Examination of Witnesses (Questions 309-389)
Q309 Chair: Secretary of State,
welcome to this evidence session on Afghanistan. At some stage,
but not today, we will have questions to ask you on the Strategic
Defence and Security Review. Today's session, as you know, is
devoted to Afghanistan. Sir Stuart and Mr Watkins, welcome back
to this inquiry.
As you have all appeared before us in recent
weeks, there is no need for me to ask you to introduce yourselves.
Secretary of State, could you begin by telling us what you think
the key challenges are at the moment in Afghanistan?
Dr Fox: I would rate them as three.
The first is security, and I ask the Committee to remember that
we are facing a persistent and ruthless enemy that has shown the
capacity both to regenerate and to adapt. That is why it's so
important to break the link between the insurgency and the population
from which it recruits. An Afghan face is vital for security operationsvital
for building support. With our Afghan partners we're putting the
insurgency under enormous pressure at the tactical level, but
the levels of violence show that we still have a long way to go.
The second challenge is Afghan capacity. Successful
training of the Afghan National Army has led to Afghan soldiers
playing an increasing role in the planning and conduct of operations,
and a renewed commitment from the Afghan Government on the training
of the Afghan National Police is a cause for optimism. Developing
committed, competent and capable Afghan Forces is essential for
long-term security and stability.
The third of the challenges is governance. One
of our biggest challenges is a shortage of educated, capable Afghans
willing to take on a role within the Afghan Government. Progress
in building up Afghan governance at both the national and sub-national
levels is much slower than that of building up the Security Forces.
That is unsurprising. The Afghans have an unequalled tradition
of fighting spirit, as Britain has discovered during its long
historical engagement there, but a very limited history of competent
and honest government. That is where we continue to place a great
deal of effort, and it is an area in which we will have to continue
putting a lot of effort for some time.
Q310 Chair: Do you think governance
has improved, or has it always been at what we would regard as
a relatively low level?
Dr Fox: I would say that governance
has improved at the local level. In Helmand, for example, we have
seen quite a lot of progress. The number of district governors
has risen from only five in 2008 to 12 today. We are also aware
of that improvement because, as a specific target, the insurgents
have continued trying to attack and undermine that governance,
although it is fair to say that disruption of the shadow governorsthe
Taliban shadow governorshas been a priority for us. I think
it is important that we point out to the public our success in
disrupting that, otherwise we have a scorecard with only the away
team showing on the scoreboard.
Q311 Mrs Moon: Could you clarify
where you see governance as being? With a score of one meaning
total anarchy and a score of 10 meaning that governance is clearly
in position with the establishment of central control, regional
control and local control, where would you put it on that scale
between one and 10? Where are we today?
Dr Fox: It depends on a number
of things. First, it depends on whether we are purely looking
at Helmand, where we have our main effort, or at Afghanistan as
a whole.
Q312 Mrs Moon: Could we do both?
Dr Fox: It is useful to remember
that Helmand is only 3.5% of the population of Afghanistan, and
those living in areas under the control of UK Armed Forces make
up only 1% of the population. We have a tendency to see Afghanistan
through the prism of that 1% which can be quite distorting. That
is probably the most difficult part of the country, and I would
rate that on the lower part of the scale. I won't arbitrarily
pick a number. In other parts of the country, it is possibly in
the middle of the scale. In Kabul, it is probably just above the
middle of the scale, but still with a long way to go.
Q313 Mrs Moon: So five or six
in Kabul and elsewhere, and two or three
Dr Fox: I think, Chairman, that
is what they call leading the witness.
Q314 Mrs Moon: No, it's called
trying to get an answer.
Dr Fox: It is very difficult to
put an absolute number on it. I would by instinct want to put
it on the lower part to give it room for improvement rather than
be over-optimistic. I also think we have tended to be over-optimistic
and have over-assessed, for the best of motives, how we see things.
We need to stand back and have a look at this whole question of
governance. The way I would put it is like this: if you're trying
to construct some kind of democratic model from scratchand
we in this country, and in the west in general, would do well
to stand back and take a look at our own history. There was 150
years between Adam Smith and universal suffrage in the United
Kingdom. We abolished slavery 100 years before we gave women the
vote. Maybe now and again taking a deep breath and looking at
our own history might be instructive.
There are probably three things that you have
to have to provide the supportive pillars for a democratic model.
One is a working judiciary and a concept of the law that applies
equally to the governing and the governed. I might ask Peter to
say a word about how the judiciary is doing. Secondly, you need
to have the concept of the ability to exercise your economic liberty
inside a free market, which, if you go to the bazaars of Nad-e-Ali
you will see quite clearly alive and well. Thirdly, you need a
concept of rights. The whole concept of rights is one that is
difficult to develop in some places. I intend to pay a visit to
Afghanistan in the relatively near future with the Attorney- General
to have a look at some of these concepts and see how we think
they are working on the ground. In terms of that judicial element,
which is key in my view to governance and the development of a
stable state, I might ask Peter to say a quick work about what
is happening more generally on judicial development and Stuart
to say a word about what is happening in terms of the judiciary
in Helmand. That might give the Committee a flavour of that element.
Peter Watkins: It might be helpful
if I cover both. In looking at the national level, the development
of the judiciary and the rule of law is an increasing focus of
ISAF. There are two aspects to this. One is building up the formal
sector, judges, prosecutors and so on. There were 1,500 judges
a couple of years ago. That number has increased, although I don't
have the precise figure for 2010. The second is building up the
informal sector. If you look at surveys, such as the recent Asia
Foundation survey, the majority of Afghans40%when
they have a dispute or whatever, take it to a local shura; they
don't take it through the formal process. So we are trying to
strengthen both of them. To give an example of how we are doing
that locally, in Helmand on the formal side we've now got eight
judges in Lashkar Gah and about 20 prosecutors. Outside Lashkar
Gah, over the last eight months alone we've gone from having just
two justice officials to 16, but at the same time we are not just
relying on the formal sector. The informal sector is very important
as well and arguably more important and so the Provincial Reconstruction
Team is helping to develop community councils and four community
councils have now been set up.
Q315 Chair: How much is a judge
paid in Afghanistan?
Peter Watkins: I'm afraid I don't
know that.
Q316 Chair: Am I right in thinking
that it is, or at least was a year ago, half the amount that is
paid to a private soldier?
Peter Watkins: The Committee has
asked this before and we have been trying to find out the answer.
There does not seem to be an available figure. It seems to vary
considerably, depending on the rank of the judge, obviously, and
the location.
Q317 Mr Hancock:
Has the increase in the number of law officials available led
to an increase in the number of citizens who would use that method
rather than going through the traditional method, or have the
figures roughly stayed the same? I ask that, because you can have
people in the right place, but the convincing needs to be done
with the people on the ground, so that they want to take their
disputes to law officials.
Peter Watkins: We don't have scientific
figures, because we have only started to track this relatively
recently, but we know that there were some areas in Helmand that
had no formal judicial figures at all just a couple of years ago.
So, almost by definition, people are beginning to take disputes
through the official process, because they now have the ability
to do so.
Dr Fox: The importance of that
process lies in denying the social space, if we might call it
that, to the Taliban, because many people, especially in the South,
were turning to the Taliban for simple dispute resolution and
it was that role that was giving legitimacy to the Taliban. The
2010 Asia Foundation survey showed that 42% of people were now
turning to the shura for resolution and 31% were taking disputes
to local government institutions, such as the district authorities,
which was certainly a change, because we know that those institutions
were not there before. We were still seeing some 27% of people
going to senior tribal figures. So there is definitely a shift
going on.
However, I think that the important point is
that there are alternatives to dispute resolution through the
Taliban. That is the key and I am not sure that it really matters
which of these methods has a relative position in the league,
if you like. However, the fact is that we are squeezing the Taliban
out and denying them the legitimacy and the space in which to
operate.
Chair: There is an interesting passage
in The Kite Runner about Afghans not believing in the rule
of law but instead believing in the rule of tradition.
Q318 Ms Stuart: Moving on from
dispute resolution to the application of criminal law, can you
update me on how many prison places we have in the areas that
are actually safe to hold convicted prisoners?
Chair: If you would like to write to
us with the answers to some of these questions, I think that that
would be helpful.
Q319 Mrs Moon: Quickly, in relation
to the legal system I noticed that the Afghan Ministry of Women's
Affairs, in its recent report, as well as the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan say in relation to violence against women
that there is a need for education and training, not only of the
judges and the shuras but of mullahs, in relation to the law,
violence against women and Sharia, which is also opposed to violence
against women. However, even in traditional law, there is a lack
of understanding of the law that they need to practise.
