European Neighbourhood Policy
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
† Carmichael, Neil (Stroud) (Con)
Clwyd, Ann (Cynon Valley) (Lab)
† Connarty, Michael (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab)
† David, Mr Wayne (Caerphilly) (Lab)
† Duddridge, James (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)
† Evans, Jonathan (Cardiff North) (Con)
† Hamilton, Mr David (Midlothian) (Lab)
† Horwood, Martin (Cheltenham) (LD)
† Lidington, Mr David (Minister for Europe)
Paisley, Ian (North Antrim) (DUP)
† Smith, Henry (Crawley) (Con)
† Stewart, Rory (Penrith and The Border) (Con)
Sarah Thatcher, Committee Clerk
† attended the Committee
European Committee B
Tuesday 6 September 2011
[Dr William McCrea in the Chair]
European Neighbourhood Policy
4.30 pm
The Chair: Does a member of the European Scrutiny Committee wish to make a brief explanatory statement about the decision to refer the relevant documents to the Committee?
Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con): It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr McCrea, and it might be helpful to this Committee if I explain a little of the background and why the European Scrutiny Committee recommended the document for debate.
The document, “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”, is the outcome of a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy that was initiated in summer 2010, six years after its inception and on the back of dissatisfaction over the impact and effectiveness of its major manifestations—latterly, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. It builds on an earlier joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative, “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, which the Committee cleared on 5 April. That was born out of the crisis in north Africa, commonly known as the Arab spring.
The central notion in “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” is a more incentive-based approach based on greater differentiation, or more for more, in which those that go further and faster in their reforms would receive greater support. The new approach aims to provide greater support to partners engaged in building deeper democracy, described by the Commission as
“the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service—and other civil and human rights that many Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom of thought, conscience and religion”.
There would also be support for inclusive economic development, and regional initiatives in areas such as trade, energy, transport or migration and mobility, complementing and strengthening bilateral co-operation. There would be mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver those objectives. The new approach proposed to increase ENP funding by €1.24 billion, in addition to the €5,700 million already provided for 2011 to 2013.
In submitting the communication for scrutiny, the Minister said that the UK had taken a leading role in arguing for a bold, ambitious offer, centred on trade liberalisation and economic integration. He also noted that the UK had successfully made the case, against some opposition, for negative conditionality: for those countries that fail to achieve benchmarks for political as well as economic reform, the EU should scale back its co-operation and even reduce its funding, or redirect it towards civil society partners as opposed to state
organisations. That went further than the EU has ever gone before, and was in his view a welcome change, providing additional incentives to partners in both the east and the south to implement meaningful reforms. Funding levels would, he said, be linked far more closely to countries’ track records on reform, in line with the stricter application of the principle of conditionality.Though the Committee recognised the desire to press on, it did not see that responding to events in the southern neighbourhood required precipitate consideration of this important document. Questions on several issues remained unanswered: the basis of the increased funding; the need for any increase at all; the practicalities of such an ambitious approach, particularly in countries whose political histories were far removed from European models and whose future policy was so uncertain; the likelihood that such a conditions-based approach would work when it had arguably not worked with Bulgaria and Romania, let alone countries with no prospect of EU membership; and the interrelationship with the existing Union of the Mediterranean, which remains as marooned as ever and as unproductive as its heavily-funded predecessor, the so-called Barcelona process. It is the same for the Eastern Partnership, which some member states are likely to see as every bit as important as the southern neighbourhood, and which—in the absence of the incentive of EU membership at some stage—has already demonstrated, for example in Belarus, the difficulties of effective implementation. There is also the question, given the opposition from at least some member states, of how well the negative conditionality approach would survive the test of reality.
The Committee saw no reason why the Government should not continue to take an active role in the Council debate, but it also felt that, before properly enjoying the House’s support, the issues raised in this important document needed to be debated to enable the Minister to explain more about, and be questioned on, the far-reaching and highly ambitious proposals in the communication. That now seems even more timely, given developments in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria since the proposals were first made.
The Chair: I call the Minister to make the opening statement.
4.36 pm
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington): I am grateful to the Committee for initiating this debate on a very important communication from the European Commission and the European External Action Service. I also want to place on record my appreciation for the willingness of the European Scrutiny Committee to consider the document ahead of July’s meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels. It was important that the EU acted quickly to respond to events in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. I am pleased, too, that the European Scrutiny Committee recommended a debate on the document, so that we have a chance to talk more widely about the proposals.
