House of Commons - 2018 World Cup Bid - Culture, Media and Sport Committee

2018 World Cup Bid - Culture, Media and Sport Committee Contents

3 The English bid

24. It is important to remember that any World Cup bid requires public funding and Government backing. During the 2018 World Cup bid, first the Labour Government and then the Coalition Government devoted time, effort and resources to supporting the bid. There is a need to consider the very serious accusations levelled at the conduct of FIFA during the bidding process. However, there is also a public interest in considering the performance of the England bid team, to ascertain whether there are lessons to be learned not just by the FA but also by the Government from the failure of the bid. We drew first on the work of our predecessor Committee, which looked at the England bid for the 2006 FIFA World Cup as part of its 2000-01 inquiry into staging international sporting events.[31]

Previous reports: Lessons learned?

25. England's 2006 bid also ended in failure in July 2000, albeit with more votes (five) than the 2018 bid team managed. In December 2000, the FA submitted to the inquiry a report of the 2006 bidding process. The FA's report reached conclusions as to why England had lost and on what was needed to win the right to stage a major international sports tournament. Some of the reasons for the 2006 bid failure were specific to the time:

perception abroad of a gentleman's agreement under which UEFA allegedly awarded England the 1996 European Championships in return for England's acquiescence in Germany's nomination as Europe's candidate for the 2006 World Cup. As a consequence, UEFA declared its support for the German bid;
problems with financing Wembley stadium;
hooliganism from English fans during the 2000 European Championships held one month before the vote; and
controversially low marks from the inspection process.[32]

26. Other reasons, however, have a more contemporary resonance. The FA's report concluded that a more fundamental cause of England's failure was:

The Football Association's and English football's relative lack of influence in both European and world football.[33]

The FA's report attributed this to a failure to engage with the international football authorities over a prolonged period:

English football, while latterly flourishing at home and particularly commercially, had adopted an insular attitude, seen by some UEFA and FIFA members as stand-offish and even arrogant […] the fact is, that for a long time, England had not been punching its weight as one of the top football nations. Our thin representation on the governing bodies of UEFA and FIFA and their Secretariats, committees and panels was both a consequence and a cause of our lack of influence.[34]

27. It is also worth recording that the 2006 bid, just like the 2018 bid, had to withstand the loss of the Chairman and Chief Executive of the FA. Chairman Keith Wiseman and Chief Executive Graham Kelly both resigned following accusations that they had offered financial support to the Welsh FA in return for a possible vote by Wales to secure Keith Wiseman a place on the FIFA Executive. Shortly afterwards, in an unrelated development, Glen Hoddle resigned as England coach. The Report does not place emphasis on these departures, suggesting that the crisis gave the FA the opportunity for new leadership that almost certainly helped the bid in the long run. It does note, however, that there was some immediate damage to the bid:

Here was a country bidding to stage the World Cup which had managed to lose a Chief Executive, a Chairman and a national coach in the space of two months. Inevitably questions were being asked overseas about what was going on in English football.[35]

28. In terms of lessons to be learned for the future, the FA's report provided a checklist of requirements to win the right to stage a major international sporting tournament. Internationally, it specified:

A long-term, systematic and conscious involvement and investment by the national association in the running of the international sport. […] A country whose national association lacks influence and friends will never host a world tournament. […] Where feasible, the national association's commitment to the international game […] should be demonstrated by a track-record of well-conceived technical assistance to less advanced countries.

The active support of the sport's regional Confederation or Governing body (equivalent of UEFA) and, where relevant, the likely or potential support of a proportion of members of the world governing body, ideally including its President.

Wide international recognition […] that England's turn has come.[36]

Domestically, the FA's report specified:

The active commitment to the bid of the sport's national authority;

The active and committed support of Government;

An experienced and dynamic campaign director;

An adequate campaign budget;

Internationally recognised, respected and influential people to front the bid;

First class stadia and supporting facilities, available on time;

Domestic support from clubs and the sports administrators;

A lack of serious, potentially undermining factors [eg hooliganism]; and

National media for the most part sympathetic to and involved in the bid.[37]

Our predecessor Committee concluded that extraneous factors and the politics of international sport would always matter as much as, if not more than, the inherent technical strengths of a bid. In consequence, bidding for events of this nature would remain a hazardous business. It was impressed by the evidence received from the FA.