Dr Fox: I think that's true. There
is also quite a difference in how the law is perceived by women.
For example, in Kabul, that perception is likely to be different
from the perception in the rural areas in outlying Helmand, because
there is a different tradition and different experience. I think
that it is also about willingness to access law, as well as the
provision of the law itself, because even if the provision is
there, if there is not the cultural willingness to take it up,
that leaves women at a disadvantage. That is something that we
need to look at that through our development programmes.
Q320 Chair: We will return to
that issue shortly, I think. I want to ask you one final question
about the BBC/ABC/ARD poll. Last year, the poll showed a remarkable
increase in the number of people thinking that Afghanistan is
going in the right direction. This year, the poll showed that
that figure had dropped again. Why do you think that is and is
it a picture that you recognise?
Dr Fox: I share the scepticism
of probably many in your Committee, Chairman, about polling, even
when it is conducted within the conditions set out in the UK.
I am not sure what the methodology is for polling in parts of
rural Afghanistan. Admittedly, I am falling into my own trap
of looking at things through the prism of Helmand, which I pointed
out in the beginning. However, having spent time in different
parts of Helmand in recent months, I notice quite a difference
in both security and attitude from previous visits, particularly
in Lashkar Gah and surrounding districts. As I think I might have
indicated when I last spoke to the Committee, if we mentioned
Afghanistan then, the fact that in Lashkar Gah the civilian airport
is open and there are three business flights a day to Kabul; the
fact that the ice factory is open and delivering ice to the bazaars,
enabling people to go about normal economic activity; and the
fact that that economic activity has increased is testament in
themselves to improving stability. The fact that a number of the
elements on the poll itself were very optimistic gives us grounds
overall for cautious optimism, but we would be fooling ourselves
if we believed that we had entirely won the battle for hearts
and minds. I think that is a long time into the future.
Chair: We will come on to that shortly.
Jeffrey Donaldson.
Q321 Mr Donaldson: We have been
provided with a list of achievements in Helmand Province, and
many of them are commendable. How would you describe the situation
there at the moment, and how quickly do you think things are improving?
Is it moving at a fast enough pace?
Dr Fox: It remains the most difficult
part of the country. It's worth pointing out that just over 50%
of all the violence in Afghanistan is in just nine of the country's
401 districts, four of which are in Helmand and four of which
are in Kandahar. That gives us an idea of the dynamic within which
we are operating. Security remains a major challenge, and the
tempo of operations is significantly higher in Helmand than in
other parts of the country. I believe, however, that our presence
there is creating the space for progress in other areas, such
as in development and governance and in the local economy, as
I have just mentioned. It's very important for us to recognise
that once an area has been cleared of insurgents, it's vital that
sufficient forcesboth Afghan and internationaland
sufficient resources are placed on the ground to hold. That has
been one of the great lessons in recent years, and we recognise
that importance.
We keep the precise tasks of our forces under
review; from time to time it might be necessary to be involved
outside our own immediately described area, but that will be looked
at on a case-by-case basis. I intend to inform the House about
such a task by way of a written ministerial statement tomorrow.
I hope that the Committee will understand that that should probably
done to the whole House, rather than done in advance to the Committee
today, much as I would like to inform the Committee of its contents.
Q322 Mr Donaldson: One of the
factors in the ceasefire in Northern Ireland was war weariness,
if I may use the term "war" loosely, on the part of
those involved on the terrorist side. Is there evidence among
the Taliban of that kind of weariness? Are we finding that at
leadership level people are drifting away, or are they remaining
intact?
Dr Fox: It's only realistic to
say that the Taliban have shown themselves to be very resilient
and adaptable. Against that, there has been substantial disruption
in terms of the command structure of the Taliban, and that has
obviously produced a degradation in some of their capabilities.
Ultimately, to go back to the example in Northern Ireland, the
economic development and improvement in Northern Ireland made
people more aware of the fact that they were stakeholders in the
broader security picture. That is where the whole concept of development
is important. People who have nothing to lose, if you like, are
likely to gamble with it, whereas people who have something to
lose are likely to be more circumspect. As we move into greater
security and greater development, where people will feel that
they have more of a stake in their wellbeing, that is how we deny
some of the space for the Taliban to operate where hitherto they
were more free politically, socially and militarily to do so.
Q323 Mr Donaldson: In denying
that space, are you finding that the people of Helmand are trusting
the coalition forces more? Is there an improvement at that level?
Dr Fox: If, for example, you lookand
Stuart might want to talk about thisat information that
we get on the placement of IEDs, the population seem more willing,
when they feel secure, to provide us with that information. That
is potentially the beginning of a virtuous circle, where greater
stability provides us with greater intelligence, which in turn
provides us with greater security, stability and intelligence,
and so it goes. It is about getting to that point of confidence,
where the public believe we are genuinely committed and that we
are going to be there and see it throughI go back to the
concept of not just clearing, but holding territory and providing
securityand that is absolutely essential.
Air Marshal Peach: The key change
is that the Afghan Security Forces are conducting a lot of the
hold operations. They, with us increasingly in the background,
are taking that sort of level of trust up another level, with
the army playing a traditional army role, and the Afghan police
increasingly being those trusted people. Exactly as the Secretary
of State says, there are these green shootsand not just
green shootsin several of the key districts, where both
the UK Forces and US Forces are in Helmand. There is now this
tendency of the people that, once that economic development has
taken holdin the bazaar, typicallythey will then
push out the Taliban and/or tell the Afghan Security Forces where
the Taliban may be going. There is that sense of things linking
together. As the Secretary of State made clear earlier, if you
can then link that, as phenomena which we've enabled, to developing
governance and developing local conditions for governance through
meetings and so on, you actually get quite a rapid change. Many
of the visitors to Afghanistan have noticed that rapid change
over months.
Dr Fox: If I may add to that,
this whole concept of securing and holding has been helped by
the fact that the Afghan Forces themselves have been able to do
very much more. 215 Corps in Helmand, for example, has conducted
a series of independent brigade level operations, some with only
very limited mentoring support from UK Forces. That improvement
in capability is also something that is adding a positive element
to the mix.
Q324 Mrs Moon: We are talking
about trust, Secretary of State. Do the people of Afghanistan
trust that we are going to stay for the long haul, or do they
fear that, in fact, we will cut and run in 2015, no matter what
the circumstances are?
Dr Fox: It is more accurate to
say that they will be wondering whether the message that the Taliban
gives is correct; namely, that the US and its allies will be leaving
in the summer of 2011. It is, therefore, of huge importance that
we take advantage of the period immediately after the summer next
year to make it very clear that we are not going home and that
the Taliban were not telling the truth. I think that they will
find it very difficult to continue that line of propaganda when
people see that the Coalition Forces are still going to be there,
particularly in the areas where the insurgency is strong. I think
that when we get to that pointnext summer is a very crucial
point in that regarda number of things will coincide. We
will have had the Afghan electionsnot great, but not too
bad. We will have had an increased concept of sovereignty, and
the willingness to exercise that sovereignty from the Government
at the centre, and there will be a continued presence of the international
coalition in the country in very large numbers after the summer
of 2011. It seems to me that that will be a time when we would
want to be pushing our psychological advantage and be pushing
concepts of reconciliation, in that period. We need to be aware,
I think, of when we potentially have the upper hand in this conflict
psychologically, and then be willing to move into the political
space that is offered.
Q325 Mrs Moon: In relation to
2015, we have talked about our troops coming out by then. Are
we considering that, in terms of the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan,
our involvement will be ongoing from 2015? Is that something that
the people of Afghanistan recognise, or do they want to see all
foreigners out after 2015?
Dr Fox: The
Government of Afghanistan have made this very clear. Time after
time, President Karzai has said that they want to take on security
themselves and take responsibility for it from the end of 2014.
I met President Karzai during the NATO summit and the impression
I have from him and from any meetings I have had in Afghanistan
is that people understand that the numbers of the Afghan Forces
are up and that the capabilities are improving, but it is very
likely that there will be a continued need for assistance when
we have finished our combat role. That was certainly reflected
at the NATO summit. Other countries recognise that getting the
capabilities of the Afghan Forces up has to become a top priority
for us now. I think there is awareness in Afghanistan that they
will require that help.
I don't think it's a bad thing that they should
want to take more control for themselves earlier on. We shouldn't
see that as a negative element in the process, but as something
that we would want to encourage. It may well be that the ambitions
of the Afghan Government are moving faster than their capabilities,
but it is up to us and the international community to ensure that
those capabilities are improving more quickly.