The ENP was launched in 2004 to enable the EU’s new neighbours to share some benefits that our new members enjoyed after their accession. The stated objective of the ENP is to create a zone of shared prosperity, security and well-being in Europe’s neighbourhood, and the events of 2011 to Europe’s east and south have shown that we have a great deal more to do.
The European Commission launched the first review of the ENP last year, well before the events of the Arab spring. It published a communication in May 2010, which the European Scrutiny Committee examined that September, once the Committee had been set up after the general election. I wrote to the High Representative, Cathy Ashton, and to Commissioner Füle in October last year, with our first formal contribution to that review. In that letter, I observed that the ENP had not delivered on its primary objective and argued that it provided insufficient incentives to neighbouring countries to reform their economies and political systems.
On behalf of the British Government, I called for five things. The first was a much clearer declaration of the right of our European ENP partners to apply for EU membership, once they had met the criteria set out in the treaty. Secondly, I said that for those ENP partners with no prospect or intention of joining the EU, we had nevertheless to offer to share many of the benefits of EU membership by integrating our economies to form some kind of European neighbourhood economic area. Thirdly, for those offers to work as meaningful incentives to economic and political reform, we should apply much stricter conditionality—in other words, our generosity would come with strings attached. Fourthly, we should differentiate the ENP to take account of the specific circumstances of each individual partner country. Finally, I argued that there is no more money in the pot for a new ENP; we were already spending a lot of money ineffectively, so we should do more with what we had.
In the meantime, as the Commission and the newly-created EEAS took forward their review, events in the neighbourhood took on a new momentum. First, in December 2010, we saw another flawed election in Belarus and the shocking subsequent crackdown on dissent. Then, in January, the Arab spring began with the revolution in Tunisia. Those events gave a much higher profile to what had arguably been a rather dry, technical exercise. It quickly became clear that the €12 billion budget for the ENP was one of our most valuable levers for influencing events in the middle east and north Africa. The fact that the ENP was undergoing review at the same time as those events were taking place gave us a timely opportunity to rebuild the policy as the EU’s response to what was happening in the world.
Happily, our arguments were taken up across the EU. Even those countries that had previously been rather opposed to some of our arguments, particularly those on conditionality and the need for greater economic integration, were now convinced. So, our policy on the ENP has not been shaped by the Arab spring, but it has certainly gained traction as a result of those momentous events. The result is this communication and the Council’s response to it, as set out in the Foreign Affairs Council’s conclusions of June this year. The communication very much reflects our views.
In the section on eastern partners, the communication refers to article 49 of the EU treaty, which addresses membership. That section has been warmly welcomed by eastern countries such as Georgia and Moldova, although some EU member states are not so happy with the outcome.
The communication’s headline policy is the offer of economic concessions to reforming partners. It sets out a long-term vision of economic integration in the EU’s internal market, leading to an economic community between the EU and its partners, both east and south.
The principle of conditionality is considerably strengthened in this text. The new ENP explicitly promotes human rights and democracy, targeting support accordingly. There is now a specific commitment to reduce support to partners that do not reform, which goes well beyond any previous ENP conditionality.
The communication acknowledges the need for careful differentiation, with support tailored to each partner according to its needs and in line with its results.
On financing, the communication proposes an additional €1.24 billion during the current financial perspective to respond to the crises in the neighbourhood, the majority going to the south. Although those funds are additional to existing allocations for the ENP, we have received assurances that they are drawn from the reallocation of resources within existing ceilings for spending under the external heading of the EU budget. The exception to that is the proposal to recycle €250 million of repayments on loans from the European Investment Bank. That proposal is opposed by the UK and a significant number of other member states, and I do not expect it to be adopted. On top of that reallocation of funds, the communication proposes €1 billion in additional loans from the European Investment Bank.
In addition to a certain lack of clarity on the financial proposals, which I am optimistic we will address through reallocation, the migration provisions are the one other element that causes us some concern. The communication proposes greater concessions on mobility than the UK feels are appropriate, and we are not alone in that view. It is important to ensure that the Commission does not raise exaggerated expectations among partner countries. Migration is covered in more detail in the Commission’s communication, “A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries,” which the Committee will debate on 17 October. My hon. Friend the Minister for Immigration is likely to be leading that debate.
I have devoted most of my remarks to the review of the ENP, but the motion before the Committee also addresses a number of other documents annexed to the review that report on the implementation of the ENP during 2010. It will come as no surprise that I see those reports as having been largely overtaken by recent events. They paint a picture of a policy that, as I have argued, failed to deliver on its core objective and gave the European taxpayer an unsatisfactory return on his or her money.