29. The performance of the 2018 bid team should also be assessed against a feasibility study for hosting the World Cup prepared by HM Treasury and DCMS in February 2007, which drew on the Committee's earlier Report and the FA's own review of the 2006 bid.[38] It records a number of positive reasons—tangible and intangible benefits—for the Government to support a well constructed World Cup bid. Key topical conclusions included:

The FA would need to fully implement the recommendations from Lord Burns' Structural Review. This would enable the organisation to have the necessary corporate decision making processes and structures that will be required when taking forward a bid.

[…] The FA will need to be able to set out a clear rationale and motivation for bidding and recognise that in order to maximise the chances of success there will be a need for a professional, adequately skilled bidding organisation, potentially at arms length from the FA. Finally, having a clear ambition for a legacy, both sporting and non-sporting is important.[39]

Interestingly, the feasibility study made no assessment of the extent to which FIFA's weak governance structure added risk to a World Cup bid.

30. Against this background, it is noteworthy that Andy Anson, Chief Executive of the 2018 bid, took great pains to stress that lessons had been learned from the previous bid when he helped launch the 2018 bid at Wembley Stadium on 18 May 2009. He was quoted as saying that:

One of the things we learned from the last World Cup bid was we were perceived to be arrogant around the world in how we presented ourselves.

The tone of this campaign has to be different. We will certainly not be saying that football is coming home. It was an arrogant slogan.[40]

In the immediate aftermath of the vote, he blamed external factors—notably the role played by the media in covering negative stories about FIFA—for England's bid failure. He was particularly critical of the BBC's decision to broadcast a Panorama programme accusing individual FIFA members of corruption on Monday 29 November, a few days before the vote. BBC Director General Mark Thompson told us, however, that, because of the need to validate evidence that only came to light a few weeks before broadcast, he was satisfied that Monday 29 November was the earliest possible broadcast time, and moreover that it was "entirely appropriate to broadcast it in the week when the very individuals and the organisation the programme was about were going to make the decision".[41] He was firm that:

my duty, as Editor-in-Chief of the BBC, or the BBC's duty, is around reporting the truth, and reporting it essentially when we're able to broadcast it.[42]

We agree with Mark Thompson that both the timing and content of the Panorama programme shown on Monday 29 November into allegations of FIFA corruption were amply justified by the public interest in FIFA's governance and, more generally, in independent and impartial journalism.

31. As we saw in the previous section, for Lord Triesman and Roger Burden, as with Andy Anson, much of the blame for the England bid failure lay with external factors — notably, in their view, the conduct of FIFA. For Mike Lee, who has considerable experience of what makes a successful bid for an international sporting event, much of the blame for England's bid failure lay rather closer to home. He told the Committee that:

I do think there is a slight danger, both for the Committee and also here in England, to just blame everybody else […] I think if we end up in this country as deciding that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with either the 2006 or 2018 bid and we don't reflect on what lessons are to be learned for the future, we will be making a grave mistake.[43]

Referring specifically to the Treasury feasibility study, he told the Committee that key lessons from the previous bid had clearly not been learned.

Composition of the bid team

32. It is striking that, during the 2018 bid, as with the 2006 bid (albeit under different circumstances), both the Chairman and the Chief Executive of the FA resigned. Although Chief Executive Ian Watmore was not part of the bid team, his resignation in March 2010 in frustration at FA governance structures, and then Lord Triesman's resignation in May 2010, are again unlikely to have been perceived positively on the international stage. It was, perhaps, particularly unfortunate that Lord Triesman resigned having been covertly taped making allegations of collusion between other bidders for the 2018 World Cup. Mike Lee felt that there were tensions within the bid team, suggesting for instance that the leadership was not clear after Lord Triesman had resigned:

Was it Geoff Thompson? Was it David Dein? Was it Andy Anson? This was a lack of clarity that cost us internationally.[44]

He was also critical of the decision to appoint the Chairman of the FA to lead the bid team, rather than establishing an arms' length organisation to run the bid:

One of the things they said, which I think is absolutely right, is that ideally you need a bid committee that has a unique focus on winning the bid […] in London 2012 we had an independent company with a board that was set up to add value.[45]

