Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. We
wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military
and civilian, who are currently serving or have served in Afghanistan
but, in particular, to those who lost their lives in Afghanistan,
and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as
a result of the conflict there. We also express our deep gratitude
for the vital contribution made by the families of Armed Forces
personnel. We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this
Report, because they are critical of the actions of successive
Governments and their senior military advisers, may be interpreted
as a criticism of the men and women who have served in extremely
hazardous, hostile and difficult conditions. We wish to place
on record that no such criticism is made. The Armed Forces and
civilian personnel in Afghanistan have our full support in tackling
the challenges before them. (Paragraph 1)
2. Communicating with
the UK population about the purpose of any mission involving UK
Armed Forces is crucial. We have found that the Government's descriptions
of the nature of the mission and its importance to UK interests
have varied throughout the campaign, lacking a consistent narrative.
Whist MoD polling data has shown some limited improvement in the
public's understanding of operations in Afghanistan, we have observed
some confusion in the communications on Libya which reminded us
forcefully of earlier stages in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 14)
3. We disagree with
the MoD decision not to give us sight of documents which are now
over five years old. Refusal hinders our Parliamentary scrutiny
of the MoD. (Paragraph 15)
4. In future, we expect
MoD to come to give evidence to the Committee briefed and prepared
to be frank and open about matters where the provision of information
would not put the Armed Forces at risk. (Paragraph 16)
Operations in Helmand in 2006
5. Given
the demanding nature of the situation in Iraq, we do not consider
that the implications of the decision to move UK Armed Forces
into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 were fully thought
through, in particular, the potential risk to UK Armed Forces
personnel. We consider that this criticism applies equally to
the international decision to deploy into the South, in that all
decisions made at such a level inevitably involve tensions and
delay, which contributed in this case to the difficulties subsequently
encountered. (Paragraph 28)
6. Notwithstanding
our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations
such as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not
anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might
stir up a hornets' nest especially as much of the intelligence
was contradictory. We consider that if, because it was essential
to support improved governance in Afghanistan, the deployment
could not have been deferred or delayed until the end of the fighting
season in 2006, senior military advisers should nonetheless have
raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the
conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing should have
drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently
robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. We believe that
such concerns as were raised by the Armed Forces were inadequate
at best, and that they were not raised, as they should have been,
to the very highest levels of Government. (Paragraph 36)
7. Whilst we recognise
that senior military staff have a role in determining the level
of resources needed on specific operations and that this might
mean moderating the demands of commanders in the field, nonetheless,
we are disturbed by the fact that the Secretary of State was being
told that commanders on the ground were content with the support
they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. We
regard it as unacceptable that hard pressed Forces in such a difficult
operation as Helmand should have been denied the necessary support
to carry out the Mission from the outset, and that this shortage
had not been brought to the attention of Ministers. (Paragraph
41)
8. We consider it
to be unlikely that this fundamental change to the operation was
put to Ministers for a decision as to whether to proceed. We cannot
be more certain on this because we have been denied sight of the
relevant minutes (see paragraph 15). As the change put the lives
of Armed Forces personnel at much greater risk, it should surely
have gone to the Cabinet for endorsement. Subsequent to the decision,
the new Secretary of State was told in retrospect but we do not
believe that senior military advisers briefed their Ministers
with sufficient force as to the strategic implications of the
operational change which had already been made. The MoD should
tell us how relevant lessons have been learnt. (Paragraph 55)
9. The significant
transfer of such senior key personnel, both political and military
would increase risks in the administration of the Armed Forces
at any time but, in 2006 at such a crucial stage in both the operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq, it gave rise to unacceptable risks. We
conclude that these risks were realised. We recommend that the
Government should avoid moving so many senior military personnel
at a time when Ministers are being moved as well. (Paragraph 56)
10. What is particularly
worrying is that the much increased requirement for additional
resources and support, in particular for additional troops and
