Memorandum submitted by the Met Office
(SAGE 34)
INTRODUCTION
1. The last three major emergencies which
involved UK Government response were weather related: Cumbria
floods in 2009; winter salt shortages in 2010 and volcanic ash
in 2010. Weather is undoubtedly the single risk that could be
said to cut across all emergency situations. Even when not the
initial cause, weather may be the direct driver of secondary factors
that act to intensify the impacts, hamper emergency response or
slow recovery.
2. All Met Office operational services,
and the meteorological advice Government relies on in emergency
situations, are underpinned by a strong and dynamic science base.
Our proven 24/7 operational capability ensures delivery to the
right people fast—through a resilient and secure infrastructure
that routinely carries classified information.
3. The Met Office is globally unique in
our capability to pull emerging meteorological and climate science
directly from research—either our own or in collaboration
with academia—to fully operational and targeted applications.
USING MET
OFFICE EXPERTISE
IN IDENTIFYING
AND QUANTIFYING
EMERGENCIES
4. Weather is frequently either the direct
or a secondary driver in emergencies. The Met Office feeds directly
into the annual process for assessing risk to the UK from natural
hazards and is frequently an expert member of the Science Advice
Group in Emergency (SAGE) convened and led by the Government's
Chief Scientific Advisor. During the recent volcanic ash emergency
the Met Office Chief Scientist was part of the SAGE core team
(working alongside an expert from the British Geological Survey
(BGS)).
5. The Met Office has long established links
directly into the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat,
COBR and its counterparts in the devolved administrations. We
update both Official and Ministerial meetings with real-time evidence,
situational analysis and impartial advice based on robust predictions
enabling Government to make immediate but considered decisions.
6. Risks arising from natural hazards have
previously, and correctly, been based largely on historical and
statistical data and evidence. However, the world's climate is
changing and the science community agree that the frequency of
damaging weather-related events is increasing. A robust underpinning
science base, delivering impartial results, is therefore vital
to ensure a measured yet realistic assessment of changing risk
is maintained.
7. An emerging issue is also the need to
be better prepared for the impacts of concurrent hazards and to
increase the resilience of the UK's critical infrastructure; recognising
that the functionality of one critical service (eg water) is interdependent
on others (power). Although infrastructure and users may be resilient
to a number of hazards experienced individually, they may experience
a different level and type of risk when they are combined eg the
recent incident in New Zealand which saw the strongest earthquake
since 1931 hit Christchurch causing widespread damage and power
outages, followed by winds of up to 80 miles per hour and heavy
rain which hampered the recovery efforts and caused further evacuations
due to risk of flooding.
8. Horizon scanning is an important aspect
of the Government's risk assessment process. In addition to the
changing probability of weather related incidents, the UK's vulnerability
is changing: the recent volcanic eruption in Iceland highlighted
the vulnerability of airline operations with respect to ash plumes
and the relatively recent and rapidly growing global reliance
on technology, for example, has catapulted the risks from space
weather to life, the economy and infrastructure to the fore bringing
concern about the ability of UK infrastructure to withstand major
space weather events.
RISKS PRESENTED
BY SPACE
WEATHER
9. The term space weather encompasses the
conditions on the sun, the solar wind, the magnetosphere, the
ionosphere, and the neutral atmosphere that can influence the
performance and reliability of space-borne and ground-based technological
systems.
10. Extreme space weather events typically
occur at the solar maximum, which itself follows a roughly 11
year cycle. The next solar maximum is expected around 2012-13—potentially
coinciding with the London Olympic Games.
11. Ionospheric storms disrupt global navigation
satellite systems and high frequency communications, magnetic
storms induce damaging currents in power lines and can weaken
pipelines, and radiation storms affect the health and safety of
passengers and aircrews. Prediction of space weather conditions
can help to reduce, or avoid, the impact of space weather on our
lives.
12. An event of the scale of the 1859 Carrington
event, the most powerful in recorded history, could result in
national grid failure causing power loss across significant areas
of the UK for up to 12 hours, and up to several weeks if many
transformers were damaged, due to the long manufacture lead times
for these components.
13. A storm of the severity of the Carrington
event could cause the permanent loss of 30% of satellites, leading
to disruption of communication satellites, Earth Observation facilities
and Position Navigation and Timing services, including GPS. This
would have a severe impact upon global and UK monetary systems
which are primarily composed of electronic accounts and assets
and rely on accurate timings from GPS to synchronise trades.
14. A US National Academy of Sciences paper
estimated that if the Carrington event were repeated today, the
economic and societal costs to the USA could reach US$1-2 trillion
in the first year, with full recovery taking four to 10 years.
