Appendix: Government response
1. On 16 March 2010 the House of Commons Communities
and Local Government Select Committee published its report on
the Prevent Programme.
2. The Committee looked at a wide range of issues
including:
- The Government's current analysis
of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent
extremism;
- The appropriateness and effectiveness
of community engagement within the programme;
- Specific issues for local authorities
in delivering Prevent locally; and
- The links between Prevent and
other related policies such as cohesion and integration.
3. The Government is grateful for the work the
Members of the Select Committee put into this report. The report
confirms the need for counter-terrorism strategy to include work
to stop people being drawn into violent extremism, but is highly
critical of what was included in the previous administration's
Prevent programme, how it was delivered, and the impact it had
on both Muslim and non Muslim communities.
4. Since the publication of the report there
has been a change of Government. The new Government shared many
of the concerns of the Committee and initiated a full review of
the Prevent programme to bring about radical change in this part
of the counter-terrorism strategy. The Committee's recommendations
were extremely useful in informing the terms of the review and
in providing suggestions for how the programme might be altered.
5. The new Prevent strategy was published on
07 June 2011. A large majority of the Committee recommendations
have been accommodated by the changes within the new strategy.
With the publication of the strategy, overall responsibility for
Prevent issues passed to the Home Office with responsibility for
integration and community cohesion issues remaining with the Department
for Communities and Local Government. It is for this reason that
the Home Office has taken the lead in developing the response
to the Communities and Local Government Select Committee Report
into the Prevent Programme.
THE NEW STRATEGY
6. The Prevent strategy has now been re-focused.
It aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
and sets out the work to be undertaken in sectors and institutions
where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.
7. The strategy now contains three objectives,
these are to;
- respond to the ideological
challenge of terrorism and of those extremist views conducive
to it. At one end of a spectrum that means taking action against
people who have broken the law. It means excluding people who
wish to come to this country to promote violence or extremist
views. It also means ensuring that extremists do not take advantage
of public spaces—libraries, education, prisons to name just
three—and that their activities are restricted. And it sometimes
means public challenge to people who for too long have been able
to get away with propaganda activity here;
- prevent vulnerable people from
being drawn into terrorism by developing and expanding programmes
to identify and provide them with support. These programmes are
working. But we need to do more of them. And they need to be transparent,
open and accountable to avoid the taint of spying; and
- support the wide range of sectors
and institutions where ideology, the ideologue and vulnerable
people come together and where there are either risks of radicalisation
or opportunities to prevent it—or both. That means education,
health, faith, charities, prisons and probation, and of course
the particular and vital issue of the internet. The strategy document
spelt out what we are planning in each area.
HOME OFFICE RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
8. The Committee's report of March 2010 predates
the Prevent review and publication of the new Prevent strategy,
therefore many of the issues identified by the Committee have
been considered as part of the review and are addressed by changes
made within the new strategy.
9. For clarity each recommendation has been outlined
below, with the Government response.
ALLEGATIONS OF SPYING AND SURVEILLANCE
10. We recommend that the Government take
urgent steps to clarify how information required under Prevent
does not constitute 'intelligence gathering'. (Paragraph 39)
Prevent is not a cover for spying on people or for
other covert activity. The new Prevent strategy is clear on this
point.
Like other aspects of Prevent, programmes to support
vulnerable people in this country and elsewhere are comparatively
new. The evidence for success is correspondingly limited. The
Government recognise that programmes of this kind raise significant
civil liberties issues. At worst, it can appear that these programmes
are an attack on freedom of expression and are both unnecessary
and disproportionate. It has been alleged that the data collected
about innocent people has been shared by statutory authorities
with policing and that the data has been placed on police records.
This area of Prevent, it is claimed, is a form of spying.
The Government believes that, if properly handled,
Prevent programmes are essential and that safeguards can be put
in place to ensure their integrity. Taking early action to protect
people from radicalisation is not the same as surveillance or
intelligence gathering. It is intended to pre-empt not to facilitate
law enforcement action.
