Memorandum from The Royal Society for
the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) (DDD 07)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 RoSPA gave both oral and written evidence
to the North Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law. A copy of our
written evidence is available on RoSPA's website at www.rospa.com/roadsafety/consultations/2010/north_review_written_submission.pdf.
This submission reflects our original evidence to the North review
and our views on the subsequent North Report1 and its associated
research papers. 2, 3
1.2 We strongly support the recommendations
made by Sir Peter North and have urged the Government to implement
them as soon as possible.
2. Should the permitted blood alcohol limit be
reduced as proposed?
2.1 RoSPA believes that the Blood Alcohol (BAC)
limit should be lowered to 50 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood
(50 mg/100 ml) as recommended by the North Report. In fact, the
evidence in support of this change is stronger now than before
the North Review.
2.2 Before the North Review, RoSPA's support
for a lower limit was based on evidence that:
— between 50mg and 80 mg drivers are 2-2.5
times more likely to be involved in an accident than drivers with
no alcohol, and up to 6 times more likely to be involved in a
fatal crash.4
— In 2000, the Government's Road Safety
Strategy5 estimated that reducing the limit to 50mg could save
50 lives, and prevent 250 serious injuries and 1,200 slight injuries
each year.
— A more recent examination of the figures
suggests that reducing the legal limit could save 65 lives each
year and prevent 230 serious injuries.6
— An International review7 of the impact
of introducing or lowering limits found that they resulted in
fewer drink drive accidents, deaths and injuries.
2.3 However, research by the Centre for Public
Health Excellence NICE2 for the North Review indicates that the
number of lives saved by a lower limit would be much greater than
previous estimates. The North Review concludes:
A reduction to 50 mg/100 ml would undoubtedly
save a significant number of lives. In the first year post-implementation,
estimates range from at least 43 to around 168 lives saved—as
well as avoiding a larger number of serious injuries—a conservative
estimate is 280 although as many as almost 16,000 has been modelled.
It is estimated that the impact of any lowering in the blood alcohol
limit will actually increase over the first few years of implementation
with an estimate of up to 303 lives annually saved by the 6th
year.
2.4 These estimates do not include casualty
savings in Scotland, which the North Report notes account for
about 7% of drink drive-related casualties in Great Britain, so
the overall number of lives saved would be even greater. Northern
Ireland are separately considering whether to lower their drink
drive limit.
2.5 The main argument against lowering the limit
appears to be that the focus should be on drivers who are significantly
above the current limit of 80mg/100 ml, and lowering the limit
to 50 mg/100 ml would not affect their behaviour. However, the
NICE research2 and the North Report1 state that there is strong
evidence to indicate that lowering the limit changes the drink-driving
behaviour of drivers at all BAC levels.
2.6 RoSPA believes that a lower drink drive
limit should be introduced as part of a wider a package of drink
drive measures, including:
— Evidential roadside breath testing.
— Wider powers to breath test drivers,
including random breath testing.
— Wider use of drink drive rehabilitation
courses.
— Encouragement for employers to set zero
limits for staff who drive for work.
— Improved public education.
— Further development of alco-locks.
3. If so, is the mandatory one year driving ban
appropriate for less severe offenders, at the new (lower) level?
3.1 RoSPA believes that the penalties for exceeding
the current drink drive limit should apply to the lower limit
of 50mg. Less stringent penalties would suggest that it is a less
serious offence. However, the lower limit should be accompanied
by sustained and high profile publicity and education to raise
awareness that people who previously had one or two drinks and
then drove are likely to find themselves exceeding the new limit.
3.2 Particular attention should be focused on
the "Morning After" effect. It is very difficult to
know exactly how much alcohol has been consumed, and how long
it will take the liver to remove it from the bloodstream (which
varies from person to person). Some drivers who do not drive when
drinking at night, find themselves unknowingly still over the
limit the following morning. This happens now with a limit of
80mg, and will happen more often with a lower limit. Care should
be taken to avoid a perception that such people are being unfairly
criminalised, especially when the penalties are so severe.
