Written evidence submitted by the Child
Poverty Action Group
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Child Poverty Action Group recognises the
positive intentions behind the proposals to simplify the social
security system, increase work incentives and tackle poverty.
The system of welfare benefits is complex and poorly administered,
and this keeps take up low amongst vulnerable groups.
1.2 Although simplifying the system is attractive
in principle, great caution is needed in practice because it must
respond to the complexity and variety in the lives of claimants
and their households. It is well understood that it is means-tested
benefits that introduce the greatest level of benefit complexity
and also create the unemployment and poverty traps that Universal
Credit seeks to address. Another type of complexity has arisen
from the growth of a sanctions bureaucracy of doubtful efficacy
and the impact over time of incremental changes often designed
to make small spending savings, but which result in more complexity.
1.3 Whilst not a government document, it is important
to recognise the origins of the current proposals in the Centre
for Social Justice publication Dynamic Benefits: Towards
welfare that works.1 There are now substantial
differences between the levels of resourcing and the Marginal
Deductions Rates (MDR) they suggested would be needed to have
an effective impact and those available today. The impact will
be further exacerbated by an £18 billion package of cuts
to benefits and tax credits introduced in the Budget and Spending
Review which increase both complexity and hardship. This renders
the successful introduction of the universal credit harder and
costlier to achieve.
1.4 CPAG's believes that welfare reform must:
- provide a national social security system that
protects all people of working age and their families against
adverse changes in their circumstances;
- enhance protection against poverty for all families
and children (irrespective of their age, status, ethnicity - and
whether their parents are in or out of paid work) and make a major
contribution to the eradication of child poverty by 2020 as required
by the Child Poverty Act 2010;
- provide a statutory entitlement to high quality
and personally tailored support that helps more claimants realise
their aspirations to enter decent jobs;
- be sufficiently flexible to meet the diverse
and ever changing needs of claimants throughout the life cycle,
responding to the complex combinations of different factors affecting
individuals and households - for example disability, ill health,
relationship breakdown, bereavement and caring responsibilities;
- recognise that at any given time a certain proportion
of the population will not be able to work, for a variety of reasons
and that it is our duty as a society to support them;
- support policies that prevent claimants becoming
excluded from the mainstream of society; and
- ensure couples are not disincentivised from both
working and choosing the best split of working hours between them
that suits their family responsibilities.
1.5 As they stand, the proposals constitute a
fundamental weakening of important principles underpinning social
security in the UK. For example:
- Portraying social security as a "contract"
between those who have and those who have not - and between tax-payers
and benefit recipients - represents a fundamental reframing of
the purposes of the social security system which ignores the fact
that benefit claimants pay tax, many working tax payers receive
benefits and there is considerable and constant movement between
these two groups.
- The rights of those in work, who pay insurance
contributions for protection, have slipped off the agenda. We
are seeing those rights eroded and although the Universal Credit
does not replace contribution based benefits, time limits placed
on entitlement mean that the amounts paid in national insurance
no longer afford much protection.
- There are dangers that a "putting all your
eggs in one basket" approach will remove a range of financial
safeguards for vulnerable families as and when things go wrong
- and problems invariably arise during major structural reforms
to welfare benefits provision.
- Restricting financial support to the most vulnerable
groups in order to influence market forces (for example, housing
and childcare) rather than tackling the need for better social
infrastructure in these areas and ignoring the wider socio-economic
issues that are driving up costs is inequitable and unachievable;
social security was not designed as a lever for governments to
influence markets and there is scant evidence it can be used effectively
for this purpose.
- While the provision of high quality personalised
support that enables claimants who face profound structural barriers
to employment is vital, paid work will not be appropriate for
everybody at all times.
- Conditionality has always been part of the architecture
of social security since Beveridge. But proposals to increase
conditionality at a time when significant cuts are eroding claimants'
rights, access to advice services and access to legal aid - these
agencies are experiencing severe cut backs.
