Effective road and traffic management

Written evidence from Halcrow (ETM 44)

About Halcrow

Halcrow delivers planning, design and management services for developing infrastructure and buildings worldwide. Founded in 1868 and working through a global network of 98 offices, drawing on the skills of some 6,000 employees, we contribute to the construction, operation and maintenance of the built environment, and the protection, enhancement and maintenance of the natural environment. We take on the big issues that affect us all – water, transportation, energy, and creating places to live and work. Our work is guided by our ethos, comprising our values, our code of conduct and our purpose: to sustain and improve the quality of people's lives.

Introduction

1.1 The Transport Select Committee’s inquiry looks specifically at "Effective road and traffic management", an area in which Halcrow has considerable expertise. The inquiry’s terms of reference are framed "in the light of the Government’s decision not to introduce road pricing on existing roads (except in relation to HGVs)". This submission of evidence responds to two of the issues raised for consideration within the terms of reference: these relate to the effectiveness of legislative provisions for road management under the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 and the Traffic Management Act 2004; and to the impact of bus lanes and other aspects of road layout.

1.2 Our evidence also gives consideration to the issues around the policy decision that triggered the Committee’s inquiry; that is the decision not to introduce road pricing on existing roads.

The effectiveness of legislative provisions for road management under the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 and the Traffic Management Act 2004

2.1 The previous Government set out its future transport strategy in the Future of Transport White Paper, published in July 2004, which recognised the importance travel plays in offering real benefits to people and in contributing to building an inclusive society. The transport system helps underpin the international competitiveness of the economy. This does not, however come without a cost and the benefits of mobility and access must be weighed against the impact on other people and the environment, now and in the future.

2.2 The White Paper also recognised the need to account for the way in which travel was changing. The growing demand for the use of the country’s road network by the travelling public conflicts with the needs of highway authorities and undertakers to occupy the road space in order to maintain and improve it. The management of this interface is crucial.

2.3 The New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (NRSWA) has been in force since 1993 and provides the basis for highway authorities and undertakers to coordinate and cooperate in the execution of work. The fundamental principle of the legislation is that the undertaker would plan and execute work in such a way as is reasonably practicable to avoid unnecessary delay and obstruction whilst the street authority coordinates the activities to ensure that unnecessary inconvenience is not caused.

2.4 Despite this, conflict has continued between authorities and undertakers and consequently the Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA) was introduced. This sought, amongst other things, to update the NRSWA legislation through clarification and amendment of some existing provisions and introduce new provisions to expand the powers available to street authorities.

2.5 In addition the TMA introduced the Network Management Duty on all local traffic authorities. This duty requires them both to secure the movement of traffic on their networks and to facilitate it on the networks of others. The TMA also introduced Permit schemes, which are structured to provide alignment and commonality with the base NRSWA but providing the street authority with a greater degree of control over undertaker’s activities.

2.6 Halcrow believes the fundamental principle of NRSWA referred to above has been lost through the advent of initiatives arising from the legislation, such as the Section 74 overstay charging regime and Permit schemes. The plethora of secondary legislation and associated statutory and non-statutory guidance that supports it, in the form of codes of practice, has resulted in confusion. It has created an environment that is very controlled. Confusion reigns amongst stakeholders and there is no clear ownership to facilitate a positive development of a coordinated and cooperative approach; something that all the representative bodies maintain is an overarching aim for them all.

2.7 Halcrow believes the community itself, both street authorities and undertakers and their representative bodies (HAUC (UK) and the National Traffic Managers Forum) must grasp the issues and develop clear governance arrangements to assert a business structure to control or influence the behaviour of stakeholders, who could then in turn develop their own business rules that describe the individual approaches each will take to meet their objectives whilst having regard to the wider governance.

2.8 There has also been a fundamental failure in the implementation of the network management duty legislation with respect to performance management. Despite the duty being in place for more than six years and the fact that it includes the specific requirement for local traffic authorities to monitor their effectiveness and assess their performance; such monitoring regimes are not in place. There is no excuse for this. The community itself recognises that this has not been done and there is a need for a formalised structure for performance management that will promote an evidence-based approach. By taking such ownership the community can ensure the right behaviours are promoted and a culture of continual improvement is developed.

