WRITTEN EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED BY
PROFESSOR MICHAEL
CHISHOLM, PROFESSOR
STEVE LEACH
AND DR
MARK ROBERTS
(LOCO 15)
Our names and relevant experience are summarised
as follows:
MICHAEL CHISHOLM
An academic geographer retired 1996 from a professorship
at the University of Cambridge, with a long standing interest
in regional development. National appointments include: the Social
Science Research Council (1967-72): the Local Government Boundary
Commission for England (1972-78); the Development Commission,
later Rural Development Commission (1981-90); the Local Government
Commission for England (1992-95). Over the period 2006-08, consultancy
reports on nine of the 16 proposals for unitary council in England
that went forward for consultation. Cambridgeshire appointments
have included: Cambridgeshire rural community council; trustee
of the Cambridge Preservation Society; chairman of the Conservators
of the River Cam. Founder member of his local residents' association,
secretary thereof and active in local planning issues.
STEVE LEACH
An Emeritus Professor of Local Government at De Montfort
University. Amongst many other interests, he has evaluated schemes
of decentralised decision-making and community involvement in
Rochdale, Kingston-on-Thames, Norwich and most recently, a major
project on neighbourhood working in Derby (with Mark Roberts).
He contributed to the DETR-funded review of public participation
(1998-2000) and has published several articles and papers on public
participation since. His new book "Managing in a Political
World: The Life Cycle of Local Authority Chief Executives"
is to be published by Palgrave/Macmillan in October/November 2010.
MARK ROBERTS
Completed his doctorate at the Institute of Local
Government, University of Birmingham in 1998 and is now Visiting
Research Fellow at De Montfort University. Recent work includes:
co-authorship of report for the Association for Public Service
Excellence (APSE) on localism in the Neighbourhood Structures
in Birmingham, Edinburgh and Nottingham entitled "The
Ensuring Council; governance neighbourhoods and service delivery"
published January 2010; a major project on neighbourhood working
in Derby with Professor Steve Leach (as above). A chapter in a
forthcoming book ("From recession to renewal: The impact
of the financial crisis on public services and local government"),
on the local political context of the recession (also with Steve
Leach).
INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND
We welcome the desire to devolve power from central
government but we note that "localism" is an imprecise
concept. We believe that improvements are possible to what already
exists in localities, and should be made, but there is no "perfect"
set of arrangements. Consequently, we do not offer a blueprint
for the future, but rather a set of issues to be considered in
reaching conclusions about what realistically can be done.
¾ Local
authorities and other bodies have statutory obligations. If localism
impinges on those obligations, care must be exercised to ensure
capacity is maintained to meet the obligations in parallel with
localism, or in the event localism fails to deliver. For local
authorities this seems to imply that localism should be achieved
by devolving powers from central government to local councils,
giving them greater financial autonomy. In this way local councils
should be primarily responsible for further devolution, and for
achieving a minimum standard in this respect.
¾ We use
the term "minimum standard" here because we recognise
a whole range of issues in relation to central government's role
in setting and enforcing standards of service delivery, and, in
particular, whether there should be uniform national standards,
or basic acceptable levels of service, on which local authorities
might be encouraged to improve as local conditions dictate. We
believe the latter approach to be more in line with the principles
of localism and more likely to bring about the innovation required
for the successful implementation of a localist policy.
¾ We also
believe it important to point out that innovation depends on a
certain amount of experimentation and with this comes the possibility
of failure. While we would not expect incidents of this sort to
be widespread we would see a role here for both local and central
government in protecting localities from the most severe consequences
of failure and enabling to learn from their mistakes.
THE OBJECTIVES
OF LOCALISM
There are a number of different reasons for introducing
or strengthening a localist perspective on public service provision.
It is important that any localist policy developed by government
is clear about the relative priority accorded to these different
objectives.
¾ Strengthening
civic engagement—as a desirable objective in itself, but
also as a contribution to social cohesion.
¾ Providing
a pattern of services, within a specified budget, which more closely
matches the priorities of local residents.
¾ Providing
a local input into the required response to local problems such
as anti-social behaviour and traffic congestion.
¾ Providing
a local input into the development of a longer term plan or strategic
vision for the locality.
¾ Different
priorities will be appropriate for different types of locality.
For example strengthening civic engagement through some form of
community development initiative may be a necessary pre-condition
for the achievement of other objectives in areas where residents
are chronically disengaged for participation. Equally it may be
possible to progress immediately to "local visioning"
in areas where "buy in" to participation is already
established.
PROBLEMS IN
PRACTICE
While we are enthusiastic supporters of the ideals
of localism, we also recognise that there are often difficulties
in their translation into practice. This section summarises some
of the problems which have arisen in the past when devolution
to local level has been pursued by central and local government.
¾ In the
past relationships between central and local government have been
fraught with conflict and have not engendered trust. In addition,
the dependence by local authorities on central government for
a great deal of their funding has not always engendered a sense
of responsibility at a local level.
¾ In this
context, central government retains a large portfolio of responsibilities
and accountabilities in relation to many democratic functions
and technocratic services which could "go local". In
the most recent past, the centre has been reluctant to trust either
local authorities or local people with these and has attempted
to "micro manage" the processes of devolution and delivery.
¾ During
the same period, local authorities have striven to hang on to
their own statutory responsibilities and accountabilities. Local
councillors see themselves as the democratically elected representatives
for their area and are often resistant to the influence of "pressure
groups" who they deem have little or no democratic mandate.
¾ In this
way councillors often see themselves as pressured from above by
central government and squeezed from below by disgruntled residents.
¾ Despite
this rather negative context, most local authorities have recognised
the value of localism in principle, and now have some structure
for devolution of powers in place, in the form of neighbourhood
committees or boards, operating across one or more council wards.