2. CHILD POVERTY
2.1 A recent analysis by the Institute for Fiscal
Studies (IFS) suggests that a further 300,000 children and working
age parents will be lifted out of poverty in 2009-2010 - resulting
in the lowest levels of child poverty Britain has seen for over
20 years when measured before housing costs (the after housing
cost figures represent a greater and more persistent problem).2
We are concerned that the cumulative impact of radical cost-cutting
policies put in place in the Budget and the Spending Review will
squander this historic achievement - and have a disproportionate
impact on the most vulnerable groups.3 By the time
introduction of the Universal Credit begins in 14 February 2013,
the IFS predict both relative and absolute poverty for children
and working age adults will have increased.4
2.2 The Government argues that the introduction
of the Universal Credit could lift 350,000 children out of poverty
by 2018. This potential progress is primarily based on the Department's
ambitious assumptions about increased take-up levels under the
new benefit. Decisions made in the process of implementing the
system, such as provision of advice serves, promotion of entitlement
and setting disregard and taper rates at the right level will
all help determine if this desired reduction in child poverty
is achievable. The Department must therefore raise its ambitions
so that, rather than a hoped for reduction in child poverty, a
reduction of at least 350,000 children below the poverty line
is a headline objective that is actively pursued.
Childcare
2.3 Even during an economic boom, delivery of
the childcare strategy was patchy, with significant gaps in provision,5
and variable quality, and the situation is likely to deteriorate
further during the recession. Childcare quality and availability
is particularly poor in the most disadvantaged areas. A combination
of high costs,6 lack of funding,7 variable
quality8 and complexity in financial support for childcare9
has generated particular problems. It is particularly important
to note that the requirement that lone parents of school-age children
be available to work means they are having to rely on that part
of the childcare strategy that is the least well-developed -ie,
extended schools and out of school childcare.
3. THE LABOUR
MARKET
3.1 Recent figures from the Office for National
Statistics show the first quarterly fall in the employment rate
since the three months to April 2010. The figures identify a drop
in the number of people employed in the public sector while the
numbers employed in the private sector remains unchanged.10
3.2 Work that fails to sustain families above
the poverty line is a persistent and growing problem. There are
now 2.1 million children (58%) below the poverty line in families
with work. This highlights one of the most important domestic
problems facing government today: there is entrenched structural
poverty that cannot be tackled by the benefit system and must
be tackled through the labour market. As much effort must go into
addressing causes of poverty in the labour market as is being
put into reforming the social security system.
3.3 Given the data that the government will hold
on employees and earnings through using PAYE to deliver Universal
Credit, it will be more possible than before to identify major
employers who exploit poverty pay and the top ups made by the
tax payer. The government should commit to investigating if this
will provide an opportunity for applying levies to companies that
exploit the presence of Universal Credit wage-subsidies in this
way.
4. UNIVERSAL
CREDIT: STRUCTURE
4.1 The Government claims that the Universal
Credit will be "fairer and firmer" and achieve the following:
make work pay and improve work incentives; "reintroduce culture
of work" by increasing conditionality; introduce a "new
contract" with "greater certainty and better incentives";
reduce poverty; reduce administrative costs. The government argues
that making the system simpler for claimants and administrators
will increase take-up and reduce fraud and error.
4.2 Although moves to ensure that everybody is
"better-off" in work are welcome, we do not think that
the universal credit is sufficient to reverse an upward trend
in in-work poverty that took place during a time of economic prosperity
and rising employment.11
4.3 Reducing the marginal deduction rate (MDR)
is welcome. However, it remains higher than originally envisaged
as necessary in the work of the Centre for Social Justice, which
proposed a maximum MDR of 55%. In Dynamic Benefits - and is much
higher than the 50% tax rate imposed on the highest earners in
the UK. This is unfair, especially given many claimants currently
had MDRs below the 65% and 76% levels planned for Universal Credit,
so will see their own MDR rise.
4.4 The Universal Credit will not remove barriers
to employment such as lack of suitable jobs, lack of family-friendly
working, discrimination in the workplace, lack of childcare or
inadequate transport.
4.5 The new system includes a number of elements
that may increase barriers to employment. For example:
- Work incentives have been made much worse by
the benefit cuts announced in the Budget and Spending Review which
have their biggest impact on working families with children. These
include cuts to Housing Benefit, tax credits, childcare support,
Child Benefit and Council Tax Benefit.
- An apparent incentive encouraging second earners
to give up their jobs or reduce their hours will render it more
difficult to access employment if a relationship breaks down and
they become lone parents; and it will be more difficult for couples
to enhance their total earnings and make decisions that fit their
personal circumstances on how to balance each others hours and
share of childcare.
- Although the costs of school meals generate barriers
to employment, it is by no means clear what will happen to free
school meals under the new system.
- Access to affordable, high quality childcare
is an essential pre-requisite and constitutes the most effective
incentive for lone parents to move into and retain employment.12
Cuts in support for childcare will render it much more difficult
for lone parents to seek work.
