HC 499 - Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies

Memorandum submitted by the
Royal Aeronautical Society (SAGE 10)

Executive Summary

The eruption of the Eyjafjallajokull volcano had a big impact on the Air Transport industry, causing considerable disruption and economic cost. There are recognised international procedures for avoiding flight in ash clouds, which were followed by UK and European regulators. Monitoring and evaluating the progress, extent and danger of the cloud often entailed taking decisions with partial data and imperfect models. The UK professional agencies in the main responded appropriately and well; some of the UK governmental structures responded less well. However, the UK in general was able to lead Europe in coping with the crisis.

An intense period of solar storms is likely, and will have the potential to cause considerable disruption to space-based hardware and especially communications on which many key terrestrial services have come to depend. The ability of the UK and Europe to assess and to respond to the resultant crisis is currently limited. However, steps are being taken to increase understanding of solar storm risks and to establish appropriate procedures.

Introduction

1. The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) is the world’s only professional body dedicated to the entire aerospace community. Established in 1866, the Society has 17,000 members in over 100 countries (including 3,500 classified as young members), and is a leader and provider of foresight within the aerospace community. The work of the Society is supported by a number of specialist groups including a Flight Operations Group and a Space Group. The Society’s response focuses on two of the case studies - the impact of volcanic ash on air transport and solar storms.

Volcanic Ash

2. The affects of volcanic ash clouds on civil aircraft have been recognised for some time. These primarily relate to the dangers of material ingested into jet engines leading to immediate loss of power, or a cumulative effect on engine performance and durability as a result of chemical bonding on fan and turbine blades and blockage of inlets. In at least one well known incident, a BA Boeing 747 lost power from all four engines over Indonesia, but recovered after an emergency restart to make an emergency landing.

Detection and monitoring of the eruption

3. Detecting and monitoring of the eruption including quantitative information on the size, composition and other physical features of the ash cloud, plus forecasting the movement of the ash and gas clouds into the future.

4. The first step (detection, monitoring and forecasting) is coordinated under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Nine Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) are located around the world, each responsible for providing the information on eruptions in a defined geographical region – see map. Approximately 60 volcanic eruptions occur each year many close to well travelled air routes, for example across the North Pacific and in South-East Asia, the Caribbean and South America. For the Eyjafjallajokull eruption, the UK Met Office was the responsible VAAC. Data from a mix of ground, air and space platforms was used by the UK Met Office together with its Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME) computer model.

5. On 26-27 May 2010, following the eruption, a workshop in Frascati Italy took stock of Europe’s remote sensing capabilities to address the impact of the Eyjafjallajokull eruption. 1 The recommendations of the Frascati and an earlier meeting prior to the Icelandic eruption in Chile, provide an authoritative and up-to-the-minute view of what actions can and should be taken to improve the detection and monitoring of eruptions as concerns our ability to cope with the consequences of future events for air transport.

6. The Chilean workshop noted that instrumentation on the European Meteosat Second Generation (MSG) weather satellite offers superior spectral, spatial, and temporal capabilities compared to the other geostationary instruments currently in orbit. MSG covers Europe, Africa, and the Atlantic as far as the Lesser Antilles, which means that significant improvement in satellite ash detection for Europe and Africa is already in place that will not be available in the Americas for example until after 2015 when the GOES-R satellite is due to be launched.

7. The Frascati workshop concluded that "the London VAAC did an excellent job on the monitoring and forecasting of the movement of the volcanic ash during the Eyjafjallajokull eruption" and noted that "the collection of remote sensing data, acquired over the period of the eruption of Eyjafjallajokull l, presents a remarkably rich source of information for studying this event".

8. The workshop summarised the two major lessons learned from the experience:

· One of the largest uncertainties was information on the eruption source parameters for model initialisation which leads to discrepancies in model outputs. Action is needed to ensure that accurate and timely data are available from volcano observatories or monitoring stations situated near volcanoes. In addition to monitoring the eruptions as they progress, satellites are recognised as able to provide early warning, i.e.: advance notice, of volcanic eruptions by detecting hot spots or sulphur dioxide emissions.

· The second big uncertainty was obtaining information on ash cloud concentrations. There is pressing need for further development and application of techniques for incorporating satellite data in forecast models in order to provide quantified ash cloud advisory information including height.