¾ However,
with some exceptions, their default position has been to set these
up to focus on the lowest common denominator aspects of managing
the local environment ,such as graffiti and rubbish clearance,
traffic calming and parking, anti-social behaviour and problems
with youth.
¾ To date,
local people do not attend these meetings in large numbers, but
will often mobilise around specific projects such as organising
a football team for youngsters, or to respond when services are
threatened (eg closure of local swimming baths).
¾ In some
cases where services of this sort might be taken on by local people,
the risks involved are clearly too high, for example, trustees
may be asked to take on liabilities which in the case of failure
would bankrupt them.
¾ Finally
there is a genuinely held fear, not only amongst councillors,
but also amongst residents themselves, that small groups of activists
who have little democratic legitimacy within communities may "capture"
local projects and turn them to their advantage. These may emerge
for example as "anti-council" groups, religiously motivated
factions, or the representatives of the "sharp elbowed middle
class".
IMPLEMENTING LOCALISM:
ISSUES AND
PRIORITIES
There is a wide range of opportunities for taking
the localism agenda forward. This section draws on research carried
out by Professor Steve Leach AND
Dr Mark Roberts to identify key opportunities and challenges in
work commissioned from De Montfort University for Derby City Community
Safety Partnership.
¾ The
potential for local civic engagement is strongest in areas in
which there is already a strong sense of local identity. How local
authorities and partners attempt to identify and demarcate localities
is extremely important.
¾ There
is also an important choice for local authorities around whether
schemes of devolution to localities should be comprehensive (eg
across all wards of the city of Derby), or selective (eg focused
on those wards best able to respond, or most in need). If those
most in need are selected these are also likely to be the localities
which are most deprived and where strengthening civic engagement
through some form of community development initiative may be a
necessary pre-condition for the achievement of other objectives.
¾ Localist
initiatives at local authority level typically require some pump
priming investment in terms of staff and a small budget to promote
civic engagement.
¾ Localism
is facilitated by robust infrastructures for local decision making
and resource allocation with the following features:
¾ A structure
based on small units within the city or geographic area (eg area
or ward committees).
¾ Some
form of mechanism for drawing in local partners (typically police,
health, education, housing providers and the voluntary sector).
¾ Some
form of community forum open to all members of the public where
issues can be debated and local residents can influence decision
making and resource allocation.
¾ Because
problems always arise regarding the representativeness and accountability
of groups at local level, the role of local councillors and partners
in leading such processes is central to engendering a climate
of fairness and in ensuring that the views of under-represented
groups such as disaffected young people are channelled into the
decision making processes.
¾ The
development of civic engagement, including in schemes such as
asset transfer and management, can be facilitated by:
¾ Limited
pump priming for local projects.
¾ Strong
accountability between local forum (eg area or ward committees)
and the wider community forum.
¾ Taking
some of the risks and impediments away from local individuals
and organisations who may otherwise be willing to manage public
assets.
¾ The
involvement and commitment of a wider group of local agencies
who may not be seen as immediately relevant to public participation,
eg local schools, medical centres, civic and recreational societies.
¾ The
stimulation of a critical mass of local activists who are prepared
to involve themselves in improving the overall quality of life
in the locality.
¾ While
pooling budgets in toto across services such as health, police
and the local authority has proved difficult at locality level,
there have been successful initiatives of this sort which address
a specific problem, eg anti-social behaviour, or overlapping responsibility,
eg services for the frail elderly.
RECONFIGURING ROLES,
RELATIONSHIPS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
The brief account we have presented above suggests
that, as a prerequisite for successful localism in practice, some
reconfiguration of roles, relationships and responsibilities will
need to be undertaken. Below we outline these briefly in respect
of central government, local authorities, and local people.
¾ Central
government should take responsibility for repairing relationships
as far as possible with local government. While we recognise this
may be difficult given the "history" between the two
sets of actors, and the current context of cuts in public services,
we believe that only when a minimal level of trust is re-established
will efforts to progress localism bear fruit.
¾ Central
government initiatives of this sort may involve allowing councils
to raise more of their revenue locally and could reasonably be
accompanied by an expectation that councillors will consequently
take more transparent responsibility for decisions made locally.
¾ In this
context, central government should be prepared to "let go"
to a large extent and avoid the temptation to micro manage devolved
responsibilities. Powers to intervene should be retained but these
would be guided by a redesigned "exception" principle.
¾ For
their part, as better relationships with central government make
them more confident in exercising their powers and responsibilities,
local councillors should be able to play a more expansive and
generous role in encouraging local individuals and groups to become
involved in both the running of services and wider participation
in local democratic processes.
¾ We would
suggest that, rather than attempting to start with a blank sheet
and incurring the disruption and costs which this would involve,
the best vehicle for this revitalised commitment is already in
place, in the form of the neighbourhood committees or boards which
most local authorities now operate at ward level.
¾ Expanding
the ambitions of these will bring to the surface some of the risks
outlined above, and so a more trusting and tolerant attitude from
both central and local government will be required towards local
groups, which allows for experimentation, diversity and the occasional
failure.
¾ In particular,
those risks taken on by "ordinary" citizens will need
to be removed from them to a greater or lesser extent, and underwritten
by local government, which in turn will be supported in these
efforts by central government. As with central-local relations
above, powers for local authorities to intervene should be clearly
stated and these would be guided by a redesigned "exception"
principle.
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION
We believe that there is an art is finding ways to
realise the opportunities offered by localism without creating
undue risks. As a matter of judgement, the main hope is that localism
will improve the quality of life, but whether financial savings
may be made is a moot point, especially in the short run. In the
end improvements in the relationship between central and local
government, and from that base, the strengthening of local government's
accountability to local people are both essential prerequisites
for the success of such an initiative.
September 2010
| 