4.6 The Universal Credit also erodes some important
principles, including the idea of an independent income for individuals
within couples, even though research on child benefit and carer's
allowance shows how targeting additional resources into the mother/carer's
purse is vital to contain poverty and enhance wellbeing of children.13
5. SUPPORT RIGHTS
AND SANCTIONS
BUREAUCRACY
5.1 Our concerns about proposals to extend conditionality
are twofold: firstly, there is scant evidence of efficacy in regard
to both sustained work outcomes and poverty reduction for the
extent and manner in which conditionality is applied in the system;
secondly, evidence shows sanctions are poorly understood, can
increase poverty, worsen health and are disproportionately applied
to vulnerable groups.
5.2 Research in the US suggests that while stringent
sanctions are associated with a (potentially short-term) drop
in the claimant count, this may be due to people dropping out
of the system completely rather than moving into work.14
The evidence also suggests that the imposition of sanctions
on families can have a profoundly negative impact on the health
and wellbeing of children.15 A more recent summary
of research findings identifies an ongoing "gulf between
the rhetoric and the evidence for the effects of sanctions on
welfare reform".16 Research findings also suggest
that benefit sanctions are often ineffective and have a disproportionate
impact on the must vulnerable claimants.17 A report
from CPAG reviewing "welfare reforms" introduced in
the US in 1996 found that tough work conditions do not necessarily
achieve a high employment rate, that increasing employment does
not necessarily reduce child poverty, and that benefit sanctions
have an impact on the most vulnerable groups.18
5.3 The costs of administering extensions to
sanctions bureaucracy will increase both the administrative burden
and costs of introducing the universal credit, and this will further
deplete the resources needed to provide high quality personalised
support.
5.4 The ongoing focus on a sanctions bureaucracy
and the continual framing of debate in terms of "carrots
versus sticks" contradicts decades of research by psychologists
and behavioural scientists on motivation. It also contravenes
a view that has been learned on the ground by private and voluntary
sector organisations providing welfare to work services. As the
head of one of the leading companies contracted to provide welfare
to work services told us: "You can mandate a jobseeker
through the door, but after that they must become a voluntary
jobseeker".
5.5 While recognising a role for conditionality
in the system, the fixation on carrot and stick approaches and
top-down sanctions impedes delivery of sustained job outcomes.
The evidence base suggests that intrinsic, rather than extrinsic,
forms of motivation tend to be most effective. Respected fields
of research and practice, such as Self Determination Theory (SDT)19
which have been taken up widely and successfully in areas such
as healthcare, education, fitness training, addiction recovery
and support for relationships should be used to inform the development
of the Work Programme.
5.6 The positive intent behind the proposed contract
with claimants is fully accepted; however we are not convinced
of the proposal in its current form and urge great caution and
very careful design. Claimants' engagement, rather than just compliance,
is essential to achieving work-related progress and sustained
work outcomes. The legislation should provide a statutory entitlement
to high quality and personally-tailored support and much greater
effort should be put into the positive marketing of services,
including peer-to-peer marketing.
5.7 We also recommend that the Department pilot
innovative and evidence based approaches that give greater autonomy
to claimants and nurture self-directed behaviour. This might,
for example, involved replacing the rigid, top-down sanctions,
with personal budgets, similar to those being used for disability
payments. A claimant could, with the support of a personal adviser,
commission their own work programme services from a choice of
public, private and voluntary providers. Our discussion with private
and voluntary sector providers has encouraged us to think there
would be interest in the piloting of innovative and evidence-based
forms of approach.
5.8 Persisting with the expansion of an expensive
sanctions bureaucracy with scant evidence of efficacy without
even trialling other evidence-based approaches represents poor
value for tax payers and is failing to move as many people into
work as should be possible.
5.9 Research from the DWP on workfare programmes
in the United States, Canada and Australia found little evidence
that workfare increases the likelihood of finding work, and is
least effective in getting people into jobs in weak labour markets
where unemployment is high.20 We believe that opportunities
to engage in work experience should be provided as an entitlement
and positively marketed. In no situation should there be mandatory
work without pay as there is evidence it may be counter-productive
and it damages perceptions about being better off in work.
6. SIMPLIFICATION
AND WIDER
WELFARE SYSTEM
6.1 Complexity—and poor administration—is
a major problem. However, there are aspects of the proposals that
have so far failed to explain how particular needs of certain
groups will be met; and there are other dangers that the new system
will create new forms of complexity of its own.