2.9 The recent Halcrow/TRL evaluation report on the TMA [1] made recommendations regarding the governance arrangements that could be developed to facilitate ownership, improve data accuracy, develop consistent approaches and measurable indicators, establish a robust reporting mechanism to identify good practice and areas of opportunity and share the same within the community. Such arrangements will start to establish the understanding of all stakeholders of the desired outcomes of performance management, rather than focussing on scores, which can encourage a ‘blame culture’ and be counter productive.

2.10 Whilst we understand the new Government’s desire to move towards an environment where there is less rather than more legislation, there is a case for the development of clearer but simpler legislation that will provide for the duties and obligations of all stakeholders to be simplified and facilitate the ownership by the community described above.

2.11 As we have already mentioned, the various initiatives that have been developed to ‘rectify’ the fact that the fundamental principle of the NRSWA has been lost has merely shifted the responsibility for the planning and execution of street works to avoid unnecessary delay and obstruction from the undertaker to the street authority. We believe this balance should be redressed. It is possible that a return to the fundamental principle of the NRSWA could do that, but this would require the undertakers discharging their obligations under Section 66 of the NRSWA and the street authority fully understanding and using the powers available to them to coordinate works and minimise the inconvenience to persons using the street. However history suggests that this desirable outcome is unlikely to happen.

2.12 We would suggest consideration is given to further development of the powers available under Section 74A of the NRSWA, or lane rental. By developing the lane rental scheme in such a way that drives a better consideration of the planning of works it will place the ownership for minimising unnecessary delay and obstruction back with the undertaker. By its nature, a lane rental scheme and the charging regime therein should be developed to ensure the charges an undertaker would face would reflect the real cost of the delay the works are causing. By focussing the charge in such a way that it is linked to a predicted delay which is, in turn, dependant on works and/or reinstatement category and an estimate of traffic volume, it will drive the correct behaviour from the undertaker to reduce the duration of works. Additionally, including punitive lane rental charges that tackle unnecessary occupation relating to defective workmanship and/or multiple phase works will reinforce that correct behaviour.

2.13 Such a self-enforcing scheme would also release the street authority resource to concentrate on network coordination. The combination of the two would result in coordination at both the micro and macro level. Each works on the network would be optimised in terms of minimising unnecessary delay and obstruction (by the undertaker) and the programme of all activities would be coordinated to maximise the availability of the network and contribute to the expeditious movement of traffic (by the street authority).

2.14 Careful consideration must also be given to the interaction of the various regimes available to manage the activities taking place on the network. As we have explained, some of the initiatives have shifted the responsibility for planning the works. As such, we do not believe a street authority would gain any additional benefit from operating lane rental and Permit regimes on the same part of the network. The additional effort required by the Permit scheme is negated by the self-enforcing philosophy of a lane rental scheme, with the perceived benefit in reducing occupation, whether it is necessary or unnecessary occupation, being the same.

2.15 Of course, the occupation of the road space by any activity has the potential to cause delay and obstruction. This applies to works for road purposes (local authority), street works (undertakers) and private development work. There is a case for having an independent body to control the road space.

2.16 The Scottish experience could perhaps lead the way, where the Scottish Road Works Commissioner is legally responsible for the Street Works Register and for the performance of all stakeholders. Such a regime could be replicated in England and Wales, with either a national Street Works Commissioner or regional commissioners, coupled with a central street works register. Whilst such a register has been considered but discarded in the past, we believe its merits should be reconsidered. There may be less expensive yet viable options available that would still provide the robust data set to underpin the performance management regime described earlier. Such robust data would also provide the basis for the development of future policies, whether that is by the community through self regulation or by the Government where there is a need for it to intervene with new or amended legislation.

The impact of bus lanes and other aspects of road layout

3.1 Whilst the number of bus journeys declined from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s this decline has been arrested or even reversed in some areas over the past eight years. Bus mode share or patronage is rising in a number of areas where operators are providing frequent, high quality services and Integrated Transport Authorities (ITAs), public transport authorities and highway authorities are pursuing supportive, integrated policies. There will be fewer major local transport schemes as we enter a period of austerity. However the Government has acknowledged that buses will continue to provide the backbone of UK public transport. This is set against a forthcoming 20% cut in funding to bus operators available through the BSOG.