Programmes to support people at risk of radicalisation
are now delivered in many areas through Channel, a police-coordinated,
multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals
at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding
partnerships and crime reduction panels.
From a two-site pilot in 2007, 28 coordinators and
a handful of support posts, Channel now covers about 75 local
authorities and police forces. Channel is modelled on other successful
multi-agency risk management processes such as child protection,
domestic violence and the management of high risk offenders.
The Channel guidance, published in 2010 provided
a clear statement about information sharing principles and legislative
framework for Channel and covered the following areas:
- Necessity and proportionality:
personal information should only be shared between Channel partners
where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate
to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of
sharing information will be the professional judgement of the
risks to an individual or the public.
- Consent: wherever possible
the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before
sharing any information about them. In the absence of consent
personal information cannot be shared without satisfying one of
the gateway or exemption conditions.
- Power to share: the sharing
of data by public sector bodies require the existence of a power
to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data
Protection Act 1988 and the Human Rights Act 1998.
- Data Protection Act and the
Common law Duty of Confidentiality: in engaging with non-public
bodies, the Channel coordinator should ensure that they are aware
of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act.
The Government is also changing the law to prevent
local authorities using surveillance for trivial offences. In
its 'Programme for Government', the Coalition Government stated:
'We will ban the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act (RIPA) by councils, unless they are signed off by a magistrate
and required for stopping serious crime'. This Coalition commitment
led to a Home Office review of local authorities' access to, and
the approvals process for, their use of covert techniques under
RIPA. This review was conducted as part of the wider Review of
Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers to which Lord Macdonald
of River Glaven QC provided independent oversight.
The key recommendations of the review, which concluded
in January 2011, were:
- That a judicial approval mechanism
should be introduced for local authority use of RIPA, for all
three of the techniques they may use. These are:
- Directed surveillance—which
is the covert surveillance of individuals in public places.
- Covert human intelligence sources
(CHIS)—which is the use of undercover officers or public
informants.
- Access to some types of communications
data—such as telephone billing information. They cannot
access traffic data (the most invasive form of communications
data, which can be used to identify the location of devices),
or the content of communications.
- That a serious crime threshold
be introduced to limit the use of directed surveillance, to investigations
concerning an offence which attracts a six months or more custodial
sentence, but that there should be an exception for of underage
sale of alcohol and tobacco offences.
The judicial approval mechanism is being introduced
in primary legislation in the Protection of Freedoms Bill. It
will be applied to Scotland and Northern Ireland where the use
of RIPA techniques is reserved. The serious crime threshold is
being introduced by secondary legislation. Both measures are expected
to come into force in autumn 2012.
The Protection of Freedoms Bill will also introduce
a code of practice for CCTV and Automatic Number Plate Recognition
systems (overseen by a new Surveillance Camera Commissioner) to
make them more proportionate and effective, as well as restrictions
on the powers of government departments, local authorities and
other public bodies to enter private homes and other premises
for investigations and a requirement for all to examine and slim
down remaining powers.
More generally, Communities and Local Government
Ministers have made clear that transparency and openness should
be the underlying principle behind everything local authorities
do. Transparency can help save money and protect frontline services,
by cutting waste and unnecessary costs. Councils' spending decisions
affect the day to day lives of each and every local taxpayer,
so it is essential to a healthy democracy that full and regular
disclosure should be every council's default position.
11. We also recommend that clear definitions
of these terms be provided in all public guidance inviting bids
for Prevent funds. (Paragraph 39)
Prevent priority areas are invited to bid for Home
Office funding for projects to deliver the activities in their
local plans. The Government works with the Prevent coordinators
and Local Authorities in the priority areas to ensure they understand
the Government's approach to information sharing as set out in
the preceding paragraph.
12. If the Government wants to improve confidence
in the Prevent programme, it should commission an independent
investigation into the allegations made. (Paragraph 40)
The allegations made in the media and the Institute
for Race Relations report—Spooked: how not to prevent violent
extremism—published in October 2009—that Prevent is
a front for spying on communities—were thoroughly investigated
by the Home Office and found to have no basis.