Q326 Mrs Moon: May I take you
back to your areas of challenge? Never mind the National Security
Force competenceyou talked about governance. How much is
the perceived corruption of the Afghan Governmentwe are
working alongside theman impediment to trust in the ISAF
Forces?
Dr Fox: In the meeting with President
Karzai at NATO to which I referred, he raised the issue of how
much corruption was and was seen to be a problem. The fact that
the Afghan Government recognise that it is a problem is good,
because it means that we might get action on it. I think we have
to be quite careful about what we are talking about when we talk
about corruption. The traditions in some parts of the world are
not the same as those we would accept in a modern, progressive,
liberal democracy. Having said that, we have a duty to deal with
it not only for the people of Afghanistan, but because the people
of our own country who pay the taxes that pay for our involvement
in Afghanistan would expect that we can move as close as possible,
given the cultural circumstances, to the sort of ethos of government
in our own country. It is reasonable that we should continue to
do that and press the Afghan Government at all times. One of the
key elements is that we get to the position that we discussed
a little while ago in which the rule of law applies equally to
the governing and the governed and a growingly independent judiciary
is willing to tackle corruption at whatever level it happens.
Q327 Mrs Moon: If it starts at
the top, how much is President Karzai an impediment to that peace,
and how much is he seen as part of the problem in terms of corruption?
Are we pressing President Karzai and his Government far enough
to tackle corruption?
Dr Fox: I will ask Peter and Stuart
to say something about this, but I think that we are pressing
President Karzai very hard. I have never been at a meeting with
the President in which the subject has not been raised by us and
pressed very strongly. I have been at meetings in which the Prime
Minister has pressed it very strongly indeed with the President.
Some positive steps are being taken by the Government, but I think
it will be an ongoing problem. The idea that we are going to find
a silver bullet to deal with this in the short term is massively
over-optimistic, but that doesn't mean that we should diminish
the effort in any way.
Peter Watkins: In addition to
raising the issue of corruption per se, it is also important that
we create the basis for a system that doesn't rely on it. One
aspect of that is building up the judiciary, which we have mentioned,
and the other is building up the institutions, particularly a
civil service as we would understand it. Again, that is an area
in which we have been making considerable investment recently.
Just to give you an example, we have helped
the Afghans set up a Civil Service Institute that is now running
programmes to train civil servants in resource management, accounting
and all those things at 29 provincial centres across Afghanistan.
In the past year, more than 11,000 civil servants have completed
that training. The idea is to build up a cadre of people who can
run the institutions and therefore embed, over time, the sorts
of processes and practices that we would like to see.
Q328 Chair: Sir Stuart, would
you like to add anything?
Air Marshal Peach: Of course,
the Afghan police have come a long way too. It is important to
recognise that under the leadership of General Bismillah Khan,
the Minister of the Interior, there have been a number of cases
recently where he has intervened, almost right down to district
level, to make sure that examples of corruption that were brought
to his attention were dealt with andwhich I think is the
important pointwere seen to be dealt with. I am not suggesting
that the police have turned overnight into paragons of virtue
across the whole country, butgoing back to the earlier
discussiongenerating that trust between the people and
the police is a vital element of establishing not just the rule
of law, but the wider sense of governance. So the fact that the
police are cracking down on corrupt individuals is very important.
The fact that it is happening all over Afghanistan, and that we
are seeing that in our three key districts, is also testament
to that change and that dynamic which is definitely at play.
Finally, we are of course assisting the Afghans,
as Peter suggests, with taskforces and other support that we can
offer, with information and help to develop practices for the
future.
Chair: We will come back to the issue
of police shortly.
Dr Fox: Could I just add to that?
I think there are two general areas and two specific areas where
we are assisting on anti-corruption, the specific being support
for the Major Crimes Task Force and the support for the Supreme
Court to establish an anti-corruption tribunal. But on the more
general, the UK is working to strengthen Afghanistan's public
financial management, in partnership with the World Bank and the
IMF, to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Of course, building
up civil society that will hold the Government to account is also
a powerful anti-corruption tool. So we have the specific tools
that we can use, but we also have the political development, which
in itself will on the one hand diminish the opportunities for
corruption and on the other hold those who might be involved in
corrupt activity to account.
Q329 Mrs Moon: The United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan says, "Harmful traditional
practices that violate the human rights of women and girls are
pervasive in Afghanistan, occurring in varying degrees in all
communities throughout the country". When I met with the
Minister for Women for Afghanistan, she was concerned that only
16% of people at the High Peace Council were women. Are we doing
enough to promote the needs of women and children in Afghanistan?
Has their position changed at all? Now, I appreciate there is
a wealth of difference in relation to the North and the South.
Perhaps you could comment on both.
Dr Fox: Yes, indeed. I had anticipated
that Mrs Moon might ask this question. I discussed it with my
colleagues at DFID this morning. We are working closely with the
Afghan Government to ensure that gender equality is integrated
into policies for the long term, in sustainable improvements.
We provided an adviser to the Afghan Government to ensure the
Afghan National Development Strategy to integrate cross-cutting
issues, such as gender equality, into sector plans. We are, of
course, working through the NGOs to ensure that we can put a lot
more money and effort into some of the programmes that are actually
very women-specific. DFID is also providing support to WOMANKIND,
which is providing £237,000 across Afghanistan and several
other countries, the International Planned Parenthood Federation,
War Child and a number of programmes to try to ensure that, on
a whole range of issues that will affect women, we are giving
greater importance to that in our general approach.
Q330 Mr Hancock: I'm interested
in this concept of how you get the wider population to understand
that there are now laws in place, which ought to safeguard them
from corruption, when, from what you read, the majority of the
Afghan population believe that corruption is still there at the
very top. I am interested to know how you are going to persuade
the overwhelming majority of Afghans that corruption is being
tackled, and that part of the condition for us being there is
that it is being dealt with, when there are still widespread allegations
against people who are very close to the President and people
in senior positions within the country.
Dr Fox: First, we would encourage
the Government, at all times, to investigate that, however senior
anybody may be. That is a constant message. As I have mentioned,
we have our support for the Supreme Court and our support for
the Task Force. Ultimately, for people on the ground, they will
believe that corruption is being tackled when they see it for
themselves, when we are achieving an improved level of governance,
when they see that the law applies at all levels of the country,
when they believe that they have access to law and when they believe
that there is impartiality of the judicial system. All those things
are necessary.
Some of that will come about as we, over time,
improve the educational status of people, as they understand how
the country is being run and how it's meant to be run, and as
we improve the ability of ordinary people to hold the Government,
at all levels, to account. It's going to be a slow process, and
I don't think that we, in any way, can believe that it is going
to be rapid.
Q331 Mr Hancock: I understand
that it's going to be a slow process, but in many countries in
former Eastern Europe, for example, the perception is that if
you're in trouble, you can buy your way out of it at whatever
level. I am interested to get a view of how you believe that the
average Afghan will not believe that there is no way that they
can buy themselves out of a problem, and that they will have to
go through the normal processes. There is corruption right at
the top and right down at the lowest level. There is always a
price that you can pay to avoid the repercussions of your actions.
When there is no excuse for that is what makes the fabric of a
society, isn't it?
Dr Fox: Mr Hancock's question
began with "in Eastern Europe, people believe that you can
do that", which shows that corruption is not exactly limited
to what is happening in Afghanistan.
Mr Hancock: Absolutely. I agree entirely.
Dr Fox: I think it emphasises
that there is quite a cultural gap to fill. As I said, I think
that if we are able to make the right steps at the top, which
we are, with the Task Force, with the Supreme Court and with our
constant pressure on politicians at the top to regard the issue
as important, which they now do seem to recognise, if we are able
to minimise the chances of corruption taking place and if we are
maximising the chances of holding people to account, all those
steps will gradually, I think, have an effect on the problem and
thereby, because seeing is better than hearing about it, the public
will ultimately come to realise that the problem is being tackled.
Chair: Moving on now to operational issues,
Julian Brazier.
Q332 Mr Brazier: I shall ask two
questions together, because they are effectively similar questions.
How has the situation changed in Afghanistan
following the adoption of the McChrystal counter-insurgency strategy?
In particular, has the policy of courageous restraint made a difference
in securing the consent of the local population?
Dr Fox: I will answer that in
general, and then I'll ask the CJO to comment.