USING MET
OFFICE EXPERTISE
TO PREPARE
FOR AND
REACT TO
EMERGENCIES
15. The Met Office operates the London Volcanic
Ash Advisory Centre, one of nine such centres worldwide, and has
responsibility for predicting and monitoring the spread of ash
plumes arising from eruptions in the Northeast Atlantic, including
Iceland. We also host and operate the Radioactive Incident Monitoring
Network (RIMNET) on behalf of DECC which records and analyses
radioactive levels across the UK. The Flood Forecasting Centre
harnesses meteorological and hydrological expertise jointly from
the Met Office and the Environment Agency and provides flood warnings
across England and Wales. We operate the National Severe Weather
Warning System that ensured the UK, and emergency responders in
particular, were sufficiently prepared during the severe cold
and snow events of last winter.
16. Those responsible for directing and
taking action during an emergency do so in real time, relying
on skilled interpretation and clear communication of often complex
information. The Met Office, as the UK's National Meteorological
Service and as the preferred supplier of meteorological information
under the Civil Contingencies Act, is at the forefront of providing
the impartial advice and supporting evidence required to enable
Government to make the best decisions possible in real time during
emergencies. The emergency response community, the public, and
industry and commerce also look directly to us for the authoritative
information and advice upon which to base their actions.
17. Users of science advice must be confident
in its veracity, its relevance and be assured of an organisation's
capability to continue to deliver to a wide range of stakeholders.
Policy makers plan and prepare according to the best advice and
forward-looking analysis that science can provide. It is vital
that decisions are based on the best science to ensure risk mitigation
and preparedness is appropriate, cost effective and provides true
value for money.
18. Confidence in policy and action comes
from the knowledge that expert advice, and therefore the underpinning
science, is robust. The UK is assured of the quality of Met Office
science, operations and advice through continual benchmarking
against international scientific institutes and the close monitoring
by the Public Weather Service Customer Group. The Met Office is
one of only two World Aviation Forecast Centres (the other being
in Washington, US), and is the accredited aviation forecast provider
to the CAA under the EU Single European Sky legislation.
19. Although the Met Office's reputation
as a world leading science institute is perhaps more commonly
associated with terrestrial weather, the breadth and depth of
our capability, our science expertise and our role as a facilitator
of academic research, is enabling a developing involvement and
expertise in space weather prediction.
20. We already know that the military, and
therefore security, is heavily dependent on space weather information.
Organisations such as QinetiQ and some US departments are developing
basic decision making tools but they still require an interpreter
trained in space weather to make best use of the information for
each customer community. The Met Office has been delivering training
in space weather to our own forecast staff and to Royal Navy forecasters
since 2006.
21. The focus of current Met Office work
is to bridge the gap in the user's understanding between the scientific
output in the space weather products and what this means for the
user's system. For example, current space weather outputs might
say, "a Coronal Mass Ejection has just occurred'; we are
translating this into actionable and relevant advice such as "this
has a, b and c operational implications for system X", rather
than leaving the user with the difficult (and unwanted) task of
interpreting the space weather information.
22. The Met Office is collaborating with
NOAA to mirror their space weather predictions on an operational
basis and to push forward with science developments. Our research
into space weather has to date focussed on exploiting our existing
strengths in troposphere/stratosphere/mesosphere modelling and
data assimilation and we have utilised these in collaborative
projects with University College London to test existing models.
23. We are actively engaged with space weather
experts in BGS and the Science and Technology Facilities Council
as well as collaborating with Bath University on an Engineering
and Physical Sciences Research Council Doctorate studentship entitled
"Design and Development of a Space Weather Forecast System".
This runs from 2009 to 2013 with the student based full time at
the Met Office from autumn 2010.
OBSTACLES TO
OBTAINING RELIABLE
AND TIMELY
SCIENTIFIC ADVICE
AND EVIDENCE
24. When multiple hazards are experienced,
Government and the wider user community may find themselves taking
advice and information on each parameter separately and sometimes
from conflicting perspectives. In addition to central Government
departments, local authorities and civil contingency responders,
over 20 agencies can be involved in providing data, intelligence
and advice to decision makers.
25. These agencies, including the Met Office,
sit within different departments, have different responsibilities
and perspectives, issue warnings for different specific hazards
and are developing new capabilities—both individually and
in collaboration. Without a clear set of priorities or the best
level of overall agency-wide and academic coordination there is
potential for duplication of effort and, more critically, capability
gaps may not be readily identifiable.
