Written evidence from The Association
of Licensed Multiple Retailers (ALMR) (DDD 39)
1. The Association of Licensed Multiple
Retailers (ALMR) welcomes the opportunity to submit written
evidence as part of the above inquiry. As the only national trade
body dedicated solely to representing the needs and concerns of
pub and bar operators, the Association is well placed to comment
on the potential impact of any changes in the law on the sector.
2. The ALMR represents neither brewing
nor property owning interests and instead provides a voice for
those running licensed retail outlets on a day-to-day basis. Between
them our 74 member companies operate just over 7,000 pubs, clubs,
bars and restaurants. Two-thirds of members are small independent
companies operating 50 pubs or fewer under their own branding,
predominantly suburban community outlets.
3. The credit crunch, economic downturn
and a series of regulatory burdens have combined to create a perfect
storm which continues to threaten many of the UK's pubs and bars.
The outlets which have been hardest hit have been the traditional
suburban community or neighbourhood pubs of the type operated
by our members. These pubs are valuable social and economic assets—community
centres, social spaces, tourist attractions and significant revenue
generators—as well as providing a well regulated and controlled
environment for people to enjoy alcohol responsibly and socially.
4. The sector clearly has the potential
to help drive forward the private sector recovery—in the
early part of this decade it was responsible for creating 1 in
5 new jobs. An early return to growth for pubs and bars will not
only help the economy as a whole but also the delivery of a successful
Olympics in 2012. In order to deliver that however, pubs and bars
need a supportive regulatory and economic environment.
OVERVIEW
5. This is a fragile industry already under
strain and we are concerned that precipitate change in the drink
driving law could have a detrimental impact on it—a point
readily acknowledged by the North Review. It will reinforce the
impression left by a diverse range of public policies that drinking
should be done at home, rather than as part of a social outing.
Consumption in a well regulated environment ensures that it is
both monitored and managed. Pubs and bars have played and continue
to have a key role in the successful delivery of existing drink
drive policy, and this should be applauded not undermined.
6. Recent Government policy on taxation,
health and law and order has significantly increased the price
to consumers of alcohol sold through the pubs and bars. At the
same time, licensing policy has deregulated the sale of alcohol
through the off-trade and supermarkets. This has fuelled a price
differential which has actively encouraged consumption at home.
Coupled with the introduction of a ban on smoking in public places
in 2007, the net effect of public policy has been to create a
disincentive to visit licensed premises.
7. We are also concerned to ensure that
any changes in driving legislation should be proportionate and
directed at those offender groups or types of driving which give
rise to the highest number of deaths or fatalities. We are concerned
that the proposals in the North Review, focused as they are on
a whole population approach, are not the most effective means
of delivering the public policy objective of reducing road casualties
and fatalities. More importantly, as a reduction in the BAC level
overall will target the responsible majority rather than those
of greatest concern—young drinkers and those drinking well
in excess of the current level—such a change may undermine
existing support for the policy and respect for the law. This
would be a retrograde step.
SHOULD THE
BAC LEVEL BE
REDUCED?
8. Drink driving policy and legislation
is an area of conspicuous public policy success. From a peak in
1966 when drink driving was responsible for over a quarter of
all fatalities, it now accounts for just fewer than 15%—and
this despite a significant increase on traffic and passenger numbers.
Since 2001, when drink drive policy was last reviewed, road deaths
attributable to drink driving have declined by 6% on average each
year. This is faster than the decrease in road deaths caused by
other factors over the same period. The latest Department of Transport
statistics reveal that in 2009 deaths from drink driving dropped
by 5% to below 400 per annum for the first time. Serious casualties
and slight casualties are both down by 8-9% year on year.
9. We now have amongst the lowest road deaths
in Europe and Britain's roads are also amongst the safest in the
world. It is also worth noting in this context that we also have
a very different legal and enforcement framework to other countries.
We may have one of the highest BAC levels in law, but we also
have some of the toughest penalties and stringent enforcement.
Countries with lower limits also have lower penalties and drink
driving is seen as a relatively minor misdemeanour.
10. The existing policy framework is demonstrably
working, not just in reducing deaths and fatalities but in delivering
a significant cultural shift which stigmatises the practice of
drinking and driving. The message of not driving if you have had
anything at all to drink is patently getting through to the responsible
majority. Pubs and bars have played a significant role in that
through designated driver schemes and contribution to public education
campaigns.
11. We do not believe that the current BAC
limit should be changed whilst the overall policy framework within
which it sits is still successfully delivering a reduction in
casualty and fatality numbers. We also question whether sufficient
evidence has been provided to demonstrate that a lower limit would
of itself reduce the figures still further.
12. The North Review itself acknowledges
the difficulties in modelling and the uncertainty surrounding
any change in the current law. We wish to draw attention to the
following points made in the Report and believe that these are
the key points of consideration in the current inquiry:
a. Will a change in the BAC be effective?
Evidence from both NICE and European Studies suggests that
reducing the limit will not necessarily influence behaviour across
the whole population and will not be effective in all cases. It
suggests that the UK's existing approach of high visibility, mass
media campaigns and prompt enforcement intervention are more effective.
A lowering of the BAC on its own will not be effective in reducing
fatality and casualty numbers.
A whole population approach is also likely to be
ineffective at tackling those drivers who continue to be immune
to existing limit; a reduction in the BAC will do nothing to reverse
this. Whilst the majority of people have readily accepted the
"do not drink and drive" message, a hard core of offenders
continue to drink well in excess of the BAC—90% of those
drink drive fatalities have a BAC in excess of 100mg. There is
also a serious problem of non-compliance amongst younger drivers.
This suggests that it would be more effective to focus attention
towards targeted enforcement against these offenders rather than
create a new BAC to enforce.
