House of Commons - 2018 World Cup Bid - Culture, Media and Sport Committee

2018 World Cup Bid - Culture, Media and Sport Committee Contents

2 FIFA's role during the bidding process

5. Roger Burden was acting FA Chairman during the latter stages of the bidding process and when the final decision was made in December 2010. He withdrew his application for the permanent post on the grounds that liaison with FIFA was an important part of the job and he was not prepared to have a relationship with FIFA given the way they had handled the bidding process and outcome.[4] When he gave evidence to the Committee during its inquiry into domestic football governance in March 2011, he was complimentary about the winning Russian bid, which he acknowledged was a good one, but told us that:

our bid was recognised as being the best by most objective judgements — indeed, some of FIFA's own judgements—and they set down the criteria on which judgements were made. Yet, we only got one vote. It felt to me as though they were not being fair and they were not being objective […][5]

Lord Triesman was FA Chairman, and Chairman of the England 2018 World Cup bid team, until his resignation in May 2010. When Lord Triesman first appeared before the Committee during our inquiry into domestic football governance in February 2011, he observed that the England bid team had been misled by FIFA:

Had they said at the time that the aim was to break into new territories, I would have advised the FA board not to start in the first place. We started on what turned out to be a completely false prospectus.[6]

Even more worryingly, as quoted in our introduction above, he hinted at unethical practices.

6. When we invited Lord Triesman back to give more detailed evidence about the 2018 World Cup bidding process in May 2011, he made specific accusations of corruption against four members of FIFA's Executive Committee. He asserted that he had been a witness to unethical behaviour, and that the examples he described were:

some things which were put to me personally, sometimes in the presence of others, which in my view did not represent proper and ethical behaviour on the part of those members of the Committee.[7]

He was adamant that in each case there was a clear linkage between what was being asked for and the promise of a vote for the England bid.[8]

7. Lord Triesman explained that he had taken a tactical decision not to report these approaches to FIFA so as not to undermine the English bid, observing:

There was a huge amount of pressure to try and secure these games for England, a huge desire not to burn off any prospect of doing so, and although there have from time to time been some discussions with people at FIFA, the point was not pressed.[9]

We asked him whether the bidding process had been unduly influenced by improper behaviour on behalf of some members of the Executive Committee. He replied that "I think it will have been influenced to some extent".[10] It is frustrating and disappointing that Lord Triesman did not see fit to raise his allegations of corruption against four members of FIFA's Executive Committee with FIFA when he first became aware of them. We welcome the undertaking he gave us that he would now raise his allegations with FIFA so that it could conduct an investigation.

8. Lord Triesman acknowledged failings in the England bid. He was frank that:

I don't know that it [the England bid] was done to the standards that, in the final analysis, would have justified it winning[11]

He also, though, pointed to the bid's strengths, including outreach work in Africa where the bid team were looking to build on existing ties:

I think it was the case that some of the things we were doing, and intended to step up to an even higher level, probably ought to have given us a little bit more credit.[12]

In the light of this, we pressed him further on whether it would have been possible for England to have mounted a successful World Cup bid without offering bribes, benefits in kind, honours or other considerations to members of FIFA's Executive Committee. He replied:

I do not know the answer to that question in a way that would allow me to say yes or no, but I certainly think it was a millstone.[13]

To prevent any recurrence of this situation, he recommended a much wider electorate, expanded beyond the twenty-four members of the FIFA Executive Committee, and reform of the FIFA Ethics Committee.

