Regeneration - Communities and Local Government Committee Contents


Written evidence submitted by the Chairs of the Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This evidence is submitted by the Chairs of the 10 Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders. The Housing Market Renewal Programme (HMRP) ends on 31 March. The purpose of this evidence is not, however, to lobby for the programme, those decisions have already been taken, but to draw out some of the lessons relevant to the questions set by the Committee.

As Chairs we have a wide range of experience in regeneration, both through the HMRP and other programmes. We also come from a range of backgrounds, including local and central government, the private sector and academia.

Our main conclusions are:

—  This country has built up considerable expertise in regeneration that stands comparison with anywhere in the world, especially in integrating the various sectors to be improved and involving fully the private sector and the local community. Regeneration policy has continued to evolve. Local authorities have a central and increasing role to play in setting the strategy, aligning expenditure and providing leadership.

—  The Pathfinders, which close on 31 March as the Housing Market Renewal Programme finishes, have been successful both in meeting their targets and in bringing about the comprehensive renewal of their priority neighbourhoods as emphasised by the Audit Commission. We have not found the planning regime or the availability of powers to be a hindrance.

—  The problem now faced in the Pathfinder areas is the absence of funding. This has been exacerbated by the fact that funding has been terminated suddenly rather than through a phased withdrawal which would have allowed a planned exit. The cuts have, of course, coincided with a significant reduction in local authority budgets. The HMR programme was £260 million in 2010-11 and will be zero in 2011-12.

—  This funding withdrawal has left many schemes half completed, neighbourhood's only partially dealt with and families in distressed circumstances, including living in streets which have been partly demolished. There is also a grave danger in many areas that the investment in part completed projects will be wasted as the neighbourhood deteriorates, giving poor value for both the public and private funds spent to date. Staff skilled in implementing projects, often paid for by the Housing Market Renewal Programme, are also being lost.

—  The Coalfields have similar and, sometimes, overlapping regeneration issues. Ministers have recently announced £30 million over two years for the Coalfields Trust and £150 million to complete remaining projects. We have no problems with money devoted to such schemes but do not see how projects in our communities can be any less deserving.

—  Other funding streams now in existence or announced, including the New Homes Bonus and the Regional Growth Fund, will probably finance only a very limited level of regeneration. In the latter case, however, decisions have yet to be announced.

—  We welcome many of the proposals in the Government's report "Regeneration to Enable Growth" particularly the reduction in ring fencing, the possible use of RDA assets for regeneration and the support for communities. These advances are, however, likely to be more than offset by the lack of funding.

—  One value of the Pathfinders has been that they straddle local authority boundaries, ensuring that priorities are agreed across the wider housing and jobs market. The Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) have an important role to play in ensuring the continuation of such an approach and we welcome the £5 million made available by the Government over two years to provide support for such work in the LEPs.

—  Private finance has always been difficult to attract to such areas, especially in an economic slowdown. Gap funding, as operated by the Homes and Communities Agency, is a cost effective way of achieving such finance for capital schemes. Other proposed schemes such as Local Asset Backed Vehicles (LABVs) and Accelerated Development Zones (ADZs) may have a part to play but would need to be developed as part of an overall regeneration strategy for the city and would be unlikely to be sufficient on their own.

CONTEXT

Before dealing with the Committee's question we should make a number of points:

—  This country has built up considerable expertise in urban regeneration over the forty three years since the launch of the first Urban Programme. Our regeneration policies have evolved in the light of experience and our skills, particularly in local authorities and the private sector but also in some communities, match those anywhere in the world, especially in integrating different activities and programmes to bring about comprehensive renewal.1

—  This is just as well because, as we were the first to enter the industrial revolution, so much of our infrastructure is outdated, particularly in the inner city. 21% of our housing stock was built before 1919 and much of this is located in city cores. The clearance programmes of the 1960's and early 1970s tended to concentrate families in social housing which was often poorly built and managed. The poorest families inevitably gravitated to the poorest quality housing, creating deprived communities. 43% of the 1% most deprived communities lie within the Pathfinder areas. These neighbourhoods have to be tackled comprehensively if we are not to condemn families to long term disadvantage and are to reintegrate the neighbourhoods back fully into the economy.

—  In all cases, local authorities have to deal with other elements besides housing, such as education, training, health and policing. One of the most sterile debates in regeneration is whether we are dealing with people or places. The answer has to be both: enhance the skills, employability and income of families and they will sensibly leave the neighbourhood to better themselves, improve the physical fabric alone and the neighbourhood will soon deteriorate again as incomes are inadequate to sustain the area.