The North Review itself identifies that the effectiveness
of the proposed change is questionable. It notes that a reduction
in the BAC level would have no impact on statistics in Scotland,
which make up over 7% of total drink drive related fatalities.
Evidence from Canada and America from earlier this decade also
suggests that a reduction would have little, if any, effect.
b. Will it impact on support for the law?
Whilst the existing drink drive regime is by no means perfect,
it is well understood by the population as a whole and is respected.
This is perhaps in contrast to other public health messages and
limits for alcohol. It is a particular measure of its success
that the BAC is now no longer viewed as a safe limit at which
to drive but rather an indicative level at which penalties will
be applied. It is this which is key to the public support for
the existing BAC and there is a very real risk that any changes
to it could result in a weakening of that; for example if the
new limit is seen as unrealistic or penalties disproportionate.
The high level of public support is acknowledged
by the North Review, as is the uncertain impact of any change,
and the potentially detrimental impact of change should not be
under-estimated. As noted previously, countries with a 50mg limit
or lower have correspondingly lower penalties and drink driving
is often seen as a minor misdemeanour. On the other hand the continued
application of stringent penalties for a perceived lower level
offence risks bringing the regime into disrepute in the eyes of
the general public and undermining the stigma currently associated
with a drink drive offence. The existing public policy success
could quickly unravel as a result.
We are also concerned that any public messaging around
a reduction in the BAC could inadvertently give the impression
of an indicative level of safety or reintroduce the concept that
there is a limit you can drink to safely before driving. Evidence
from NICE clearly shows that the consumption of any alcohol impairs
ability and the suggestion of a safe level would be a retrograde
step.
c. Will it impact on the hospitality industry?
The North Review acknowledges the difficulties inherent in
any cost benefit analysis and that the modelling of the impact
on the industry was uncertain. The report acknowledges that the
change could have a detrimental impact on pub trade but suggests
that the industry could do much to protect itself against this—for
example through designated driver schemes and lower priced soft
drinks. This fails to acknowledge the existing investment and
support for such schemes already in place in the industry. We
do not believe there is anything additional or significantly different
that pubs and bars etc could do to insulate against the likely
downturn in trade resulting from a change to the BAC level.
The North Review is equally dismissive of the likely
economic impact on an industry already under strain. The pub trade
has faced severe pressures since 2007 as a result of the credit
crunch and subsequent recession. Pubs have been closing in record
numbers since then—industry estimates suggest 39 per week—and
new pub openings have declined by some 60%. A change of this nature
which could further affect trade in a vital sector of the economy
should not be under-estimated. Pubs are already facing increasing
operating costs—those directly attributable to legislation
increased by 20% in the last year alone—and a resulting
pressure on margins. There is simply no slack with which to insulate
themselves against a further downturn in custom.
The proposed change also needs to be seen in the
context of the wider public policy environment. The net effect
of recent Government taxation and law and order policies has been
to significantly increase the cost of alcohol sold in pubs as
compared with that sold through supermarkets. During the 1990s,
beer was on average 3 times more expensive in a pub than in a
supermarket: it is now more than 10 times as expensive. The total
deregulation of alcohol sales through the off trade as part of
the Licensing Act 2003 has fuelled the use of alcohol as a loss
leader by the major supermarkets and aggressive price promotions
coupled with the introduction of a ban on smoking in public places
have resulted in over 70% of alcohol now being consumed at home.
The policies of the previous Government have resulted
in a legislative disincentive to drink in a social, well-regulated
environment. The reduction of the BAC and associated messaging
will simply serve to reinforce this.
13. All of the above make it uncertain that
a change to the BAC level at this point in time will deliver the
public policy objective of reduced fatalities and casualties and
the wider costs and benefits outlined in the report.
PUB TRADE
RECOMMENDATIONS
14. At a time of limited resources at both
a central, local and police level, it is vital that any reform
in this area is focused on delivering the greatest reduction in
fatality and casualty figures most effectively. We question whether
a focus on reducing the BAC and a whole population approach will
deliver that.
15. In the first instance, measures to further
reduce drink driving statistics needs to be put in the context
of overall fatalities and casualties. There are many causes of
death on the roads and measures to tackle them must be prioritized
accordingly. In particular, as the North Review notes, driving
under the influence of drugs is a serious cause of death and casualties
on the road which is, as yet, not being tackled in any meaningful
way. A short and long term strategy to address the problem of
drugs and driving is needed as a matter of urgency and may deliver
a greater reduction in fatalities and casualties than an adjustment
in the BAC. There is considerable overlap between alcohol and
soft drug use which means that action to tackle the latter could
also reduce drink drive statistics.
16. Looking specifically at measures to
reduce drink drive fatalities and casualties, evidence from NICE
and other countries suggests that this is best achieved by means
of public education and enforcement. Efforts to target young drivers
and existing persistent non-compliance should be stepped up; over
90% of those dying on the roads are well above the existing BAC
level. It is worth noting in this context that publicizing the
change in the limit and educating people about its implications
would divert valuable resources away from enhanced enforcement.
More can and should be done to enforce the existing limit before
measures are taken to reduce it further. We would support increased
levels of random breath testing and visible and rapid enforcement.
CONCLUSION
17. In summary, therefore, we believe that
changes in driving legislation should be proportionate and directed
at those offender groups or types of driving which give rise to
the highest number of deaths or fatalities. Moreover, controls
and costs should be targeted specifically at the irresponsible
minority rather than penalising the responsible majority. The
proposals outlined in the North Review fail these tests and, more
importantly, could undermine existing respect for the regime and
its effectiveness. We question whether the benefits of a small
reduction in casualty figures justified the social and opportunity
costs in terms of support and impact on the hospitality industry.
September 2010
| 
