1 Introduction
Financial regulation - from Tripartite
to 'Twin-peaks'
1. In July 2010, the Treasury published a consultation
document, A new approach to financial regulation: judgement,
focus and stability, proposing changes to financial regulation
in the United Kingdom.[2]
The Government proposes to do away with the tripartite system,
in which the Treasury, the Bank of England, and the Financial
Services Authority work together. Instead, the Government is consulting
on:
giving the Bank of England powers over macro prudential
regulation through a newly established Financial Policy Committee
(FPC),
and creating:
A new prudential regulator under the control of the
Bank of England [...] which will be responsible for supervising
the safety and soundness of individual financial firms.
A new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA)
to act as a single integrated regulator focussed on conduct in
financial markets.[3]
The new regulatory framework will follow a 'twin-peaks'
model, in which prudential regulation of financial institutions
is separated from the oversight of consumer protection and markets
conduct.
2. The reforms are intended, among other things,
to deal with the problems of the tripartite system. In the aftermath
of the collapse of Northern Rock, the then Treasury Committee
concluded:
we are concerned that, to outside observers, the
Tripartite authorities did not seem to have a clear leadership
structure. We recommend that the creation of such an authoritative
structure must be part of the reforms for handling future financial
crises.[4]
The system was amended somewhat after the Committee's
report, but the basic structure remained.
3. The Government's proposals go further than simply
dividing prudential regulation and conduct of business regulation
between two regulators. They would create a macro-prudential regulator
with wide, as yet undefined, power to intervene not only in the
affairs of individual institutions, but to take action system
wide. The consultation paper states:
Domestically, a major deficiency in the UK's tripartite
system has been precisely that no authority had clear, overall
responsibility for identifying, monitoring and responding to risks
building up and fault lines in the system as a whole. While recent
attempts have been made to fill this gap by providing statutory
objectives for financial stability to the Bank, and latterly,
to the FSA, these changes assigned responsibility without appropriate
powers, and entrenched rather than addressed the fundamental problem.
The Government will therefore legislate to put the
Bank of England in charge of macro-prudential regulation, by creating
a strong Financial Policy Committee (FPC) within the Bank, with
ultimate authority to identify imbalances, risks and vulnerabilities
in the financial system and take decisive action to mitigate these
in order to protect the wider economy.[5]
4. There will be three major bodies. The Financial
Policy Committee (FPC), to be created within the Bank of England,
and chaired by the Governor, will have "primary statutory
responsibility for maintaining financial stability". A Prudential
Regulation Authority (PRA) "will be responsible for prudential
regulation of all deposit-taking institutions, insurers and investment
banks."[6] As well
as being a subsidiary of the Bank, the PRA will have strong working
links with it: its board will be chaired by the Governor, and
the PRA Chief Executive will be a Deputy Governor of the Bank.
The Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) will have
"a primary statutory responsibility to promote confidence
in financial markets".[7]
The CPMA will be a freestanding organisation, but with strong
links to the other regulators: its Chief Executive will sit on
the FPC and the regulators will have statutory duties to consult
one another.
The financial services industry
5. The UK financial sector was estimated to have
contributed about 10% of GDP in 2009, and employed around 993,000
people as of June 2010.[8]
It is a diverse industry which includes banking, insurance, securities
dealing, and fund management. Regulatory changes can have significant
impacts, both on individual firms and on the efficiency of the
UK financial industry as a whole. The challenge will be to produce
a regulatory structure which reduces the systemic risks financial
services pose while ensuring economically advantageous activity
is not driven out by inappropriate regulation. Good regulation
can provide competitive advantage, as many of our witnesses told
us. For example, a home regulator can provide standards which
are accepted throughout the world. Mr Abbott, CEO of the London
Metal Exchange noted that:
90%-plus of all of the metal futures trading in the
world [...] takes place here in London. [...] Therefore, the regulation
of the LME takes place here in London by the FSA. We are subject
to regulation in other jurisdictions around the globe. We are
approved, for instance, in North America by CFTC; also in jurisdictions
such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia. They accept that the
best regulator to regulate any business is the home regulator
[...][9]
6. The banking industry is the largest segment in
financial services, with over 400,000 employees. However, other
sectors within the financial services industry also contribute
significantly to the economy:
- the UK insurance industry is
the largest in Europe and third largest in the world, with insurance
premiums collected reaching almost £200bn in 2009;
- the London equity market had a global share of
17% in 2009, second only to New York;
- the UK fund management industry is one of the
largest in the world, with assets under management reaching £4.1tn
in 2009.[10]
The sector is estimated to have been the largest
payer of corporation taxes in 2010 and accounted for 11.2% of
total tax receipts for the year.[11]
7. The Government has said that it intends to bring
in a Bill on its proposals by "mid-2011", with an intermediate
consultation on more detailed proposals early in 2011.[12]
Given this timetable, the importance of the sector, both as a
direct and indirect influence on the United Kingdom economy, and
the potential impact of the changes, we made it a priority to
provide a preliminary examination of the Government's initial
proposals. The Committee intends to return to a number of these
key issues in the light of the findings of the Independent Commission
on Banking. We have not attempted to respond to each of the consultation
questions: rather we have identified areas where the Government
may need to reconsider, or at least give a fuller account of its
reasoning. The Government's proposals are evolving, and we expect
to return to this matter again during this Parliament.