I think that General McChrystal was successful
in changing the way that we thought about what we were doing in
Afghanistan, so that the emphasis moved from killing terrorists
to protecting the population. As I said in an earlier answer,
the real value of protecting the population comes in the virtuous
circle of security and intelligence that we can get from that.
What was successful? There was the doctrine
itself, counter-insurgency, the fact that the surge came and brought
greater numbers in terms of manpower and equipment and brought
a thickening across the country, and, again as I said in an earlier
answer, the concept of "clear and hold," which means
not only clearing territory of insurgents, but holding it to protect
the population. That was key.
Courageous restraint perhaps over-corrected
for a time, in that extra risks were being taken. Perhaps in the
way that it was being interpreted, right down to the lowest level,
it was putting our forces at greater risk in order to give even
greater protection to the public. Perhaps under General Petraeus
the pendulum swung back a little bit towards the middle, or perhaps
that is just experience. I think it has been important, however,
and it has been important in giving confidence to the public that
they could give us information, and that they could help us improve
their security and our security, without the Taliban coming back
at night and paying them a visit. That holding element and that
element of protecting the public have been absolutely key. Certainly,
I have visited a number of places myself where that has been quite
evident on the groundnot everywhere, and there still remain
far too many hotspots and areas of violence, but where it has
been put successfully into place General McChrystal's strategy
has certainly been vindicated.
Air Marshal Peach: Of course General
Petraeus, as the Secretary of State indicated, has developed that
and has tuned the strategy to suit the emerging situation as our
own operations and those of the Afghan Forces have changed the
situation. As indicated, the pendulum has now gone back and General
Petraeus has issued a number of directives to the NATO Forces
to make it clear that we continue the strategy, which is starting
to reverse the momentum and starting to work.
The other key change that General McChrystal
introduced, which has now taken hold across Afghanistanit
looks different across Afghanistan for all sorts of reasonsis
the concept of partnering, where the ISAF Security Forces partner
with the Afghan Security Forces. That looks different for all
sorts of reasons, as much to do with the geography and the layout
and whether it's urban or rural, as to do with particular styles
of European armies in the way they do this. None the less, the
concept of partnering becoming part of the strategy, as that strategy
has moved forward, under now very firm leadership from General
Petraeus, is definitely achieving the effects set out by General
McChrystal. We remain very positive about that outcome.
We also remain very positive, if we turn back
to the Afghan Security Forces, that we are now seeing what I would
describe as a shift in the Afghan Security Forces from us all
focusing on inputsrecruiting, training and deployingto
outputs. We are now talking about, as the Secretary of State indicated,
brigade level operations with us training, assisting, mentoring,
supporting and enablingall those words. Increasingly, the
Afghan Security Force is taking the lead within the concept of
the McChrystal, now Petraeus, strategy.
Q333 Mr Brazier: Thank you. Could
I drill down a little on that? Moving from the overall picture
specifically to focusing on the British element of it, the picture
very often painted of the Brits by off-the-record American service
personnel, and often reflected in their media, is characterised
by our forces being unwilling to fire because of their, as they
see it, extremely
Chair: We are coming on to that later
on, I think. I would rather leave that until later on.
Dr Fox: There was one other element
that General McChrystal was able to bring, which was greater clarity
to command and control. Unlike his predecessors, he was able to
tell people what to do and where they were to do it, whereas his
predecessors before then had only been able to co-ordinate and
ask. That improvement, which I know that both sides of the House
of Commons for a very long time were complaining about, was the
clarity of command and control. General McChrystal definitely
brought an improvement to that.
Chair: If when we come to it, Julian,
we find that your point has not been covered, can you come in
after Penny Mordaunt please? John Glen.
Q334 John Glen: I would like now
to turn the Secretary of State to the issue of compensation for
civilian casualties caused by UK Armed Forces. It would be helpful
if you could set out what the UK policy is. Secondly, there has
been some concern about the differences between the UK and the
US policies, perhaps with regard to the level but also the speed
with which that compensation has been paid. If you could address
that, I'd be grateful.
Dr Fox: First, on the latter point,
I'm not aware of difficulties caused by any difference in approach
by the UK and the US. I have heard that mentioned in public, and
if any member of the Committee has any evidence on that, we're
very keen to hear about it. If there are examples of where difficulties
may have been caused, that is something we would like to look
at as a matter of policy. As of the moment, however, although
the question has been raised in the past, we are unable to find
areas where it has made a practical difference.
When we're made aware of an alleged incident
that may have been caused by UK Forces, the UK follows the ISAF
process to investigate. A system is in place for handling claims
for compensation brought against the Ministry of Defence by Afghan
civilians. We have an area claims officer located in Lashkar Gah,
and claims officers travel throughout Helmand, and make visits
even further afield, to ensure that all claims receive attention
and so that people feel that they are able to bring claims forward.
Air Marshal Peach: There is that
sense of local feel. This is very detailed work and it would almost
be different within a village, depending on the circumstances
and whether the particular farmer has a particular need and so
on. That's why we have the local area claims officer.
Q335 John Glen: What about the
difference between the US and the UK? Your assessment is that
there is no significant difference in the speed with which they
operate.
Air Marshal Peach: Absolutely,
because we both follow the ISAF procedure, and increasingly over
time, and certainly now, such things are held and dealt with at
the local level. That might mean that, across Afghanistan, stories
appear different, because they're applying a local context, which
is very different depending on the nature of the economic activity.
Q336 Chair: Is this is an issue
that arises out of claims having to be made, as opposed to ISAF
Forces making an offer if they know that civilians have been killed?
The latter doesn't happen; it happens instead by way of claims
made. Is that right?
Air Marshal Peach: Yes, but that
is an interactive process. It would be right to say that the Afghans
understand this and are quite agile at understanding the local
circumstances.
Peter Watkins: Perhaps I can add
to that. We have a process by which, in the interests of speed,
we can make ex gratia payments quickly, before the claim has actually
been proved, as it were. I think the Americans have a similar
approach.
Q337 Chair: Is that often used?
Peter Watkins: It is often used,
yes.
Air Marshal Peach: It's highly
effective.
Q338 Mrs Moon: To clarify, if
there is an incident somewhere and as part of that incident there
is damageto a building, perhaps, when a vehicle reverses
and knocks down a wall, or a cow is knocked over, or whateverdoes
there have to be a claim; or is there the potential to make an
immediate payment there and then, on the spot, before moving on,
so that you don't end up with a build-up of resentment?
Dr Fox: That is exactly what the
ex gratia payments are for. They are used and range from $100
upwards. They are to do exactly thatto make sure there
is swift reimbursement for any damage or loss accrued. We also
make sure that the Afghan locals know that the claim scheme is
available by announcements on the radio and leaflets distributed
by the military stabilisation support teams. They collate details
of claims for those who can't reach the claims officer. We go
out of our way to offer swift possibilities for people to be reimbursed
for loss and to ensure that people are aware of the scheme more
widely than just the big population centres.
Q339 Sandra Osborne: You referred
to the support in Helmand Province by DFID. We have quite a long
list of support that has been given, including information about
improvements in the health service and education. Do you think
that enough resources are being put into the civilian side of
the stabilisation operation to sustain it following 2015 when
the troops come out?
Dr Fox: Certainly we in the UK
are the second largest contributor to the multi-donor Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund. Since 2005, we have channelled £200
million through this to help, for example, to support the salaries
of civil servants. That now includes 168,000 teachers, 29% of
whom are women. So we are doing a great deal.
There are two things that I will say. First,
we need to recognise that there is a limit as to how much can
be absorbed in terms of the pace at which development can take
place. In addition, we should also be a bit more vocal, perhaps,
about the extent to which we have already made quite big improvements.
In 2002, 9% of the population of Afghanistan were covered by basic
health care; at the end of last year, that had risen to 85%, which
is an astonishing improvement in the world's second poorest country.
Also, 5.3 million children are now in school, compared with 1
million in 2001and, of course, in 2001, very few were female.
That has dramatically increased.
Q340 Chair: Last year, wasn't
it 6 million?
Dr Fox: The estimates were between
5.3 million and 6 million, and we're heading towards 8 million
by the end of next year, we hope.
Q341 Chair:
But, we don't know what the population is, do we?
Dr Fox: It's an estimated figure,
Chairman.
Peter Watkins: It is true that
there hasn't been a census for many years, so all of these figures
are estimates and they are compiled on different bases, which
is why you sometimes get these differences between figures.
Q342 Sandra Osborne: Do you think
we're getting good value for money from the development aid being
spent in Afghanistan?
