Forensic Science Service
Written evidence submitted by Dr S P Day (FSS 31)
Executive Summary
1.
The Forensic Science Service’s failure to survive in the marketplace is a symptom of a dysfunctional market caused by an inappropriate procurement framework and in-sourcing. The current situation is driving a re-nationalisation of forensic science by the back door to the detriment of innovation, best value and impartiality. I believe that the Government’s "firm ambition that there will be no continuing state interest in a forensics provider by March 2012" can be achieved but a fundamental reform of the Forensic Science market place is needed. I am therefore writing to you to present an outline proposal for the future organisation of forensic science in this country.
Declaration of Interests
2.
I am a current employee of the Forensic Science Service (FSS). The views expressed here are my own personal views, not those of the FSS.
Index:
3.
The topics below are covered in the paragraphs indicated below:
4: About the Author
5-8: The Forensic Science Marketplace
9-20: National Procurement Framework
21-32: Police In-Sourcing
33-42: Conditions for a Healthy Market
43-50: Regulatory Body
51: Conclusion
About the Author
4.
I have 29 years experience as a forensic scientist in a number of roles with both the present Forensic Science Service and formerly with the Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory. During this time I have acted as an expert, consultant and scientific lead, appearing in court on many occasions, and I have also performed roles as operations lead, a product manager and commercial lead, the last resulting in Green-Belt accreditation in the use of Lean-Sigma tools.
The Forensic Science Marketplace
5.
While the failure of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) might be attributed to poor financial management, a lack of strategic direction and failure to listen to the customer, it should not disguise the fact that the demise of the FSS is a symptom of a wider problem within the forensic marketplace. The market is dysfunctional because of an inappropriate procurement framework focused on purchasing commodities, not services or whole-business solutions and the in-sourcing of work by the police reducing opportunities for growth.
The Conditions Required for a Market to Operate
6.
From previous work
it has been established that the forensic market place needs to:
·
Provide high-quality service that meets the needs of the police, the courts and the citizen, re-assures the public and inspires confidence.
·
be impartial.
·
provide best value.
·
and be at the forefront of international forensic science through innovation.
7.
This was generally the view expressed by Mr McFarland in his review in which he recommended that the Forensic Science Service become a GovCo in preparation for full privatisation as a Public/Private Partnership, and he has re-stated these aims in a recent letter to The Guardian newspaper. He believes that the current market is dysfunctional for two main reasons which are:
·
That the police are the sole arbiters of what scene of crime samples are sent for analysis
·
Increased in-sourcing of forensic services
8.
The following paragraphs deal with the problems created by the National Procurement Framework and police in-sourcing before discussing the requirements for a healthy and sustainable market.
National Procurement Framework
9.
As an experienced Forensic Scientist I know that a successful investigation of a case, whether it results in acquittal or conviction, ultimately relies on the material initially collected.
10.
In the current commodity-based procurement system as defined by the National Police Improvement Agency’s (NPIA) National Procurement Framework, a forensic scientist is rarely involved in influencing what to collect, what to submit, or what issue to address, causing a systemic failure when investigating crime using forensic science.
11.
The National Procurement Framework is flawed because it assumes that there is only one type of forensic product but in fact there are two; Forensic Testing, and Forensic Interpretation. It is aimed at delivering commodities, not service.
12.
Forensic Testing products deliver certifiable results using standard operating procedures. The product specifications can be tightly defined and rigorous quality controls can be introduced to ensure the products meet the market-defined standards. Drugs testing, DNA profiling (including user-defined search specifications) and blood/urine testing all fall into this category and comprise approximately 60% of the total accessible forensic market, by revenue.
13.
Forensic testing products benefit from a market economy because there is sufficient demand and competition to drive innovation.
14.
Forensic Interpretation products are characterised by their reliance on expertise (not process), by their unpredictability, and their focus on solving a problem. Like CSI on television, every case is different. They are expensive because they require investment in an individual’s knowledge, scientific research, and innovation. Forensic Interpretation products make up around 40% of the total accessible forensic market and around 54% of this is the finding and interpretation of body fluids. The rest is comprised of at least 16 other disciplines, each requiring the same degree of expertise. Crimes are often solved by combining two or more disciplines.