—  There has been talk of excessive top down regeneration. We do not see it that way. The Pathfinders were created and managed by local authorities with central government funding. They defined their own strategies and priorities. The proposals for dealing with priority neighbourhoods were always negotiated with full local community involvement. This was also the case with New Deal for Community projects. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that in some of the communities with which we have had to deal the population is not stable. Up to 50% of the houses were vacant in certain places in the early days and much of the remaining population was transient.

—  In these circumstances the role of the local authority is key. In most cases it alone can provide the leadership and the ability to draw together different activities and funding streams. Many authorities, especially unitary councils, are adept at such delivery. Moreover, the neighbourhoods to be regenerated may be central to the wellbeing of the city and it is legitimate for the city fathers, as well as the local community, to be heavily involved in decisions about renewal.

—  It is also important to avoid tilting at windmills. Planning policy or the available powers have been quoted as restricting the success of regeneration. That is not our experience. Planning is not usually a difficulty in such areas where the local authority is determined to achieve renewal: similarly we know of no major cases where the powers have significantly limited action. Some requirements, particularly around compulsory purchase procedures, can be demanding and time consuming but that is justified by the importance of the decisions being taken.

—  Our premise, therefore, is that regeneration in this country has evolved into a successful policy area. It is not perfect by any means but it is capable of real achievements thought skilled and experienced politicians, staff and communities. The Pathfinders, for example, have met almost all their targets. Their success has been generally endorsed by the Audit Commission who have reviewed them in detail. We can do no better than quote the Commission's final annual review.2

"The HMR programme is making a difference to the communities it serves, with fewer empty houses, reduced crime, and more jobs and training opportunities, especially in those neighbourhoods that are more advanced in their programmes. By March 2011, HMR investment will have averaged about £115 per resident per year—surprisingly less than the comparative spend by the New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme per head on housing. By March 2011, pathfinders will have:

—  refurbished more than 108,000 existing homes;

—  attracted private investment to complete over 15,000 new homes;

—  readied substantial sites for future development through selective acquisition and clearance of up to 30,000 properties;

—  generated some £5.8 billion of economic activity across the economy;

—  created some 19,000 jobs in construction and related industries; and

—  helped maintain over 2,600 jobs in the construction industry each year."

The problem therefore is not mainly one of skills or commitment or community involvement. The problem is that resources both for the Pathfinders and regeneration generally have dried up. In the case of the Pathfinders, cuts implemented over time could have been managed but the programme has gone from £260 million in 2010-11 to zero in 2011-12.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS

"How effective is the Government's approach to regeneration likely to be? What benefits will the new approach bring?"

As we have argued above, the country has built up considerable expertise in regeneration, especially within local authorities, the private sector and some communities. There is not a lot wrong with the way in which the process was evolving.

This is not to argue for the status quo. The development of a single regeneration block within the Homes and Communities Agency's (HCA) budget linked to the Local Investment Plans drawn up by the local authorities, for instance, would mark an advance on the Housing Market Renewal Programme. Moreover, we welcome many of the proposals in the Government document "Regeneration to Enable Growth." It is valuable, for example, that the HCA is working with the Regional Development Agencies to ensure that the land and property assets of the latter are managed in a way which delivers the best possible outcome for regeneration. Similarly, the strengthening of the community voice should prove valuable as will the proposals to enhance the skills and employability of the workforce. The ending of ring fencing of budgets will remove one of the most frustrating elements in attempting to put together a regeneration package. Other benefits are mentioned elsewhere in this evidence.

These advances, however, are likely to be more than offset by the extreme cut backs in regeneration funding, not only through the Housing Market Renewal Programme but also through local authority budgets. Alternatives such as the Regional Growth Fund and the New Homes Bonus may provide some resources. These however, must be put in context.

The amounts through the New Homes Bonus will be relatively small. The Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder, for example, has calculated that, on the basis of construction rates over the past ten years, the two authorities will gain about £6.03 million over six years. This compares with an HMR budget for the Pathfinder of £28.9 million in 2010-11 alone.

Similarly there will no doubt be many pressures on the Regional Growth Fund. The Fund overall is £1.4 billion over three years (ie about £470 million a year). This is in excess of the HMR programme which peaked in 2007-08 at £405 million. However, the fund is available across the country, though focused on the areas that have suffered public sector job losses. Moreover, the priorities of the Fund, according to the consultation paper, lie firmly in the creation of jobs, business support and the revival of the economy.4 This is understandable but it should not be assumed that there will be much available for the capital improvements of the infrastructure in the poorest areas Matters will become clearer only when the results of the first round of bidding are announced.