9. The space community is already responding to the recommendations of the Frascati workshop, with studies to be made of potential new satellites and instruments dedicated to monitoring volcanic ash plumes and eruptions. The European Space Agency has already adjusted an ongoing study on a class of sensors called lidars to address this question. 2

The hazard and standard procedures

10. There are established procedures to cope with eruptions. ICAO rules are clear: any flight in known volcanic ash is to be prohibited.3 This ruling was followed in the case of the Eyjafjallajokull eruption defaulting to the safe condition of grounding of most flights over the United Kingdom and Northern Europe. This was at some cost to the European transport industry, estimated to be in the order of £100-£200m (US$150-300m) per day (with doubtless greater losses to the rest of the economy).4 The Eyjafjallajokull eruption was especially disruptive due to unseasonable weather conditions and the fact that this eruption covered a particularly intense part of the global air transport network.

11. The hazards presented by the 2010 Eyjafjallajokull (E15) eruption were the potential damage that volcanic residues (ash and chemical aerosol) could cause to flying aircraft, in particular jet aircraft carrying passengers. The presence of this hazard was identified by the United Kingdom VAAC operated on behalf of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) by the Met Office (a trading fund of the Ministry of Defence). These hazards were identified from local reports of volcanic eruptions, then forecast models run at Met Office’s headquarters in Exeter. This information was then supplied to the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and National Air Traffic Services (NATS).

Government preparations for the emergency and use of scientific advice

12. Some parts of UK government handled this emergency extremely well, others less so. It must also be recognised that the lack of elected leadership through this crisis was particularly unfortunate, coinciding as it did with the general election campaign. Senior participants were aware in the early part of the crisis of the considerable intellectual leadership of Lord Andrew Adonis as both transport and science minister; but once the election campaign was under way this leadership was not apparently replaced by a single either elected or appointed official or by a defined group. The main agencies involved were:

Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)

13. The CAA initially closed UK airspace, appropriately and promptly, in accordance with ICAO procedures. There was an expectation that leadership in these issues would be taken by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); once this was not forthcoming from EASA, the CAA through its Head of Airworthiness rapidly created a working conference of all available national and international experts which subsequently steered UK (and through example, Europe) to timely solutions.

Met Office

14. The Met Office, acting as an agency of the MoD, has a role in providing support to the UK in cases of civil contingency. In this case, it was the UK VAAC and provided regularly updated information to CAA on the status of the ash cloud.

15. The Met Office rapidly redirected the available scientific resources to develop an under standing of the problems and to provide advice to central government. However in the early stages of the crisis there appears to have been a deterioration in communications, which led other organisations to question the Met Office’s role and competence. Later in the crisis, the Met Office more effectively took on a scientific leadership role.

Department for Transport (DfT)

16. A few days into the crisis, the DfT attempted to assume a leadership role. However, this largely confused issues rather than helping, tending to interfere with the work of the CAA and other scientific actors who by that time already had a better appreciation of the situation and scientific competence and were far better placed to lead the response.

The Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)

17. The Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) is operator of the Dornier 228 Airborne Research and Surveying Facility (ARSF), and 50% owner with the Met Office of the Facility for Airborne Atmospheric Measurements (FAAM), operating the BAe-146-301 large Atmospheric Research Aircraft (ARA).

18. NERC reconfigured ARSF using instruments from FAAM and was obtaining airborne data to supply CAA and the Met Office within 11 hours of the initial airspace closure. Once it was realised that this emergency was not short term, NERC worked with the Met Office to make the ARA available within 6 days of the initial airspace closure. NERC’s National Centre for Atmospheric Sciences (NCAS) and British Geological Survey (BGS) took an immediate national lead in providing expert advice as required on the non-engineering scientific issues that became live. Subsequently, NERC’s British Atmospheric Data Centre (BADC) took the European lead in collating all data that was collected by various means.

National Air Traffic Services (NATS)

19. National Air Traffic Services (NATS) ensured timely closure of airspace once volcanic ash was known to be present, subsequently taking instruction from the CAA.

Ministry of Defence (MoD)

20. MoD was heavily affected, primarily as a large operator of aeroplanes. It was able rapidly to take appropriate advice and decided that flying would only be authorised for lifesaving purposes, whilst keeping the situation under review. Appropriate MoD laboratories were also rapidly redirected to investigating necessary airworthiness issues. There was to some extent a failure on the part of MoD to ensure adequate coordination with the airworthiness efforts centre on the CAA. Better coordination between MoD and CAA would have been beneficial.

Cabinet Office Civil Contingency Office

21. The Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingency Office co-ordinated with the Department for Transport and others, but like DfT, it came relatively late to the event and failed to recognise the leadership already assumed by other actors, particular by the CAA, Met Office and NERC.