3.2 Thus bus operations need to be as cost-effective as possible for a number of reasons:

· efficient operations will allow operators to maximise the number of services they operate commercially, reducing the call on local funding through service subsidy agreements – this is important especially at a time when the availability of public finance is much reduced;

· efficient operations will offer the best opportunities for operators to maximise service quality;

· efficient operations will result in attractive service levels that will continue to provide the best means of attracting new customers – in particular encouraging people to switch from the car for some types of trip.

3.3 Whilst bus priority and other road public transport measures have formed the basis of many major scheme bids in recent years, key strengths of bus based measures are that they:

· can be implemented as one-off localised measures addressing a specific shortcoming on a route;

· are often relatively low cost measures offering good returns for modest levels of expenditure;

· can be easily matched with operator investment through statutory or non-statutory partnership agreements; and

· when part of a wider programme such as a corridor scheme can be implemented in phases according to the availability of funding.

3.4 There are numerous examples across the UK of successful individual bus priority measures. However there are three themes that appear to offer particularly good opportunities and that are in keeping with current constraints:

· getting the best from bus operations in urban centres – securing efficient and attractive operations that offer good penetration of centres. The Birmingham Bus Mall scheme, associated with the Big City Plan, is a series of proposals aimed at making bus operation in the city centre more efficient and more "legible" to users;

· getting the best from bus operations in urban centres – looking again at how buses penetrate urban centres. Some authorities are examining the creation of "bus spines", often in pedestrian areas, with low emission buses sharing space at low speeds in areas where the public realm has been improved but where buses are forced to operate at low speeds, sharing space with pedestrians, cyclists and other road space users. Blackett Street in Newcastle upon Tyne is a good example where buses continue to operate but on a much reduced carriageway, thus maintaining penetration but at the same time reducing severance. Bus operators have generally been supportive of the proposals as they have enabled them to retain core penetration whilst improving reliability and safety;

· getting the best from bus operations in urban centres whilst managing the capacity of centres – the Nottingham city centre access scheme where, through a Statutory Quality Partnership, bus access to the city centre is rationed and regulated in terms of capacity and emissions levels;

· small schemes, good potential returns – park and ride "pockets" where parking areas are identified in urban catchments and promoted as park and ride sites that are served by high frequency passing services rather than dedicated services. Often on a weekday basis only, parking is at existing facilities that have capacity on a weekday such as sports centres, hotels or garden centres. The comprehensive park and ride system in Norwich grew from this type of initiative and the concept has been revived recently in Nottinghamshire;

· small schemes, good potential returns – increasingly bus lanes are also open to cars with two or more passengers – a more palatable form of bus priority that is now more easily enforced through camera technology. Many bus lanes in West Yorkshire are now open to shared cars.

3.5 A further category of highway that may result in gains in road network efficiency through public transport is the strategic or trunk highway network. The Highways Agency (HA) carried out research in the early part of this decade and an important conclusion reached was that the interface between the HA and local highway authorities could be improved through better dialogue and partnership.

3.6 At present some of the operators of the Managing Agent Contracts for the HA are investigating how to integrate bus priority and traffic management initiatives that may have been realised on the local road network to similar effect on the strategic network.

3.7 The HA is conscious that a lot of infrastructure upgrades stop on reaching the strategic network. Some would not be appropriate at the strategic level but others are not implemented due to the complexities of delivery that result on roads beyond the jurisdiction of local highway authorities. They are working to try and develop a list of improvements in the areas that they manage through consultation with operators, ITAs and so forth.

3.8 It is recognised that the impediments are often institutional, procedural or financial rather than purely technical. The research currently being carried out involves the examination of current procedural and governance arrangements and the outcomes are expected to involve better cross party and cross-agency working arrangements, and partnership procedures that more directly involve the HA and MAC managers.