6.2 How carers fit into the system remains
unanswered. We support the proposal from the Centre for Social
Justice that support for carers should be increased. We believe
that it is vital to retain provision for payment of the couple
rate of the carer's and severe disability premiums.
6.3 Moving to a system of local council tax
benefit schemes will complicate the calculations and create
"postcode lottery" problems. It will compromise the
aim of making the financial gain from taking up employment more
transparent to claimants and easier to calculate.
6.4 The form of provision of financial support
for childcare under the new system and the principles that
underpin it are as yet unknown. Access to affordable childcare
is in many cases at least as significant as taper rates and earnings
disregards for real and perceived work incentives and is often
the make or break factor for entering and retaining work. The
cuts announced to the maximum childcare costs payable through
working tax credit must be reversed and must not be carried into
the new system if access to childcare is not to become a greater
barrier than it already is.
6.5 It remains unknown how the system will deal
with the self-employed. In contrast to employees, who will
be covered by the PAYE "real time" system, the self-employed
will presumably remain subject to the onerous and complex reporting
requirements which currently apply, and which undoubtedly act
as disincentive to take up self-employment.
6.6 Parts of the Social Fund - an essential
safety net for many vulnerable claimants who find themselves in
the most difficult circumstances - will be subsumed into the Universal
Credit. The restriction of budgeting loans to advances
of benefit represents a major cut in provision and the devolution
of community care grants and crisis loans to cash
strapped local authorities could leave some claimants effectively
destitute.
6.7 Replacement of the current system by Universal
Credit will mean the loss indicators in the system that are used
for passported benefits. This is a dangerous recipe for
form filling, complexities, "cliff edges" and erosion
of entitlement in areas like access to health benefits and free
school meals.
6.8 We are strongly opposed to the possible replacement
of hardship payments by loans and limiting the circumstances
in which they would be paid. This will result in long term lowering
of benefit claimants incomes for those affected while loans are
recovered, leaving their children in a sustained period of exceptional
poverty.
6.9 Moves to monthly payments and the
possible loss of payment via post offices could generate weeks
of considerable hardship and reduce take-up. This, and the extension
of income support capital limits to those already in paid
work extends monthly means-testing to a much wider group than
anticipated and may act in itself as a work disincentive.
6.10 Overpayments have always provided additional
complexity for claimants and bureaucratic costs under the current
system. The Department appears confident that the extent of overpayments
will be massively reduced under the new system. Given this confidence,
we recommend that there should either be no overpayment recovery,
or a significant level up to which overpayments are disregarded
and not recovered for the Universal Credit. It would allow for
a significant amount of costly bureaucracy and complexity for
both the Department and claimants to be swept aside.
6.11 Support from a range of different sources
currently provides some protection to claimants when administrative
error or poor decision generates delays. Combining all support
into one system presents a greater hazard when errors are made
that result in delayed or reduced payments, incorrect decisions
and appeals. The Department must design into the system swift
and sufficient provision of emergency support and must guarantee
a maximum time for the appeals process with quality guarantees.
7. CONSULTATION,
DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION
7.1 We are concerned that the introduction of
the Universal Credit was announced the same day the 21st Century
Welfare consultation ended (within which Universal Credit was
only one option). There has been no consultation on the Universal
Credit and there is very poor public knowledge of the proposals,
so we believe the speed at which a reform, which ministers describe
as the greatest change since Beveridge, is too fast with too little
consultation and public engagement.
7.2 Given that this ambitious programme of reform
has implications for many millions of people, we urge the Committee
to highlight the importance of sufficient time and sufficient
information for very thorough parliamentary scrutiny. Draft regulations
in key areas must be provided in advance of bill committee sessions
in both houses of parliament.
7.3 The involvement of the Social Security Advisory
Committee (SSAC)—the main UK advisory body on social security
matters—is vital. The six month rule by which the SSAC is
not consulted on regulations made within six months of the enactment
of parent legislation should not be applied in the case of this
bill.
7.4 Transition to the Universal Credit will follow
staff cuts in DWP and HMRC, and funding cuts for independent advice
services and legal aid. This may prevent the new system being
delivered effectively, and may prevent people getting the information
they need to access their entitlement.
7.5 A new IT programme is already being put in
place to administer an amalgamated Work Programme and interactions
and transfers between existing systems (which may, or may not,
be functioning effectively) and two new systems may generate problems.