15.
In the submissions where investigative skills are required the National Procurement Framework drives the wrong behaviour in Scientific Support units. Cases where inadequate or insufficient samples have been submitted or where the strategy for the forensic investigation has been set based on cost or policy rather than effectiveness are common.
16.
Because of the way the National Procurement Framework is constructed the forensic interpretation products often find themselves competing against forensic testing products. Getting a DNA profile does not necessarily solve a crime but is a lot cheaper than interpretation of how the DNA got there, which is the more important aspect of successfully solving a crime. Interpretation will only be seen to give value for money when the total cost of crime is taken into account instead of just the "forensic spend" as happens in a commoditised market.
17.
The current product-based system has no way of valuing a service that changes the way police work, for example by collecting more effective samples or by saving police time that can then be spent on front-line duties.
18.
A consequence of this is that some forensic science disciplines, such as Fibres, Questioned Document Examination, Glass Comparison, Paint Comparison, Toolmark comparison, analysis of Noxious Substances and so on are considered expensive and are becoming less used. Eventually the skills will be lost to the country.
19.
Forensic interpretation is a holistic service not a series of discrete products and the market should be re-constructed to trade services, not products.
20.
Conclusion: The National Procurement Framework pricing structure is inappropriate for the majority of disciplines because it drives the wrong behaviours within police scientific support units. Consequently there is a risk that some Forensic Interpretation disciplines will not be available to solve major crime in the future.
Police In-Sourcing
21.
The police state that their "spend on external forensic suppliers will continue to fall over the next few years" as the effects of budget cuts takes hold. However, their spend on internal forensic science is high already and is set to rapidly increase.
22.
There is a growing trend within police forces to undertake forensic science in scientific support units instead of placing the services out to tender. Whole internal industries are growing up around mobile phones, computer forensics, footwear, accident investigation and body fluid searching.
23.
The Metropolitan Police have already introduced and staffed a 100-strong laboratory to replace the Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory (MPFSL) that the Conservative Government of 1995 took away from them, and West Midlands Police, Greater Manchester Police and the Yorkshire forces all have similar plans at various stages of advancement.
24.
Fingerprints is a discipline that is completely absorbed into the internal police structure, and this may be the fate of all interpretive forensic science if this trend is allowed to continue.
25.
The forensic providers are gradually being replaced with police-owned, state-run laboratories- Nationalisation by the back door. In-sourcing prevents the growth of a true market place and challenges all four of the basic requirements for a market stated above, as described in paragraphs 25-31.
26.
Quality: regulation in the industry is weak. Forensic science providers already have to attain ISO standards, but police laboratories do not have to until 2015. If internal Police laboratories are to be allowed, then they must deliver to the same quality standards now.
27.
Impartiality: McFarland says that "it is stretching credulity that [impartiality] could remain meaningful if the expert owes his career to a police service which, in an adversarial court system, is intent on securing conviction. Police-owned laboratories will not be seen by the public or courts as impartial, irrespective of whether they are or not.
28.
Best Value: In-sourcing is felt to be a cheaper option than placing the work with a forensic supplier. However, the real cost of running services in-house is usually under-estimated and laboratories focused on the work of one police force or a group of police forces do not compete and cannot benefit from the economies of scale, shared expertise or from the market forces that drive the best value for the customer.
29.
Innovation: If the suppliers are all internally focused then improvements will be piece-meal and directed at immediate local problems. Shrinkage and fragmentation of the market, as is happening at the moment, will mean that forensic science providers will have less money to invest, and innovation will cease.
30.
One of the strengths of the FSS over the years has been its innovation and there is a groundswell of opinion from eminent forensic scientists such as Dr Alec Jefferys and president of the American Academy of the Forensic Sciences, Joseph Bono that winding up the Forensic Science Service will be the end of that innovation.
31.
As discussed above, a larger external forensic market will create space for companies to grow, and with that growth will come investment and innovation.