Dr Fox: It depends, of course,
on how you measure value for money, but I am sure that the Afghans
who are getting their children immunised and getting them to school
and who are seeing the improvements in health care would think
that they are getting value for our money. I doubt if there has
ever been an aid programme that couldn't be more efficient, but
I defer to my DFID colleagues in terms of how they are able to
measure those elements. They do not fall within my expertise,
although either of my colleagues are very welcome to add something
if they wish.
Q343 Chair: You look keen to do
that, Mr Watkins.
Peter Watkins: As you know, we
also have a Conflict Pool, where money is administered on behalf
of all three Departments for various forms of assistance in Afghanistan.
So we do, as MoD officials, have an opportunity to see how the
money is spent, and my sense is that we do get value for money.
Q344 Sandra Osborne: So there's
not going to be any big major withdrawal of aid to Afghanistan
after the troops come homethat stabilisation effort is
going to continue?
Dr Fox: I think the international
community fully understands that if your measurement of value
for money is greater stability and therefore security in the region,
which is our primary purpose there, that has to continue for some
time. This is a very poor country and often I think that people
here don't necessarily understand what we're talking about. Eritrea
is wealthier than Afghanistan. This is a country with a life expectancy
of 43 or 44, where over 60% live in rural areas, and where the
literacy rate is probably 20% or so. This is a very poor country,
and some of the developments that have happened in recent years
have been quite spectacular.
Q345 Sandra Osborne: You mentioned
the support that goes to women. What proportion of that goes through
NGOs and what proportion through the Afghan Government? Are you
secure in your own mind that that money is being spent well by
the Afghan Government?
Dr Fox: I couldn't give a specific
answerI'm not sure if Peter can do that in terms of the
absolute proportionsbut the majority of DFID's money goes
through the Afghan Government, on the basis that we want people
to see that their Government can deliver the services and to be
able to have faith in their central Government for the very reasons
that we mentioned of concepts of governance and confidence in
governance. However, we also have a large number of NGOs that
the British public will be contributing to, which will carry on
their own work, especially in specific areas.
Peter Watkins: I would have to
check the statistics, but I think about 75% to 80% of DFID's money
goes through the Afghan Government.
Q346 Mr Hancock: On that point
about the aid, if it goes centrally, how do we monitor the way
it is then filtered down locally? It is one thing to say that
we give the money centrally, but we really need to know for sure
that the aid and the money are going in the predicted direction.
What are the checks and balances that you see on the ground?
Peter Watkins: My DFID colleagues
could give you more detail, but my understanding is that they
have a system agreed with the Afghan Government under which the
money is accounted for and the purposes on which that money should
be spent are indicated to them. It is not just given to the Afghan
Government as a block and then forgotten about.
Dr Fox: The money largely goes
through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is specifically
there to provide certain things in terms of services and livelihood.
That can be identified and is, I understand, closely monitored
by DFID.
Air Marshal Peach: Some of the
money is spent in the Afghan Government sense, at district level
though things such as the PRT in Helmand and elsewhere, where
it is monitored very closely. The projects themselves are very
local, but of course, as the Secretary of State has indicated
they go a long way in such a poor country.
Q347 Chair: Those are generic
answers, rather than answers on the issue of aid for women, are
they not?
Dr Fox: They are generic.
Q348 Mrs Moon: I want to pick
up on how much is actually going through. Could you write to us
on how much is going through the Ministry of Women's Affairs?
Chair: I think it would be useful to
have an account. Although I have been impressed by the depth of
the detail that you have given us, could you answer that question
in writing?
Dr Fox: That is a question on
which I imagine DFID would be able to give us better figures,
and we will certainly ask them.
Q349 Ms Stuart: Before I move
on to the Afghan national security forces, I want to quickly follow
up something Peter Watkins said. He mentioned the Conflict Pool.
Does DFID contribute money to that conflict Pool?
Peter Watkins: It's slightly more
complicated than that. It is a pool of money that is held centrally
but is administered by a board upon which sit DFID, the MoD and
the Foreign Office. Between the three Departments it is, if you
like, a manifestation of the comprehensive approach. We work out
the priorities and spend the money accordingly.
Q350 Ms Stuart: I am asking because
DFID is bound by a statutory definition of what it can spend its
money on. I am trying to establish whether that statutory definition
causes you any difficulties in pooling money.
Peter Watkins: I think you mean
the so-called ODA eligibility. No it doesn't, but it does mean
that we have to be able to identify which money is ODA-compliant
and which isn't.
Q351 Ms Stuart: I want to move
on to the Afghan National Security Forces. A US report in June
2010 stated that 23% of Afghan soldiers and 12% of the police
can work unsupervised, which are very small numbers. Some 12%
of the army and 17% of the police were absent without leave. That
is combined with the continuing lack of recruitment of Pashtun
soldiers. Could the Secretary of State answer two questions? First,
could we have a brief update on the progress of the Afghan National
Security Forces? Secondly, what progress has been made to ensure
that by 2015 those forces could secure the safety of our soldiers
who are there not in a combat capacity, but in a training capacity?
Dr Fox: There has been a big improvement
in total numbers recruited and operating. The problems that Stuart
mentioned are correct. Obviously there are going to be problems
with those who are absent without leave and those who require
supervision, but the fact that a quarter of the army can operate
unsupervised is probably not a bad figure. The fact that they
are able to carry out brigade-level activity with minimal mentoring
is a substantial improvement from where we were before.
I think there is a change in how the international
community views the ANSF, in that all our measurements until now
were about inputs, such as the numbers we were getting in, and
now, subtly perhaps, it is beginning to move to outputs. What
are the capabilities? What proportion can operate unsupervised?
How much further training do they require? What are they capable
of doing on their own? There has been substantial progress. Numerically,
they are several months ahead of the targets that were set for
them. In terms of capability, that is where we need to be focusing.
At the bilateral meetings we attended at the Lisbon summit, a
lot of the focus on Afghanistan was on the training mission. Who
was to contribute to the training mission and how was it to be
sustained? What would happen after 2015? It seems that almost
imperceptibly the argument has moved from, "Do we have the
numbers?" to "Do we have the quality and the capabilities?"
That is a very good place for the argument to be.
I am encouraged that countries such as Canada
have decided to make a major contribution to the training mission
as it moves out of a combat role. I hope that is something that
other countries will follow, because that is essential to the
long-term maintenance and coherence of the alliance in Afghanistan.
As General Petraeus and others say, "In together, out together."
We will need to focus on the capabilities of the Forces now. There
would be no point leaving behind a numerically large force, if
it didn't have the ability to carry through the security tasks
that we are currently undertaking but gradually transferring on
to them.
Q352 Ms Stuart: What about Pashtun
recruitment?
Air Marshal Peach: Pashtun recruitment
is still an issue, but not a dominant one. We'll have to get back
to you on the latest figures, but the sense is that more Pashtuns
are being recruited. There is also a sense that the army is a
trusted institution across Afghanistan. So, even if the local
mix of the army units is not Pashtun, we get no sense that that
makes them any less trusted. We are encouraged by what NTM-Athe
NATO Training Mission Afghanistanis telling us. As the
Secretary of State indicates, this is an army that is changing
its whole ethos, from building itself up through numbers into
basic light-scale, light-equipped units. Now we are at that point
of transitioning to brigade-level operations and so on, there
is a definite focus on administration. That is most welcome because
that is exactly, Ms Stuart, what will switch those absentee rates,
sort out the pay, sort out the leave plotit is all important
administrative detail that will help reduce absentee rates. The
next switch we are likely to see and we are working together with
them on, is a move towards logistic support, developing Afghan
specialist capabilitiessignals, police and so on. We are
at that important moment when we are shifting gear from light-scale
equipped forces that have been trained quite quickly, to developing
that training-and-assist function to do more specialist tasks
around the country.
Q353 Ms Stuart: Does the same
apply to the police? Is there the same kind of progress, or is
it just the army?
Dr Fox: If I can add on the army
before I answer that question, of the 140 ANA kandaks since May
2010
Q354 Chair: And an ANA kandak
is what exactly?
Air Marshal Peach: A battalion.
Dr Fox: I am sorry, Chairman,
that is twice I have fallen foul. There is probably some donation
to charity I have to make.
Q355 Chair: Twice in six months
is not too bad.
Dr Fox: If I told you about the
number of offences inside the main building.
Since May, of 140 battalion levels, those judged
by ISAF to be broadly effective or better, has increased from
51 to 74. That is quite a big increase in that time. Talking to
commanders on the ground, many have been surprised at how quickly
the Afghan National Army has been able to improve and take on
responsibilities for itself. I imagine some did not believe it
could do that in the time scale.