The review of the ENP is both timely and necessary, and the proposals in the communication broadly reflect the Government’s priorities. The ENP can be a powerful tool for securing British objectives in the region, but only if it can be rendered more effective. This communication is an important and welcome first step in that direction.
The Chair: We now have until 5.30 for questions to the Minister. I remind Members that questions should be brief. It is open to a Member, subject to my discretion, to ask related, supplementary questions and I will try to be as flexible as possible.
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab): I would like to ask the Minister four questions, if possible. First, may I say that I very much agree with the general thrust of his
remarks? He has made an important statement and this is a vital document, particularly at this crucial time for the development of the Arab spring and our eastern partners.My first question relates to conditionality and negative conditionality. There is a lot to be said for that. It is right that those countries that are not doing as well as they might in a raft of different areas, lose out as a consequence. It is important that other countries have the material incentive to make sure that they get the changes in place to which they rhetorically are committed. Will the Minister give us more information about which member states have forced the introduction of this? He said that it was advocated by the British Government, quite rightly, but there was some opposition. Where did the opposition come from? Who were they?
My second question relates to finances. The Minister indicated that extra resources will be taken from the existing spend. There would be a reallocation, but I was not entirely clear about where it would come from. He mentioned that there was a lack of clarity. Could he give us some more information because obviously, given the developments in north Africa, it is extremely important that the necessary resources back up these statements of good intent? Those resources are necessary to make those policies real.
Linked to that, I understand that there is renewed impetus, because of what has happened to the Arab spring. That highlights the fact that in that part of the world the European Union’s policy to date has not been that successful. We are catching up on what should perhaps have been done before. Nevertheless, although our emphasis is inevitably on the north of Africa, we should not forget about our Eastern Partnership countries. Can the Minister give us a commitment that the resources will not be taken from the Eastern Partnership to help aid the southern Mediterranean countries? That assurance is very important.
Finally, looking ahead to the development of this policy, the European External Action Service will play a much bigger role. It is a new entity and a controversial body in some people’s minds. Is the Minister absolutely confident that the EAS is well placed to ensure that it makes the greatest possible commitment to the successful development of these policies?
Mr Lidington: First, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the welcome he has given to the document and, broadly speaking, to the Government’s approach. On a matter of such historic importance it is good that we are able to find a clear measure of cross-party agreement in the House. Let me take his four questions in turn. On negative conditionality, we have seen the first example of this in that the ENP instrument aid to Syria has been suspended since May this year as a result of the brutal crackdown on dissent and demonstrations in that country. We, the member states and the European institutions, are examining whether it will be possible to re-channel all or part of that assistance to Syrian civil society organisations. The Committee will appreciate the practical challenges that are involved in that, but it is an indication of the approach that we intend to see followed in the future.
The hon. Gentleman asked me which other countries were sceptical about not only negative conditionality, but conditionality in general. Two points: first, there is a continuing debate about vocabulary. There is a sensitivity, in north African countries in particular, about being seen to be told what to do by European countries, especially on the part of new Governments who have just come to office through an explosion of popular unrest. It is the substance that matters. We learned 20 years ago from our experience with central Europe that the help needs to come with strings. I do not care whether it is called conditionality or mutual accountability or some other term. What is important is the substance. The help should be available and generous, but it should be clearly targeted towards countries and initiatives that are going to work and are delivering results.
Secondly, it is fair to say that there was, at first, some resistance to conditionality from southern European countries which saw the crisis in north Africa as presenting them with an immediate challenge, both in terms of migration and the risk of political instability in the north African littoral, close to their shores. They tended to argue at Council meetings that what we needed was immediate help for the emerging new-fledged political forces, so that they could demonstrate to an impatient populace on the streets and in the squares that they were able to deliver better results than the regimes that had been overthrown.
We persuaded those countries that conditionality was important. The package also includes additional funding, found elsewhere in the EU budget, to demonstrate that we want to offer that help quickly. We are urging, among others, Baroness Ashton and the Commission to ensure that they are on the front foot and can help countries such as Tunisia and Egypt in practical ways as soon as possible. That requires the Governments of those countries to wish to engage and take advantage of what we put on the table.
On the hon. Gentleman’s question about finance, he will know, from his experience in the European Parliament, that the annual negotiations for an EU budget take a while to conclude. The negotiations for the 2012 budget are still ongoing. There is an established Council position, which has now gone to the European Parliament. We do not have a final outcome as yet for 2012. That accounts for a measure of uncertainty, but there are a fair number of member states, including the United Kingdom, who are net contributors to the EU budget and are determined to see a tight ceiling placed on overall expenditure. They will therefore be looking to provide extra resources for the neighbourhood policy through the reallocation of existing resources, namely, lower priority or unspent allocations under heading 4, external affairs.