3.3 A more sustained educational effort will
be required to raise awareness of this issue and enhance drivers'
understanding of the length of time necessary following drinking
to allow alcohol levels to decline to safe levels. Many agencies
and organisations need to be involved, including employers of
staff who drive both to commute and for work purposes. There needs
to be a recognition that for those who drive on a daily basis
regular heavy drinking is no longer a practicable option if they
are to comply with the law. Given the very large proportion of
the population in this category this will mean a major change
in the Nation's drinking habits with related health benefits which
in turn should be taken account of in any overall cost benefit
analysis.
3.4 The UK's penalties for drink driving are
considerably more stringent than most other countries. However,
the effectiveness of laws and penalties depends to a large extent
on the perceived and actual level of enforcement. In the case
of drink driving, we believe much depends on the level of breath
testing conducted by the police and the "visibility"
of that testing.
3.5 The penalties are stringent enough to act
as a significant deterrent, provided that people think there is
a strong chance they will be caught if they drink and drive. If
people do not think they will get caught, the level of penalties
is largely irrelevant. An increase in breath testing and more
consistency across the country would improve the effectiveness
of drink drive laws.
3.6 RoSPA supports the courts having the power
to impose a driving ban as part of bail conditions, where a defendant
might commit a further drink-drive offence whilst on bail. The
immediate confiscation of the driving licence of drivers who have
failed an evidential breath test and who are high risk offenders
would be another way of reducing the likelihood that such people
would drive while waiting for their case to come to court. A further
measure would be to ensure that where an offender is imprisoned
as well as disqualified from driving, the disqualification period
does not begin until they have been released from prison.
4. How severe is the problem of drug driving and
what should be done to address it?
4.1 Drug driving is a much more complex issue
than drink driving, and the level of knowledge and research we
have about drugs and driving is far less comprehensive. Although
we know that the effects of many drugs impair driving and that
a proportion of drivers take drugs and then drive, we still do
not have clear data about the numbers and types of road accidents
and casualties caused by drug driving. Even where drugs have been
detected in a driver following a crash, this does not necessarily
mean that the drugs caused or contributed to the crash. The presence
of drugs in a driver may also be masked by the presence of alcohol.
4.2 The review3 of drug driving evidence commissioned
for the North Review identified a lack of recent UK data on the
impact that drug driving has on casualty rates as it is over 10
years since the last survey exploring the incidence of drugs in
road accident fatalities. It found that analysis of the various
data sources that are available shows:
— Cannabis remains the most prevalent illicit
drug, but, there has been a significant increase in cocaine use.
— Regional variations are apparent: in
Scotland, benzodiazepines are the most prevalent drug group, with
over 80% of drivers suspected of being impaired by drugs testing
positive for a benzodiazepine.
— There appears to have been a considerable
increase in polydrug use by drivers since the 1990s.
— Recent surveys and anecdotal evidence
suggest there has been a surge in the use of legal highs, but
there is limited evidence of the extent to which those using these
drugs are also driving, or what effect the substances have on
road safety.
4.3 The contributory factor database shows that
in 2008, impairment by illicit or medicinal drugs was judged by
the police to be involved in just 56 fatal and 207 serious accidents.
In comparison, drink drive figures show 380 fatal accidents (resulting
in 430 deaths) and over 1,200 serious accidents (resulting in
over 1,600 seriously injured people) involved alcohol in excess
of the legal limit.
4.4 Very few drivers are convicted of driving
while unfit through drugs. The complex procedure for detecting,
charging and convicting a drug driver makes it difficult for the
police to enforce the law adequately. During the Christmas 2009
drink/drug drive campaign fewer than 500 Field Impairment Tests
for drugs were conducted, compared with over 223,000 alcohol breath
tests.8
4.5 Compulsory drug testing of drivers in fatal
or serious accidents should be introduced. This would provide
better data as well as act as a deterrent. As with drink driving,
RoSPA believes that the police should have the power to conduct
random and targeted drug drive tests.