In terms of the police, the police have always
lagged behind the army. That is something we have discussed in
the House of Commons on a number of occasions. When shadow Defence
Secretary, I was particularly criticalsome of us do remember
a time before Government.
Ms Stuart: I didn't want to mention it.
Dr Fox: That criticism was fair.
There have been two major changes that have put the police training
on to a different path. The first was to give equivalence in pay
with the ANA; the second was compulsory literacy training. In
a country with very low literacy levels and very low income levels,
suddenly being able to get a better income and suddenly being
able to be taught to read and write would improve the social standing
of anyone. That is why I think there has been such a big increase
in the number of people coming forward for police training.
AnecdotallyI accept that that is never
a good basis for anythingwhen we were last in Lashkar Gah,
I was told that locals had been complaining that police had been
brought from another part of the country to carry out policing
in their district, until it was pointed to them that they actually
were locally trained. They had problems believing that this quality
of police training could come from their own area. It was a very
nice bit of local colour, and it indicated first, that the training
was occurring and secondly, that people were recognising the improvements.
Training of the army alone will not be sufficient; we must have
police training at several levels. The different types of police
training also bear scrutiny, and the UK contribution in Helmand
has been quite remarkable. I visited the training centre that
we run there and I was very impressed, not least by the English
skills that the students were exhibiting after a relatively short
time.
Q356 Mrs Moon: Can I ask you about
the training of the police force in connection with the aspects
of Afghan law that relate to violence against women? The UN report
says that Afghan law enforcement authorities are unaware of the
violence against women laws, many authorities are unwilling and
unable to apply the law, and police often fail to enforce the
law. It also says that, in fact, a large number of women detained
in Afghanistan are detained for moral crimes, and the police will
arrest, jail and prosecute girls who are running away from violence;
the charge is usually the intention to commit zina, which is sexual
intercourse outside marriage. In the training that we provide,
are we including experience and understanding of Afghan law that
actually protects women?
Peter Watkins: Yes. The training
that we provide includes training in the principles of the rule
of law, principles of human rights, including women's rights,
and all those things. That is part of our training. As the Secretary
of State has said, we started from a lower base with the police,
so it's taking time for this to, if you like, suffuse through.
Q357 Mr Hancock: It is not very
often that senior military commanders disagree with each other
when they are both still in the serviceif Britain is anything
to go by, they normally wait until they retire to criticise each
other. However, we now have the situation where, in answer to
Gisela's question about the quality of the service, General Caldwell
has said one thing only to be contradicted by General Rodriguez.
Who, in your opinion, is right? Rodriguez said that the reports
about the lack of substance to the Afghan Forces were correct
and Caldwell, who was responsible for training them, denied it.
So, one of them has to be wrong.
Chair: These are US generals.
Mr Hancock: Yes, I might add that.
Air Marshal Peach: I know both
generals.
I do not know the specifics, but I think that
we are painting deliberately an improving picture. General Caldwell
has the detailed knowledge of the output of both the army training
and the police training, and General Rodriguez, of course, will
be observing more from a visits perspective. Rather than comment
on individual reports, I don't think that that sounds like a tremendous
dispute in the sense of progress this year
Q358 Mr Hancock: They are diametrically
opposing each other. One was saying that 17% of the police were
absent and only 12% can work unsupervised, and so on. The same
statistics that Gisela mentioned were coming out and General Rodriguez
made it quite clear that he supported that view and said that
the report is correct. He is the one who has to use these soldiers
in conjunction with his own, whereas Caldwell is only responsible
for training them.
Chair: I think we are going to have to
call the Americans up.
Q359 Mr Hancock: Okay, but I just
wondered from our perspective whether we agreed with Rodriguez
or Caldwell.
Dr Fox: Well, I think we should
look at the evidence about the capability of the Afghan National
Army, and what they are actually able to do. They have already
opened branch schools in intelligence, engineering, legal, military
police, logistics, religious and cultural affairs, and finance,
in order to develop those capabilities. So, whether you want to
take an optimistic or a pessimistic view of exactly where they
are at any one time, on top of the figures that I gave earlier
that 74 out of 140 were regarded by ISAF as being particularly
effective, and when you take on top of that these branch schools
that are opening to give particularly improved capabilities in
specific areas or understanding specific areas, you see an improved
picture. Certainly if you compare what we are looking at the end
of 2010 with what we would have been looking at the beginning
of 2006, there is huge gulf between the two.
Q360 Mr Hancock: How confident
are you now that the aspirations of the Prime Minister and others
that the coalition can leave at the end of 2014 can be achieved?
Dr Fox: That's the military coalition?
Mr Hancock: Yes.
Dr Fox: We think that this mission
is doable and the improvements that we have made are sustainable.
I believe that the capability of both the Afghan National Army
and, to a lesser but improving degree, the police, will enable
the Afghan Government to achieve their own goal of being a sovereign
Government, looking after their own internal and external security
by the end of 2014. So we are confident.
Q361 Mr Hancock: What do you consider
are the dangers of announcing the intention to withdraw by 2015?
What happens if Helmand in particular, and possibly Kandahar,
is not ready for the transition?
Dr Fox: I don't do the "what
ifs" on that because I think it is very important that we
give a very strong signal of confidence. It is very important
for the Afghans themselves to believe that it is going to happen.
It encourages them to move forward positively. To say that we
don't think that we ourselves will necessarily complete what we
want does nothing for the morale of our own forces but does a
great deal to improve the morale of the Taliban. So I think we
move forward with the belief that we can achieve it. There is
always an upside and a downside to this, if we are being very
frank. The upside to setting a time scale is that we deal with
the issue that the Taliban never have to deal with, which is that
we require consent and support in democratic societies for what
we are asking our armed forces to do.
An entirely open-ended commitment, especially
at times of high casualty rates, is very likely to undermine our
ability to have the sort of resolve that we need to see the mission
through. There is always the possibility of sending signals that
we are not there "for the long term", but as I have
made repeatedly clear today, we intend to be there in sufficient
numbers and in a sufficient force to ensure that the quality and
capabilities of the Afghan National Forces will themselves be
able to take on that security role by the end of 2014. To start
to talk about plan B or "what ifs" runs a great risk
of making us look as though we do not have the resolve required
to be successful in the objectives we have set ourselves.
Q362 Mr Hancock: By 2015 it will
have been 13 years and by any shadow of the imagination that is
a very long haul, during which time an awful lot of lives have
been transformed one way or another and, tragically, many have
been lost. NATO has stated that it will not go into a transition
unless its Afghan partners are ready and want that to happen.
We've made it quite clear that it is our intention not to be there
except in a training role. Does that put us in difficulty with
our NATO partners?
Dr Fox: No, we have made it very
clear on transition that the criteria for geographical transitioning
will be agreed by the Afghan Government and NATO, so we will set
them between us. There was a great deal of discussion about this
at Lisbon, as one might expect. There has to be a balance struck.
Above all else any transitioning needs to be regarded as irreversible.
The worst thing that could happen would be to transition any areas,
only to see it roll backwards. We need to think about the number
of areas that we will transition and this is something where work
is being done. Were we to transition only a very small number
of the very safest areas, it would provide a very key target for
the Taliban. So we will need to think about exactly how many areas
are transitioned and in what time scale. I know that there is
a lot of military thinking going on about that at the moment.
CJO might want to comment specifically on that.
Q363 Mr Hancock: The last time
you were at the Committee you talked about the issue of sub-provincial
transition, but there were some difficulties. Have the issues
relating to that now been resolved?
Dr Fox: Yes, I remember saying
that I was very concerned that we would stick to the provincial
level only, and that that would provide us with a number of difficulties
in choosing which Provinces and in potentially not being able
to show momentum in how quickly progress was being made. That
has been resolved, and we will now do it at a sub-provincial level.
That has been a major step forward.
Q364 Mr Hancock: Can I ask a question
about UK troops after the withdrawal, and the ones that will be
there for training purposes and so on? It might be difficult to
answer this question now, but has any thought been given to the
numbers that you would expect to be fulfilling that role and for
what period of time?
Dr Fox: Obviously, that will be
dependent on the conditions in 2015. It will also be dependent
on the size of the NATO mission and the contributions from the
rest of our NATO allies. It is very key, not only from the perspective
of UK domestic opinion but from an alliance and NATO cohesion
perspective, to ensure that that mission is spread as widely among
the coalition members as possible. Very clearly, as a matter of
arithmetic, the more our allies are contributing to training,
the less we are likely to have to do given any particular size
of the mission.
