Forensic Science Service
Written evidence submitted by the FSS London Toxicology Team (FSS 42)
This response follows the same order as defined in the Terms of Reference issued in January 2011.
Declaration of Interest
This response has been compiled by members of the FSS London Toxicology Team and the responses are therefore mainly specific to this particular work area. It is not a corporate response and the views contained within are those of the submitters only. Representatives can be made available to give oral evidence to the Committee should you so wish.
Responses
1.1.
Currently the FSS Toxicology Section performs around 75% of the total work of the forensic toxicology market within England and Wales (Scotland and N. Ireland are supported by other, state-funded, laboratories). This comprises around 3000 Criminal Toxicology cases, 1800 Drugs/Driving cases, 7500 Road Traffic Act (RTA) alcohol cases and 800 Alcohol Technical Defence (ATD) cases.
1.2.
FSS Toxicology is the largest team of forensic toxicologists (45) within the UK and possibly the world.
1.3.
Within the FSS, toxicology was, until very recently, delivered from Chorley and London laboratories only. The closure of the Chorley laboratory was announced in June 2009 which comprised 40% of total staff involved in toxicology analyses and 40% of the casework, including, specifically, dedicated units which delivered RTA alcohols and Drug/Driving cases.
1.4.
Toxicologists at FSS Chorley had a total of 400 years experience between them and of these none are staying within forensic science in the UK; all of those that have found jobs are leaving the profession. London Toxicology has 600 years experience within the team and there is a very real risk that most of this experience will be lost from the profession too, should the FSS be wound-down.
1.5.
We know that there is insufficient capacity elsewhere in forensic toxicology for FSS casework to be absorbed. The FSS Toxicology team is larger than all of the other providers put together.
1.6.
As with virtually all forensic science disciplines, experience counts for a lot within this work area. We have a good balance of new recruits and experience which works well and would continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It is important that a critical mass is maintained going forward.
1.7.
Some casework does not require a large amount of expertise, much of it does. The minimum training time for a casework criminal toxicology court-going Reporting Officer (RO) is one year. Training for analytical staff takes at least 6 months. Once trained the simplest casework can be undertaken. To deliver all types of casework can require at least 10 years training, mentoring and experience. Consequently it takes a long time to develop a team capable of delivering all types of forensic toxicology casework.
1.8.
FSS Toxicology has a massive database of casework and this was used to publish 2 papers concerning drug facilitated sexual assault (DFSA) in the UK in 2005/6 i.e. how prevalent is it? The study comprised >1000 cases and was the first to go into the detail concerning deliberate spiking, showing how rare deliberate spiking with drugs is, but also showing the extent of the problem with alcohol in such crimes. This had a wide impact on the investigation of such crimes and education of potential victims. Publication of this paper was encouraged by the Government to help gauge the actual situation in the UK. Since then 2 papers by smaller suppliers have been published comprising 100 cases or less. We now have data for another 5-6000 cases which could be published given resources.
1.9.
FSS Toxicology leads the rest of the UK in setting protocols for delivery of DFSA, RTA alcohols, Drugs/Driving and ATD casework and assisted the NPIA in defining their requirements for toxicology products. We also have an input into investigation of DFSA cases in the USA and assisted them in setting appropriate standards.
1.10.
We are currently working on validation of a batch of new methods which, when completed, would have taken FSS Toxicology to the forefront in analytical approach since the processes were aimed precisely at the needs of the police by targeting them to the exact requirements of the National Forensic Procurement Framework (NFPF). This project is about to deliver the first stage into casework. A large amount of money has been invested in this project which would have had enormous benefits for the police in significant reduction of turnaround times and costs. It is difficult to envisage other providers investing this time and money (we have the equivalent of 6 staff on this project full-time) in such projects.
1.11.
The team also possesses the only DART-MS in the country which has been used many times on cases of national security giving virtually instant intelligence information (further details can be supplied privately if required).
1.12.
Given the FSS Toxicology team’s extensive experience we have been involved in a large number of high profile cases over the years including:
1.12.1.
Harold Shipman (GP who killed many patients)
1.12.2.
John Warboys (London Black-cab rapist)
1.12.3.
Shannon Matthews (child abduction)
1.12.4.
Kevin Cobb (male nurse who drugged and raped patients in hospital)
1.12.5.
Selina Hakki (female who drugged rich clients and stole expensive items)
1.12.6.
Godfrey Onubogu (bogus Defence Expert who was also involved in practising as a doctor without qualifications).
2.1 Toxicology is an expensive discipline to set up and deliver a quality service. Mass spectrometry equipment, which is required to deliver results to the required standard, is expensive and requires expertise. We have had many examples over the years where police have tried to get cheap, quick results by using hospital or other laboratories which are geared-up to do fast-screening thereby enabling rapid treatment of patients. Such analysis is not done to the requirements of the Criminal Justice System where it would come under much closer scrutiny. Standards expected for forensic analysis have been defined. Despite this we have numerous examples where analyses carried out by other laboratories have not been performed to the appropriate standards. A few examples include:
2.1.1.