Road pricing - a debate which needs to be held

4.1 Halcrow believes that road pricing is an idea whose time has come. Congestion on Britain’s road network represents a major and increasing cost to our economy with knock-on negative implications for our environment. Road pricing might be viewed as analogous to the metering of water consumption. Prior to metering, water was a resource that was considered to be "free" or at least covered by a set charge. In those households where a meter has been installed, there is now a very clear link between use and cost.

4.2 Like water metering, we recognise that road pricing will never be popular. Consequently, to develop a road pricing scheme will require an act of political courage by the coalition Government which no previous government has been willing to consider in the face of public hostility. However, we believe that the global economic downturn, accompanied by the high levels of public indebtedness experienced in the UK economy, mean that ideas previously considered unacceptable should now be reconsidered. In our view, road pricing will help in the management and conservation of a scarce resource (road space) and play a role in reducing our national debt, while at the same time enhancing our transport network.

4.3 It is quite clear that traffic congestion on Britain’s roads represents a considerable cost to our society. The Eddington Study of 2006 suggested that the then current cost was in the region of £7-8 billion and predicted that unchecked, this would rise to £22 billion by 2025.

4.4 Road pricing has long been viewed as a means of improving the economic efficiency of national and urban highways networks. Put simply, pricing of a scarce resource (road space) at the point of consumption is the most efficient means of allocating that resource amongst competing users. The growing experience of congestion charging and road pricing schemes is that they both increase the economic efficiency of networks (by reducing congestion and increasing traffic speeds, while increasing the attractiveness and performance of public transport) and can produce a significant financial return (London recorded net revenues of £140m - TfL 2008).

4.5 Thus far, despite evidence demonstrating the economic and financial benefits, urban congestion charging schemes are rare. Experience of road pricing schemes in London and Stockholm suggests the following benefits:

· in London the net annual economic benefits of the London central area scheme range from £216 million (with a £5 charge) to £245 million (for an £8 charge). These benefits exceed annual scheme costs of around £145 million (under both charging regimes) and provide a benefit cost ratio (BCR) of between 1.5 (£5 charge) to 1.7 (£8 charge)

· in Stockholm, the benefits have been calculated over 20 years and total SEK 8 billion and costs total SEK 1.9 billion, giving a BCR of 4.3.

4.6 Halcrow believes that the current economic climate may provide a strong incentive for governments to reconsider the case for road pricing at a national level. However, despite the Netherlands and the UK considering such schemes in the past, no such national scheme has thus far been progressed. The Coalition Government has committed itself to driving down the budget deficit while reducing state indebtedness. Road pricing could be deployed in the pursuit of both these desirable outcomes. Our belief is that a national road pricing scheme would generate a significant income for the Government, equal to that of servicing the debt generated by the banking bail-out and the Government’s economic recovery programmes.

4.7 To date, road pricing has not been widely proposed as a form of general public revenue raising (i.e.: taxation). The rationale promoted in the vast majority of published literature has been economic (promoting a more rational use of scarce road-space, see Rouwendal & Verhoef, 2006), environmental (effecting a modal shift from polluting private transport to public transport, see Proost & van Dender, 2001) or policy driven (constraining demand and reducing congestion in congested corridors, see May & Milne, 2000). Where road pricing has been proposed, the tendency has been to suggest that it would be done in a fiscally neutral way i.e. if introduced other motoring taxes would be reduced. In Holland, they wanted to reduce the very high costs of owning a car. In the UK, RP has been discussed in terms of providing offsetting reductions in fuel duty.

4.8 Of course, the potential of road pricing programmes to generate net revenues has significantly increased their attractiveness to operating authorities. Nevertheless promotion and acceptance of an explicit ‘taxation’ objective would be a significant deviation from current practice in most parts of the world and would clearly present a major challenge to those charged with presenting the argument to the general public.

4.9 In Halcrow’s view, road pricing would bring significant benefits to the management of roads and traffic. Though we are aware of public hostility to the concept of road pricing, our view is that its benefits have not been persuasively explained to the general public. Road pricing at least has the merit of conferring wider economic benefits on the transport system due to reduced journey times, while additional revenue can be spent on improving infrastructure.