Q365 Mr Hancock: My final question
really relates to resilience of the Afghan Forces post-2015. When
we first went there, the Taliban didn't effectively have an army
of the size that the Afghan Forces will have post-2015 when they
could have as many as 200,000 fully trained soldiers, as our colonel
said earlier, twice the size of the UK Forces. Are we sure that
a re-emergence of the Taliban wouldn't effectively give them the
whip hand so that they would not only have control of the country,
but the resilience of the army would simply collapse and they
would become the fighting force of the Taliban?
Dr Fox: Well, of course the primary
aim is not to allow the re-emergence of the Taliban, by denying
them both the military space and the political space in which
to operate. That is dependent on the things we've already discussed:
the quality of governance and the level to which the Afghan Government
and its constitution is accepted by the population, and the ability
of the Afghan Security Forces themselves to secure the space.
The political space is secured by governance and the military
space is secured by the ANSF. These are the key discussions for
us in the years ahead.
Q366 Chair: Presumably, after
2015 there will be a need for a helicopter force in Afghanistan,
and possibly even a fixed-wing force. Would we take part in that?
Dr Fox: In terms of support I
think we would be unlikely to see fixed wing, but no decisions
have been taken. Those will be looked at over the years ahead
in terms of the conditions on the ground.
Q367 Chair: That includes the
helicopter force?
Dr Fox: We may again want to give
support in terms of what we have in the helicopter force. It would
be difficult to envisage the Afghans being able to do everything
for themselves, but of course the United States has a substantial
presence. The balance between the allies in terms of the support
we gave to the Afghans would be dependent on what they needed
and what we had available at the time.
Q368 Chair: Combat helicopters?
Dr Fox: That is a level of detail
that we haven't yet considered, but it is something that we will
have to look at.
Chair: It's a tricky one, isn't it?
Dr Fox: That's why you asked it,
Chairman.
Q369 Penny Mordaunt: Former commanders,
including General Messenger, have said that we didn't have enough
UK Forces personnel to carry out the tasks asked of them in Helmand
in 2006, and independent commentators have agreed with that view.
In your opinion, what was the impact of the failure to deploy
sufficient troops, and do you think that now the armed forces
have the correct force density level?
Dr Fox: Yes, I do believe we have
the correct force density levels. I was very concerned for a long
time that the ratio of our force strength to the size of the population
we were looking after was incorrect. I think that has been remedied.
I think that was helped by the movement of British forces in Afghanistan
into the area that they are now responsible for, as well as simultaneously
seeing the American surge, which improved not only the level of
troops available, but also the amount of equipment, frankly, that
was available.
In terms of the 2,000, I am not yet aware whether
the Committee has had the classified memorandum giving details
on decisions made in 2006.
Q370 Chair: No, we haven't yet
had that. We have had a letter from the Ministry of Defence apologising
for not having had that yet. We would quite like it.
Dr Fox: I've seen it today, in
fact. I think it goes into quite a lot of operational detail that
the Committee would find very interesting in terms of what happened
in 2006-09, but I am not sure that I would be entirely comfortable
sharing some of that detail publicly.
Chair: Are you done on this point?
Penny Mordaunt: Yes.
Chair: That leaves Julian Brazier's question
from earlier, and then I want to come on to Bob Stewart.
Q371 Mr Brazier: The frequent
criticism from Americans prior to the McChrystal strategy in both
Iraq and Afghanistanand I have heard it by word of mouth;
it is not just WikiLeaks stuffis that they feel their British
counterparts are so hampered by the rules of engagement they operate
under and the wider legal framework that they are unwilling to
open fire. To expand on that point a little, we also have the
sort offor want of a better wordcoroner's environment
every time we lose one of our own soldiers. As Richard Holmes
points out, it is unlikely we would have won either of the World
Wars if we'd had the coroners checking on every casualty. Do you
actually think that the legal framework, both in terms of the
risk to civilian casualties under the rules of engagement and
the duty of care for the individual soldiers, is fair on young
commanders? Very often, the safest thing for everybody is for
them to make a decision quickly.
Dr Fox: I think the rules of engagement,
and related subjects, are for CJO.
Air Marshal Peach: We have robust
rules of engagement. I have not picked up, in almost two years
as Chief of Joint Operations, precisely that sort of concern that
the rules of engagement are insufficient to allow the freedom
of action to open fire when the circumstances permit. So I think
that our rules of engagement are robust. The process is flexible
in that commanders on the ground are allowed to request changes
to the rules of engagement, and in appropriate circumstances that
is done very urgently. I would apply that statement to aeroplanes
and helicopters where appropriate. Whether that looks back, returning
to the previous discussion, I don't know, but I do not think that
applies now to our rules of engagement. They, of course, are consistent
with the overall framework inside the NATO strategy, which goes
back to the Chairman's questions on courageous restraint.
In terms of the overall framework, that is more
of a policy question. Of course, there will be individual cases
that we are not here to consider. But again, we are alive to changes
in policy and, where appropriate, the operational chain of command
will ask the Ministry of Defence for clarification on any legal
issues or any rulings. We will always try and interpret those
to ensure our operational freedom of action.
Peter Watkins: I was just going
to add to that. We obviously do try to ensure that our soldiers
operate within a clear policy and legal framework. For example,
that is why the Government decided to appeal against the ruling
in the Smith case last year in order to precisely get a clear
ruling from the Supreme Court on what the duties of officers were
to their soldiers.
Q372 Mr Brazier: But clearly you
can't predict the outcome of that particular case. It is one of
a number of cases that have left commanders, one hears anecdotally,
increasingly concerned about that particular area. It has led
to an ever-increasing training chain of people going off to Afghanistan.
One really has to ask oneself whether, in the long run, it will
save lives to have an ever-increasing feeling that there could
be something like a corporate manslaughter charge out there. At
a presentation I attended in the past fortnight, there was a strong
hint that even that was lurking in the background. Is it really
fair to have British troops on operations under this kind of threat,
when the Americans and Canadianswho both have a very similar
legal structureare not under this threat, despite the fact
that America is statistically the most litigious country in the
world?
Dr Fox: One of the key ways in
which you might judge that is to actually ask our commanders whether
they feel that there is an appropriate balance and whether the
rules of engagement are set in a way that makes it easy for them
to operate. When I became Secretary of State, one of the things
that I did was to ask whether there were elements there that needed
to be redressed. There was the specific example, which we mentioned,
of courageous restraint. I met some young soldiers who told me
that the rules were being applied too tightly. In fact, the rules
themselves weren't wrong, but the interpretation as it came down
the chain was, in effect, making them feel that they had to err
too much on one side. Mr Brazier mentions that what we did in
that case was simply to give clarification to them.
Q373 Chair: You have, in the past,
raised the issue of lawfare, as opposed to warfare. I do not know
whether it is right to announce it now, but it is likely that
we may well do some inquiry in the next year into the concerns
that Julian Brazier is raising. It strikes us that they are very
important.
Dr Fox: That would be as interesting
for us as it would be for you, because it is a very important
and contentious political area, where there are no clear party
political lines. It would be useful for us to consider.
Chair: That is true of most of these
defence issues.
Q374 Bob Stewart: WikiLeaks has
exposed some criticism of our operations, specifically from the
Afghanistan Government and even the United States. Are they being
unfair? Are these criticisms wrong?
Dr Fox: I have studiously avoided
questions on WikiLeaks disclosures. First, they are fragments
and incompletely disclosed. They are designed to damage the United
States in the eyes of the outside world, and drive a wedge between
the United States and its allies. We should have no part in playing
the WikiLeaks game. It is trying to set a particular agenda and
put particular ideas into the public mind and the wider public
discourse. I think that it is extremely regrettable that some
organs of the British media have played along with it. I find
the whole concept of WikiLeaks and its activities completely loathsome.
Q375 Bob Stewart: I accept that
totally. That's good. Going back to 2006, Secretary of State,
what do you think is the key lesson that we learned from what
happened in Helmand?
Dr Fox: The key lesson is that
if you are going to undertake any military activity, you should
have a clear plan and it should be properly resourced.
Q376 Bob Stewart: What about our
deployment? Maybe we shouldn't touch on it.
Dr Fox: Well, as I say, a lot
of operational information is being made available to the Committee.
I could only give a necessarily partial opinion on that, in that
I regularly said in those years that I believed that our mission
was being under-resourced.
Q377 Bob Stewart: Since the surge
in 2008, what have we done differently? What have we done operationally
that is different from what we did before the surge, apart from
the fact that we have more troops around?