The hon. Gentleman’s point about the eastern neighbourhood is well made. Clearly judgments will have to be made year by year, country by country, and programme by programme, about which countries should get most assistance. The right principle is that it should go to those countries who are most willing to commit themselves to deliver both political and economic reforms. I have always been clear, both privately and publicly, that our focus on the Arab world and the south should not lead us to forget about the importance of the east. I have consistently urged that the prospect of membership should be held open to them if they want to meet the
criteria, and we are working closely with the Poles and others on the east. I look forward to the eastern neighbourhood summit at the end of this month, which I am hoping to attend with my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister.Finally, on the role of the External Action Service, some things still need to be done. We need a good, eager special representative in north Africa, but the track record of Baroness Ashton and the EAS on north Africa has been pretty good so far. She is working very closely with Štefan Füle, who is the key Commissioner involved. They not only put together the ambitious, bold communication that we are debating, but they did so in what for the EU is quick working time. That demonstrates their commitment and also their ability and determination to get this right.
Jonathan Evans (Cardiff North) (Con): Thank you, Dr McCrea, for giving me the opportunity to raise an issue that the Minister just touched on. The thrust of what I got from my right hon. Friend’s presentation is that he was not terribly impressed with the European neighbourhood programme in 2010, but he is pleased to see the clear change of emphasis in the document before us. Yet the reality is that in so many cases, both within the Commission and the Council, the desk officers for the respective countries may remain exactly the same individuals. That is a concern. I understand from what the Minister says that he has great confidence in Cathy Ashton. I do not challenge that in any way at all. That is demonstrated from the document and the speed to which the Minister referred, but may I ask him whether there has been any review of the performance of some of the individual desk officers in many of the countries, most particularly in north Africa? A number of them have been in place for many years during the period of time when the performance of the neighbourhood policy was not—at its most polite—particularly impressive.
Mr Lidington: My hon. Friend makes a good point. My direct answer, which will not surprise him, is that the performance of individual officers is primarily a matter for the High Representative and her senior management team. In my brief experience of Government, officials respond to clear direction and political leadership and a process that makes it clear what tests have to be met and how accountability is to be assessed. What we have in the communication is what amounts to a White Paper for the EU’s new approach to its eastern and southern neighbours. That now has to be translated into detailed measures to embed a new system. To give my hon. Friend an example, the EAS and the Commission—primarily the EAS—have reviewed the existing programmes for neighbourhood countries and made changes to them to focus much more on the concept of deep democracy: not just elections, but human rights, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press and so on. That is a core principle of this paper.
I will not go on too long, but there are a lot of quite technical changes to do with the relationship of different instruments—strategy papers, action plans and so on. Those will be put in place over the next 12 to 18 months—I hope sooner rather than later. The intention is to build more rigorous, tightly measured benchmarks for performance on the delivery of reform than has been the case in the past. We cannot be content with simply
writing the cheques and seeing them cashed, but seeing neither the political nor the economic changes needed.Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab): I endorse most of the sentiments that we are all hoping to move forward on ENP. Some of us can recall the abject failure of the first Barcelona process. That is the reality. Very little was achieved for the efforts that were put in. Some of the implementation reports in the addenda make very poor reading. Even in countries that are stable, such as Lebanon, the report on human rights in most aspects is pretty poor, and we now have a post-revolutionary situation in many of the neighbouring countries. Where are we going to find the resources for reconstruction, particularly in places such as Libya where there has been major disruption? Has that been discussed? The concept of reallocation is not attractive if it means that countries that require continuing efforts to reach the aspirations of the ENP are denied those, so that we have too much of a focus on what happened in Libya, just as international development policy was massively distorted by withdrawing resources from many parts of the world to focus on Iraq.
Mr Lidington: It is certainly important that we do not focus on Libya to the detriment of other countries in the region, particularly a country such as Egypt that is looked to in the Arab world as one of the key regional powers. It is important that we see this communication and the EU’s proposals in the broader global context. This is one element—it is important, but it is one element—in a much bigger strategy.
In May this year, for example, at its summit in Deauville the G8 agreed on major assistance to the countries of north Africa and the middle east that were embarking on political change. The United States committed itself to $20 billion from multilateral development banks for Egypt and for Tunisia. The United States has also provided $2 billion in bilateral support for Egypt alone through a mixture of debt cancellation and loan guarantees. The G8 leaders all committed themselves to looking for ways to channel extra bilateral help from within their existing aid budgets towards countries that were embarking on economic and political reform.