26. In real-time decision making terms,
multiple sources of rapidly updating information and advice may
cause delays as time is taken to assimilate and analyse data.
In extreme cases, particularly where the full picture is not known
to all, advice could be ambiguous, confusing or even in direct
conflict. More information does not necessarily mean better advice
and clarity.
27. There is increasing recognition of the
need for cross-departmental coordination to ensure adequate mechanisms
are in place to develop or enhance warning services focussed on
critical areas—especially when we consider that although
infrastructure may have sufficient tolerance for single hazard
events, a combination of hazards may affect the total resilience
of any part of the infrastructure.
28. Other countries, most notably the US
and China, are moving towards a more integrated one-stop-shop
approach to realise efficiencies across infrastructure and warning
systems through the adoption of a multi hazard approach.
29. The Met Office already plays a unique
and critical role in hazard management and in providing science
advice and evidence. We frequently act as a hub for many strands
of environmental information and there is an opportunity for this
central role to be further enhanced by closer collaboration with
existing partners and by exploiting the security and resilience
of our physical infrastructure and technical expertise.
CASE STUDY
(II)—WAS
THERE SUFFICIENT
& TIMELY ADVICE
IN ASH?
30. The Met Office was formally appointed
as one of nine International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAAC) in 1987. Policy and operational
procedures of a VAAC is set by ICAO. As a VAAC, the Met Office
is responsible for issuing volcanic ash advisories of the forecast
trajectory of ash from any erupting volcanoes within its designated
area which includes Iceland and the Canary Islands. Six-monthly
exercises are undertaken to test the ICAO European and North Atlantic
contingency plan for volcanic eruptions and ensure the relevant
parties are familiar with the procedures. The last exercise prior
to the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull took place on 25 February
2010.
31. The weather forecast model which underpins
the Met Office's NAME dispersion model has been subject to continuous
research and development. Comparisons of the accuracy of the Met
Office weather forecast model predictions with those from other
weather forecasting centres consistently show the Met Office's
forecasts to be within the top three in the world. The dispersion
model itself has also been continuously developed and tested against
other models for a range of environmental hazards since it was
introduced in 1986. Indeed, this is an advantage of using a common
dispersion model for multiple purposes: funding, research and
expertise can be used to deliver benefit for multiple emergency
scenarios.
32. NAME has been used to support a number
of incidents including:
(a) pollution resulting from the Kuwaiti oil
fires (First Gulf War);
(b) the 2005 Buncefield oil storage depot incident;
(c) the 2001 and 2007 Foot and Mouth disease
outbreaks;
(d) the 2008 Bluetongue outbreak in northern
Europe; and
(e) the Icelandic volcanic eruption in 2010.
It is also used more routinely to support smaller,
potentially hazardous incidents such as tanker vehicle fires and
to provide air quality forecasts. There are numerous papers in
the peer reviewed literature which compare the performance of
NAME to similar models and, where possible, observed data. The
most relevant is a comparison of the London, Darwin, Washington,
Montreal and Toulouse VAAC models undertaken following the Grimsvotn
eruption in 2004. The comparison of ash dispersion predictions
from all five VAAC models showed good agreement, despite the different
model details and meteorology used.
33. The Eyjafjallajökull volcano in
Iceland erupted in March 2010, though the specific location of
the fissure, the intensity of the eruption and the prevailing
weather conditions meant that the impacts were largely confined
to Iceland. On 14 April 2010 however, a much more intense and
sustained eruption took place towards the centre of the crater
under a glacier. The resultant ejection was more explosive with
a high concentration of solid particulates.
34. The Met Office's Environment Monitoring
and Response Centre (EMARC) was notified by the Icelandic Meteorological
Office (IMO) of the eruption and instigated standard procedures
in line with ICAO guidance. The NAME dispersion model was run
twice a day to provide forecasts of the location of the ash. These
predictions were used in conjunction with any available observations
of the ash to generate the VAAC Advisory graphics and associated
text messages. It is standard weather forecasting process that
a trained forecaster combines forecast model information with
observational data to provide a prediction. This same interpretation
of the model output also formed the basis of advice the Met Office
provided to the relevant parties. Whenever the Met Office was
notified of a significant change in the volcano's behaviour by
IMO, either in terms of the amount of material emitted or the
height to which it was emitted, the dispersion model was re-run.
VAAC forecasts were issued at 0, 6, 12 and 18:00 hours GMT every
day.
