Drink and drug driving law - Transport Committee Contents


Memorandum from The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) (DDD 07)

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  RoSPA gave both oral and written evidence to the North Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law. A copy of our written evidence is available on RoSPA's website at www.rospa.com/roadsafety/consultations/2010/north_review_written_submission.pdf. This submission reflects our original evidence to the North review and our views on the subsequent North Report1 and its associated research papers. 2, 3

  1.2 We strongly support the recommendations made by Sir Peter North and have urged the Government to implement them as soon as possible.

2. Should the permitted blood alcohol limit be reduced as proposed?

  2.1 RoSPA believes that the Blood Alcohol (BAC) limit should be lowered to 50 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood (50 mg/100 ml) as recommended by the North Report. In fact, the evidence in support of this change is stronger now than before the North Review.

  2.2 Before the North Review, RoSPA's support for a lower limit was based on evidence that:

    — between 50mg and 80 mg drivers are 2-2.5 times more likely to be involved in an accident than drivers with no alcohol, and up to 6 times more likely to be involved in a fatal crash.4

    — In 2000, the Government's Road Safety Strategy5 estimated that reducing the limit to 50mg could save 50 lives, and prevent 250 serious injuries and 1,200 slight injuries each year.

    — A more recent examination of the figures suggests that reducing the legal limit could save 65 lives each year and prevent 230 serious injuries.6

    — An International review7 of the impact of introducing or lowering limits found that they resulted in fewer drink drive accidents, deaths and injuries.

  2.3 However, research by the Centre for Public Health Excellence NICE2 for the North Review indicates that the number of lives saved by a lower limit would be much greater than previous estimates. The North Review concludes:

    A reduction to 50 mg/100 ml would undoubtedly save a significant number of lives. In the first year post-implementation, estimates range from at least 43 to around 168 lives saved—as well as avoiding a larger number of serious injuries—a conservative estimate is 280 although as many as almost 16,000 has been modelled. It is estimated that the impact of any lowering in the blood alcohol limit will actually increase over the first few years of implementation with an estimate of up to 303 lives annually saved by the 6th year.

  2.4 These estimates do not include casualty savings in Scotland, which the North Report notes account for about 7% of drink drive-related casualties in Great Britain, so the overall number of lives saved would be even greater. Northern Ireland are separately considering whether to lower their drink drive limit.

  2.5 The main argument against lowering the limit appears to be that the focus should be on drivers who are significantly above the current limit of 80mg/100 ml, and lowering the limit to 50 mg/100 ml would not affect their behaviour. However, the NICE research2 and the North Report1 state that there is strong evidence to indicate that lowering the limit changes the drink-driving behaviour of drivers at all BAC levels.

  2.6 RoSPA believes that a lower drink drive limit should be introduced as part of a wider a package of drink drive measures, including:

    — Evidential roadside breath testing.

    — Wider powers to breath test drivers, including random breath testing.

    — Wider use of drink drive rehabilitation courses.

    — Encouragement for employers to set zero limits for staff who drive for work.

    — Improved public education.

    — Further development of alco-locks.

3. If so, is the mandatory one year driving ban appropriate for less severe offenders, at the new (lower) level?

  3.1 RoSPA believes that the penalties for exceeding the current drink drive limit should apply to the lower limit of 50mg. Less stringent penalties would suggest that it is a less serious offence. However, the lower limit should be accompanied by sustained and high profile publicity and education to raise awareness that people who previously had one or two drinks and then drove are likely to find themselves exceeding the new limit.

  3.2 Particular attention should be focused on the "Morning After" effect. It is very difficult to know exactly how much alcohol has been consumed, and how long it will take the liver to remove it from the bloodstream (which varies from person to person). Some drivers who do not drive when drinking at night, find themselves unknowingly still over the limit the following morning. This happens now with a limit of 80mg, and will happen more often with a lower limit. Care should be taken to avoid a perception that such people are being unfairly criminalised, especially when the penalties are so severe.