We have a small, but I hope significant, initiative through the Arab partnership initiative that the Foreign Secretary launched earlier this year, which aims to build on our experience with the know-how fund 20 years ago in central and eastern Europe in providing money to fund practical reforms to help build democracy, independent judiciary and the rule of law in countries that want to work with us on that. We need to look at those various offers of help together.
I have to add that trade and the integration of markets are likely to be much more effective in the long term in providing jobs and profitable business opportunities for countries in the middle east, north Africa and eastern Europe than the sort of assistance that we have described. The assistance should be there to provide some seedcorn to help provide the infrastructure for reform, but market integration will be key to success.
Michael Connarty: I am very satisfied with the Minister’s analysis. Moving on, one of the great aspirations of the renewed ENP was to create an environment in which people in north Africa, in particular, or near neighbours, thought it better to stay in their own country than to seek passage to Europe. That was clearly one of the
problems that people faced if they were in a young population near to Europe. The situation has changed slightly as a result of the disruption and violence, and their consequences for immigration.The Minister has said that in the long term everything will come right, but in the long term, I believe the phrase is, “We will all be dead.” In the short term a large number of people have sought to leave north Africa, many of whom were not necessarily north African citizens but were offered a trafficked passage on an adjacent boat, where they could claim they had been migrant workers in the countries where the disruption was taking place. Has the Minister and his EU colleagues looked seriously—I know that there is a section about immigration—at how that might be tackled in the short term and the whole matter of whether they are absorbed into Europe by burden sharing or is there more focus on whether there is an attempt to persuade people to return north to Africa from whence they came? What is happening with immigration policy? Is it being discussed and what are the thoughts on it at the moment?
Mr Lidington: The subject is certainly regarded by the Government as important. Indeed, it is being discussed although, in fairness, I must say to the hon. Gentleman that such matters are more properly for the Minister for Immigration, my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford and for the Home Secretary who are close to the issue and leading on it within the Government. However, I shall try to provide the hon. Gentleman with an answer. The British view is certainly sceptical about burden sharing. It is something that is understandably very much championed by countries in the front line, such as Malta and Italy. The hon. Gentleman is obviously describing disorderly migration.
We continue to believe that to allow burden sharing in the way advocated would simply add to the pull factor. It would encourage the people traffickers behind such a vile business to continue to exploit African people by just trying to get them into various European countries. Political order and stability are needed first in those north African countries so that they can have a measure of control over what happens within their own frontiers. We would want to work with them to see robust immigration systems.
Although we considered that some of the language in communication on migration went too far, too fast, we welcomed the fact that it envisaged the development of migration partnerships. They involve not only discussion about whether particular categories of skilled worker or student should be allowed to come to European countries, usually for a limited time, but about the policing of those countries’ external borders, rooting out corruption in their own immigration services, and re-admission agreements that they will abide by, if we find clandestine migrants or overstayers in European countries and wish to return them to African countries.
Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD): I strongly welcome the Minister’s remarks, and indeed the policy document in front of us. Clearly, we shall have a more harmonious time of it up here this afternoon than our colleagues in the Chamber.
I wish to ask about two issues that have been touched on, the first of which is the localisation of the ENP. The Minister was right to say that the policy needs to be adapted to different circumstances in different places, but, as the hon. Member for Caerphilly said, there is a twin track. The Eastern Partnership strand to the policy is emerging, as is the north African and middle eastern strand. The Minister talked about the possible risk of concentration on north Africa obscuring the emphasis on the east, but, if anything, with the Polish presidency, I suspect that there might be a risk of possibly going in the other direction and that, for quite understandable domestic reasons, it wants to focus very much on the Eastern Partnership strand, and there might be some neglect of the north African side.
I wonder whether we need slightly to formalise the split, perhaps even having two ENPs. It is not as though such a measure would proliferate, given that there are only two directions in which Europe points geographically to connected countries. In the east, there is clearly the overwhelming presence of Russia as a major factor—a different history, culture and ethnic and religious background. In north Africa and the middle east, there is a different set of issues touching on Palestine and relations with Africa. There are two distinct areas of international policy, and they could fit neatly into two different strands. Will the Minister expand a little on the Government’s position on such matters?