35. During the course of this event the
Met Office was in contact through telephone conferences and email
with the following organisations:
(b) NATS and through them the airlines and airports
in teleconferences;
(c) the Department for Transport and other Government
departments;
(d) Eurocontrol and through them other air traffic
control organisations;
(e) European aviation met services and through
them other national regulators;
(f) European Met Watch Offices;
(g) Other VAACs, in particular VAAC Toulouse
who would have been responsible for providing predictions should
the Met Office's system have failed;
(h) ICAO (European office and Montreal Office);
(i) World Meteorological Organization; and
(j) NERC for the provision of airspace and surface
monitoring facilities.
The Met Office was in regular contact with each
of these bodies, in most cases several times a day. Guidance was
provided to the RAF through our Defence forecasters as part of
our standard briefing process. We also participated in, and provided
briefings to, COBR and its Scottish equivalent, SAGE, the Health
Protection Agency and Defra.
36. As is normal practise the Met Office
established an Incident Management Team to oversee all aspects
of its involvement in the incident.
37. Paragraph 3.4.8 of the ICAO Manual[54]
makes clear that there were no agreed values of ash concentration
which constitute a hazard to jet aircraft engine. The recommended
procedure was therefore to avoid flying through any concentration
of volcanic ash. The Met Office was asked to provide its forecasting
and advisory services to the CAA on this basis. The model threshold
used as the basis for delineating areas of ash in London VAAC
guidance was based on the data in a table used in the Volcanic
Ash Forecast Transport and Dispersion (VAFTAD—a model used
in the USA).
38. In response to VAAC London advice that
the "ash cloud" would cover much of Europe, many European
nations' aviation authorities closed airspace during the period
15-23 April 2010. The unprecedented scale and impact of the Icelandic
volcanic eruption prompted airlines and aircraft manufacturers
to agree between themselves a safe level of atmospheric ash concentration
which the CAA promptly endorsed. Once these new standards were
agreed, the Met Office was asked to modify its advice to provide
differing sets of analysis depending on the concentration of ash
in the atmosphere. These products were issued as supplementary
guidance to the official VAAC advisory graphics.
39. Throughout the incident work was ongoing
to extend the capability of NAME to represent more fully the specific
nature of the Eyjafjallajökull eruption[55]
and develop additional products to help Cabinet Office, the civil
aviation industry, MOD and Defra to manage the incident. Development
occurred at pace, but always in such a way as to ensure resilience
of the production capability, with many more staff than normal
working shift patterns and being on call to ensure we could respond
promptly to changes in volcanic activity or customer needs.
40. In parallel with providing forecasts
of the ash trajectory it was necessary to obtain observations
of the ash cloud, the size, location and concentration of the
particles. These were needed to:
(a) determine the height to which the volcano
was erupting and how much material was being emitted;
(b) manually adjust the extent of the ash cloud
before issuance of the VAAC product;
(c) assist regulators in tactical decisions about
opening/closing airports;
(d) provide data to assist engine and airframe
manufacturers in determining safe limits; and
(e) help convince the public, media and airline
industry the threat was real.
41. Three sources of observational data
exist: satellite data, in-situ data taken from an aircraft
and remotely sensed ground based observations. All three sources
of observation have limitations and concentration and particle
size estimates have significant error bars associated with them.
Whilst it is possible to provide ash/no ash observations relatively
quickly and initial estimates of concentration ranges, these observations
need time-consuming and lengthy analysis before concentration
and particle size data estimates can be quoted with confidence.
42. The Met Office has access to large amounts
of satellite derived products; some are fully operational others
are still in development. These were routinely used, particularly
to help assess the height to which the volcano was erupting and
the extent of the ash. However satellite derived products have
a number of limitations, particularly in cloudy conditions, often
prevalent in northern latitudes, or when the ash particles become
coated in ice.
43. Ground based observation assets are
limited, but inventive use of the assets did help to observe the
plume. The Met Office contacted colleagues in academia and using
both Met Office, NERC and academic instruments it was possible
to obtain data for up to six fixed locations within the UK from
15 April 2010. These data were supplemented by information from
the Met Office's standard network of cloud observing equipment.
44. The Facility for Airborne Atmospheric
Measurements (FAAM) BAe 146 aircraft (jointly leased by NERC and
the Met Office to perform atmospheric research) was unavailable
at the start of the eruption as it was stripped down for essential
maintenance. Instruments were transferred from it to the Natural
Environment Research Council (NERC) Dornier 228 aircraft which
flew four flights until it suffered engine damage on 19 April
2010 which was later found to be consistent with sulphuric acid.
