Written evidence submitted by the Wimbledon
Independent Supporters Association (WISA)
INTRODUCTION
1. WISA is the Independent Supporters Association
of supporters' trust-owned AFC Wimbledon, the club formed following
an FA Commission's approval of Wimbledon Football Club's move
to Milton Keynes. We believe we have a unique insight into the
abject failure of football governance in this country. WISA was
formed in 1995 during the club's exile at Crystal Palace's Selhurst
Park, 10 miles away from their home in Plough Lane, London SW19.
Club owner Sam Hammam (later owner of Cardiff City) had moved
it there in 1991. WISA was created to meet a need for dialogue
between the club and supporters, and in particular to campaign
for a return home of the Club to its historic home borough of
Merton.
Two years after its formation, WISA campaigned against
the attempt to move Wimbledon Football Club to Dublin. But its
biggest and most passionately-fought battle came with the Club's
proposed move to Milton Keynes. WISA came of age, inspiring and
mobilising Wimbledon fans' united opposition to the move in a
determined and professionally-run campaign which caught the imagination
of both the Club's fans and football fans throughout the country.
It was during this campaign that WISA and Wimbledon
supporters in general then created The
Dons (Supporters) Trust, with the help of Supporters Direct.
1.1 In summary, WISA advocates the following:
1.2 Ownership of a club by its Supporters' Trust
is a far more appropriate model for ownership of a football club,
as it properly protects the sporting, cultural and community characteristics
of a football club, and provides for supporters to be consulted
and balloted on key decisions affecting their club.
1.3 Football clubs would benefit from at least
a mandatory presence of a supporter on the board. We believe that
Supporters' Trusts best fit this purpose.
1.4 The governance of football must be rebalanced
in order for the leagues to be able to administer their competitions,
and for The FA to regulate. The too often malign self-interest
of the professional clubs, led by The Premier and Football Leagues,
leads to an organisation driven with self-interest, incapable
of properly regulating the game.
1.5 Implementation of the 2005 Burns Report in
full, including independent non-executive directors on the Board
of The FA; a truly independent Chair; a concomitant reduction
of the influence of both Premier and Football Leagues and the
FA Counties; and a reduction in the size of the FA Council itself,
so as to create a "Parliament of Football".
1.6 We also believe that, specifically in serious
matters judged to be in the wider interests of football, these
disputes must be ruled over by The FA, and take into account clearly
the needs and wishes of all stakeholders in a club.
1.8 We believe that the path to a proper framework
ensuring that football is run much more in the interests of the
people who stick with it through thick and thin lies in active
government intervention to ensure that our game is suitably regulated.
Given the government's annual contribution to The FAa contribution
funded by the taxpayer, many of whom are themselves supportersthis
seems only fair.
2. Should football clubs in the UK be treated
differently from other commercial organisations?
2.1 We believe that this issue is directly connected
to the failures in governance on the part of the authorities,
which we address in part 3 of this submission
2.2 Football clubs are sporting, cultural and
community assets first, and must be treated as such. However there
is a clear contradiction in their legal status as, in the main,
private limited companies, the objective of which is to deliver
a profit and be principally concerned with their shareholders.
The case of Wimbledon Football Club over a number of years illustrates
the need to properly address this contradiction.
2.3 Over the years, key decisions were made by
directors and at most a handful of shareholders of the company
that failed to even take into account the views of the supporters
of the club, much less actually ballot or consult in any binding
way.
2.4 The first instance of this failure was when
Sam Hammam, owner of Wimbledon FC, was given permission by the
Board of The Football League to move the Club to groundshare with
Crystal Palace, citing the imminent introduction of all-seater
stadia as the reason
2.5 The second instance of failure was in 1997,
when The Premier League ruled that it had "no objections"
to the Club being moved to Dublin, as it was keen to "explore
new markets". This move was only scuppered by the intervention
of the FAI (Football Association of Ireland) and FIFA. At no point
did anyone from The Premier League or The FA intervene.