4.6 A new offence of driving with an illegal
drug in the body would make it easier to catch and convict drug
drivers, which in turn would be a greater deterrent. RoSPA believes
that the only way to emulate the success we have had against drink
driving is to implement a practical and effective system for detecting,
charging and convicting drivers who are driving while impaired
through drugs.
4.7 In RoSPA's view, an absolute ban would be
best, so the law does not set a legal level of use for drugs that
are illegal in the first place. However, many illegal drugs can
be used legally if they are prescribed, so an exemption will be
needed for drivers who have been prescribed the drugs. If their
driving is impaired, the existing offence of driving under the
influence of drugs can be used. The Review of Drug Driving Evidence3
states that:
"The complex nature of drugs makes it difficult
to establish values that would represent impairment in the general
population. Tolerance issues and interactions with other drugs
suggest that identifying suitable cut-off values for other drugs
may also be inappropriate."
4.8 RoSPA believes that any new offence should
not apply to prescribed or over-the-counter medicines, because
some people may be deterred from taking the medicines that they
need. Including prescribed and over-the-counter medicines would
make the new offence little different from the existing one, and
the benefit of making it easier to catch and convict drivers with
illegal drugs in their bodies would be lost. Individuals need
to be responsible for deciding whether they are fit to drive,
and where they get this substantially wrong, the existing offence
of driving under the influence of drugs could be used.
4.9 Another key tool is the development of a
roadside drug test device (a "drugalyser"). There have
been attempts to develop such devices for at least 20 years, and
it has still not been possible yet to produce a device that can
be used as evidence in court. However, recent announcements suggest
that a roadside drug tester may become available in the next two
years. The Review of Drug Driving3 refers to the experience of
introducing roadside screening devices with impairment testing
and a zero tolerance approach in relation to a new Drug Impaired
Driving law in Western Australia, where the police almost exclusively
favoured the use of the drug testing device because the process
was simple, straightforward, quick to administer and unambiguous.
5. What wider costs and benefits are likely to
result from changes to drink and drug driving law?
5.1 Given an average cost of over £1.6
million per fatality, the economic benefits would be very significant.
5.2 Changes to drink driving laws, and the public
attention that is likely to accompany such changes, may contribute
to the wider public health debate about sensible drinking.
6. What would be the implications of such changes
for enforcement?
6.1 The North Report identified a "decreasing
priority given to drink drive policing", attributed, in part,
to the fact that drink driving offences (other than causing death
by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs)
are not prioritised in England and Wales by inclusion within the
"Offences Brought to Justice" regime. It concluded that
"Drink driving needs to be afforded a much higher policing
priority."
6.2 RoSPA believes that this lack of priority
can be seen in Home Office Statistics. Enforcement levels (ie,
the number of breath tests conducted) have been inconsistent,
fluctuating substantially from year to year. In 2007, just under
600,000 breath tests were conducted—200,000 fewer than 10
years previously.9 But, in 2008, the number increased to over
700,000, although this may in part be due to better recording
with new digital recording equipment rather than necessarily a
large increase in tests. The number of tests varied from 650 per
100,000 of the population in the West Midlands region to 2,961
in Wales. 10 An increase in breath testing and more consistency
across the country would improve the effectiveness of drink drive
laws.
6.3 The NICE research2 suggests that:
"UK citizens stand out from the rest of
Europe in their lack of knowledge of their country's legal BAC
limit; and UK drivers are among the least likely to have experienced
a check for alcohol levels, and, in common with drivers in other
countries without systematic random breath testing, are more likely
to think they will never be checked."
6.4 The police should have wider powers to breath
test drivers, including the power to conduct random breath tests.
This would increase drivers' perception of the risk of being caught.
The North Report1 notes:
"There is sufficiently strong evidence to
indicate that publicity and visible, rapid enforcement is needed
if BAC laws are to be effective. Drivers need to be aware of—and
understand—the law. They also need to believe they are likely
to be detected and punished for breaking the law."
