1 Introduction
The threat
1. Today's society places an ever-growing reliance
on technology. Modern infrastructures such as power, telecommunications
and water systems, businesses, industries and services are now
interdependent to a very significant degree, and disruption can
therefore spread very quickly as the effects cascade through connected
systems. A failure of the national grid for example, would inevitably
have repercussions for a wide range of businesses and services,
from energy supplies, water processing, traffic control and logistical
systems and even parts of the finance sector. Similarly a growing
reliance is placed on satellite-based technology such as GPS (global
positioning system); for instance the operation of financial markets
relies on accurate timing supplied by GPS. The UK military are
greatly reliant on a range of electronic communications and navigation
systems.
2. Such technologies are known to be vulnerable
to the effects of space weather and other electromagnetic activity,
such as that which would result from the detonation of a nuclear
weapon at high altitude. The potential threat of EMP (Electro-Magnetic
Pulse) used as a weapon against the UK also poses a significant
risk to UK National Security. Understanding the extent of these
risks and the need to mitigate them is therefore at least partly
within the remit of the MoD.
3. For 50 years, governments concentrated on
the threat of deliberate attack, and electromagnetic pulse was
regarded as a problem to be addressed by the military. It was
only in 2008 that space weather was accepted as a threat of which
civil authorities should also take account.
How likely?
4. The National Security Strategy (NSS) published
in October 2010 itemised several tiers of "priority risks"
which had been identified by the National Security Risk Assessment.
The highest, Tier 1, risks included "a major accident or
national hazard which requires a national response". Space
weather is referred to as part of this identification:
We also monitor new and emerging risks, such as the
potential impact of severe space weather on our infrastructure.
Given the range of hazards and accidents that can cause large-scale
disruption and the very severe impacts of the worst of these,
this risk grouping is judged to be one of the highest priority
risk areas. Our approach is to plan for the consequences of potential
civil emergencies no matter what the cause.[1]
5. Written evidence from the Government suggests
that a severe space weather event, with resulting damage, may
occur in the next few years:
The impact of EMP events caused by nuclear devices
would be very severe but the likelihood is currently considered
to be low. Non-nuclear EMP devices exist and the risks are being
kept under review but are not currently considered to be sufficient
to warrant recognition as a national security risk. Severe space
weather, which might cause geomagnetic storms impacting the Earth's
magnetosphere, has been the subject of extensive research over
the past year. The likelihood of a severe space weather event
is assessed to be moderate to high over the next five years, with
the potential to cause damage to electrically conducting systems
such as power grids, pipelines and signalling circuits.[2]
6. The most recent published version of the National
Risk Register (2010) contains no explicit reference to space weather
or EMP events and the only reference made to electricity outages
assumes that there is no actual system damage.[3]
However, space weather is currently under assessment by the Government
for the National Risk Assessment and Risk Register 2011.
7. While there are a number of similarities between
the effects of severe space weather and deliberate EMP attack
—not least in that neither is likely to respect national
boundaries—they merit separate treatment both by the Government
and in this Report.
The inquiry
8. On 13 September 2011, the Committee announced
an inquiry with the following terms of reference:
- The extent of any threat posed
to UK electronic infrastructure by EMP events caused by space
weather events, nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude or
other EMP weapons;
- The likelihood that a viable
EMP weapon can or will be used by either state or non-state actors;
- The extent to which space weather
is forecast and the effectiveness of early warning systems that
may be in place;
- The potential impact of such
events for both civilian and military infrastructure;
- Ways of mitigating electromagnetic
pulse events, either targeted or naturally occurring;
- The resources available in
respect of research and development in this field;
- Contingencies in place to react
to a large-scale loss of UK electronic infrastructure, and the
role of the military in such an event;
- The broader security of UK
electronic and space infrastructure, particularly satellites and
satellite navigation systems and the risk posed by space debris.
9. This inquiry is intended to be the first of
a series into emerging threats. We acknowledge that we may, as
our first contribution to the debate, have raised more questions
than can, at this stage, be answered.
10. The Committee invited the submission of written
evidence by 14 October 2011. We received evidence from HM Government,
the Electronic Infrastructure Security Council (EISC), the US
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Chair of the
Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electro-Magnetic
Pulse Attack (the EMP Commission), the Office of Electric Reliability,
the International Electrotechnical Committee, Peter Taylor of
Ethos Consultancy, the Royal College of Physicians, the National
Grid and Research Councils UK. We held one oral evidence session,
hearing evidence from Professor Richard Horne of the British Antarctic
Survey, Dr David Kerridge of the British Geological Survey, Avi
Schnurr, Chairman and Chief Executive of EISC, Chris Train of
the National Grid, Nick Harvey MP, Minister of State for the Armed
Forces, Charles Hendry MP, Minister of State, Department of Energy
and Climate Change, Sir John Beddington, Chief Scientific Adviser
to HM Government, David Ferbrache, head of Cyber, Ministry of
Defence and John Tesh, Deputy Director, Civil Contingencies Secretariat,
Cabinet Office. We are grateful to all who assisted us, and particularly
to Michael Hapgood and Philip Sturley, our Specialist Advisers[4]
and to our staff.
11. It is noteworthy, and indicative of the complexity
of the subject, that the Government evidence was provided by the
MoD in consultation with officials from other Government Departments
and the National Security Council.
12. We note that the Science and Technology Committee,
in its Report on Scientific Advice to Government, has commented
on the implications for the UK of severe space weather events.
Our own Report, to some extent, builds on theirs, and we are grateful
to them.[5]
1 Cabinet Office, National Risk Register of Civil
Emergencies, 2010 Edition, para 3.44 Back
2
Ev 20 Back
3
Cabinet Office, National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies,
2010 Edition Back
4
For the interests of the advisers, see Minutes of the Defence
Committee , 13 July 2010, and 13 September 2011. Back
5
Science and Technology Committee, Third Report of Session 2010-11,
Scientific Advice and Evidence in Emergencies, HC 498,
para 18 Back
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