My second question is on the issue of funding. I am entirely supportive of the Government’s basic position on the EU budget. Clearly, there is no new cash around. Nevertheless, we are starting to look at the beginning of negotiations for the next multi-annual financial framework—effectively the European comprehensive spending review, which I think, in theory, takes us all the way to 2020. That is an important consideration. I could not quite detect from what the Minister said whether we are supportive of more funds or funding facilities being available within that overall framework. Without a great deal of extra cash overall being provided, do he and the Government support more funds and more funding facilities being available for the ENP? That does not have to be actual cash spending; it could be such things as loan finance from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and so on. It is important that we promote trade and mutual prosperity that will benefit not only the countries of the European neighbourhood; greater trade and access to markets and so on will eventually benefit those of us within the Union too. That seems well worth spending a few euros on.
Mr Lidington: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his questions. Let me deal with the second one first. He knows that the negotiations on the next multi-annual financial framework have only just begun. The Government’s position is that, at a time of austerity throughout the European Union, any change to the European Union budget for the multi-annual financial framework should be a real-terms freeze or less. Within that commitment, which we have expressed, to a real-terms freeze or less, there would be scope to look at the relative priorities given to different heads of expenditure. We would certainly be willing to see an increase in heading 4 on external spending, but that would have to be contained in a very tight overall ceiling. That logically
points to savings being made under some other area of EU expenditure. I have consistently said to my European colleagues that we will talk about the sub-headings and try to be constructive, but we are not in the business of agreeing on all the sub-headings, adding them up and finding what the new financial perspective total overall should be. There needs to be strict discipline in relation to that overall figure.On the Eastern Partnership, the Polish presidency is very clear about the importance of the east and regards the forthcoming Eastern Partnership summit as one of the major events of the presidency. However, the presidency also accepts the importance to Europe, as a whole, of what is happening in the Arab world. I disagree with the suggestion that my hon. Friend made that we should have a clear separation. I understand his reasons for suggesting that course of action, but there are counter arguments. One is that what happened in north Africa has enabled us not just to revisit policy there in a serious way, but to try to kick new life into the Eastern Partnership policy too, which I believe had become somewhat ossified. Secondly, we should be in the position where good practice and lessons learnt in one part of the neighbourhood could be applied to the other. There is also some virtue to having a degree of flexibility and not being too rigid about how much money should be spent on each. What is envisaged with the new money is that roughly two thirds will be spent on the south and one third on the east. I would not be surprised if that was something of a pattern for the future, but I do not think that we should be in the business of ring fencing one part of the neighbourhood against the other.
Finally, we have 27 very different member states in the EU. The UK, because of our history and the breadth of our global interests, has, like France, a serious interest in what is happening both to the south and to the east of the European Union. However, I want the European Union to be a place in which Malta, Italy and Portugal think that it is right to take an interest in what is happening in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Equally, I want the Baltic states, Poland and Slovakia to have an interest, as European partners, in what is happening to the south of our continent.
If we have a single European market and, on much of continental Europe, an area of freedom of movement within the Schengen area, there is a serious common interest in looking both eastwards and southwards. For those reasons, I would not want to make rigid the separation between the two.
The Chair: If no more Members wish to ask questions, we will proceed to the debate on the motion.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Committee takes note of European Union Document No. 10794/11, relating to a new response to a changing neighbourhood, and Addenda 1-16, detailing the results and recommendations of the Commission’s review of the European Neighbourhood Policy and a report on implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy during 2010; and supports the Government’s approach as set out in the Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the FCO dated 3 June 2011.—(Mr Lidington.)
5.16 pm
Mr David: I shall make a few brief comments, some of which will reinforce what the Minister said. It is extremely important that we have a cross-party approach
on this matter and that there are no fundamental differences between us. I commend the European Scrutiny Committee on presenting the document to the Committee for consideration, especially at this time.It is important for those countries that we are discussing, whether in the east or the south, to have a realistic prospect of eventual membership of the European Union, and we should hold that out to those countries that reform. We should not regard the EU as an ossified club; we should be open to ideas, influence and eventual enlargement beyond 27.
I welcome the strong emphasis that is being placed on trade liberalisation and economic integration, which is extremely important. Equally, as has been said, the emphasis on conditionality and negative conditionality in the ENP is to be warmly welcomed.
I am especially pleased that there is a big emphasis on political benchmarks, because deep political reforms are necessary. We should go beyond simply looking at what happens at elections, important though they are, and look at deeper democratic changes in the respective societies. I welcome such proposals because there has been some indication, particularly regarding the EU’s policy towards Russia, of a diminution of the emphasis placed on political reform. There has almost been an acceptance of things as they are with the new partnership and co-operation agreement with Russia. There has been an emphasis on the EU engaging in traditional realpolitik rather than in the need to encourage change and positive economic, social and political developments in the countries on our borders.