6.5 The NICE research2 identified evidence from
other countries that sobriety checkpoints (random and selective
breath testing) can help reduce road traffic injuries and deaths,
and that random breath testing had an immediate, substantial and
permanent impact on accidents in three out of the four states
studied in an Australian study. High quality review evidence also
shows that mass-media campaigns can reduce alcohol-impaired driving
and alcohol-related crashes. The effects of the 0.05 BAC law in
Austria and Netherlands were attributed in part to publicity and
enforcement measures.
6.6 The power to use evidential breathalysers
at the roadside was introduced in the Serious Organised Crime
and Police Act 2005. This would mean that the roadside test could
be used as evidence in court and eliminate the need for the second
test, which in turn would free much police time. However, this
equipment is still not in use.
6.7 In Scotland, the Christmas/New Year Drink
Drive campaign included, for the first time, seizing the vehicle
of repeat drink driver offenders. 11 During the campaign, four
drivers had their cars forfeited, and a further 24 had their cars
seized pending consideration by the Court. During a two-week summer
campaign in July 2010, 12 six repeat offenders were caught and
now risk having their cars seized. In addition, drug driving was
added to the forfeiture scheme, so drug driving recidivists are
at risk of losing their vehicle. The forfeiture scheme for drink
and drug drive recidivism in Scotland is now general practice
and not just for specific campaigns. RoSPA believes that this
is a significant additional deterrent and should be adopted throughout
the UK.
7. CONCLUSION
7.1 RoSPA supports the broad conclusions of
the North Report1, that:
— The drink drive limit should be lowered
as this is likely to reduce the number of alcohol-related deaths
and injuries.
— A lower limit could have an impact on
the drink-driving behaviour of everyone who drinks alcohol, including
those who tend to drink well above the current limit.
— A lower limit should be supported by
increasing the public's awareness and understanding of the limit
and the likelihood of being tested.
— Much more research and data about drug
driving is needed to inform future policy.
— Police forces should training more officers
to conduct the Field Impairment Tests (FITs) and increase significantly
the number of FIT tests conducted.
— Drug screening devices (in Police stations
and at the roadside) should be developed and introduced.
— Drug drive rehabilitation courses should
be considered.
7.2 We are not convinced about the recommendation
to research and set legal limits for driving with illegal drugs
in the body, but support the recommendation that if it proves
not to be possible to set such limits, a zero limit should be
considered.
7.3 Since the North Review the need to reduce
the public deficit has become clear, and while RoSPA recognises
that it is public spending cuts will affect road safety because
they will affect every area of our lives, it is crucial that that
spending decisions are informed and based on clear evidence and
data, and crude, blanket spending cuts are not imposed. The casualty
and financial savings that a lower drink drive limit, the other
recommended drink drive measures and the drug driving recommendations
would produce must be very carefully considered and balanced against
the need to reduce spending. Getting these hard decisions wrong
will cost lives.
August 2010
REFERENCES1 Report
of the Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law, Sir Peter North CBE
QC, June 2010.
2 Review of effectiveness of laws limiting blood
alcohol concentration levels to reduce alcohol-related road injuries
and deaths, Centre for Public Health Excellence NICE, 2010.
3 A Review of Evidence Related to Drug Driving
in the UK: A Report Submitted to the North Review Team, P G Jackson
and C J Hilditch, Clockwork Research Ltd June 2010.
4 Combating Drink Driving: Next Steps: A Consultation
Paper, DETR, 1998.
5 Tomorrow's Roads: Safer for Everyone, DETR,
2000.
6 Reducing the BAC level to 50 mg—What
Can We Expect to Gain, R Allsopp, PACTS Research Briefing, 2005.
7 The Effects of Introducing or Lowering Legal
per se Blood Alcohol Limits for Driving: An International Review,
Mann et al, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2001; 33(5).
8 ACPO Press Release 006/10, 21 January 2010.
9 Road Safety Compliance Consultation, DfT 2009.
10 Police Powers and Procedures, England and
Wales 08/09, Home Office, April 2010.
11 Vehicle Forfeiture to Continue Beyond Festive
Drink Drive Campaign, ACPOS press release, 2 January 2010.
12 Drink Driving Campaign—No Journey Is
Worth The Risk, ACPOS News Release, 20 July 2010.
| 