PREVENT AND CONTEST
13. We remain convinced that a targeted Prevent
strategy at national level is required. The nature of the contemporary
terrorist threat is specific and, as our inquiry has shown, extremely
complicated to comprehend and tackle. Broadening Prevent could
add further complication and confusion to an already complicated
arena. Other forms of extremism are being addressed in programmes
such as Connecting Communities, which we very much welcome. The
risk-based approach of Connecting Communities offers a potential
solution to the problems which we have identified in this section
of our report. (Para 54)
The new Prevent strategy has a broader scope (extending
to cover all forms of terrorism) but a tighter focus (targeted
in line with risk assessment).
There is a much clearer distinction between work
to support Prevent objectives, and wider work to promote integration.
The new Prevent strategy has three key objectives;
to challenge the ideology behind terrorism; to protect vulnerable
people; and to support sectors where there are risks of radicalisation.
Domestic Prevent resources are focused on key priority
areas (to be kept under review) moving away from a system where
funding was distributed on a crude calculation of demographics.
The prioritisation process combines different information and
policing indicators of terrorist activity to understand areas
where Prevent work needs to be prioritised. Prioritisation will
be the responsibility of OSCT and will be regularly reviewed.
RISK FACTORS FOR RADICALISATION
14. Our evidence suggests that the Government
has taken insufficient account of recent research and intelligence
on this subject. We therefore recommend that the Government update
CONTEST, and the guidance which accompanies it, in the light of
analysis of the most recent research on risk factors for radicalisation,
and commit itself to regular future updating in the light of further
such research. (Paragraph58)
A refreshed CONTEST strategy was published in July
2011. The new strategy reflects the changing terrorist threat
and incorporates new Government policies on counter-terrorism.
To further enhance our understanding of radicalisation
and deradicalisation, we have published the three Rapid Evidence
Assessments, which informed the development of the Prevent Strategy.
The three reports are:
- Individual disengagement from
Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorist groups—A Rapid Evidence Assessment
to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism—this
research identifies the social, psychological and physical factors
for vulnerability or resilience to Al Qa'ida influenced violent
extremism:
- Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation:
A rapid evidence assessment guided by Situational Action Theory—this
research employs a criminological framework (Situational Action
Theory) to understand vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa'ida
influenced violent extremism; and
- Understanding vulnerability
and resilience in individuals to the influence of Al Qa'ida violent
extremism—A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy and
practice in preventing violent extremism—this research looks
at why and how individuals stop being violent and what can we
learn from other areas that has relevance for Prevent.
The reports can be found at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/science-research/research-statistics/publications/occasional-papers/
The Home Affairs Select Committee is currently conducting
an inquiry into the roots of violent radicalisation. Ministers
have given evidence to the Committee and we will of course respond
to its findings and any recommendations in due course.
15. We recommend that the Government make
available a proportion of the funding currently available to communities
through Prevent specifically to projects aimed at encouraging
participation in democratic means of debate. (Paragraph 69)[1]
Prevent now supports safe space debates through a
variety of mechanisms. The FCO Prevent team has driven an outreach
programme on foreign policy aimed at British Muslims; through
events both in the UK and overseas. Events have included discussions
with Muslim opinion formers as well as safe space debates with
audiences of young Muslims.
In the UK, DCLG is considering how to promote and
encourage people to participate in opportunities for debate and
discussion at local level.
16. We further recommend that the Government
more explicitly acknowledge, in the CONTEST strategy, in guidance
to local authorities, and in project funding criteria, the contribution
to counter-terrorism objectives of work to improve understanding
between people of different cultures and religious groupings.
(Paragraph 69)
It is important that CONTEST and Prevent, led by
the Home Office, remain focused on counter-terrorism.
The Government accepts work to improve integration
including interfaith work is important in promoting understanding
between communities and can indirectly counter conditions that
support terrorism. DCLG will continue to have the lead policy
responsibility for integration including interfaith dialogue in
England, encouraging people from different backgrounds to come
together locally to improve their neighbourhoods. Through joint
social action over time, trust and understanding is built between
different groups and this can be very effective in addressing
the prejudices which contribute to extremist attitudes.
