Forensic Science Service

Written evidence submitted by Dr S R Baker (FSS 56)

Please find attached my submission to the Science & Technology Committee regarding the questions raised in the Select Committee press notice about the implications of the closure of the Forensic Science Service announced by James Brokenshire MP in the House of Commons on 14th December 2010. I believe the issues I have presented fall within the terms of reference of the Committee’s inquiry.

Declaration of Interest

I am a current employee of the Forensic Science Service Ltd, formerly as an operational forensic scientist, and latterly concerned with Information Management and IT systems & strategy and have over 30 years experience working with forensic scientists in the UK Criminal Justice System.

Irrespective of my personal interest in the outcomes of the inquiry, as a citizen of the UK I have a wider concern that the announcement was made without consultation or a full analysis of the impacts that sole reliance on the private sector to deliver forensic science services in England & Wales may have on the wider Criminal Justice System.

As a citizen I expect a transparent, cost-effective and high quality criminal justice system with equal access to high integrity forensic science should I unfortunately become the victims of crime or am wrongly accused. I recognise that reform is needed; forensic science and the CJS have to evolve to counter emerging threats and capitalise on new technologies. The need for change is not questioned, but it must be beneficial.

The aim of this submission is to make sure these views are recognised, duly and fully considered. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss these concerns further with the Select Committee in determining the future shape of forensic science England &. Wales

I believe it is vital to find a positive way forward that maintains the UK’s leadership in forensic research, its international status in forensic matters and continues to provide the consistent coordinated and coherent scientific investigation of crime that the UK Public expects, wherever they live, accepting that in the future this may be under a different guise than now.

Dr Steven R. Baker

13 February 2011

SUBMISSION TO SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

Context

This submission is made to the Science & Technology Committee regarding my views about the implications of the closure of the Forensic Science Service. Irrespective of any personal interest in the outcomes of the inquiry, as a citizen of the UK I have a wider concern that the announcement was made without consultation or a full analysis of the impacts that sole reliance on the private sector to deliver forensic science services in England & Wales may have on the wider Criminal Justice System.

Declaration of Interest

I am a current employee of the Forensic Science Service Ltd, formerly as an operational forensic scientist, and latterly concerned with Information Management and IT strategy. Overall I have over 30 years experience working with forensic scientists in the UK Criminal Justice System.

The seventh report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Science & Technology [1] recognised that

"Forensic science is a vital instrument for the detection of crime and the administration of justice. The Forensic Science Service (FSS) plays a critical role in the delivery of forensic services to the criminal justice system and has established itself as a world leader in forensic science".

While mindful of the Government’s imperative to reduce the financial deficit, the Prime Minister has argued that while public services reform is necessary "our first priority is to protect front line services and to protect jobs in the public services" [2] . That reform must not impact upon the provision of essential services was re-iterated in the Minister’s statement of 14th December 2010 seeking to ensure that the closure

"does not impact on police service customers or the wider Criminal Justice System".

I have summarised below the headlines of my submission grouped within the Committee’s terms of reference. These headlines are then developed in more detail and I would request that the committee consider each as they conduct their inquiry.

The impact on the future development of forensic science in the UK and Alternatives (ToR1&5)

· Research and innovation in forensic science

- The continuation of research in forensic science that has given the UK its acknowledged international lead?

- The development and establishment of standards to ensure forensic innovations withstand scrutiny in the CJS

- Removing commercial and political barriers to the introduction of innovation in forensic science

· Impacts on Britain’s leadership and international reputation

- The loss of the UK as an acknowledged world leader in forensic science

- The reduction of the UK’s influence on and participation in international cooperation on forensic science

- Collaboration with international security services and organisations

- Relationships with friendly nations where the UK is helping to establish a national forensic capability

The implications on the quality and impartiality of forensic evidence used in the Criminal Justice System (ToR2)

· The impact of fragmentation of forensic science provision on the judicial process and the correlation of forensic intelligence