9. On the eve of our evidence session, we received a written submission from the Sunday Times which included allegations that Qatar, the winning bid for the 2022 World Cup, had bought the votes of three FIFA Executive Committee members and that FIFA had not launched a proper investigation, despite having had these allegations brought to its attention.[14] We put them to Mike Lee, who told the Committee that he had no knowledge of them. He was very clear that:

I've never witnessed, never personally been involved, have absolutely no reason to believe that those allegations are correct. Certainly if I'd had any sense that any bid I've been involved in would engage in those tactics then obviously I personally would not be involved. But I saw no evidence of that, absolutely not.[15]

He also argued that the Qatar bid stood on its own merits. He pointed to the work Qatar had done to prove the viability of air-cooled stadiums, training camps and fan zones to address concerns that the high temperatures of a Qatar summer would pose a health risk to players and spectators, and to the strong legacy message that both Qatar and Russia, the other winning bid, had articulated. He justified the big budget of the Qatar bid as required to enable Qatar to gain a hearing:

if you're coming from a position where you're not on anybody's radar screen necessarily, where you don't have some of the same traditions that certain bidders have, where you need to establish yourself in a campaign, then I think it is important to make sure that you do build alliances and you do have appropriate ambassadors.[16]

He observed that Qatar was not alone in offering to aid and develop football round the world during the bidding process:

I think that England 2018, like many other bids, was trying to think creatively about where the England team would play and where the development programme money would go and where bid ambassadors went to visit to do training camps. Whether we like it or not, the international sport political process has also a very important element about how it benefits the organisation, the rights holders as a whole, how it will make a difference in the development of the global game and how it will help certain markets. That is the reality of it and you might say that England tried on some of those fronts but weren't successful in ultimately converting it into votes.[17]

He also reflected on the permissiveness within FIFA's own rules on gifts, noting, for instance, that gifts of incidental value were allowed, but that incidental value was not defined.[18]

10. Following the oral evidence session, we received written evidence from the Qatar bid committee, denying the Sunday Times allegations. It queried the working methods of the Sunday Times investigative team; questioned the motivation of the alleged whistleblower; and affirmed that:

At all times, the Bid Committee has observed rigorous propriety and acted entirely within the rule prescribed by FIFA for the bidding process […]What is concerning and unfair is that there appear to be those who are unable to accept that a team from a country like Qatar could perform in this way and are ready—on the basis of no evidence—to assume the worst.[19]

11. Guy Oliver, author of an almanac on world football, also provided written evidence attesting to the need to place any allegations of FIFA corruption within the wider context of the important work that FIFA does promoting the game worldwide as well as its historic role in developing the international game.[20]

12. We acknowledge the significance of FIFA's role in developing the worldwide game. However, the fact remains that the Committee has received serious allegations of corruption by the FIFA Executive Committee and others occurring during the bidding process to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. Such allegations severely damage the credibility of FIFA. Following our oral evidence session, therefore, we wrote to FIFA President Sepp Blatter urging FIFA to conduct a full investigation of the allegations that had been made to us, and to make the outcome public, in order to restore confidence in the integrity of FIFA. We suggested that the allegations indicated a need for FIFA to consider a wider reform of its governance of future bidding processes, and that FIFA's investigation should consider systemic reform as well as the conduct of individuals. We also invited him to give evidence before the Committee. He responded that FIFA had already asked the Football Association and the Sunday Times for a report and that:

Once we have received all relevant reports, we will then decide about the next steps to be taken, based on the evidence provided to us and will inform you accordingly. Therefore, there is no need for me to come to your Committee.[21]

13. The FA commissioned James Dingemans QC to conduct an independent review of the allegations made by Lord Triesman concerning FIFA Executive Committee members seeking bribes or inducements from the England bid team in return for votes. The FA submitted his findings to FIFA on Friday 27 May and FIFA published a summary document on Monday 30 May.[22]

14. In the summary document, James Dingemans QC explained that the purpose of his review was:

(1) To review the evidence of the allegations against the four Executive Committee members; and (2) to ascertain if there is any other evidence that implicates FIFA Executive Committee members or other FIFA offices taking 'bribes' in return for votes.[23]

He observed that it was not part of his terms of reference to determine whether the allegations made by Lord Triesman were well-founded. He explained the reason for this:

it is fundamental to any system of justice that a person against whom allegation has been made is given an opportunity to answer that allegation before adverse findings are made. The FA does not have jurisdiction to require answers from the four Executive Committee members who were the subject of Lord Triesman's evidence to the Select Committee. As between FIFA and the FA, FIFA is the relevant body for those purposes.[24]