Two reports from the Ombudsman identified a raft of problems with
the design and delivery of the tax credits, and problems with
the IT system, and these should be taken on board when rolling
out the universal credit 21 In particular lessons about
requisite training and dangers of IT failure must be taken into
account.
8. CONCLUSION
8.1 While supporting the core aims of simplicity
and increased work incentives, we are extremely concerned that
the Government is embarking on such an ambitious and potentially
risky programme of reform in such haste in the context of extensive
cuts in support for families, service cuts and a contracting labour
market.
8.2 The reforms must not be used to pair back
social security, but to strengthen it. Whilst simplicity is desirable,
it is not paramount if it means in future we may lose important
support for particular groups, or the benefits of universalism
within the system.
8.3 Reducing national insurance benefits also
removes entitlements to independent income for women—eg
the reduction of contributory ESA to one year and the consideration
being given to folding carers benefits into Universal Credit.
8.4 Any benefit that seeks to replicate all the
pre-existing tests of entitlement based on work, health and caring
requirements will not be simple.
8.5 Universal Credit means more means-testing
- it spreads monthly assessments to those in work, more onerous
reporting requirements and new capital rules to those who currently
experience "means-testing light" through tax credits.
8.6 We have serious doubts the real time computer
system will work - the road to previous DWP and HMRC IT projects
were paved with equally good intentions.
8.7 As currently outlined, it looks likely to
trap more mothers in low-hours, low-paid work and discourages
partners from working - this is undesirable as it prevents families
in future from staying out of poverty.
8.8 Poverty traps are inherent to this type of
means-test - and without sufficient investment, marginal deduction
rates will not be much improved for some groups.
8.9 Key decision have yet to be taken - chief
amongst these is whether Universal Credit will continue to be
paid (as child benefit and tax credits are now) to the main carer,
including childcare costs.
8.10 The proposals are severely reduced in effectiveness,
including any reductions in child poverty, by the cuts which will
precede them and which will seriously damage work incentives and
cause predicted rises in child poverty. The stated ambition to
make inroads into child poverty rates could be thwarted and there
is now a real risk that the introduction of Universal Credit can
only hope to reduce poverty rates back to the pre-cuts level.
ABOUT CPAG
CPAG promotes action for the prevention and relief
of poverty among children and families with children. To achieve
this, CPAG aims to raise awareness of the causes, extent, nature
and impact of poverty, and strategies for its eradication and
prevention; bring about positive policy changes for families with
children in poverty; and enable those eligible for income maintenance
to have access to their full entitlement. If you are not already
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END NOTES
1 This report
by the Centre for Social Justice, published as part of their Breakdown/Breakthrough
Britain series can be downloaded from can be downloaded from:www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk
2 M Brewer
and R Joyce, Child and working-Age Poverty from 2010 to 2013,
(commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and published
by Institute for Fiscal Studies, December 2010) http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn115
3 We are
particularly concerned about reassessment of the remaining Incapacity
Benefit claimants, the switch to Consumer Price Index
(CPI) indexation of benefits, changes to DLA and Employment and
Support Allowance and radical changes to Housing Benefit.
4 Mike Brewer
and Robert Joyce, Child and working age poverty from 2010 to 2013
(supported by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and published by
the Institute for Fiscal Studies, December 2010).
5 Gaps include:
lack of childcare for disabled children, out of school childcare
including holiday childcare, childcare for older children, childcare
for anyone working atypical hours and in some areas, childcare
for children under two.
6 The costs of
childcare in the UK are two to four times more than in Finland
and Québec in Canada, and four to eight times more than
in Sweden - see OECD, Babies and bosses: reconciling work and
family life: volume 4, Canada, Finland, Sweden and the UK (2010).
7 The Government
spends around 6.5 billion (or 0.54% of GDP) a year to finance
childcare. Even if it doubled this to 1% of the Gross National
Product, it would still be half the rate of some other countries—See
G Cooke, 4Children, Realising the childcare revolution, 2004.
8 An OFSTED report
has identified wide local variations in the quality of childcare.
OFSTED, Leading to Excellence report can be downloaded from: http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/Ofsted-home/Leading-to-excellence
9 The way in which
childcare is delivered and financed is complex, and take-up of
the childcare element of Working Tax Credit is low among disadvantaged
groups, and does not cover costs. - see HM Revenue and Customs
- Child and Working Tax Credit Statistics, (April 2009).