4.10 There are also environmental benefits. In London, for example, the congestion charging scheme was initially designed to improve the flow of traffic in the capital and thereby generate a net economic return. Subsequent changes to the scheme were made in order to additionally further environmental goals by persuading more people to use less polluting modes of transport.

4.11 Halcrow has conducted high level analysis and estimated the potential revenues and benefits which would flow from road pricing. Based on a system of charging usage on motorways, ‘A’ roads and minor urban roads it is calculated that 431 billion vehicle km could currently be charged, rising by 28 per cent to 555 billion vehicle km in 2025. This could generate net revenues of £18.8 billion per year, rising to £26.5 billion in 2025. These figures take into account a proportion of the total revenue being reinvested into the road network (£4 billion p.a.) at around 400 lane km p.a., and the cost of establishing and operating the system (£4.5 billion p.a.).

4.12 Using such a system, vehicle trips are likely to reduce in number by 7 per cent, while total journey times would reduce by 12 per cent and congestion would reduce by 75 per cent.

4.13 The cost to motorists is envisaged at 5 pence per vehicle km for cars, and 10 pence per vehicle km for vans and goods vehicles. For an average family this would mean an increase in the annual cost of motoring of around £800 per year, representing a rise of some 10-15%. However, these costs would be outweighed by the economic benefits of increasing government revenue and improving the infrastructure network. Similarly, business road users such as hauliers would benefit from the improved network, as well improved national economic health.

4.14 In the medium to longer term there would be scope to reconfigure the public finances by substituting road pricing revenues for those raised through other forms of taxation. This would be ‘economically generative’ in that the burden of tax would shift from wealth creating activities (e.g.: employment taxes) to congestion and pollution causing activities. There would be scope to reduce income tax by 4p for most bands, leaving society at large in a financially neutral position (i.e.: the sums raised through road pricing would be deducted from other forms of general taxation). Alternatively, council tax could be replaced by the projected revenues from road pricing. In line with the coalition’s localism agenda, local authorities could be given an element of discretion to develop and implement their own local road pricing schemes, accompanied by a reduction in central funding or council tax rates.

4.15 A large number of issues remain to be addressed in detail including technology (though following the successful Stockholm experience, we believe that this is less of an issue than hitherto), and implementation. The major challenge relates to managing public and political attitudes. These challenges are not to be under-estimated; however, it is important to emphasise that the current macro-economic context represents the largest single difference between this and most previous work. Raising additional revenues in the short-term through road pricing may not be popular, but the alternatives, including deeper cuts in public spending and reduced government services, may be even less palatable.

Annex

5.1 Since June 2004 Halcrow has been one of the Highways Agency’s three term consultants appointed under the Northern Development Control Consultancy Commission for the North, providing advice on proposal that influences travel at the Strategic Road Network. This encompasses advice on all levels of the planning system from (revoked and reinstated) Regional Spatial Strategies, Local Development Frameworks to individual planning applications. Halcrow was a key contributor to the Agency’s representations to the North East and Yorkshire and Humber RSS, including supporting the Agency at the NE RSS’s Examination in Public.

5.2 In addition to this, and with reference to Halcrow’s suite of National and Local Authority and private sector clients, we have a vast amount of experience of dealing with the challenges faced by those both tasked with managing transport networks and those promoting new development in terms of dealing with the matter of congestion, including identifying, assessing, and evaluating the means to overcome such through various intervention measures.

5.3 Halcrow has been the Department for Transport’s (DfT) single supplier of technical advice and support in respect to NRSWA and the Traffic Management Act for the last 4 years. We are recognised as one of the leading consultants in the field of street works and network management and have advised DfT, the industry’s representative bodies and local authorities across the country on issues covering street works policy development and network management issues. We have also played a significant part in the development of new codes of practice for safety at street works and road works and the reinstatement of openings in the highway and we were instrumental in the development of the HAUC (UK) Advice Note on a Performance Management Process for Works in the Highway.

5.4 Halcrow also has extensive British and world wide public transport planning experience, including bus priority, bus operations, legislation, regulation and procurement. This note demonstrates that, in times of restrained budgets, the bus has the ability to contribute to wider transport strategies in a cost effective manner and, importantly, schemes can be implemented in a "budget friendly" incremental manner.

February 2011