15. Some members of the Committee have had the opportunity to view the full report of James Dingemans on a confidential basis. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the above context, although his summary does appear to provide a degree of corroboration for some of the allegations made by Lord Triesman against some of the FIFA Executive Committee members, it does not provide a definitive view on their validity. It does, however, highlight specific issues for FIFA to pursue, and makes a more general point about the need for greater transparency in the bidding process. In particular, it calls for an updated and detailed Code of Ethics covering lawful and unlawful approaches to and from members of the FIFA Executive Committee. It also draws attention to an omission in the current Ethics Code, which does not refer to the situation where gifts or other advantages are sought by FIFA Executive Committee members and officials for family members, member associations or corporations. Finally, the review is critical of the rules relating to the bidding process, particularly the fact that they are directed only to the bidding member association and the bid team and not to FIFA Executive Committee members and officials, and the absence of rules regarding benefits provided to other member associations, or countries, by bidding teams or by corporations intending to support the bid committee. This latter point is important given allegations that bidding nations have sought to promote their bids by offering national football associations funds to develop football in their country and friendly matches. By the same token, it is relevant in light of allegations that Executive Committee members have sought funding from bidding national associations for football development projects or friendly matches that generate significant revenue.

16. FIFA issued an immediate response to the review on its website, stating that it had "found no elements in this report which would prompt the opening of any ethics proceedings".[25] The response also stated that FIFA "had not received any evidence whatsoever from the Sunday Times or from the 'whistleblower' cited in that newspaper with regard to allegations made against two other members of the FIFA Executive Committee".[26] We find this response disappointing and inadequate. While the review does not confirm the allegations made by Lord Triesman, neither does it refute them. It does find enough corroborative evidence to merit further investigation. The FA deserves a substantive, formal response from FIFA, which we understand it has yet to receive. FIFA needs to give due consideration to both the additional material relating to Lord Triesman's specific allegations made against the four FIFA Executive Committee members, and the wider points made about the need for greater transparency and a tightening of FIFA's bidding rules with regard both to personal gifts and more general offers by bid teams to develop football through national associations. The FA has only limited jurisdiction to explore the allegations made by Lord Triesman—it is, for example, only within FIFA's jurisdiction to require answers from the four Executive Committee members—while it is also for FIFA to take forward the general points raised about the urgent need for greater transparency at FIFA. The separate allegations made by the Sunday Times are also sufficiently serious to warrant further investigation by FIFA. In supplementary evidence, the Sunday Times informed us that it had attempted to arrange a meeting between FIFA and the whistleblower, but that FIFA, having originally agreed to give assurances to protect the whistleblower, withdrew them without explanation. The Sunday Times was critical of FIFA for "closing the matter down at the earliest possible opportunity".[27]

17. On 1 June 2011, Sepp Blatter was elected, unopposed, for a fourth term of office as FIFA's President, until 2015. The previous day, the FA had called for the elections to be postponed to give credibility to the process, and to enable any alternative reforming candidate to be given the opportunity to stand for President. Although the FA was unsuccessful, under the circumstances we applaud its principled stance. In his speech following re-election, Sepp Blatter spoke about the need for transparency. FIFA's Congress agreed to take responsibility for the final vote to decide on the host of future FIFA World Cups away from FIFA's Executive Committee, and approved the creation of a corporate governance and compliance committee composed of respected personalities from the football family, and possibly from areas outside football.