Because the 2018 bid team did not go down this path, he felt that "they did not run a particularly focused and unique campaign".[46] By contrast, neither of the bid leaders of the winning bids (Russia for 2018 and Qatar for 2022) were chairmen of their FA.[47] Lord Triesman, though, explained that he had felt he had no option but to chair the England bid because FIFA's President Sepp Blatter had indicated to him that this was desirable.[48]

33. Evidence received during the course of our football governance inquiry has also pointed to a lack of harmony between the FA and the Premier League. William Gaillard, adviser to the President, UEFA, referred to "the turf wars that have been going on in this country".[49] Lord Mawhinney, former Chairman of the Football League, observed:

there is a poor relationship—and I use my diplomatic language because I am testifying before Parliament—between the FA and the Premier League.[50]

Such rivalry is not likely to have assisted the cohesiveness of the bid team. Indeed, in this context, it may be noteworthy that Sir Dave Richards, Premier League Chairman, resigned from the FA bid team in November 2009.

34. Lord Triesman was somewhat critical of the Premier League, noting that "it took a long time to get the Premier League on board".[51] He also observed that the Premier League had sought to make FA support for its '39^th game' proposal—an idea, now dropped, for an extra round of English Premier League matches to be played at neutral venues abroad to capitalise on the Premier League's global appeal—a condition of its support. In subsequent evidence submitted to the Committee, Richard Scudamore, Chief Executive of the Premier League, strongly denied this.[52]

Tone and message of the campaign

35. In earlier evidence to the Committee Niall Quinn, chairman of Sunderland, who was active in the England bid because Sunderland was a potential host venue, was critical of the tone of the campaign:

there was a lot of good stuff, but a lot of that good stuff got drowned in arrogance. I really believe that.[53]

In written evidence to the Committee, Guy Oliver similarly referred to "the arrogance of English football".[54] He also cited international perceptions of the Premier League, particularly the arrogance inherent in the 39^th game plan, as having harmed the bid.[55] Lord Triesman commented further that, while the Premier League's commercial success was much admired, there was also some resentment amongst other footballing authorities that it was buying their brightest young talent, stating that "not everybody wants to see their 16-year-olds move around".[56]

Role of Government

36. The Committee noted that the announcement of the bid for England to host the World Cup was made considerably earlier than that by Qatar and that the ensuing, drawn-out campaign of over two years may have contributed to the lack of success. Mike Lee felt that Government had not always played a supportive role. He agreed with our suggestion that England had announced its bid too early in 2007, observing that the timing appeared to reflect Government priorities and that "the FA got a little bit bounced in terms of timing".[57] Lord Triesman told us that the Prime Minister announced the bid before the FA Board had an opportunity to consider the timing of the announcement.[58] One consequence, he told us, was that the England bid appeared to struggle to maintain momentum, observing that "I had a sense that they sort of ran out of steam at a certain moment and came back with a little flourish but it was all too late".[59] More tentatively, he wondered whether Government had sustained its commitment to the bid, telling us that "I didn't feel it was this wholehearted rush of activity and real sustained work coming from the highest levels of Government".[60]

International influence

37. The FA Report into England's 2006 bid identified a lack of influence at the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and FIFA as the fundamental cause of defeat. Judging by comments from a number of witnesses, nothing has changed. William Gaillard, giving a perspective from UEFA, felt that "the English FA is probably in a weaker spot than any other FA in Europe".[61] When Peter Coates, Chairman of Stoke City Football Club, and long-standing member of the FA, gave evidence he observed that the bid team should have had more inside knowledge of FIFA's thinking:

It surprises me that we are not smart enough to get a feel and get a flavour for what is going on and end up with egg on our face with one vote.[62]

Mike Lee commented that:

I am interested in lessons learned, and one of the reasons to me is that UK Sport, on the back of London's 2012 victory, have developed an international leadership programme thinking about how we can support sports administers and people that work in the politics of sport to take up more leading positions in the international sports federations.[63]

My sense, and I've worked for UEFA for four years so I saw a little bit on the inside, is that the engagement is not consistent enough. It doesn't feel strategically thought through.[64]

In subsequent written evidence, he turned this comment into a firm proposal that:

The FA, in conjunction with the Premier League, should conduct a thorough review of their activities within UEFA and FIFA in order to clarify the most effective and strategic use of English football representatives within both organisations and perhaps seek to replicate the International Leadership Programme created by UK Sport to identify administrative and political talent to be coached and encouraged to fulfil international roles in the future.[65]

As an example of tactical naivety, he pointed during the oral evidence session to the fact that the UK has four guaranteed places on the International Football Association Board, the law-making body of the game. He felt that these four guaranteed places for the home nations caused resentment, without delivering real influence. In written evidence, he argued further that:

Even if the FA do not want to relinquish these positions at least they should be asked i) what is their real purpose in the years ahead and ii) what are the advantages that could be gained by volunteering to stand down and open them up as part of an overall FIFA reform process.[66]

38. Finally, in his written evidence, Guy Oliver urged the FA to spend more time strengthening its bilateral international relations:

If we want to play a central role in the organisation of world football and to host a World Cup in the future, we must start engaging with other football nations around the world by acknowledging and trying to understand better the different football cultures that exist in different countries.[67]

Similarly, Mike Lee drew attention to the FA's international development programme, expressing concern that the FA was conducting a review that might well include cutting budgets and closing down projects in Africa. He observed that:

This does not seem to fit with the progressive, long term approach to building friendships and alliances for the future that is sorely needed.[68]

39. Lord Triesman accepted that the FA had not put fully into practice the recommendation of the FA Report on the 2006 bid regarding sustained engagement with football's international bodies:

I think that over the years there was a great deal more that could have been done in working with both FIFA and UEFA. I completely accept that.[69]

Way forward

40. The FA would appear to have a very difficult balance to strike. On the one hand, its historic disengagement from FIFA is preventing England from bidding successfully for international football tournaments, and from attracting the wider benefits for the game and the country that hosting such tournaments entails. On the other hand, deepening engagement with an unreformed FIFA risks tarnishing the FA's own reputation unless it continues to press for reform. As the Committee learned during its visit to Germany as part of its inquiry into football governance, the FA is held in high regard by a number of other national FAs. One way forward might be for the FA to develop its bilateral relationships with a view to building consensus amongst like-minded FAs for reform. The fact that, at least under current rules, European countries will be unable to bid for the right to host a World Cup until at least 2030, means that the FA can perhaps afford to play a long game, and to consolidate its position as a leading internal advocate of FIFA reform. Sports Minister Hugh Robertson has undertaken to make representations about FIFA with European Sports Ministers and within the European Union (EU), as part of the EU's wider initiative to reform international sporting bodies based in Europe.[70] We welcome this Government commitment.

41. As our predecessor Committee concluded, bidding for international sporting events will remain a hazardous business. However, England's bid team appears to have lacked a number of the components of a successful bid. Lessons did not appear to have been learned from previous studies with regard to the composition and unity of the bid team, and the messages it needed to project. More fundamentally, it appears that the groundwork for a successful bid had not been laid effectively with football's international bodies.

42. We urge the FA to conduct a review of the 2018 bid along the lines of its 2006 bid report. We recommend that the FA also review its longer term strategy for engaging with FIFA and other international football authorities with a view to increasing its influence, including with regard to governance reform. The review should include an assessment of the pros and cons of maintaining its representation on the International Football Association Board and of reducing its international development programme.

43. We recommend that the Government review its advice and its own actions on bidding for international sporting events in the light of our Report and any future FA report on the 2018 bid. The Government should consider, in particular, its early announcement of the bid and whether sufficient attention was given to evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the England bid both before the bid was declared and during the bidding process.

31 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Third Report of Session 2000-01, Staging International Sporting Events, HC 286-I and II Back

32 Ibid, p 123 Back

33 Ibid. Back

34 Ibid. Back

35 Ibid, p 121 Back

36 Ibid, p 125 Back

37 Ibid. Back

38 HM Treasury and DCMS, Hosting the World Cup: A Feasibility Study, February 2007 Back

39 Ibid. Back

40 BBC Sport, 2018 bid Chief calls for humility, 18 May 2011 Back

41 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, BBC Licence Fee Settlement and Annual Report, HC 454, Ev 47 Back

42 Ibid. Back