17. We recommend that the Government continue
to prioritise investment in this area [socio-economic deprivation]
in recognition of the positive contribution it makes to achieving
the aims of the Prevent agenda. (Paragraph74)
The Government has recognised the links between socio-economic
disadvantage and integration. And in less well-integrated areas
the advocates of extremism are often most active.
The Government's Social Mobility Strategy[2]
sets out a series of actions to improve life chances for all individuals
and communities, including:
- Investing in 15 hours a week
of free pre-school education for all disadvantaged two-year-olds,
on top of existing provision;
- Providing an extra £2.5
billion a year for the most disadvantaged pupils through the Pupil
Premium;
- Reforming the welfare system
and implementing the new outcome-focused Work Programme to tackle
worklessness; and
- Creating a statutory Social
Mobility and Child Poverty Commission.
In addition, Government is committed to supporting
targeted projects which overcome specific barriers to social mobility
and integration. For instance, Government has committed to provide
additional funding to support English language provision for those
adults who have little or no English, are not in employment or
actively seeking employment, and are unable to afford fees. These
people are likely to live in areas already facing significant
integration challenges. Government has identified that improving
the English language skills of these groups will have the most
impact on local integration challenges by enabling people to communicate
with people of all backgrounds and to participate in their local
communities.
18. We recommend the Government take urgent
steps to ensure that work in universities and prisons is better
coordinated with the overall Prevent programme. (Paragraph 76)
Universities and prisons are key sectors of the new
Prevent strategy.
OSCT continues to work closely with universities
and prisons to ensure that work in these sectors is aligned with,
and supports delivery of the objectives of the new strategy.
19. We also recommend that where appropriate,
universities and prisons are included within local risk assessments.
(Paragraph 76)
Where appropriate, vulnerabilities in universities
or associated with prisons will be reflected in Counter Terrorism
Local Profiles, produced by the police in conjunction with local
partners.
20. We therefore reiterate our calls for opportunities
for greater empowerment and civic engagement with democratic institutions
which strengthen Muslims' participation in communities and society
as a whole. (Paragraph 83)
The Government recognises the importance of promoting
engagement by Muslim groups along with all other faith communities,
and of encouraging community members to actively participate and
engage in local civic life. Encouraging communities to come together
to do practical, everyday things will bridge divisions. We are
creating the conditions for people to act jointly through mechanisms
such as the Big Society agenda and the Localism Act 2011 which
sets out major steps to put power into the hands of local communities
and neighbourhoods, giving people the ability to take charge of
their lives at the most local level. Specific DCLG-supported initiatives
related to faith include Near Neighbours (www.cuf.org.uk/near-neighbours)
and A Year of Service (www.ayearofservice.org.uk), in both of
which Muslim organisations have shown themselves to be enthusiastic
participants.
21. We recommend the Government takes steps
to clarify its understanding of the terms 'violent extremism',
'extremism', and radicalisation. Holding extreme views is not
illegal and Prevent should clearly focus on violent extremism.
Extending Prevent interventions to those holding extreme views
should only take place where there is a risk that an individual's
adherence to an extremist ideology may predispose them to violence.
(Paragraph 84)
AND
22. The Government should ensure that this
understanding is shared widely across the range of its partners
in delivering Prevent-related projects. (Para 84)
The review of the previous Prevent strategy found
that the phrase 'violent extremism' was ambiguous and caused some
confusion. The new strategy avoids using the term.
The glossary of the new Prevent strategy describes
extremism as: vocal or active opposition to fundamental British
values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty
and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.
Also included in the description of extremism are calls for the
death of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.
The main aim of Prevent is to prevent people from
becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. That requires challenge
to extremist ideologies which can be made to justify terrorism
and intervention with some extremists who are at the risk of moving
into terrorism.
Prevent must recognise and tackle the insidious impact
of extremism, where it creates an atmosphere conducive to terrorism
and popularises views which terrorist exploit. For example, Channel
is the process used to identify those potentially vulnerable to
being drawn into terrorism; to risk assess them through a multi-agency
panel and then to put a support package in place to reduce the
risk.
