical national infrastructure.
It will not always be clear who the attacker
is and what their motives are. For example, a cyber attack apparently
by a hacker working alone might, in fact, be a politically motivated
attack. It is also possible to disguise which country an attack
originates from, as perpetrators working in one country can bounce
information they send from a server in another country. This makes
it very difficult to mobilise the appropriate response swiftly.
In the time it takes to ascertain whether an attack should be
met with a military, diplomatic or criminal agency response, the
attack could have occurred and perpetrators will have moved on.
Large-scale organised cyber crime is a significant
threat, with growing markets for selling and acquiring cyber attack
capabilities. There is a flourishing and fast evolving market
in the trading of botnet code that can insert itself into computers
that then launch denial of service attacks under central or distributed
direction.
Cyber attacks can have real physical effects,
especially if they are targeted at critical infrastructure. An
attack aimed at the control systems in a power plant could interrupt
generation and potentially damage the plant. If smart meters are
introduced, cyber attacks could turn large numbers of them off
remotely. However, in reality more damage is likely to be done
to the electricity infrastructure through physical attacks on
substations. Conversely, nation states could also attack cyber-infrastructure
using other means, such as an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), though
to effect large scale damage to the cyber-infrastructure would
require a pulse of the magnitude caused by a nuclear explosion.
2. How does the Government use scientific
advice and evidence to identify, prepare for and react to a cyber
attack?
The Office of Cyber Security (OCS) and other
agencies have established ad-hoc networks seeking academic and
industry support, but this is still formative. The role of the
OCS needs clarification, particularly in terms of its ability
to coordinate existing expertise.
The network of CSAs is, as always, important
in providing Government with a capability to use scientific advice
and evidence, and can work with the learned societies and professional
bodies to do so. The GCSA John Beddington's recent review of cyber
security, run by an ad hoc committee of experts in the area, should
feed into national security strategy.
The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) appears
to have had a good understanding of how the criminal world is
developing cyber attack capabilities. It cooperated and coordinated
with other law enforcement agencies but there is undoubtedly much
more to be done here and more support will be required by any
agency planned to replace SOCA. In general, there is little expertise
within the public sector, and the Government relies on experts
in the private sector working together on common issues.
Ensuring availability of evidence and advice
is a challenge. There is science and engineering research devoted
to encryption and the hardening of the software running our systems.
But there is too little research on the systemic way in which
the Web is changing and evolving and new applications can arise
faster than our ability to appreciate their significance. The
newly emerging discipline of Web Science is an attempt to anticipate
how the evolving cyber capabilities present new vulnerabilities
and new opportunities and it could be exploited further by Government.
3. What are the obstacles to obtaining reliable,
timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions
in emergencies? Has the Government sufficient powers and resources
to overcome the obstacles?
There is a lack of coherent leadership within
Government, with no central conduit for advice on this area. The
process of obtaining advice needs to be better resourced &
made coherent with alerting through CPNI and SOCA or its replacement.
Academics working in this area rarely have the
level of security clearance required to engage with Government
and help to plan for cyber attacks, putting potentially useful
advice is out of reach. Government also needs to work with experts
in the commercial sector, but some of these may work in businesses
which lack the structure to engage with Government.
The fact that almost all critical infrastructure
assets are in private hands is a potential obstacle, as is the
fact that the UK is a small player in a globalised world.
4. How effective is the strategic coordination
between Government departments, public bodies, private bodies,
sources of scientific advice and the research base in preparing
for and reacting to a cyber attack?
Coordination is likely to be limited because:
— some of these areas are highly sensitive
and the agencies involved find it difficult to share insights;
— key aspects of the cyber estate are in
the control of private companies;
— many of the public bodies that need to
play a role lack the required competences; and
— research on the Web as a critical ecosystem
is fragmented.
At present, there is no one place in Government
where responsibility lies, and different departments ask the same
of advice of the same people. The role and resourcing of OCS needs
to be resolved, clarifying whether OCS is merely raising awareness
of this issue, or whether it will be setting out and enacting
a cyber security strategy.
5. How important is international coordination
and how could it be strengthened?
Organised cyber crime is not an issue that can
be resolved at a national level and urgently needs international
diplomatic effort to agree behavioural norms, including a UN cyber
crime treaty. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty processes are not
fit for purpose in this domain as they take too long: attacks
are over and perpetrators have moved on before any kind of agreement
can be reached. There must be better international police cooperation
in order to deal with the high levels of acquisitive cyber crime.
Submitted by:
Mr P Greenish CBE
Chief Executive
The Royal Academy of Engineering
Prepared by:
Katherine MacGregor
Policy Advisor
14 September 2010
53 http://www.raeng.org.uk/societygov/policy/responses/pdf/Scientific_Analysis_in_Policy_Making.pdf Back
| 