- The proliferation of expert witnesses in a case

- The coordination and coherence of forensic evidence in a case

- Information sharing and the ability to build forensic intelligence, linking "out-of-area" and cross-border crimes

- Issues concerning police in-sourcing of forensic science

The state of and prospects for a forensic market (ToR4)

· The operation of a forensics "Market"

- The regulation of a forensic market

- The consistency of forensic science nationally

- Financial considerations taking priority over Justice

- The vulnerability of an immature and small market

- The ability of existing providers to absorb the capacity

1 The Development of Forensic Science In The UK (ToR1)

The Research & Development (R&D) undertaken by the FSS has delivered tools that advanced the capability of both forensic science and the wider Criminal Justice System (CJS), including the world’s first National DNA Database and pioneering every development in forensic DNA capability for more than 20 years.

1.1 Forensic R&D is at risk because in recent years Police contracts have focussed overwhelmingly on the cheapest price, squeezing providers’ operating profits. Although there are a few companies that are research led, the entry of new providers into an ever more competitive market will continue to drive down the prices of commoditised forensic offerings, leaving no margin for, and giving no incentive to, commercial companies to invest in R&D.

1.2 Quality and standards of service may be at risk in a fiercely competitive market as suppliers may be tempted to reduce or shortcut these to retain business. This short-term focus will be at the expense of the longer term developments necessary to maintain healthy and robust forensic provision.

1.3 In the USA where commercial laboratories have been established the longest: it is still recognised that the long-term health and viability of their justice system relies on state-owned provision to cover complex and financially unattractive elements of forensic science that commercial companies do not provide. This includes core R&D, the creation and maintenance of forensic databases and the development of standards, all of which are provided by centrally funded Federal Laboratories and Agencies.

1.4 There should be real concern over the future of Forensic R&D. The FSS has been the key provider of forensic R&D in the UK, and a major contributor to forensic science globally. It has developed and improved standards for forensic science worldwide and it is to the benefit of the UK CJS and our international reputation that this work continues. Currently no other UK organisation has the remit or capability to do this; the research councils don’t fund forensic research, stating it should be directly funded by government; university departments lack experience of taking a concept through to a rugged and validated process that can withstand scrutiny under our adversarial judicial process; and there is no government research capability in this area, the closest being the Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology (HOCAST) which does not have DNA development capability or experience.

1.5 Units established in police forces to in-source work lack both the necessary environment and the critical mass of research staff to undertake substantial research projects. Currently virtually no forensic work, and none of the limited forensic research done by police forces is accredited to recognised quality standards (ISO17025 and 17020). Such forensic research within police forces is likely to be to a lower quality standard and this will take longer than March 2012 to rectify. This increases the risk of both miscarriages of justice and of forensic evidence being successfully challenged in the courts where the validity of scientific techniques is being ever more vigorously scrutinised.

1.6 Decisive early action is required if highly skilled researchers, are not to be lost in the current climate of uncertainty. Much of their work benefits forensic science not just the FSS and if made generally available rather than being constrained by commercial and political considerations could improve the quality and efficiency of forensic science nationally and increase resilience to challenge within the Courts. This approach is well-established practice in the USA by the FBI.

1.7 Placing forensic R&D within central Government allows synergies with other central scientific units to be exploited. The expertise the FSS has in DNA analysis, software development and its statistical capabilities could compliment units such as HOCAST. Similarly, alignment with the National DNA Database could provide the vision, technical knowledge and skills to re-energise this national facility back into the world-leading service it was before the link to R&D was severed because of the need for it to be separated from any commercial provider.

Impacts on Britain’s Leadership And Reputation

1.8 Organised crime and terrorism recognises no national barriers and both forensic intelligence and investigations (through operational capacity) need to collaborate internationally to be effective against these threats. It is unknown to what extent foreign intelligence or investigation agencies will be prepared to collaborate with non-governmental, commercial providers in the UK, damaging this country’s ability to counter these threats

1.9 The UK’s leading status in forensic research, via the FSS, has been recognised by over 30 internationally respected scientists in a jointly published letter in the Times on 28th December 2010. This highlighted the consequences not only for the UK CJS, but also the negative impact that will be felt internationally if this forensic R&D capability is lost.