It is important to spend a moment considering a couple of examples of what is happening with the ENP in practice. A cause of concern is what is happening in Ukraine. An assessment in the joint staff working paper states:
“As regards the political domain, there are fewer positive signs. Ukraine has experienced a deterioration of respect for fundamental freedoms notably as regards the freedom of the media, freedom of assembly and democratic standards.”
The Minister touched on an important message: if Ukraine is not prepared to introduce proper democratic reforms—which, frankly, the civilised world would want to see—it cannot expect to receive the same treatment as other countries that adopt a far more positive and enlightened attitude to reform. I am concerned, as are others, about the recent arrest of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko by the Ukrainian authorities. That is a negative example of what is happening; a more positive one is that of Georgia. I was in Georgia a few weeks ago and have to say that, although there is still much to be done, progress there is nevertheless very good indeed. There is no doubt at all that Georgia sees its relationship with the European Union as extremely positive, and that provides an effective vehicle for bringing about democratic change in that country. There are good signs of economic recovery and an effective reform of the judiciary is under way. The rule of law is being applied.
Despite the Russian invasion of 2008 and the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, good progress is being made in Georgia. That is in large part because of the effective implementation of the ENP. It is, therefore, important to recognise that there is much work to be done in all the countries under discussion. It is important,
too, that we have a refined policy, as has been discussed this afternoon, to take us forward from the current position.The reason why the ENP is important is that it spells out exactly what kind of European Union we want in the future—not a European Union that looks in on itself and sits on its laurels, but one that is an instrument for international, progressive social change. The kind of debate that we have had this afternoon is extremely important and reinforces the positive vision that I believe many of us in the House share of what the European Union should be.
5.21 pm
Martin Horwood: May I again strongly welcome the Government’s position on the policy? It is clear that the old ENP was broken in many respects. In particular, there was a predictable emphasis on domestic economic reforms in the neighbourhood countries and on EU access to those export markets. That was prioritised over domestic political reforms and institutional reforms and freedoms. Perhaps the economic emphasis was well intentioned, but the result was that many neighbourhood countries benefitted from EU rewards—trade access, extra development aid and so on—to progress on the economic front even though there was very little or no progress towards any kind of human or civil rights. I think that the Arab spring has woken us all up and reminded us that that is a recipe not for stability or prosperity in the long term, but for stagnation and instability, and that we neglect democracy and human rights at our peril.
I endorse the five priorities that the Minister set out; it is important that some of those economic priorities are not neglected. The reduction of protectionism in a wider economic area is an important step forward that will help to deliver prosperity—on, I hope, a more equal basis—to many countries and peoples in the neighbourhood. I urge him not to backtrack on the migration partnerships, which are an important part of that approach. We need an enlightened and economically intelligent approach to migration, and I hope that his colleague, the Minister for Immigration, will reinforce that when he appears before the Committee.
The most important of the five priorities set out by the Minister is that of conditionality, which has been a difficult concept. In the past, it has not been terribly politically correct to talk about conditionality. We need to get over that. I welcome the document’s emphasis on progress towards what it describes as “deep and sustainable democracy” and the priority for things such as
“free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.”
Those should be the bedrock of relations with the neighbourhood states. It is very welcome indeed that they play such a prominent role in this document. They have to be done on a strategic basis.
If I have a slight concern about some of the Minister’s opening remarks, it is that we seem to be reacting to events quite a lot. The lesson of the Arab spring is that
we should have been thinking on that strategic basis all along and not saying, “Oh look, there’s another interesting country with a bit of a revolution going on. Let’s support that one.” We need a long-running policy that delivers a democratic dividend, not least to the countries that have successfully implemented democracy and are waiting to see the benefits of it.Overall, in international policy, we can see that the balance of power in the world is beginning to shift. When I entered politics, half of Europe was under dictatorial control, as was almost the entire continent of Africa, virtually all South America and more or less the whole middle east. We are now seeing an historic shift towards democracy and human rights becoming the norm. Nevertheless, democracy is a fragile flower, and the remarks on Ukraine from the hon. Member for Caerphilly were well made. It is not inevitable that these democracies will emerge successfully; they need nurturing and fertilising, and the ENP is a good vehicle for doing that. If it can spread to the wider field of European international relations, that will be a positive thing. I strongly support the motion and the Government’s document.
5.26 pm
Mr Lidington: I thank all hon. Members who have taken part in today’s debate. I am grateful for the broad support that the Committee has given to the approach that I have outlined on behalf of the Government. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham said in his earlier remarks that he would contrast the harmonious nature of our proceedings with what is going on in the Chamber in the debate on the NHS. I do not know whether it is a breakthrough that we have achieved a harmonious state of affairs on Europe. Perhaps I should not count my chickens for too long, but it has been welcome this afternoon.