The support package or intervention that is put in
place can include a combination of activities such as counselling,
faith guidance and interventions provided by mental health or
drugs services, for example. Some of these interventions are supplied
by statutory partners (education, housing, drugs services, and
mental health services) who provide support for Channel cases
in the same way that they do in other safeguarding contexts such
as work with children at risk from drugs and gangs, for example.
23. Government interference in theological
matters must be avoided. Empowering young people from a variety
of backgrounds to take part in open and honest discussion and
debate—and facilitating their influence and access to democratic
institutions—is key. Initiatives such as Project Safe Space
must be pursued and backed with appropriate funding. Support and
funding should also be made available to initiatives which improve
communications between young people and Government. (Paragraph
94)
The Government does not engage directly in matters
of theology but we recognise the imperative for theologians, academics
and communities to do so. The Government will support their efforts
to ensure that counter-narrative work on extremism and terrorism
is widely circulated and in a form that reaches as many people
as possible. In addition, the Government is seeking to work with
the many mosques in the UK who have already taken a leading role
in challenging terrorism. This dialogue, so vital to Prevent work,
is clearly sensitive and needs to be handled with care.
The Government's recent 'Positive for Youth' strategy
exemplifies interaction between Government and young people, setting
out an approach which is "centred on young people…respects
young people's right to have their voice heard…is based on
genuine partnership rather than state control and silo working".[3]
24. The Government should engage with those
who demonstrate a desire to promote greater understanding, cohesion
and integration. No organisation—unless proscribed—should
be excluded from debate and discussions. (Paragraph 98)
The Government will not fund or engage any groups
when it is not in the public interest to do so. The purpose of
this position is to determine engagement with organisations that
for example do not support the values of democracy, human rights,
equality before the law and which promote separation rather than
integration.
25. It should not be left to local authorities
to decide which local organisations should or should not be engaged
with—or funded—through Prevent for counter-narrative
work. (Paragraph 108)
It is right that local authorities—in conjunction
with local partners—should play a key role in implementing
local counter narrative activities. They are fully aware of the
local threats and risks as well as the organisations that might
be best placed to challenge terrorist and extremist narratives.
The new Prevent Strategy makes clear that those receiving
Prevent funding in the future must not hold or support extremist
views, or support terrorist activity, and that includes groups
involved in counter narrative work. This applies irrespective
of the source of funding: central government, local government
or policing. Local partners and central government are all responsible
for ensuring appropriate due diligence is undertaken.
Before any Home Office funding is approved all Prevent
projects are rigorously assessed. This assessment takes into account
the extent to which funding will deliver Prevent objectives; reach
people most vulnerable to radicalisation; deliver value for money
and that funding will not go to extremist organisations. In respect
of organisations providing support to people at risk of radicalisation,
we test their commitment to British values and we carry out evaluation
visits. We also work with our Prevent coordinators to look at
the wider impact of the work of these organisations. We publish
details of specified grants in accordance with the Home Office
publication scheme guidance and are developing appropriate indicators
in line with the Government's Public Service Transparency Framework.
The monitoring and evaluation of Prevent projects
under the previous Government was not robust enough to justify
the sums of public money spent on them. We are working to improve
this, and unless there is evidence that they are effective and
of value for money, projects will lose their funding.
26. The Government should investigate how
more independent and academic initiatives that support the public
and community bodies to resist the ideology and politics of violent
extremists and terrorists can be developed. Part of the work of
such initiatives should be the challenging of violent extremist
networks on the internet (Paragraph108)
Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism
and those who promote that ideology continues to be a fundamental
objective of Prevent.
The review of the previous Prevent programme found
that not enough work to challenge ideology had been done, or done
effectively, to date.
Delivery of the new Prevent strategy will identify
more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice
system to enable people to challenge terrorist ideology effectively
and to provide credible alternatives. The internet is a priority
for the new Prevent strategy; the primary focus for counter-ideological
work online is on increasing the confidence of civil society groups
and the public to challenge online extremist messages effectively.