1.10 The UK has provided forensic expertise around the world in the wake of natural disasters, terrorism and wars, such as identifying bodies in mass graves or from body parts. How is this valued service to be sustained from the private sector?

1.11 The FSS has been a major contributor to International Forensic Science and scientific standards through its participation with the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENSFI) and collaboration in international research projects. The closure will undoubtedly lessen the UK’s influence on the development of forensic science internationally and will damage its reputation.

1.12 The FSS has assisted a number of friendly nations to establish or improve their own forensic capability, with contracts to develop or provide services. These international relationships are jeopardised by the closure announcement which must surely damage the UK’s reputation and standing with these nations.

2 The Quality and Impartiality of Forensic Evidence (ToR2)

The intention to rely on a variety of private sector companies, or the "in-sourcing" of forensic science by various police forces, serves only to further fragment the provision of forensic science to the Criminal Justice System (CJS). Specifically,

2.1 Few private sector suppliers, or indeed police forces are equipped to provide, what might be termed "full service" forensic science; the experience and skills necessary to scientifically investigate complex crimes. While screening and testing can be "productised", considerable experience is required to collate disparate evidence and interpret complex scenarios.

2.2 Many commercial providers offer only a limited range of services, such as DNA or similar match testing, as a simple product without necessarily interpreting the result in the context of the crime or of wider knowledge. "Commoditised" or piece-work testing is, of course, more profitable.

2.3 The stated intention "to maximise the level of competition in the Market" [3] or replicating forensic science in-house for each police force, whether it is "full-service" or of limited scope, will inevitably result in a greater number of parties being involved in the delivery of forensic science.

Whether forensic scientific is provided by private companies or individual police forces, an increasing number of organisations, units or companies will be involved in the scientific investigation of a crime. This proliferation and fragmentation of service provision is a major concern, both in the scientific investigation of a single crime and the implications for crime detection in general:-

2.4 It will become increasingly complex to collate the scientific findings within a case when these have been generated by a number of different providers.

2.5 Links and connections between exhibits, or the findings adduced from them, could be overlooked or missed because they have been examined by different parties.

2.6 No single forensic scientist will necessarily be responsible for, or have a holistic view of, the case and the scientific evidence unless this responsibility is developed elsewhere in the CJS

2.7 The Courts could encounter a procession of expert witnesses, or expert statements within a single case, from a variety of providers, increasing the time and cost of court proceedings.

2.8 Our adversarial system allows each side to present their own expert witnesses or statements, however, the concern described in Point 2.7 is exacerbated if each side also uses separate providers for different aspects of the case.

2.9 The coherence of the scientific evidence, and therefore the comprehension by Magistrates, Judges, Juries and the Public may be adversely affected as a consequence of it being presented by such a proliferation of expert witnesses.

Besides the issues of coordination within a single case, the fragmentation of scientific investigations arising from a much larger number of commercial or police forensic science providers raises more general concerns for sharing forensic information across the CJS:-

2.10 There is no obligation, commercial imperative or framework for private sector companies to collect or share forensic information between each other or within the CJS other than in the context of a single case when expert evidence is presented to the courts.

2.11 Most commercial providers do not have a national coverage, making it difficult for findings to be considered in a wider (national) context – e.g. to identify similarities with other exhibits or cases examined by providers, in other areas, compromising the ability to link "cross-border" or "out-of-area" crimes series.

2.12 The Bichard Inquiry [4] improved Information sharing between police forces but its focus was child protection, not forensic science intelligence. It is an unanswered question as to whether an effective model and process for sharing forensic science intelligence nationally could be achieved by March 2012.