  3.3 A more sustained educational effort will be required to raise awareness of this issue and enhance drivers' understanding of the length of time necessary following drinking to allow alcohol levels to decline to safe levels. Many agencies and organisations need to be involved, including employers of staff who drive both to commute and for work purposes. There needs to be a recognition that for those who drive on a daily basis regular heavy drinking is no longer a practicable option if they are to comply with the law. Given the very large proportion of the population in this category this will mean a major change in the Nation's drinking habits with related health benefits which in turn should be taken account of in any overall cost benefit analysis.

  3.4 The UK's penalties for drink driving are considerably more stringent than most other countries. However, the effectiveness of laws and penalties depends to a large extent on the perceived and actual level of enforcement. In the case of drink driving, we believe much depends on the level of breath testing conducted by the police and the "visibility" of that testing.

  3.5 The penalties are stringent enough to act as a significant deterrent, provided that people think there is a strong chance they will be caught if they drink and drive. If people do not think they will get caught, the level of penalties is largely irrelevant. An increase in breath testing and more consistency across the country would improve the effectiveness of drink drive laws.

  3.6 RoSPA supports the courts having the power to impose a driving ban as part of bail conditions, where a defendant might commit a further drink-drive offence whilst on bail. The immediate confiscation of the driving licence of drivers who have failed an evidential breath test and who are high risk offenders would be another way of reducing the likelihood that such people would drive while waiting for their case to come to court. A further measure would be to ensure that where an offender is imprisoned as well as disqualified from driving, the disqualification period does not begin until they have been released from prison.

4. How severe is the problem of drug driving and what should be done to address it?

  4.1 Drug driving is a much more complex issue than drink driving, and the level of knowledge and research we have about drugs and driving is far less comprehensive. Although we know that the effects of many drugs impair driving and that a proportion of drivers take drugs and then drive, we still do not have clear data about the numbers and types of road accidents and casualties caused by drug driving. Even where drugs have been detected in a driver following a crash, this does not necessarily mean that the drugs caused or contributed to the crash. The presence of drugs in a driver may also be masked by the presence of alcohol.

  4.2 The review3 of drug driving evidence commissioned for the North Review identified a lack of recent UK data on the impact that drug driving has on casualty rates as it is over 10 years since the last survey exploring the incidence of drugs in road accident fatalities. It found that analysis of the various data sources that are available shows:

    — Cannabis remains the most prevalent illicit drug, but, there has been a significant increase in cocaine use.

    — Regional variations are apparent: in Scotland, benzodiazepines are the most prevalent drug group, with over 80% of drivers suspected of being impaired by drugs testing positive for a benzodiazepine.

    — There appears to have been a considerable increase in polydrug use by drivers since the 1990s.

    — Recent surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest there has been a surge in the use of legal highs, but there is limited evidence of the extent to which those using these drugs are also driving, or what effect the substances have on road safety.

  4.3 The contributory factor database shows that in 2008, impairment by illicit or medicinal drugs was judged by the police to be involved in just 56 fatal and 207 serious accidents. In comparison, drink drive figures show 380 fatal accidents (resulting in 430 deaths) and over 1,200 serious accidents (resulting in over 1,600 seriously injured people) involved alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

  4.4 Very few drivers are convicted of driving while unfit through drugs. The complex procedure for detecting, charging and convicting a drug driver makes it difficult for the police to enforce the law adequately. During the Christmas 2009 drink/drug drive campaign fewer than 500 Field Impairment Tests for drugs were conducted, compared with over 223,000 alcohol breath tests.8

  4.5 Compulsory drug testing of drivers in fatal or serious accidents should be introduced. This would provide better data as well as act as a deterrent. As with drink driving, RoSPA believes that the police should have the power to conduct random and targeted drug drive tests.