Action will also be taken to try to remove unlawful
content from the internet—as per sections 1 and 2 of the
Terrorism Act 2006. This requires effective dialogue with the
private sector and collaboration with international partners,
as the majority of material that concerns us is held overseas.
As of 19 January 2012, the Counter Terrorist Internet Referral
Unit (CTIRU) had received 2,280 referrals and removed material
from the internet on 209 occasions. We will encourage the use
of parental controls, and encourage industry to improve filtering
categorisation policies for harmful content.
27. We recommend that the Government fund
more initiatives along the lines of the recent study hosted by
the University of Cambridge [Contextualising Islam in Britain:
Exploratory Perspectives, 2009] (Paragraph 109)
The Government will not engage in matters of theology,
but will support theologians, academics and communities to do
so where appropriate, ensuring that counter narrative work on
extremism and terrorism is circulated widely and in a form that
is accessible.
28. We also recommend that the Government
revisit the recommendation in Our Shared Future, (Commission on
Integration and Cohesion, 2006) for a central Rebuttal Unit which
can assist local authorities on a day to day basis in tackling
all extremist myths (not just those relating to Muslim communities),
effectively and with facts. (Paragraph 110)
The Research, Information and Communications Unit
(RICU) was established in 2007 and sits within OSCT in the Home
Office. Its work receives little publicity or media attention
as much of it is delivered indirectly, in order for it to achieve
the desired impact with the audiences that we are trying to reach.
RICU does however provide ongoing support to other government
departments and local partners (police and local authorities)
to challenge terrorist narratives. Other government departments
and agencies also have a key part to play in communicating their
policies, both at home and overseas.
CENTRAL AND LOCAL CONTROL OF PREVENT-LACK OF RISK
BASED ASSESSMENT
29. We recommend that the Government prioritise
work on facilitating the development of 'local narratives' and
improving information sharing between local partners—including
a more rapid roll-out of Counter Terrorism Local Profiles—to
provide local authorities with the vital information they need
to undertake their roles effectively. (Paragraph 129)
Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) are a critical
mechanism in driving the information sharing necessary to identify
threat and vulnerability in the local area. The Government is
working closely with the police and local partners to ensure that
the continued development of CTLPs assists a joint understanding
amongst local partners of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks
relating to terrorism and non-violent extremism conducive to terrorism.
CTLPs aim to support the mainstreaming of Prevent activity into
day-to-day policing, local government and partnership work. The
police have worked closely with local Prevent partners to ensure
that accurate and relevant information is included in developing
the forthcoming round CTLPs so that they can be rolled out promptly.
30. Much greater training and support for
front line workers such as council staff, police, teachers and
youth workers should be provided. (Paragraph 129)
OSCT has developed training for public sector front-line
staff such as police, council staff, youth workers, teachers and
health workers.
One such training product is the Workshop to Raise
Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) which is delivered to such audiences
and is aimed at raising their awareness of Prevent and instilling
confidence in their ability to recognise individuals who may be
vulnerable to radicalisation to help ensure that appropriate support
and intervention is provided. WRAP has to date reached in excess
of 16,000 front line workers and has been re-evaluated and relaunched
to ensure it accurately reflects the new strategy.
THE PREVENT FUNDING FORMULA
31. We recommend that the Government apply
the approach being adopted for the Connecting Communities programme,
which demonstrates that risk based approaches to identifying need
in similar programmes is achievable [to Prevent]. (Paragraph 133)
The Prevent strategy sets out a new process for prioritising
local areas in line with the risk assessed. Unlike the previous
strategy, prioritisation no longer relies on simple demographics
of Muslim population density. The new prioritisation process aggregates
different information and policing indicators of terrorist activity
to understand areas where Prevent work needs to be prioritised.