2.6 The most obvious instance of failure in the
case of Wimbledon Football Club came to a head on the eve of the
2001-02 season, when the owners and Chairman of the Club, Kjell
Inge Rokke, Bjorn Gjelsten and Charles Koppel, announced they
had signed a deal with the "Milton Keynes Stadium Consortium"
to "move" the Club to Milton Keynes.
2.7 It is clear to us, and we believe to anyone
who agrees with our view that football clubs are not merely private
entities with shareholders, that Wimbledon Football Club operated
almost exclusively as a private company, which on all key decisions
properly consulted only shareholders.
2.8 As supporters of a club owned by its Supporters'
Trust, we believe this to be a far more appropriate model for
ownership of a football club, as it properly protects the sporting,
cultural and community characteristics of a football club, and
provides for supporters to be consulted and balloted on key decisions
affecting their club.
2.9 We also believe that all football clubs would
benefit from at least a mandatory presence of a supporter on the
board. We believe that Supporters' Trusts best fit this purpose.
2.10 However, we also believe that the manner
in which football is run, both by The FA and the Leagues themselves,
desperately needs overhauling, and the better regulation of these
essentially private entities.
3. Are football governance rules in England
and Wales, and the governing bodies which set and apply them,
fit for purpose?
3.1 The three incidents outlined in Section 2
illustrate the manifest failure at the most extreme end of the
governing bodies of football to govern in the wider interests
of football, and specifically of supporters.
3.2 In the case of the Club's groundshare at
Selhurst Park, although the move to all seater stadia was an acknowledged
problem for clubs, there was also no such rule or guidance preventing
Wimbledon from remaining at Plough Lane whilst a replacement was
built, or a new site foundas has been the case with any
number of clubs since then. Not only did The Football League fail
to properly scrutinise the proposals, it also failed to attach
any conditions to the groundshare, such as a new ground being
built on the old site, or a new site being identified,. Thus Plough
Lane never saw first team football again. It is this incident
that can be seen as the precursor to the Club being moved to Milton
Keynes by its shareholders.
3.3 The attempt by the Club's shareholders to
move it to Dublin was only scuppered by the intervention of the
FAI (Football Association of Ireland) and purportedly, UEFA and
FIFA. At no point did The Premier League intervene. Indeed it
is our understanding that The Premier League actively wished the
"exploration of new markets". We are also not aware
of any public intervention in the matter on the part of The FA.
3.4 In the case of the shareholders' successful
plan to move the Club to Milton Keynes, the Board of The Football
League did, properly, refuse permission when the plans were formally
presented. However the decision was subject to appeal by the shareholders.
The Board's verdict was overturned by an arbitration panel convened
under FA rules. The panel consisted of then Arsenal Chairman
David Dein, Charles Hollander QC, and York City Chairman and FA
Council member Douglas Craig, who was later to sell York's ground
to a property developer, precipitating the demise of that club.
3.5 Following the matter's return to the Board
of The League, it was then agreed that an Independent Commission,
under the rules of The FA (not "by" The FA: this
rule is provided to resolve disputes between parties within football)
would be established. This Commission, made up of lawyer Raj Parker
(Freshfields Solicitors), Steve Stride, Operations Director of
Aston Villa, and Alan Turvey, FA Council Member and Chairman of
the Ryman (Isthmian League), voted 2-1 in favour of permitting
the "relocation" (it is widely accepted that Alan Turvey
was the single vote against, though he has never confirmed this).
3.6 The Commission's report, riddled with contradictions
and inaccuracies about the financial state of the Club, the consequences
of such a precedent (ie the move) being set, even opined that
the fans' vow to form their own club should the move be approved
was "not in the wider interests of football".
Although both WISA and The Dons (Supporters) Trust were called
to present evidence, the clear understanding was that the two
parties involved were The Football League and Wimbledon Football
Club; the fans had no mandatory right to be heard, much less directly
consulted. We urge members to read this report, which we have
attached in the appendices to this submission (5.1), as it underscores
the points we are making in much of our submission.