The Government Chief Scientist

22. The Government Chief Scientist formed a Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), which brought together a wide group of appropriate scientists - albeit under some secrecy.  SAGE appears to have acted as a useful co-ordination medium for those senior scientists, but the lack of visibility of its existence and membership perhaps degraded its usefulness, since other players within the emergency could otherwise have perhaps been able to contact individual members with requests that SAGE acted as a co-ordinator for other critical communications.

Government agencies’ understanding of the crisis - a summary

23.There were clear differences between government organisations in the degree of scientific and situational understanding of the crisis.  The CAA, with the Met Office and NERC close behind had the clearest understanding of a difficult and complex problem where data and scientific modelling were often uncertain. The MoD had good scientific appreciation but did not heavily engage with the civil efforts. The DfT and the Cabinet Office had a poor scientific understanding for much of the time; this weakened their situational appreciation, rendering their attempts to adopt leadership roles often  ill-judged.  SAGE clearly had good scientific literacy, but the relative secrecy of its operation was an obvious weakness.

Obstacles to obtaining reliable, timely scientific advice and evidence to inform policy decisions in emergencies

24. However, it is clear that, despite some problems, the UK agencies worked very well together – certainly far more coherently than any other country in Europe. Decision makers had access very rapidly to high quality scientific advice, which was freely given.

25. There were occasions where this advice was not adequately used; the most obvious of these being that considerable resources were expended on the problem of flying research aircraft into the core of the ash plume. Scientific advice was that this was both unnecessary to achieve a good understanding of the situation, and endangered vital national assets. For example, the USA withdrew an offer to lend aircraft because they, like the UK aircraft operators, were unprepared to fly into the core of the ash plume - indeed a NASA DC8 did so in 2000 and suffered US3.2m of damage. Despite these strong caveats from expert bodies, senior management in several organisations pursued this course of action, distracting them from more important issues.

Government powers and resources

26. In most cases, the Government had sufficient power resources to get to grips with the problem. The largest obstacle was financial commitment – the DfT were particularly very reluctant to underwrite the cost of damage to, or to pay for the use of airborne resources committed by NERC and the Met Office. The DfT still has not done so, with the risk that these resources will not be available be in a future emergency.

The adequacy and timeliness of scientific evidence informing policy decisions

27. Scientific evidence was available from various sources – universities, NERC and the Met Office worked together to provide geological and atmospheric science advice freely available as and when required by decision makers. The CAA worked with aircraft and engine manufacturers to ensure a high level of understanding of the engineering science problems and thus the airworthiness implications.

Strategic coordination

28. Strategic coordination between Government departments, public bodies, private bodies, sources of scientific advice and the research base in preparing for and reacting to emergencies was less effective Preparation for this emergency was essentially non-existent and almost all coordination occurred ad-hoc. Nonetheless, the quality of this ad-hoc decision making structure turned out to be very good, and served the UK very well.

29. It could be argued that a scientifically and managerial competent "national emergency co-ordinating body" could have provided better leadership – although in this instance this might have been doubtful given the special circumstances surrounding this crisis. However, it was clear that the required leadership ultimately came down to a small number of key individuals who might not be present in a comparable emergency in the future.

International coordination

30. International coordination was necessary on two levels; sharing of information and the coordination of resources.

31. The sharing of information worked extremely well; aeronautical engineering data exchange was coordinated through the CAA’s airworthiness / volcanic ash teleconferences and supporting communication. Such sharing was probably unprecedented in the history of aeronautics.

32. International (as opposed to British national) coordination of resources was often very poor. US Government offers of resources were wasted through lack of understanding in the senior ranks of HMG organisations. The Spanish government requested a 1-day "hire" of the ARA to try and unlock Spanish airspace, which was refused by HMG in order to hold the aircraft in reserve when it was clear that it was not going to be required at the time.

Solar Storms

33. The volcanic ash crisis was an unusually disruptive event but in all probability volcanic eruptions will occur again in the European area. Solar storms are also regular natural phenomena, but we have yet to experience a major event that has the potential to have a disruptive global impact on satellite-based or dependent services. There have been a number of serious local disruptive events.

34. In the USA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is mandated to provide space weather information. In the same way that NOAA supplies information freely about earth-bound weather, anyone interested in the subject of space weather can obtain it from the NOAA Space Weather Prediction Centre (SWPC). 1 There is no equivalent arrangement or organisation in the UK, although there has been some discussion about the Met Office setting up a UK Natural Hazards centre to cover all aspects of natural hazards including space weather.