  4.6 A new offence of driving with an illegal drug in the body would make it easier to catch and convict drug drivers, which in turn would be a greater deterrent. RoSPA believes that the only way to emulate the success we have had against drink driving is to implement a practical and effective system for detecting, charging and convicting drivers who are driving while impaired through drugs.

  4.7 In RoSPA's view, an absolute ban would be best, so the law does not set a legal level of use for drugs that are illegal in the first place. However, many illegal drugs can be used legally if they are prescribed, so an exemption will be needed for drivers who have been prescribed the drugs. If their driving is impaired, the existing offence of driving under the influence of drugs can be used. The Review of Drug Driving Evidence3 states that:

    "The complex nature of drugs makes it difficult to establish values that would represent impairment in the general population. Tolerance issues and interactions with other drugs suggest that identifying suitable cut-off values for other drugs may also be inappropriate."

  4.8 RoSPA believes that any new offence should not apply to prescribed or over-the-counter medicines, because some people may be deterred from taking the medicines that they need. Including prescribed and over-the-counter medicines would make the new offence little different from the existing one, and the benefit of making it easier to catch and convict drivers with illegal drugs in their bodies would be lost. Individuals need to be responsible for deciding whether they are fit to drive, and where they get this substantially wrong, the existing offence of driving under the influence of drugs could be used.

  4.9 Another key tool is the development of a roadside drug test device (a "drugalyser"). There have been attempts to develop such devices for at least 20 years, and it has still not been possible yet to produce a device that can be used as evidence in court. However, recent announcements suggest that a roadside drug tester may become available in the next two years. The Review of Drug Driving3 refers to the experience of introducing roadside screening devices with impairment testing and a zero tolerance approach in relation to a new Drug Impaired Driving law in Western Australia, where the police almost exclusively favoured the use of the drug testing device because the process was simple, straightforward, quick to administer and unambiguous.

5. What wider costs and benefits are likely to result from changes to drink and drug driving law?

  5.1 Given an average cost of over £1.6 million per fatality, the economic benefits would be very significant.

  5.2 Changes to drink driving laws, and the public attention that is likely to accompany such changes, may contribute to the wider public health debate about sensible drinking.

6. What would be the implications of such changes for enforcement?

  6.1 The North Report identified a "decreasing priority given to drink drive policing", attributed, in part, to the fact that drink driving offences (other than causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs) are not prioritised in England and Wales by inclusion within the "Offences Brought to Justice" regime. It concluded that "Drink driving needs to be afforded a much higher policing priority."

  6.2 RoSPA believes that this lack of priority can be seen in Home Office Statistics. Enforcement levels (ie, the number of breath tests conducted) have been inconsistent, fluctuating substantially from year to year. In 2007, just under 600,000 breath tests were conducted—200,000 fewer than 10 years previously.9 But, in 2008, the number increased to over 700,000, although this may in part be due to better recording with new digital recording equipment rather than necessarily a large increase in tests. The number of tests varied from 650 per 100,000 of the population in the West Midlands region to 2,961 in Wales. 10 An increase in breath testing and more consistency across the country would improve the effectiveness of drink drive laws.

  6.3 The NICE research2 suggests that:

    "UK citizens stand out from the rest of Europe in their lack of knowledge of their country's legal BAC limit; and UK drivers are among the least likely to have experienced a check for alcohol levels, and, in common with drivers in other countries without systematic random breath testing, are more likely to think they will never be checked."

  6.4 The police should have wider powers to breath test drivers, including the power to conduct random breath tests. This would increase drivers' perception of the risk of being caught. The North Report1 notes:

    "There is sufficiently strong evidence to indicate that publicity and visible, rapid enforcement is needed if BAC laws are to be effective. Drivers need to be aware of—and understand—the law. They also need to believe they are likely to be detected and punished for breaking the law."