Conduct of the inquiry
8. We thought it was important to gather the widest
range of views possible on the Government's proposals, and to
hear from many different sectors. Accordingly, our inquiry spanned
18 oral evidence panels, taking place from July to November 2010.
A full list of witnesses is given at pages 81-3. We are grateful
to our many witnesses for sharing their views on this important
subject with the Committee. We are also grateful to those who
submitted written evidence and to our specialist advisers, Bill
Allen, Alex Bowen, John Tiner and Professor Geoffrey Wood.[13]
Overview
9. There have been large costs from the crisis, both
to the taxpayer and the wider economy. On top of this, the taxpayer
remains exposed to potential loss through the shareholdings it
retains in banks such as Lloyds Banking Group or Royal Bank of
Scotland (RBS) and through the Asset Protection Scheme. In a speech
in November 2009, Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial
Stability at the Bank of England, suggested that the support packages
provided by Governments and central banks amounted to 74% and
73% of GDP in the UK and US respectively.[14]
10. The costs of the crisis to the wider world economy
were significant as well. In a speech in March 2010, Mr Haldane
noted that "World output in 2009 is expected to have been
around 6.5% lower than its counterfactual path in the absence
of crisis".[15]
This cost, borne by taxpayers at home and abroad, as well as those
directly affected by the financial crisis, carries a significant
lesson. Failure of financial services companies can have effects
which reach far beyond the companies involved. Mr Haldane outlines
the problem, and potential government action:
The banking industry is [...] a pollutant. Systemic
risk is a noxious by-product. Banking benefits those producing
and consuming financial servicesthe private benefits for
bank employees, depositors, borrowers and investors. But it also
risks endangering innocent bystanders within the wider economythe
social costs to the general public from banking crises.[16]
11. Against this background, the Government's desire
for urgent action to strengthen the regulatory system is understandable.
However, the speed with which its consultation was prepared and
published has meant that, although the Government has described
the regulatory structures which it wishes to put in place, and
their broad objectivethe new regulators will pursue 'financial
stability'there are many places where more explanation
is essential. In its report on Financial Stability and Transparency,
published in 2008, the Treasury Committee noted "There is
a continuing lack of clarity about what is meant by financial
stability as well as what events constitute a 'serious threat
to financial stability'".[17]
The new Government now needs to define what it considers financial
stability to be. As we will explore throughout this Report, at
this stage there is more clarity about the regulatory architecture
than the detailed outcomes the Government wishes to achieve.
It's not all about banking
12. The consultation has been criticised for an overemphasis
on the banking sector, which may be the result of the speed with
which these reforms have been worked out. The banking crisis demonstrated
the need to reform bank regulation. Bank activities have been
the source of financial instability in the past, and are clearly
continuing sources of risk, given their activities in maturity
transformation, their use of leverage, and the interconnectedness
of their activities. However we heard that regulatory reforms
which focus too much on banks may adversely affect other areas
of financial activity.[18]
To give one example, the Government's proposal to set up two new
regulators, the PRA and CPMA, may lead to confusion about which
firms will be regulated, or part-regulated, by which regulator.
Under the proposals, all banks (including building societies and
credit unions), broker-dealers (including investment banks) and
insurers will be regulated by the PRA, while the CPMA will pick
up the rest of the financial sector, including the conduct of
business regulation of any PRA-regulated firms.
