Draft Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2012
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
† Brake, Tom (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)
† Brokenshire, James (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)
† Buckland, Mr Robert (South Swindon) (Con)
† Crockart, Mike (Edinburgh West) (LD)
† Crouch, Tracey (Chatham and Aylesford) (Con)
† Duddridge, James (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)
† Evans, Jonathan (Cardiff North) (Con)
† Goggins, Paul (Wythenshawe and Sale East) (Lab)
† Heyes, David (Ashton-under-Lyne) (Lab)
† Johnson, Diana (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
† Kelly, Chris (Dudley South) (Con)
† Lazarowicz, Mark (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab/Co-op)
† Pincher, Christopher (Tamworth) (Con)
Robertson, John (Glasgow North West) (Lab)
† Shannon, Jim (Strangford) (DUP)
† Walker, Mr Robin (Worcester) (Con)
† Wilson, Phil (Sedgefield) (Lab)
Sarah Petit, Mark Etherton, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Ninth Delegated Legislation Committee
Wednesday 18 April 2012
[Katy Clark in the Chair]
Draft Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2012
2.30 pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Brokenshire): I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2012.
I welcome you to the Chair, Ms Clark. It is a privilege to serve for the first time under you as Chair. I also welcome other members of the Committee.
The order was laid before the House on 1 March and approved by the House of Lords on 21 March. Protecting the public from terrorism will always be a top priority for this Government. We are committed to ensuring that the police and others have the powers that they need to tackle terrorism. However, there is also a need to guard against placing disproportionate burdens on business, industry and academia.
The purpose of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is to ensure that the Government have the necessary powers to counter the terrorist threat to the UK. Part 7 of the Act is intended to improve the security of dangerous biological substances that may be targeted or used by terrorists. Schedule 5 lists the substances that are subject to the provisions of part 7.
Any site that intends to hold or use one of the controlled pathogens and toxins must notify the Home Office. The police can then require information relating to the security of the substances held and the names of people with access to those substances. The police must be admitted to the premises to carry out security checks. Any direction made by the police regarding security measures must be complied with. Those could include physical, personnel and electronic security measures. The Home Secretary also has the power to deny access to a named person if that is deemed necessary in the interests of national security. If she believes that adequate security measures are not being taken, she may give a direction requiring disposal of the listed substances. Any occupier who fails to comply with any direction or duty without reasonable excuse will be guilty of a criminal offence, although it is possibly worth noting that, to date, there have been no prosecutions under the Act for failure to comply with any duty or direction.
The purpose of the order is to add one dangerous pathogen to the list of controlled pathogens and toxins in schedule 5 and to remove four pathogens of low concern. The order sets out the specific details of the modification, including the names of the substances, which I will not attempt to repeat now. [Laughter.] The list of controlled pathogens was reviewed by a group of Government, academic and industrial experts—who
probably are better at pronunciation than I am—to ensure that it is up to date with scientific advances, emerging terrorist threats and diseases. Pathogens and toxins should be added to or remain on the list only if we are satisfied that they can be used in an act of terrorism to endanger life or to cause serious harm to human health.Conversely, where we are satisfied that a pathogen or toxin cannot be used effectively in an act of terrorism, we should remove it from the list to remove unnecessary burdens. Security advice will still be offered by the police to those laboratories that hold the four substances to be removed. Although there is a potential increase in the risk of those four substances being acquired, they have limited potential for harmful use. That is the assessment that we have received in considering our approach to them.
The approach used to review the list of controlled pathogens and toxins is robust. Experience with lists of pathogens produced for health and safety at work shows that there are always debates about the inclusion of individual pathogens and toxins, and that they need to be reviewed from time to time as more information becomes available. The key is to make pragmatic decisions based on the available knowledge of the experts involved.
However, the threat posed by the possible terrorist use of pathogens and toxins remains real. It is imperative to ensure that terrorists do not have access to dangerous substances, but it is also important to ensure that any measures are proportionate and that important scientific research and medical use is not restricted.
If the draft order is approved by both Houses, it will come into force on 1 October. The modification strikes the right balance and I commend the draft order to the Committee.
2.36 pm
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab): It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Clark. I thank the Minister for his clear explanation, as usual, of what the draft order would do.
Having looked at the explanatory note, I should like to ask a few questions. First, I was surprised to note that SARS was not already listed as a substance in schedule 5. Many people might be surprised by that. The references in the explanatory note state that there were 8,000 SARS cases in 2003, with 800 deaths, mainly in Asia. Clearly, the substance is dangerous. Will the Minister comment on why it has not been included in schedule 5 in the past?
Secondly, why add SARS now? Has something changed? Has something happened?
Thirdly, the police have an important role to play. I note that the counter-terrorism security advisers are based in police forces. Are they warranted officers? Given the cuts to police officer numbers, will this group, which performs an important particular task, get any protection in terms of budget cuts? That is a matter of concern.
Fourthly, I understand that the review of the list of substances included in schedule 5 is due to take place every two years. What would happen if a dangerous substance suddenly came to light and action needed to be taken? Is there an opportunity for a more regular review, to include such a substance in schedule 5?