10 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=12
11 The most
recent Household Below Average Income show that—apart from
a brief respite between 1999 and 2004-05—in-work
poverty has been on a rising trend since the late 1970s. Some
commentators believe that this trend destroyed Labour's goal of
halving child poverty by 2010. See Peter Kenway, "The untold
story of poverty in working households" in The Guardian,
21 May 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/21/work-poverty.
12 See T
Tomaszewki, J Chanfeau and M Barnes, Lone parents and employment:
an exploration of findings from Families and Children Study 2006-2008,
DWP working paper 93, 2010) - http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/WP93.pdf
- confirms that "research evidence has repeatedly demonstrated
that the absence of suitable childcare is a key barrier to work"
and that "for work to be retained, it is important
that lone mothers see the transition as an achievable option and
one that is beneficial for both them and their children",
p 2.
13 Research
on child benefit shows that mothers/carers welcome the money being
paid directly to them, as this ensures the money is spent on children
(see J Pahl, Money and Marriage, (Macmillan Education 1989). Research
on families with disabled children also suggests that paying Carers
Allowance to mothers has the same effect. See, G Preston, Helter
Skelter: Families, disabled children and the benefit system (CASE
paper 92, 2005), and G Preston with M Robertston, Out of
reach: benefits for disabled children (CPAG, 2006).
14 James
Midgley, with commentaries by Kitty Stewart , David Piachaud and
Howard Glenniser, CASE/1312 - April 2008 reports "moving
off benefits doesn't necessarily mean that they are now working
in remunerative jobs and that they are self-sufficient and successful"
- "leaver studies" provide useful
information about fate of benefit leavers. (p.32) - http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper131.pdf
15 A Skalicky
and J T Cook, The children's sentinel Nutrition Assessment Program,
Boston, Massachusetts, July 2002—http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/csnappublic/C-SNAP%20Report.pdf.
This study by the Boston University Medical Center found that
infants and toddlers in families whose welfare benefits were reduced
or eliminated by 1996 welfare sanctions have higher rates of hospitalization
and hunger than infants whose families have kept their benefits.
The study found that infants and toddlers in families who have
been sanctioned have approximately a 50% higher risk
of being hungry than children whose families receive welfare benefits.
It found that children in families who had been sanctioned, as
opposed to those in receipt of social security payments who had
not, experienced a 30% higher incidence of past hospitalisations,
60% greater risk of "food insecurity" (including,
for instance, being underweight) and a 90% greater risk of being
admitted to hospital on an accident and emergency visit.
16 J Griggs
and M Evans, A review of benefit sanctions, (Joseph Rowntree Foundation,
2010).
17 See, for
example, Lone Parent Obligations: a review of recent evidence
on the work-related requirements within the benefit systems of
different countries, (Dan Fister and Rosie Gloser, DWP Research
Report 632, 2009-2010); The effects of benefit sanctions on lone
parents' employment decisions and moves into employment (Vicki
Goodwin, Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report No
511, 2008) http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep511.pdf;
A review of the JSA sanctions regime: Summary research findings,
(Mark Peters and Lucy Joyce, Department for Work and Pensions
Research Report No 313, 2006) and Qualitative research exploring
the Pathways to Work sanctions regime (by Martin Mitchell and
Kandy Woodfield, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report
No 475, 2009) - http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep475.pdf
18 Alison
Garnham, Work over welfare: lessons from America? (CPAG, 2007)
19 For more
information on Self Determination Theory, see http://www.psych.rochester.edu/SDT/
20 R Crisp
and D R Fletcher, A comparative review of workfare programmes
in the United States, Canada and Australia, (DWP Research Report
533, 2008)
21 The Ombudsman
published a special report on the administration of the Child
and Working Tax Credits system published in June 2005 (Tax credits:
Putting things right) which "highlighted the key issues and
challenges that the new system had created for HMRC in the first
two years following its introduction, and made 12 recommendations
which were intended to help relieve some of those consequences
and promote a more customer-focused approach."
Although HMRC made a number of improvements to the administration
of the tax credits system, the Ombudsman published a second report—Tax
credits: Getting it wrong (5th Report—Session 2006-07, The
House of Commons, 8 October 2007—http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/improving-public-service/reports-and-consultations/reports/parliamentary/tax-credits-getting-it-wrong/3)
which makes six recommendations, which highlighted the need for
"clear and comprehensive guidance for Tax Credit Office staff"
and "training".
December 2010
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