The BAe146 was re-equipped and flew 11 missions between 20 April
2010 and 18 May 2010. The Met Office played a key role in planning
these flights and provided scientists to help staff the flights
and analyse the data.
45. The Met Office also contacted its European
and North American counterparts to ask for assistance in providing
observational data of the "ash cloud". This provided
access (not necessarily in real time) to additional ground based
observations and satellite products which were under development.
Of particular value however was the assistance provided by the
German Aerospace Centre (DLR) in conjunction with the German Met
Service (DWD). They provided intelligence from their research
aircraft which undertook flights in both UK and European airspace,
complementing the flights undertaken by the BAe 146 and Dornier.
46. The Met Office also explored options
with MOD and its supply chain for the provision of additional
UK assets (including Unmanned Airborne Vehicles) which would be
suitable to provide additional data. When all suitable assets
were found to be deployed on operations joint Met Office and FCO
diplomatic communications with the US were started. One member
of Met Office staff was transferred to the UK Embassy in Washington
to help negotiations and provide briefings on the situation.
IMPORTANCE OF
COORDINATION AND
HOW IT
COULD BE
STRENGTHENED
47. Weather systems and other natural hazards
do not respect international boundaries and hence international
cooperation is often essential in the management of weather related
hazards. This is particularly true if the event involves the transport
of material (volcanic ash, chemical, biological or nuclear agent)
which has been emitted into the atmosphere and is thus able to
be carried long distances by the wind.
48. Nor do they respect the delineation
between Government Department and research body responsibilities.
Better coordination of expertise and developing capability has
already proven successful in the Flood Forecasting Centre. This
partnership between the Met Office and the Environment Agency
provided much clearer and longer lead times for warnings during
last year's Cumbrian floods and there is scope, through further
partnerships, to expand this concept to encompass other natural
hazards in a single warning and monitoring centre.
49. An example of international partnering
to the benefit of all participating countries is in space weather
where the UK has the data assimilation skills lacking in the US
and the US has the satellite, solar modelling and predictive capability.
Partnerships like this, whether where UK national and international
concerns coincide or in drawing cross-Government capability together
in the UK, would undoubtedly result in a more cost effective final
solution and on a time scale much increased than each partner
alone would otherwise achieve.
THE MET
OFFICE
The Met Office is a Trading Fund Agency owned
by MOD. We are a world leading scientific organisation,
both in the field of weather forecasting and climate prediction.
An independent review of the Met Office Hadley Centre published
in 2007[56]
acknowledged the pioneering nature of our work and our position
at the "pinnacle of global climate science".
The Met Office is globally unique. We offer
prediction across all timescales (weather and climate) using a
single, highly sophisticated computer forecasting model and drawing
from an extensive, shared observations network.
The Met Office operates the Public Weather Service
(PWS), which is funded by Government through MOD, providing operational
forecasts to the public—including the Severe Weather Warning
System—and fulfilling international commitments on behalf
of the UK Government.
Weather forecasting has improved rapidly in
the last 10 years and the latest figures from the World Meteorological
Organization (a UN agency) show definitively that the Met Office
is the most accurate operational weather forecaster in the world.
These improvements are bringing real and genuine value to the
economy: an independent report from 2007 concluded that for every
£1.40 of public money invested in our Public Weather Service
alone, the Met Office returned over £10 of savings to the
UK taxpayer. The report also acknowledged how investment in the
PWS enabled the development of the science that underpins the
UK's response to incidents as diverse as Buncefield, Volcanic
Ash and outbreaks of bluetongue among UK livestock.
Although the Met Office has no statutory responsibility
it is identified as the preferred supplier of meteorological information
and services under the Civil Contingencies Act.
Met Office
16 September 2010
54 The ICAO Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material
and Toxic Chemical Clouds states: "Unfortunately, at present
there are no agreed values of ash concentration which constitute
a hazard to jet aircraft engines. This matter is discussed in
detail in Chapter 4, but it is worth noting at this stage that
the exposure time of the engines to the ash and the thrust settings
at the time of the encounter both have a direct bearing on the
threshold value of ash concentration that constitutes a hazard.
In view of this, the recommended procedure in the case of volcanic
ash is exactly the same as with low-level wind shear, regardless
of ash concentration: AVOID AVOID AVOID" Back
55
No two volcanic eruptions, or indeed natural hazard events, will
be the same. As the event unfolds and more observational data
becomes available it is possible to refine the modelling to provide
more specific advice. Back
56
Hadley Centre Review 2006 Final Report; a report for DEFRA/MOD-Risk
Solutions March 2007 Back
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