Fifthly, the Lightfoot review identified several other substances to be removed from the list. I noted what the Minister said about the need to be proportionate and not to overburden academia and industry with unnecessary security measures. Will he say why it was decided not to remove those other substances at this point? Will he also say what those substances were?
Sixthly, will the Minister say a little bit more about why the substances being removed are no longer a threat? He said in his opening remarks that there was limited potential for harmful use of those substances, but one of those—like the Minister, I shall not attempt to pronounce their names because they are complicated—seemed to relate to tuberculosis. Is that being removed because science has moved on and there is not so much concern about it?
Finally, will the Minister outline in a little more detail a few of the security measures that would be required for substances that are set out in schedule 5?
2.40 pm
James Brokenshire: I thank the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North for her comments. It is worth underlining the consultation and the consideration that went into the revisions to the list. Obviously, considered views were taken from Government, academic and industry experts. As I suspect she knows, the panel was drawn up with the involvement of organisations such as: the Health and Safety Executive; the Health Protection Agency; the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory; the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; the National Counter Terrorism Security Office; the Security Service; the Department of Health; the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control; the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry; Imperial college London; the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, and the Home Office.
The relevant information was also part of a publicly available consultation document, and we undertook a targeted approach with those who would have a particular interest in the sector on two occasions, because of the way in which purdah fell on the first occasion. Therefore, what is or is not appropriate has been under very careful consideration.
Any other substances that it is not considered appropriate to bring forward now will be examined again as part of the 2013 review. I emphasise that if there was intelligence that a new pathogen or toxin that was not included as a risk was clearly dangerous and a threat to national security, obviously a Government would act swiftly. The hon. Lady and I agree on the need for regular reviews to look at the use of particular bacteria or viruses and to see how science has moved on in that time, but it is important that we act swiftly if any new organism becomes known as potentially harmful. Clearly, science has advanced and there is good understanding of a great deal of the biological science that underpins this, but I agree with her about the need for vigilance and to act promptly if there were an emerging threat, and I am confident that that is precisely what would happen.
The hon. Lady asked about security measures, and, as I said, we have acted on the recommendations of the police, who will gain access to the site to inspect and ensure that they are content. We have looked at recommendations and there is guidance that contains minimum standards to ensure consistent advice across
the UK. I am sure that she will understand that I am unable to go into specifics in Committee because doing so may expose security issues, but I can reassure her that there are standards, which are adopted and which the police investigate to ensure that they are available and that a regular review process takes place.The hon. Lady highlighted SARS specifically and asked why it is included now, when it was not previously. Experts reviewed in, for example, 2007 whether it posed a risk, but it has been included only now that science has advanced understanding of how its utility might be adopted.
She also asked about the substances removed by the order. As she asked for the details, I think that she will force me into trying to pronounce some of the items listed; for example, mycobacterium tuberculosis, which is effectively the bacterium that spreads tuberculosis. She will understand the public health requirements attached to it and the potential restrictions, but it has been considered by the expert panel. It regards it as having negligible potential to cause harm if it were used in an act of terrorism, because of how treatments and the science have moved on. It is really about the scientific analysis that has been undertaken on various items. For example, clostridium perfringens is a bacterium naturally produced in the gut, so the approach is to ensure that the toxin that may be produced is still retained in schedule 5. However, the bacterium, which is commonly produced by all of us, is considered, based on proportionality, not to fall within the schedule’s requirements. The two fungi—cryptococcus neoformans and cladophialophora bantiana—have been removed from the list as they rarely cause infections in humans and are not necessarily considered to carry a risk of causing serious harm.
There has been detailed consideration of the biological activity and science, reflected in the advice given by the expert group, and that highlights the attention these matters have been given. The police, in terms of their objectives, are able to enter and search premises, and issue directions, and we are confident that the existing arrangements will continue to be enforced. As I said, there have been no prosecutions or specific breaches of which I am aware relating to the relevant provisions of the Act, but that does not in any way undermine the need for vigilance. The provisions must be followed through, and we remain confident in the police’s ability to ensure that the Act is enforced properly.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP): I am sorry for coming in just a wee bit late, but I had something urgent to do beforehand. I have a question for the Minister—I would have intervened, but he was too quick to sit down.
I had a quick look through the notes, so I have the gist of what was said and the background information. I presume that some of today’s order comes on the back of counter-intelligence activity. Is gathering intelligence, and exchanging intelligence with other countries that would be aware of movement or germ warfare substances that could be used for these purposes, done regularly? If so, returning to the point of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North, can we bring something in quickly to address a new situation?
James Brokenshire: Clearly, we keep those issues under review. The Home Office scientific branch is a mechanism for exchanges of expert input on such matters, as part
of a more international network. There are forums in which experience and science are exchanged. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that we consider such areas internally, in our work between different Departments, and, where the opportunity arises, we share experience and see what information, science and understanding may be being developed overseas.With those comments, I hope that the Committee will be minded to approve the order.