A death reported as being due to overdosage of an anti-depressant which, when re-analysed at FSS and given a full interpretation, could have had an entirely innocent explanation.
2.1.2.
Cocaine metabolite and morphine reported in post-mortem blood sample from a bed-ridden epileptic who died in a nursing home. FSS analysis on remaining blood residue, using accredited methods, was negative.
2.1.3.
A reported fatal level of carbon monoxide in a putrid blood sample analysed spectrophotometrically when this method should never be used on such samples. The same laboratory then failed to detect an overdose level of cocaine and metabolite in the same sample.
2.1.4.
A reported significant blood alcohol level in a very young child which was actually negative when analysed by an accredited method.
2.1.5.
A laboratory which missed an overdose level of zopiclone in a mixed alcohol/drug fatality.
2.1.6.
A recent report containing the phrase "Note that the laboratory did not find a recognised benzodiazepine in the sample (by HPLC or GCMS) but found a significant concentration of a substance similar to the Rohypnol metabolite; 7-aminoflunitrazepam, which may be a non-proprietary illicit analogue similar to Rohypnol which may have been obtained from the Internet." Police enquired as to whether they should submit the sample for forensic analysis. They did submit it and no such compound was found. The wording on the report beggars belief.
2.2.
The likelihood is that police will in-source the cheap, easy forensic science and expect the private sector to take on the expensive, unprofitable examinations. Toxicology, as mentioned earlier, is an expensive discipline to set up properly. It is therefore unlikely that many, if any, forces, would be able to do anything more than perhaps carry out simple screening. This in itself is dangerous as many screening techniques are designed to be used in a workplace testing situation and not a forensic one. The much lower levels of drugs/metabolites which can be encountered in a forensic context, where samples may be taken days after an incident, would not be detected by many screening techniques. Many dip-stick tests operate in a similar manner and we have become aware that some have been used by police to screen samples before deciding whether to submit for toxicology analysis.
2.3.
There have also been very many cases brought to our notice where detailed interpretation of results has not been considered. This is when experience matters most. Some suppliers offer little more than an analytical certificate detailing the results with little, or no, interpretation of those results. This is a dangerous practice and one wonders how these certificates are viewed by CPS, and what use they make of them.
2.4.
Our Reporting Officers undergo a thorough training process at the end of which they participate in a certified expert witness course which is externally assessed. The Home Office recognises this course. Only one other forensic toxicology provider operates an expert witness course.
2.5.
When the Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners existed the Lead Assessor, and 2 out of 3 of the original Assessors, came from within FSS Toxicology and all FSS Toxicology ROs were registered. Very few from elsewhere were registered.
2.6.
The scope of accreditation of forensic suppliers for analytical work is included on the United Kingdom Accreditation Service’s (UKAS) website and we are the most accredited laboratory for forensic toxicology analyses. Only one other supplier (LGC) has a significant amount of such analytical work accredited. Acquiring accreditation requires much work and is expensive to achieve. A quality system comes at a price. Ever-increasingly it appears that police forces are unwilling to pay what’s needed for quality results; it can easily take a year or more to attain even limited accreditation.
2.7.
We have many cases where Defence Experts are appointed to investigate our findings and very rarely are any challenged.
2.8.
We routinely undertake analysis of what might be described as "difficult" samples e.g. samples from bodies which have been dead for many weeks/months. Many laboratories are designed to deal with clinical (and therefore fresh, clean) samples and simply either cannot deal with these complex samples or attempt to use other routine methods with, sometimes, unfortunate consequences for accuracy of the results.
2.9.
One big benefit is that we are part of a laboratory which offers all forensic analyses and as such toxicologists can perform joint examinations with scientists from other disciplines; this would not be possible with most other providers. Failure to do so can compromise forensic evidence (e.g. fingerprint or DNA examinations on shared items such as glasses/ bottles from DFSA cases).
2.10.
We get positive feedback from customers regarding our quality of results and interpretation and offer an urgent service which many other providers do not (e.g. weekend analysis when required). We have picked up such work when other providers would not offer it.
2.11.
We take on work which isn’t profitable; private companies would almost certainly either not do this or would charge a much higher price to customers.
2.12
Several of us were previously employed at the Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory. In 1995 the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard, decided that we should merge with the national FSS because of fears concerning impartiality. Here we are, 16 years later, with such concerns apparently being cast to the wind. Many police forces are now setting up forensic services to a varying extent. Most of this appears to be unregulated (only one force has an accredited laboratory at present). FSS takes on work on behalf of the Defence.
2.13
In some Drug/Driving cases all of the evidence is provided to FSS Toxicology, including police statements, doctor’s notes etc., to review the whole case. Once all of the evidence is fully considered we have recommended that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) does not proceed with a prosecution, due to inadequacies in certain aspects in some instances, and cases have consequently been dropped.
3.1.