Mr David: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the relatively harmonious climate is because certain hon. Members are not present?
Mr Lidington: The hon. Gentleman is being mischievous, as he well knows.
I first want to respond to the points that the hon. Gentleman made about Georgia and Ukraine. I welcome the progress that Georgia has already made, although, in fairness, it is right to add that they still need to take further steps towards economic reform, as well as entrenching human rights and democratic values. In recent months, we have seen some civil disorder in Georgia—we have heard some arguments about who was to blame—which was worrying. Georgia needs to meet the necessary technical criteria before formal negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement can begin. We are awaiting the European Commission’s assessment of whether Georgia has yet met those criteria.
As far as we are concerned, we wish Georgia well and we want to support her in taking forward her programme of economic and political reform. As with the other eastern partnership countries, if Georgia one day meets the criteria and wishes to join the European Union as a full member, we see no reason of principle at all why Georgia should not be able to succeed in that ambition.
Ukraine is an important country, and we are concerned about recent events there. It is ironic that over the past year the Government of Ukraine have taken some important steps to take forward the negotiations on the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union. They have started to bring in some demanding economic reforms, which are necessary to prepare them for the standards expected under the DCFTA.
At the same time, we have seen politics in Ukraine take an ugly turn, as the hon. Member for Caerphilly said. In August, after the detention of Mrs Timoshenko, my officials called in the Ukrainian ambassador to express our grave concern at the direction being taken in Ukrainian politics. I have impressed on the Ukrainian authorities when I visited Kiev last year, in public statements and speeches that I have made in this country and in my conversations with the ambassador of Ukraine, the need for Ukraine to adhere to the highest democratic standards, including respect for human rights and the rule of law and having an independent, transparent and fair judicial process. We have said that corruption cannot be fought with the selective application of the law and that an independent judiciary must ensure equal treatment for all under the law.
We raised the issue with the Ukrainian authorities at every opportunity and, following recently developments, are considering next steps along with other EU member states and international partners. I still believe that an association agreement and a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with Ukraine would be the best way to influence it to move in the direction of reform. We should consider freezing negotiations only as a last resort, in line with the principle of conditionality. However, I do not want to hide from the Committee the gravity of recent political developments in that country.
I shall turn to the more general issues raised by the hon. Member for Caerphilly and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, whose arguments I welcome. It is important to look at the communication as the high-level strategy document for a renewed and improved neighbourhood policy. The principles and the ways of working described in the communication need to be turned into strategic plans for each neighbourhood partner. Those country-specific strategies then need to be turned into more detailed action plans, so that we can test the effectiveness of programmes and projects on the ground. Building the relationship between the strategic objectives at EU level and partner level and what is being delivered in concrete terms will be key to getting the results that we all hope to see from the new neighbourhood policy.
I welcome what the hon. Member for Caerphilly said about the importance of political reform and the fact that the commitment to deep democracy is a vital ingredient in the communication. I think that we all recognise that it is not enough simply to allow people to vote in an election for a Parliament. There needs to be freedom of speech and assembly, a free media, an impartial judiciary and an independent courts and prosecutorial system. There also needs to be security, and the armed services need to be clearly under democratic control. All those changes are needed if one is to see a confident and enduring democracy emerge in the countries to our east and south.
I would add to the hon. Gentleman’s list the importance of market integration. That again is a key feature of the Commission and External Action Service communication. Reducing tariff barriers is important, but market integration and the negotiation of deeper comprehensive free trade agreements mean a serious commitment to tackle the non-tariff barriers to trade and investment. The bringing down of those barriers will prove in the longer term to be our best hope of seeing the development of sustainable and inclusive prosperity in our neighbouring countries and ensuring that the millions of young men and women who are currently without work and who sometimes despair of the future can see a promise of security and better standards of living for themselves and their families. Through our political reform and assistance programmes, we will be able to help those nations to get a political and judicial system that gives international investors the confidence to invest there and assures those nations’ people that their hopes will not be dashed and that they will have a say in shaping the future of their society and Government.
If the Arab spring has taught us anything, it is that political stability and democratic accountability cannot be regarded as alternatives. In today’s world, we will get enduring political stability only if the people themselves feel that the Government are accountable to them and that they have an important stake in shaping the priorities and practices of the people who govern them.
The Chair: May I say that, as your Chair today, I join the hon. Member for Cheltenham in welcoming the harmonious manner in which the debate has been carried out? Perhaps each of us can carry that downstairs.