32.
Conclusion: In-Sourcing of Forensic Science is destroying the marketplace and will reduce quality, value for money, impartiality and innovation.
Conditions for a Healthy Forensic Market
33.
Providing the pricing structure is reformed to prevent inappropriate commoditisation of products and allows innovation in delivery and service offerings, and providing the trend to police in-sourcing is reversed, then demand for external forensic provision will grow and most of the disciplines will survive in the market.
34.
One of the terms of reference for the select committee to consider is: "What are the alternatives to winding-down the Forensic Science Service?" Given the issues discussed above, I consider the steps in paragraphs 34-41 need to be taken to create an environment that would allow the market to flourish.
35.
The full scope of the marketplace needs to be defined by discipline so that it is clear which services are best delivered through in-sourced Police laboratories and which will benefit from market forces. This should include consideration of fingerprints, mobile phones and computer analysis as well as those activities currently undertaken by the FSS.
36.
The power of the regulator needs to be increased so that all services, both in-sourced and externally provided, are subject to the same standards of quality and regulation now.
37.
The operational laboratory services currently offered by the FSS should be separated from the corporate organisation to create four independent Operational Units (London, Huntingdon, Wetherby and Birmingham).
38.
The existing police laboratories identified from action 1 should either be combined with one of the ex-FSS units (para 37), offered to the market place separately or simply disbanded, with subsequent transfer of the demand into the private sector.
39.
Staff, management and other forensic providers should be given the opportunity to submit proposals to manage and run the Operational Units thus created. "Pump-priming" finance in the form of business loans for the best proposals may be necessary to ensure that these units can compete in the market place from day one.
40.
Any redundancy required would need to be financed by the Government, not transferred to the new Operational Units.
41.
The National Framework will need to be reformed so that companies can tender for offering a complete service rather than pricing per product (except where the product can be closely defined). For instance, police could buy a "Burglary Service" to increase detections through forensic science by x% or reduce time spent at a scene by the Scenes of Crime Officer by y%. There would be tangible, measurable benefits expected through purchase of the service that would demonstrate value for money and create the opportunity for innovation.
42.
A "Forensic Science Institute" will need to be formed to regulate and support the market. It would include the Regulator’s Office, the databases currently run by the NPIA including the NDNADB, and possibly the training functions of Harperly Hall (NPIA), the Forgery desk (Immigration) and the research function of the police research and development branch (PSDB-NPIA).
Role of the Regulatory Body
43.
The Institute would regulate the market and set scientific standards through the Regulator.
44.
The Institute would effectively be the ombudsman for Forensic Science; it would ensure co-ordination of Forensic Suppliers in the event of a major terrorist incident, assist in investigation of "cold-case" reviews and in miscarriages of justice.
45.
It would ensure rare interpretive services are maintained.
46.
It would run databases needed by the industry including those relating to DNA, Firearms, Fingerprints and the Drugs Intelligence Service, ensuring Forensic Science Providers (FSPs) have regulated and appropriate access to the relevant data.
47.
The Institute could also take an overview of forensic science training and research and assist FSPs and Universities in developing private/police partnerships to support innovation. It would take over the forensic research of the Police Scientific Support Branch
48.
The Institute would maintain strong links internationally and advise the government on forensic matters
49.
Most of the required organisation exists already but is spread around the police service. Some if not most of the required financing could be raised through rationalisation of existing services currently delivered through the NPIA and other organisations.
50.
The Forensic Science Institute would be state-owned, but not run by the police directly. Its function would be to put the interests of the customer first, but it should not be the customer, as it currently is in the Forensic sector.
Conclusion
51.
Implementing this plan will
·
Create a larger external demand
·
Create more competition by introducing more providers
·
Drive best value for the Police service
·
Increase and re-enforce the impartial nature of forensic science
·
Ensure innovation is at the heart of service provision
·
Provide independent national co-ordination of non-profit-making activities
·
Ensure that rarely-used services are preserved
·
Introduce a regulatory framework independent of suppliers and customers.
Dr. S.P. Day
10 February 2011
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