3.7 As if this were not failure enough, the verdict
and report itself was
only announced following significant pressure being applied by
Supporters Direct, the then Football Supporters Association and
the National Federation of Football Supporters Clubs
(the latter two now amalgamated as the FSF).
3.8 In The FA's statement, despite being the
regulators of the game in this country, it was made plain that
they not only opposed the decision, but were unable to exercise
their governing role: "However, this [decision] is
binding on everyone under the Football
League rulesthere is no appeal."
(Our emphasis). That was a failure of governance
of astronomical proportions: how can a regulatory body be forced
to approve something it knows is wrong, and is in fact contrary
to the over-arching principles of the game (that clubs should
not be franchised), because its own rules have been exploited
to the letter by a small number of self-interested individuals?
We suggest this is because of the excessive power held by the
Professional Game in The FA (The Premier and Football Leagues).
We have also included this statement in our appendices (5.2).
3.9 This was seen as a proprietorial dispute
between The Football League and the shareholders of Wimbledon
Football Club, not a crucial matter on which a regulator had to
intervene, and on which the views of supporters were seen as a
vital part.
3.10 The Football League and The Premier League
are groups of shareholders in a private company who pursue their
own interests, often against those of the wider game, and certainly
against those of supporters. The FA is a body established, it
is widely assumed, to govern the game in the best interests of
the game. Yet because of the excessive influence over The FA by
these private bodies, and the lack of any will to actively involve
themselves by the counties/"National Game", The FA is
rendered impotent on even the most critical matters. In other
words, there is no alignment of interests between the legal owners
of a club, and the people who have invested far more in that club,
emotionally and financially, relative to their own meansie
the supporters.
3.11 We believe that the governance of football
must be rebalanced in order for the leagues to be able to administer
their competitions, and for The FA to regulate. The too often
malign self-interest of the professional clubs, led by The Premier
and Football Leagues, leads, to paraphrase FA Chief Executive
Ian Watmore on resigning in March last year, to an organisation
riven with self-interest, incapable of properly regulating the
game. Even the Sports Minister, Hugh Robertson, has described
football as the "worst run sport in the country".
3.12 The minimum requirement for change to the
governance of The FA must be for the 2005 Burns Report to be implemented
in full. This would include independent non-executive directors
on the Board of the Association; a truly independent Chair; a
concomitant reduction of the influence of both Premier and Football
Leagues and the FA Counties; and a reduction in the size of the
FA Council itself, so as to create a "Parliament of Football".
Only then would The FA even begin to resemble a body that could
be regarded as "fit and proper".
3.13 We also believe that, specifically in serious
matters judged to be in the wider interests of football, these
disputes must be ruled over by The FA, and take into account clearly
the needs and wishes of all stakeholders in a club.
4. Is Government intervention justified and,
if so, what form should it take?
4.1 If The FA is to perform an effective role
as regulator of our national game, then it must be permittedperhaps
forcedto actively regulate on all major decisions such
as Wimbledon Football Club's move to Milton Keynes. That it was
not able to intervene in such a critical case would not be permitted
in almost any other area of regulation, for example in the media
industry.
4.2 We believe that the path to a proper framework
ensuring that football is run much more in the interests of the
people who stick with it through thick and thin, whose only desire
is the joy and the fun of having a club to support and to see
it do well, lies in active government intervention to ensure that
our game is suitably regulated. Given the government's annual
contribution to The FAa contribution funded by the taxpayer,
many of whom are themselves supportersthis seems only fair.
The game of football will not change on its own,
and supportershowever many take over their own clubs, or
like us, start again from the bottomcannot on their own
create the magnitude of change needed.
5. APPENDICES
5.1 FA Independent Commission of Inquiry: Summary
of the Commission's Decision
http://www.wisa.org.uk/cgi/l/articles/index.cgi?action=show&id=116
5.2 FA statement on decision of the Independent
Commission
http://www.wisa.org.uk/cgi/l/articles/index.cgi?action=show&id=111
January 2011
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