Prioritisation will be the responsibility of OSCT and will be
reviewed regularly.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
32. The development of a proportionate and
risk-based approach to delivering Prevent, along with greater
clarity as to what the programme aims to achieve, are needed before
any useful performance measures can be agreed at national and
local level. (Paragraph138)
A guiding principle of the new Prevent strategy is
that the evaluation of Prevent work is critical and must significantly
improve. Data collection must be more rigorous and there will
be increased focus on rigorous assessment of bids for funding
and financial monitoring; improved programme management and governance;
greater research and evaluation and stronger monitoring of progress
and performance.
Prevent performance indicators are under development
and are listed in the new CONTEST strategy. We will assess:
- public support in the UK and
overseas for extremism and terrorism;
- the proportion of the 25 priority
local areas in which implementation of the Prevent programme is
on track;
- the numbers participating in
Prevent programmes to support vulnerable people, and the proportion
assessed to be at lower risk of supporting or engaging in terrorism-related
activity after completing the programme;
- popularity of terrorism-related
websites and the impact of our work to disrupt terrorist content;
and
- the extent of radicalisation
in prisons.
None of these indicators alone will give us the key
measure of success, but taken together with further analyses of
the effectiveness of our programme we will assess performance.
THE OVERLAP BETWEEN PREVENT AND PURSUE
33. It should be made clear that Channel does
not focus exclusively on Al Qa'ida (AQ) inspired extremism, but
on all forms of extremism. We therefore recommend that Channel
be removed from the CONTEST strategy and placed within the context
of other crime prevention initiatives. (Paragraph148)
CONTEST now addresses all forms of terrorism. Channel
is a programme that evaluates and supports individuals at risk
of being drawn into terrorism of any form. As such, it forms part
of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Channel
works effectively alongside other safeguarding and crime prevention
initiatives.
PREVENT AND COHESION
34. Any approach to community cohesion should
be from a positive stance. (Paragraph 164)
AND
35. The Government needs to acknowledge community
cohesion work—particularly that focused on tackling exclusion—as
a much sharper tool in the long-term fight against violent extremism
[...] in order to address exclusion, it is critical that both
the excluded and the mainstream of society are involved. Tackling
one with the other is detrimental to cohesion. (Paragraph 165)
AND
36. Ensuring communities are approached from
a positive perspective is therefore vital, to ensure that individuals
and communities do not feel alienated by the very work that is
meant to draw them closer together and give them a stronger sense
of identity and belonging. (Paragraph 167)
We believe that creating the conditions for integration
is important in itself but recognise that it the medium and long
term it can also reduce extremism.
Britain is a place where most people get on well
with each other most of the time. However some communities and
places still face challenges, tensions and missed opportunities.
The Government is currently developing a new approach to promoting
integration. The new approach emphasises what we have in common
rather than difference; a country where everyone, regardless of
background has the opportunity to get on; where people have more
opportunities to come together, play an active role, be heard
and take decisions; and where threats to our shared values from
discrimination or extremism are robustly challenged.
The Government is committed to maintaining the distinction
between counter-terrorism work and integration. The review of
the previous Prevent strategy found that when work to promote
integration was connected with work to counter-terrorism it left
some Muslim communities feeling targeted and undermined trust,
thus harming the objectives of both programmes.
The new Prevent strategy asserts that Prevent will
depend on a successful integration programme but that, as a general
rule, Prevent and integration programmes must remain distinct,
though linked with one another. Counter-terrorism Prevent funding
must not be used extensively for community interventions which
have much wider social objectives. Combining Prevent and integration
risks using counter-terrorism funds and delivery structures for
activities which have a much wider purpose and whose success will
be jeopardised by being given a security label.
37. All community cohesion work and work focusing
on shared values should be decoupled from the Prevent agenda and
brought under DCLG's broader responsibilities for cohesion and
integration. (Paragraph169)
Responsibility for Prevent will lie with the Home
Office (in the OSCT) and responsibility for integration with DCLG.
Prevent and integration programmes should be distinct
but linked. These policies will also relate to other policies
such as social mobility and equality.
1 This recommendation followed reference to the impact
of the UK's foreign policy as a potential catalyst for radicalisation. Back
2
http://www.dpm.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files_dpm/resources/opening-doors-breaking-barriers.pdf Back
3
http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/p/positive%20for%20youth.pdf Back
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