The coalfields have similar issues of neighbourhoods experiencing a long period of decline, some recovery and successful schemes but being susceptible to the economic slowdown. These were highlighted in the Review of Coalfields Regeneration published last September.5 In response Ministers have recently announced £30 million over two years for the Coalfields Trust and £150 million to complete remaining investment projects. We welcome the money for such regeneration but do not regard our communities as any less deserving, our unfinished projects as any less pressing or the danger of failing to gain full value from past expenditure any less real.

Will it ensure that progress made by past regeneration projects is not lost and can, where appropriate, be built on? Will it ensure that sufficient public funds are made available for future town centre and city regeneration projects as well as for more localised projects?

As is implied above, it seems unlikely that sizeable regeneration projects will be fundable in the near future.

There is also a danger that funding will be inadequate to retain within local authorities sufficient staff with the necessary core skills. Besides anything else many of the staff working on implementing projects on the ground are paid for by the Housing Market Renewal Programme. Such retention is essential to ensure that, when resources become available, we do not as a nation have to re-learn techniques such as integrating the various activities and working with communities and the private sector. This was to some extent the case in the 1970's.

What lessons should be learnt from the past and existing regeneration projects to the Government's new approach?

One lesson that we have learned to our cost recently is that Government and regeneration timescales do not coincide. As we pointed out to the ODPM Select Committee Inquiry into low demand Pathfinders in 2005 and to the All Party Urban Development Group in 2009 "Regeneration and renewal schemes typically have a lead time of four to six years from inception to delivery, and in complex neighbourhoods the period can be far longer. During this time considerable negotiations take place with local communities and with the private sector."6

Recognising this issue, a commitment to a ten year horizon was given to the New Deal for Communities programme, but this was the exception rather than the rule. The original implementation agreements between the Pathfinders and Government in 2004 stated that the agreement would run until 2018, though with the usual termination clauses. In reality funding has never been provided for longer than two years and, on more than one occasion, the budgets were not approved by Government until several months into the year in question.

These problems have been severely exacerbated recently with the sudden ending of the programme. Some cuts were no doubt inevitable though it would have been desirable for a significant renewal programme to continue. The problems have been magnified, however, by the abrupt ending, rather than the phased withdrawal, of the programme. Neighbourhoods which were promised action in later years will be disappointed. More importantly, many schemes have been left partially completed. As a result there are streets where some houses have been refurbished, some demolished, others boarded up and some still occupied by families living in dismal conditions. Moreover, some neighbourhoods where renewal has been only partially completed may well regress because of the unsatisfactory state of the half completed environment. This is likely to provide very poor value for money from the investment to date.

Annex A provides two examples of such schemes.

An interesting characteristic of the Pathfinders has been that they straddle local authorities because housing markets are no respecters of local authority boundaries. This has ensured that priorities have been defined across the wider market. To do otherwise runs the risk that improving one neighbourhood could well be at the expense of another just across the boundary. Another, less obvious, benefit has been that the less adept authorities have significantly improved their performance as a result of working closely alongside the more able. We therefore welcome the £5 million made available by the Government to the Local Enterprise Partnerships over two years to fund the continuation of cross authority working.

What action should the Government be taking to attract money from (a) public and (b) private sources into regeneration schemes?

As far as public money is concerned the greater the freedom given to local authorities and other funders to align their priorities locally the better. As already mentioned, the move of the Homes and Communities Agency towards a single housing pot linked to local investment plans is also welcome. It is unfortunate that it coincides with that pot being almost empty!

The ability of central government to align its funding streams to ensure, for example, that schools or health centres can be built in regeneration areas or skills training provided to the inhabitants, has improved over recent years. The Government's localism policy and the measures listed in the CLG statement "Regeneration to Enable Growth" should continue that improvement.

Private finance has always been difficult to attract to regeneration areas, even before the recession. One reason that such neighbourhoods are rundown is that private money has fled. Again, over the past twenty years, considerable expertise has now been built up by both the public and private sectors in negotiating and implementing projects, especially capital schemes. The use of gap funding as developed by the HCA has been particularly important in gaining the best value for money from the public pound.

A large number of other proposals for attracting private money have been suggested in the past. These almost always involve public expenditure, either as subsidy or as income forgone. We have commented on two in the recent past, namely Local Asset Backed Vehicles (LABVs) and Accelerated Development Zones (ADZs), as follows.

 "Local Asset Backed Vehicles (LABVs). In the classic situation the local authority puts land into a specially created company and seeks equity funding from the private sector. The company, which is jointly owned, is then able to borrow against its assets to invest in its area and the returns are distributed between a dividend and a re-investment into the area.