18. We recognise that events have moved on with the re-election of Sepp Blatter, and welcome both his avowed commitment to greater transparency and the aforementioned Congress decisions. We note though that FIFA has yet to provide details of the membership and terms of reference for the corporate governance and compliance committee, or a timescale for it to report. The true tests of Sepp Blatter's new Presidency will be the extent to which FIFA pursues investigations into the serious allegations made against members of its Executive Committee; the extent to which it addresses systemic reform of its governance; and the extent to which both strands are brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Ideally, both tasks should be conducted with a strong independent element. The need for this is further borne out by the resignation of FIFA Vice President Jack Warner, and consequent dropping of the investigation into his conduct by the FIFA Ethics Committee. We understand from media reporting that the FIFA Ethics Committee intended to be critical of the conduct of both Jack Warner and FIFA Executive member and one-time FIFA presidential candidate Mohammed Bin Hamman in relation to their conduct during the FIFA presidential election.

19. There is a precedent for an international sporting organisation undertaking far- reaching governance reform. In December 1998, stories of corruption and bribery among members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) emerged in relation to the selection of Salt Lake City as host of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. The allegations prompted investigations by the IOC itself (led by Dick Pound) and by the Salt Lake Olympic Organizing Committee for the Olympic Winter Games of 2002 (SLOC); the United States Olympic Committee (USOC - headed by former Senator George Mitchell); the FBI; and the US Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, which took evidence from, among others, then IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch. A US Congressman also introduced a bill to prohibit American corporations, including the television networks, from providing any financial support to the IOC until it had instituted reforms, and a major sponsor threatened to withhold payments pending answers to the allegations.[28]

20. The IOC responded to the mounting pressure to instigate reform by expelling six IOC members, and establishing a permanent, independent Ethics Commission to develop a Code of Ethics and appropriate enforcement mechanisms and a second commission, the IOC 2000 Commission, to reform the entire structure of the Olympic movement. In December 1999, at an extraordinary session in Lausanne, the IOC approved 50 reforms proposed by the IOC 2000 Commission. The reforms included age and term limits for IOC members; eliminating visits by IOC Members to the bid cities; and much more transparency in the financial transactions of the IOC, the bid cities and the organising committees of Olympic games. In his evidence before the Committee, Mike Lee noted that:

the IOC, in the light of Salt Lake City, took a number of very important steps and reforms, which I think has made the IOC process recognised across the world as more open and more transparent than it used to be.[29]

He observed, in particular, that IOC rules now state unequivocally that gifts of any value are not allowed.[30] In recent media interviews, Sports Minister Hugh Robertson has called on FIFA to follow the example of the IOC in the wake of the Salt Lake City allegations.

21. The Committee was appalled by the allegations of corruption made against members of the FIFA Executive Committee during the course of its inquiry. Although they have been challenged in other evidence, they are sufficiently serious for FIFA to commission a full, urgent and independent investigation, and for the outcome to be made public. Instead, FIFA has given every impression of wishing to sweep all allegations of misconduct under the carpet and of dismissing anyone bringing allegations to them with an approach bordering on contempt.

22. The Committee agrees with the conclusions of the FA independent review with regard to the need for greater transparency at FIFA. We urge FIFA to conduct a thorough review of its governance of bidding processes, incorporating independent input to address systemic reform as well as the conduct of individuals, taking heed of the example set by the International Olympic Committee following allegations of bribery and corruption relating to Salt Lake City's bid to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. The record of Sepp Blatter to date does not inspire confidence that this will occur. We look to him now to fulfil the undertakings that he gave at the time of his re-election to the Presidency. We urge the FA and other national associations to ensure that he is held to account for them.

23. We find the decision to drop the investigation following the resignation of Jack Warner extraordinary and it suggests that nothing has changed. As a first step towards restoring confidence we call upon FIFA to publish the Ethics Committee report.

4 29 March 2011, Q556 Football governance, HC 792-ii of Session 2010-12 Back

5 Ibid. Back

6 11 February 2011, Q 55, Football governance, HC 792-i of Session 2010-12 Back

7 Q 47 Back

8 Q 49 Back

9 Q 51 Back

10 Q 54 Back

11 Q 67 Back

12 Q 67 Back

13 Q 97 Back

14 Ev 21 Back

15 Q 16 Back