13. The split in responsibility between the PRA and
CPMA may not be clear in some cases. Whilst most banks will be
prudentially regulated by the PRA and by the CPMA on conduct of
business, regulation of the non-banks is less clear. For example,
most large insurance firms would have asset management arms. Under
the new structure, it is not clear whether the PRA or CPMA will
be the lead regulator for such organisations. Aviva told us:
no single body will be charged with taking a holistic
view of the whole Aviva group. Under the proposed new structure,
supervisors would have to gain such an overview despite the fact
that substantial businesses within the Aviva group would be subject
to prudential supervision by different regulatory bodies: the
insurance business by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA),
and Aviva Investors (our asset management business) by the Consumer
Protection & Markets Authority (CPMA).[19]
14. Furthermore, the proposed structure could cause
problems for asset management firms associated with deposit-taking
activities. Blackrock told us:
Some asset managers may have entities within their
group in the United Kingdom which have permissions as a deposit-taker
for insurance business only [...]. It is unclear from the consultation
whether these permissions will bring some or all of asset management
group entities in the United Kingdom within the scope of prudential
regulation by the PRA and conduct regulation by the CPMA or whether
it is intended that these activities would be excluded from the
scope of the PRA.[20]
15. There are other areas within the financial sector
which merit more focus than the consultation paper gave them.
Lloyd's, the specialist insurance market with more than £22bn
of premium income in 2009, was hardly mentioned in the document.
Lord Myners described the consideration given to regulation of
Lloyd's as an "afterthought":
It really does appear right at the end of this document.
Lloyd's is a significant market. It has been very well regulated,
very well run and has produced large tax revenues and large employment
in the UK. It is almost an afterthought in this document. We need
to make sure that this structure does not in any way disadvantage
the UK as a centre for insurance and reinsurance.[21]
We are concerned that the current
proposals for reform say relatively little about some key segments
of the UK financial sector. Inappropriate regulation of non-banking
sectors could cause serious and unintended damage to companies
within those sectors, and to the UK more widely. As the Treasury's
consultation evolves, it is important that the Government clarifies
the regulatory impact of its proposals on the non-bank sectors.
2 Cm 7874 Back
3
HM Treasury Press Notice, 32/10. 26 July 2010 Back
4
Fifth Report of Session 2007-8, The run on the rock, HC
56-I, para 284 Back
5
Cm 7874, paras 2.8-2.9 Back
6
Cm 7874, para 1.14 Back
7
Cm 7874, para 1.21 Back
8
Financial Markets in the UK November 2010, TheCity UK;
estimates of the contribution of financial services to the UK
economy are however not straight forward. Back
9
Oral evidence taken before the Committee on 2 December 2010, European
Financial Regulation, HC 658-i Q 15 Back
10
All data comes from Financial Markets in the UK - November 2010,
TheCityUK Back
11
PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Total Tax Contribution of UK Financial
Services,Report prepared for the City of London Corporation,
December 2010) Back
12
Cm 7874, 7.12, 1.26 Back
13
Relevant Interests of the specialist advisers are as follows (a
complete list of interests is published in the formal minutes
available on the Committee's website):
Professor Geoffrey Wood: Director,
Hansa Trust; Member, Investment Advisory Panel, Strathclyde Pension
fund; Member and Adviser, PI Capital (private equity group); Adviser,
Elliot Advisors.
William Allen: Financial and economic
consultant; Two current consultancy contracts. One is with a company
called Ad Satis Ltd (their internet site is http://www.adsatis.com/
). Ad Satis itself provides consultancy services to banks, and
the contract is to provide them with pieces of research on bank
regulation. The other is with NBNK Investments PLC, which intends
to acquire banking assets in the UK and establish a new retail
banking company to compete with the established incumbents; Consultancy
work for the International Monetary Fund in the past and am on
their list of occasional consultants.
Alex Bowen: No relevant interests
declared
John Tiner: Partner and CEO of Resolution
Operations LLP, an FSA authorised firm, Non-Executive Director
- Lucida Plc, an FSA authorised firm, Non-Executive Director -
Credit Suisse Group, Swiss Bank with major businesses in the UK.
Back
14
Bank of England, Banking on the State, Piergiorgio Alessandri
& Andrew G Haldane, Bank of England, November 2009 Back
15
Bank of England, The $100 Billion Question, Speech by Andrew G
Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England,
March 2010 Back
16
Bank of England, The $100 Billion Question, Speech by Andrew G
Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England,
March 2010 Back
17
Sixth Report of Session 2007-08, HC 371, para 7 Back
18
Q 467 Back
19
Evw 14 Back
20
Evw 12 Back
21
Q 94 Back
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