Such a scheme, or a variation of it, would certainly seem to have its place. It is, however, a long term solution and is as yet untried. There is much to be said for encouraging those Authorities who have such schemes in mind and monitoring closely their performance. One feature which might greatly help their attractiveness would be if Government were to make it clear that any borrowing by such a body would be outside the local authority's prudential borrowing limits.

ADZs ("Tax Increment Finance" in the USA) were proposed by the Core Cities Group and Price Waterhouse Cooper in 2008. In essence councils would be able to borrow funds for development against future business rate revenue. ADZs would assist the provision of infrastructure and would, as the Core Cities report points out, "enable local authorities to participate in the growth dividend." From our point of view, however, any ADZs which are established should coincide with the priority regeneration areas. If this is not the case they would add to the competition for scarce private resources.

An ADZ would assist in financing the provision of infrastructure in an area. It would be relevant, however, only where the Authority could be confident of a resulting uplift in property values. In many of our areas, as has been mentioned, action is needed on a number of fronts over a prolonged period to achieve comprehensive and lasting regeneration, especially in times of slow economic growth. Thus an ADZ could be a useful addition to the bag of possible actions but, as the Core Cities Group report recognises, may well not be sufficient on its own."

How should the success of the Governments approach be assessed in future?

An assessment of regeneration policy is never straightforward because of the difficulty of distinguishing the effects of policy from other influences. One obvious criterion is the gap, according to a range of indicators, between the most deprived neighbourhoods and the norm. This was one of the recommendations of the National Audit Office in its inquiry into the Pathfinders for the Public Accounts Committee in June 2008.7

Again, various academic institutions have built up considerable expertise through evaluating such programmes as City Challenge, the Single Regeneration Budget, New Deal for Communities and the Housing Market Renewal Fund.

REFERENCES

1 See, for example, "Messages for Competitive European Cities" Liverpool John Moores University 2007

2 "Housing Market Renewal: Programme Review," Audit Commission February 2011.

3 "National Evaluation of Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders 2005-07." Nevin Leather Associates, Sheffield University, Sheffield Hallam University. CLG 2009.

4 "Consultation on the Regional Growth Fund," Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for Communities and Local Government, July 2010.

5 "A Review of Coalfields Regeneration" Coalfield Regeneration Review Board, September 2010.

6 Evidence to the Parliamentary All Party Urban Development Group Inquiry "Regeneration and the Recession" 2009.

7 "Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders," House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, June 2008.

Use has also been made throughout this evidence to documents published by the Chairs.

Annex A

EXAMPLES OF NEIGHBOURHOODS AFFECTED BY WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDING

BENSHAM, GATESHEAD

In Gateshead, the focus of demolition and renewal activity is Bensham. Three phases of demolition were planned for about 450 houses (all Tyneside flats). The final 90 are now in limbo thank to the loss of funding. Some £9 million would secure the acquisition, displacement and demolition costs. The streets in question are surrounded by completed housing improvements so lack of demolition will be an eyesore for those owners and tenants and would also leave many people trapped in homes from which they cannot be decanted.

As well as community blight, there will be a significant economic impact. The land in the three clearance phases is included in the proposed disposal of 19 publicly owned sites to a consortium for development, including affordable housing. The final stages of the OJEU tendering process are in place but the basic assumption of cleared land cannot be delivered if resources are not available. The area action plan has strong resident approval and the new homes would add to the choice of tenure and house type available in the area.

GRANBY ESTATE, EDLINGTON, DONCASTER

As part of the HMR Pathfinder programme in Doncaster, the clearance of selected properties on the Granby Estate, Edlington was approved on 19 September 2007. To date, 183 properties have been demolished. As at 2 March 2011, there are 23 empty properties awaiting clearance (pepper potted between tenanted homes), with a further 12 fully disconnected properties currently with our demolition contractors.

The announcement that there will be no dedicated HMR funding beyond March 2011 has meant that Doncaster is unable to release the last four phases of the clearance scheme. As a result residents are left in the middle of a clearance site, with no timescales regarding when, or indeed if, they will now be given the opportunity to move. They find themselves adjacent to large areas of undeveloped brownfield land, which they feel is detrimental to the neighbourhood. Crime, arson and ASB have recently escalated. Resident aspirations and the Council's relationship with the community, which has been developed over the last five or six years, have been handicapped.

In addition, maintaining the cleared sites and securing any empty homes to ensure the safety and security of those who remain is costly to the Council. Obtaining maximum value for the land is also dependent on a fully cleared site.

In short, the local community on the Granby estate have been left in limbo regarding the future of their homes and aspirations of a sustainable, thriving community. The Council is unable to progress re-development of the site to stimulate housing and economic growth, with a real threat that the area will suffer further decline.

March 2011



 
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