  6.5 The NICE research2 identified evidence from other countries that sobriety checkpoints (random and selective breath testing) can help reduce road traffic injuries and deaths, and that random breath testing had an immediate, substantial and permanent impact on accidents in three out of the four states studied in an Australian study. High quality review evidence also shows that mass-media campaigns can reduce alcohol-impaired driving and alcohol-related crashes. The effects of the 0.05 BAC law in Austria and Netherlands were attributed in part to publicity and enforcement measures.

  6.6 The power to use evidential breathalysers at the roadside was introduced in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This would mean that the roadside test could be used as evidence in court and eliminate the need for the second test, which in turn would free much police time. However, this equipment is still not in use.

  6.7 In Scotland, the Christmas/New Year Drink Drive campaign included, for the first time, seizing the vehicle of repeat drink driver offenders. 11 During the campaign, four drivers had their cars forfeited, and a further 24 had their cars seized pending consideration by the Court. During a two-week summer campaign in July 2010, 12 six repeat offenders were caught and now risk having their cars seized. In addition, drug driving was added to the forfeiture scheme, so drug driving recidivists are at risk of losing their vehicle. The forfeiture scheme for drink and drug drive recidivism in Scotland is now general practice and not just for specific campaigns. RoSPA believes that this is a significant additional deterrent and should be adopted throughout the UK.

7. CONCLUSION

  7.1 RoSPA supports the broad conclusions of the North Report1, that:

    — The drink drive limit should be lowered as this is likely to reduce the number of alcohol-related deaths and injuries.

    — A lower limit could have an impact on the drink-driving behaviour of everyone who drinks alcohol, including those who tend to drink well above the current limit.

    — A lower limit should be supported by increasing the public's awareness and understanding of the limit and the likelihood of being tested.

    — Much more research and data about drug driving is needed to inform future policy.

    — Police forces should training more officers to conduct the Field Impairment Tests (FITs) and increase significantly the number of FIT tests conducted.

    — Drug screening devices (in Police stations and at the roadside) should be developed and introduced.

    — Drug drive rehabilitation courses should be considered.

  7.2 We are not convinced about the recommendation to research and set legal limits for driving with illegal drugs in the body, but support the recommendation that if it proves not to be possible to set such limits, a zero limit should be considered.

  7.3 Since the North Review the need to reduce the public deficit has become clear, and while RoSPA recognises that it is public spending cuts will affect road safety because they will affect every area of our lives, it is crucial that that spending decisions are informed and based on clear evidence and data, and crude, blanket spending cuts are not imposed. The casualty and financial savings that a lower drink drive limit, the other recommended drink drive measures and the drug driving recommendations would produce must be very carefully considered and balanced against the need to reduce spending. Getting these hard decisions wrong will cost lives.

August 2010

REFERENCES1  Report of the Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law, Sir Peter North CBE QC, June 2010.

2  Review of effectiveness of laws limiting blood alcohol concentration levels to reduce alcohol-related road injuries and deaths, Centre for Public Health Excellence NICE, 2010.

3  A Review of Evidence Related to Drug Driving in the UK: A Report Submitted to the North Review Team, P G Jackson and C J Hilditch, Clockwork Research Ltd June 2010.

4  Combating Drink Driving: Next Steps: A Consultation Paper, DETR, 1998.

5  Tomorrow's Roads: Safer for Everyone, DETR, 2000.

6  Reducing the BAC level to 50 mg—What Can We Expect to Gain, R Allsopp, PACTS Research Briefing, 2005.

7  The Effects of Introducing or Lowering Legal per se Blood Alcohol Limits for Driving: An International Review, Mann et al, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2001; 33(5).

8  ACPO Press Release 006/10, 21 January 2010.

9  Road Safety Compliance Consultation, DfT 2009.

10  Police Powers and Procedures, England and Wales 08/09, Home Office, April 2010.

11  Vehicle Forfeiture to Continue Beyond Festive Drink Drive Campaign, ACPOS press release, 2 January 2010.

12  Drink Driving Campaign—No Journey Is Worth The Risk, ACPOS News Release, 20 July 2010.





 
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Prepared 2 December 2010