FSS Toxicology is now centralised following imminent closure of the FSS Chorley laboratory. We have therefore achieved efficiencies with cost-effective batching of analyses. We are unable to comment further.
4.1.
The private sector would need to make money. As it stands there is very little profit in the forensic marketplace. Private providers are not obliged to deliver forensic science.
4.2.
Eurofins withdrew from forensic toxicology in the UK in 2010 as there was no profit to be made.
4.3.
Other suppliers cannot anywhere near cope with a large increase in case load as they stand. None has enough equipment or personnel either. FSS Toxicology, as mentioned earlier, has around 75% of the overall forensic toxicology market. Apart from LGC most of the other suppliers concentrate on the Coroners’ Toxicology market, which can be significantly different in analytical requirements and, especially, interpretation of results.
4.4.
In order to deliver the required increase in forensic toxicology work suppliers would need to invest in additional laboratory space and equipment as well as a massive increase in recruitment of staff.
4.5.
Only one other provider (LGC) currently offers RTA alcohol and Drug/Driving analyses to the standards and requirements of the English and Welsh legal system. If FSS ceases to exist they will have a monopoly. An increase in prices would be inevitable. We do not believe this provider has the capacity to take on a significant amount of FSS work (currently both RTA alcohols and Drugs/Driving is split approximately 50:50 between FSS and LGC). [Update 11 February –NPIA have just asked LGC to take on FSS RTA alcohols casework and there is therefore now a monopoly].
4.6.
Although FSS subcontracts the analytical part of hair analysis we offer full interpretation. There are very few forensic providers who offer interpretation of hair results in the UK. Recently, in a child custody case, 2 providers of hair analysis were openly criticised in court, and in the press, for significant failings.
4.7.
The FSS Toxicology Team can deliver statements concerning rates of drug use in cases where a defendant is arguing personal use but has been charged with possession with intent to supply. This is partly because we have a close working relationship with our Drug Teams who publish drug seizure data. This is ending shortly given the FSS closure announcement. This data was also used widely within the country including by the Government/Advisory Council for the Misuse of Drugs.
4.8.
The Team also undertakes many very complex poisoning cases including "consumer terrorism" cases which often require bespoke painstaking analysis. We have very many years experience in tackling such cases.
4.9.
Succession planning within the FSS is excellent and we have a good balance of experience, for casework and mentoring, and younger, enthusiastic staff to guarantee continuation. This mix works well. As mentioned earlier, there is a lot of training required to deliver even the simplest casework. Analysis is not simply a "push-button out come the results" process as often depicted on TV. It is far more complicated than that and a significant degree of knowledge and understanding of the discipline is required to produce meaningful results.
4.10.
A few years ago it took a large sum of money for a new provider of toxicology services to set up a laboratory from scratch. This provider currently has 3 full-time ROs delivering casework; the FSS has 21, to give some perspective.
4.11.
The FSS Toxicology Team also undertakes work from abroad on behalf of other police forces e.g. Jamaica (Bob Woolmer case), Japan (Lucy Blackman case) and has worked with Abu Dhabi in assisting them attain international accreditation successfully.
5.1.
In excess of £50m was invested 2 years ago by the Home Office to allow the FSS to transform into a slicker organisation. The plan to deliver these benefits is exactly on schedule. If the decision to close the FSS is a financial one then time should be given to allow the full benefits to be realised. If not, then the money has been wasted. If the decision was to be reviewed in a year this would probably give sufficient time for the FSS to become a profit-making organisation again. The costs of winding-down the FSS are not known at present but are likely to be significant. There will also likely be significant costs in maintaining some of the legacy work of the FSS e.g. databases, cold-case review data etc. Given this it would probably make financial sense too for a year’s grace to be given.
5.2.
The forensic marketplace is in turmoil with police funding being reduced and forces consequently cutting back on their forensic submissions generally (although we have not noticed any significant decline yet in toxicology). If police forces in-source their forensic work they don’t see this as a cost. A review of actual total police spending on forensic work, including costs associated with in-sourcing, could prove useful. It is highly likely that English and Welsh police forces in the future will actually be spending more overall on their combined forensic science requirements by in-sourcing rather than by sending out to forensic suppliers. As previously mentioned, impartiality is not an issue if work is delivered outside of police forces.
5.3.
Without exception, the rest of the world sees forensic science as a publicly-funded service not to be carried out in the private sector. Consideration should be given to bringing it all back within the public sector. Attempts to establish a viable forensic market have seemingly failed. This is exactly what happened in New Zealand where the work is now publicly funded once more.
6.1.
When the situation was announced there were no plans on how to close down the FSS. Currently there still seems to be very few plans. At this moment there are still no details on staff redundancies or selling assets. There is a very high risk of the loss of a large amount of knowledge and expertise from forensic science.
M. Scott--Ham, Principal Scientist
T.J. Ayres, Team Leader
C.A.M. Horwood, Team leader
On behalf of London Toxicology Team
February 2011
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