2.13 The solely commercial delivery of forensic science will lead to a range of providers, some specialist (niche) companies, some more generalist, but each with a different scope and geographical coverage. This will give rise to disparities in the forensic science services available to different Police Forces and thus to the CJS and Public resulting in a potential "post code lottery" for the scientific investigation of crime on behalf of the citizen.

2.14 The proposed in-sourcing of forensic services into police forces could compromise the transparency and perceived independence of forensic science investigations leading to increasing numbers of challenges to the integrity of scientific evidence in the Courts.

The proliferation of forensic science providers and the fragmentation of the scientific investigation of crime impacts upon the wider CJS in a number of ways

· More time and cost to prosecute cases through the Courts

· Lack of a holistic overview of the scientific evidence

· Potential to miss links between different types of evidence

· Compromise the sharing of forensic intelligence - fragmentation

· Reduce the ability to link cross-border or out-of-area crimes

· Reduced capability to understand the "epidemiology" of crime.

· Lead to a non-uniform approach to the scientific investigation of crime in different parts of England & Wales

3 The State and Prospects for a Forensics Market (ToR4)

The Government’s drive to reduce the national debt and the focus on "operating costs" is understandable but the risks of a market model must be fully understood

3.1 While commercialising some simple commoditised forensic services such as the analysis of DNA reference samples has worked successfully, improving the service to the police, without unduly affecting the quality provided standards are rigorously enforced and monitored. However, this does not necessarily hold true for more complex forensic work, and certain core non-fee earning capabilities need to be retained if forensic capability and development in the UK is not to be damaged in the long term.

3.2 In a purely commercial market what assurance does the public have that forensic investigations are not unnecessarily limited simply by the contracts or service level agreements negotiated by the police with commercial providers, rather than what should be done in the context of the case and in the pursuit of Justice?

3.3 With a variety of contracts and service levels between police forces and different providers across the country, how will the Home Office ensure that the Public receives consistent, impartial and comprehensive access to forensic investigation and interpretation, irrespective of where a person lives or where the crime is committed?

3.4 In the current financial situation police forces are facing funding cuts and consequently any forensic market is vulnerable given the limited number of customers. What contingences exist if the UK market fails because commercial providers leave, or focus services abroad, for reasons of profitability?

3.5 What evidence is there that commercial providers have the capacity to meet UK forensic demand within the time scale of the announced closure, given that the FSS market share was approx. 60%? How vulnerable would the supply of forensic services to UK police forces be to the exit of another major provider?

3.6 What assurance does the Government have that the capacity and capability for a coordinated response could be provided by the private sector in the event of a national emergency or terrorist outrage?

3.7 What is the cost benefit case for in-sourcing duplicated forensic services into a number of police forces given the current financial position? This replication negates any economies of scale and could engender different standards from force to force.

3.8 An undoubted success of new DNA technologies has been "Cold Case" reviews, only possibly because of the (unprofitable) retention of recovered materials and biological samples. Will unsolved crimes still be able to be re-investigated if a suspect is identified in the future? Will the private sector be mandated to sustain this?

3.9 The commercial model for forensic science provision has created operational and political barriers that make bringing forensic innovation into the CJS difficult. Real collaboration, alignment and integration of objectives between police, forensic science providers and the CPS is hampered by commercial factors that create counter-productive barriers with other parts of the CJS. How does the Government intend to resolve this?

SUMMARY

As a citizen I expect a transparent, cost-effective and high quality criminal justice system with equal access to high integrity forensic science should I unfortunately become the victims of crime or am wrongly accused. I recognise that reform is needed; forensic science and the CJS have to evolve to counter emerging threats and capitalise on new technologies. The need for change is not questioned, but it must be beneficial.

This submission aims to make sure my views are recognised, and fully considered. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss these with the Committee in person in determining the future shape of forensic science.

It is vital to find a positive way forward that maintains the UK’s leadership in forensic science, its international status in forensic matters and continues to provide the consistent coordinated and coherent scientific investigation of crime the UK Public expects, wherever they live, albeit in the future this may be under a different guise.