Dr Fox: First, the whole counter-insurgency
approach, as we discussed earlier, changed how we saw the conflict.
Secondly, we were able to adapt our force densities, and, in Helmand,
if you look at the population density map rather than the geographical
map, you will see that we now are roughly a third, a third, a
third between the Americans north and south of us and our Forces
in the middle. Previously, we were hugely stretched in terms of
the proportion of the population we were being asked to cover
with a much smaller total force in Helmand. That has been the
biggest change. Not only did the Americans bring numbers in terms
of manpower, but they brought large amounts of equipment. That
is one of the basic rules of warfarea sufficient size of
force is required for the job in hand. I don't know whether
Bob Stewart: Get there firstest with
the mostest.
Air Marshal Peach: Understand
what the key terrain is, which as you understand very well, is
dependent on being there to understand it. Once we'd got to that
point, we were able to focus on that key terrain, as the Secretary
of State said. The second area is to understand that having an
integrated approach is essential, not simply nice-to-have. In
other words, when you have cleared the village where the Taliban
may have been present, the stabilisation effort has to be very
close behind the troops to set the right conditions for the whole.
Q378 Bob Stewart: And stay there.
Air Marshal Peach: And stay there,
and deliver that which is sufficient locally to give the people
confidence that you will stay there and follow up. Those would
be our key lessons, and, of course, that masks quite a lot of
integrated planning action between the Task Force and the PRT,
which General Petraeus has often remarked is a model. All of that
flows up the echelons. The final point I offer is the understand
function, which is an amalgam of being there to understand the
tribal dynamics and developing intelligence structures and fusion,
so we can understand the context of where we are.
Q379 Bob Stewart: So going back
to the Secretary of State's key lesson, the key is that we have
to have enough to do it.
Dr Fox: And also to understand
the importance of clear and hold. I think that has been one of
the key things that we have learntclearing territory is
not enough; you have to hold it, or a counter-insurgency strategy
certainly becomes nigh on impossible.
Bob Stewart: I think Caesar understood
that too. When he visited us in 55BC, he realised he didn't have
enough and got out.
Q380 Penny Mordaunt: Just a couple
additional questions on the theme of lessons learnt. Are there
things that our troops were doing well, and the Americans have
taken over and maybe have not learned from our good practice?
To give an example: our understanding is that our troops had developed
a model of working that created a number of small bases and zones,
which enabled them to patrol and to reduce the risk to themselves
and the risk of casualties. The Americans are now covering that
area, and they have reverted to the too large base strategy and,
as a consequence, casualty rates have increased.
Dr Fox: This relates to Sangin.
Air Marshal Peach: I don't wish,
Mr Chairman, to go into comparing and contrasting the US and UK
ways in war. Those differences, as reported, are largely media
reports. In fact, as I think I made clear last time, when we handed
over in Sangin, there was a relief in place between the Royal
Marine Commandosit happened to be themand the US
Marine Corps, and there were reconnaissance visits by the Americans
to the British Forces. It was a very harmonious process. In fact,
many of the Royal Marine Commandos40 Commando, to be precisestayed
on for a few weeks as the Americans arrived. Of course, certain
forces have a different way of developing their tactics, but it
is true that Sangin was a difficult place for us and it remains
a difficult place for the United States. That is the truth of
it, and how they apply their tactics actually on the ground is
very similar to the way that we did.
Q381 Chair: I want to pick up
on one remark there. Those reports are largely media reportspretty
well informed media reports, aren't they? The media are there
to report things and they are facilitated by us and the American
Forces, and they do a valuable job in Afghanistan.
Air Marshal Peach: I hope I didn't
imply that they were not doing a valuable job, but they will not
have had the insights that the tactical commanders have generated
over many weeks or, in some cases, months of understanding the
local terrain. This is what we did, this is what worked, and this
is how we may choose to do it, and so on. So it's a very tactical
activity that can be observed from different perspectives.
Dr Fox: It is also fair to say
that Sangin presented particular difficulties, not only because
there was a very high level of insurgent activity, but because
of its centrality to the drug problem in Afghanistan. So it did,
it does, and it probably will present one of the biggest challenges
that we face anywhere in Afghanistan. I would like to put on record
how well British Forces did and the progress that they achieved.
It was very hard won and the sacrifices were very high, but they
transformed the district's centre. One example of that being the
more than 850 shops trading in Sangin's bazaar, which is more
than twice as many as this time last year.
Chair: I want to pick up speed dramatically,
because I understand that there might be a vote at about 12 minutes
past 4. I think that we might be able to get through the rest
of our questions if everybody is tight and fast.
Dr Fox: Are you looking at me,
Chairman?
Chair: I am looking at us all, including
myself.
Q382 Penny Mordaunt: Just one
final question on the withdrawal from Sangin. What was the withdrawal's
impact on the morale of our troops?
Dr Fox: Our casualty rate clearly
fell as a consequence of that, but to say that that necessarily
meant an improvement in morale would be misleading, because it
might imply that morale was low in our forces in Sangin. In fact,
they understood that they had a difficult task to do and were
applying themselves with huge professionalism. When I previously
visited Sangin I didn't detect a low morale.
Q383 Ms Stuart: If I put the four
components of my questions together and you answer all four, rather
than forgetting about the one you may not like, it may help us
get through in the time that the Chairman wishes.
One is on the shortcomings of equipment, which
we all know about, and the current financial constraints. I would
like to know precisely whether the current Treasury opposition
will affect UORs and, in particular, affect the introduction of
new technologies. The second question is: could you tell us a
little more about the new funding stream known as Urgent Defence
Requirement? The third element again goes back to the Treasury's
asking the MoD to pay back the cost of UORs for Afghanistan. Is
that going to happen for this year and in the future? Finally,
what impact do you think the withdrawal of UOR funding will have
on the efforts in Afghanistan overall?
Dr Fox: The future UORs are not
affected by the current settlement, because the MoD and Treasury
reached an agreement that whatever was required for Afghanistan
in terms of UORs would be met from the Treasury reserve, notwithstanding
the financial difficulties inherited by the Government.
Q384 Ms Stuart: So there is no
payback?
Dr Fox: There is no payback, because
the MoD has not exceeded the expected level for UOR spending that
was previously arranged with the Treasury. In terms of the other
financial flow
Q385 Ms Stuart: Before we move
on to that, how will it affect new technologies that might have
been covered by UORs?
Dr Fox: We have an agreement that
we will still be able to procure what we require in terms of new
technologies, if they are required for the conflict in Afghanistan.
Peter Watkins: On your question
about Urgent Defence Requirements, basically £150 million
has been allocated to that. That sum will be paid back into the
reserve from the defence budget in 2012-13. The point to note
about UDRs is that they are not the same as UORs. These are projects
for which we believe we have a continuing requirement, beyond
the current operations. In effect, therefore, the Treasury is
advancing the resource to us so that we may procure them in a
timely way so that they can be available for Afghanistan, but
then continue in use thereafter.
Q386 Ms Stuart: Is there a limit
on that stream?
Peter Watkins: £150 million.
Dr Fox: These are things that
would have to have been bought anyway, but are of more use to
us if we bring them forward. So it is effectively, if the Treasury
would forgive me for saying it, a kind of interest-free loan from
the Treasury for the sort of thing that doesn't happen very often.
Q387 Mr Havard: I was just wondering
whether you're, therefore, re-badging UORs as UDRs. That's not
what you're saying, but, presumably, some will be, because some
of the new armoured vehicles will be exactly what you described,
won't they? But you applied for them with UORs.
Dr Fox: It is a developing debate,
because, as we move closer to a point at which we will no longer
have combat forces there, it becomes harder to justify in terms
of pure UORs. Clearly we are going to transition into different
funding mechanisms as we go through that. Where we specifically
require something for the conflict in Afghanistan that we would
not otherwise have, that falls under the UORs. That system continues,
because that is something that the Treasury and the MoD had a
very clear agreement about.
Q388 Mr Havard: Is that the Snatch
replacement?
Peter Watkins: That is a UOR,
rather than a UDR.
Q389 Chair: I was almost tempted
to fall into the trap of disobeying my own injunction about not
getting into the SDSR. That is an issue to which we will return
in our next inquiry, which will be on the SDSR. From what you
have said, it sounds as if planning round 12 will be even more
ghastly than planning round 11.
Dr Fox: If such a thing is conceivable.
Chair: Thank you very much indeed. That
was profoundly informative. We got through a lot of material,
and you gave us a lot of detail. We are most grateful.
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