helicopters, was not acted upon quickly enough. Whilst we accept
that it is not possible to prepare and train soldiers quickly
to reinforce those on the ground when circumstances change, we
are, nonetheless, concerned that no strategic reserve had been
trained and prepared in order to be readily available, particularly
as this Mission had been planned for some considerable time. There
should always be a contingency reserve available with the resources
to support it. If it is used, immediate plans to restore it should
be in place. (Paragraph 62)
11. Armed Forces personnel
achieved the best tactical outcomes possible in very difficult
circumstances in no small measure due to the high quality and
training of the troops themselves. But it must be acknowledged
that the force levels deployed throughout 2006, 2007 and 2008
were never going to achieve what was being demanded of the Armed
Forces by the UK, NATO and the Afghan Government. We view it as
unacceptable that UK Forces were deployed in Helmand for three
years, as a result of a failure of military and political coordination,
without the necessary personnel and equipment to succeed in their
Mission. (Paragraph 67)
Military operations since 2009
12. We
welcome the adoption of the counter-insurgency strategy by the
coalition and recognise that, for UK Forces, it was a continuation
of its previously adopted strategy although this had been badly
under-resourced. It seems to us that the two crucial aspects of
the revised strategy are the decision to put the security of the
local population at its core and the acceptance of the need to
hand over responsibility for security to the Afghan Government
and the ANSF. We also recognise that the McChrystal Strategy could
not work without the accompanying surge in troop numbers. (Paragraph
71)
13. We consider that
it is vital that NATO, ISAF and UN Missions and the international
alliance succeed with this latest strategy in both political and
military terms. We note the progress already made and that training
and support arrangements may have to continue for some time after
the withdrawal of combat capability. [See Part 6 for further discussion
on withdrawal and transition arrangements.] (Paragraph 78)
14. We welcome the
introduction of the role of the UK National Contingent Commander
and the "two star" headquarters for Regional Command
South. We also conclude that the command and control arrangements
for operations in Afghanistan in 2006 were deficient. Following
the review of the operational role of PJHQ, we require a clear
description of the revised command and control arrangements for
Afghanistan including the role of the PJHQ and its relationship
with headquarters in theatre. We recognise the importance of having
a readily available and capable "two star" headquarters
for these types of deployments and are concerned about the reduction
in the number of such headquarters following the SDSR. (Paragraph
88)
15. We recommend that
the MoD make greater efforts to reduce breaches of harmony guidelines
for all personnel and take these breaches into account when deciding
which trades and groups of Armed Forces personnel should be subject
to redundancies. (Paragraph 90)
16. The MoD does not
record centrally how many Armed Forces personnel have been on
multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and other operational
theatres. Such information is vital to allow the Armed Forces
to judge the load on individual personnel. We recommend that this
information is collated and should be considered alongside breaches
of harmony guidelines when judging the pressures on the Armed
Forces, and on individuals when deciding on posting. (Paragraph
91)
17. We look forward
to seeing the results of the work being done to improve the effectiveness
of the airbridge. In the meantime, we recommend that the MoD negotiate
with allies to permit the use of their resources to plug any gaps
in the airbridge. (Paragraph 93)
18. We recognise the
importance of close air support and the skill and bravery of those
providing it. We would like confirmation from the MoD that the
Armed Forces in Afghanistan now have access to sufficient and
timely close air support. (Paragraph 95)
19. We are conscious
that our predecessor Committee was told in previous inquiries
that UK Forces have enough helicopters only to discover subsequently
that this was not true. We are not convinced that UK Forces yet
have access to sufficient helicopter hours. We recommend that,
in response to this Report, the MoD set out how the new helicopters
delivered into theatre have impacted on the availability of helicopter
hours, any outstanding delivery of helicopters and how much reliance
and use we are making of helicopters from the USA and other countries.
(Paragraph 97)
20. We recognise that
the Taliban continues to change its tactics and methods and that
the extent of the use of IEDs has changed and developed since
2007. However, we believe that the MoD did not respond quickly
enough to these challenges as they developed. We continue to be
concerned about the time taken to get a suitably capable vehicle
fleet into theatre. Protecting Armed Forces personnel is a critical
duty of the MoD. We recommend, in its response to this Report,
the MoD explains how current equipment levels are providing the
Armed Forces with the necessary protected vehicles, body armour
and counter-IED support. The MoD should prioritise the protection
of personnel when considering the funding of such needs that emerge
in the future. (Paragraph 102)
21. We recognise that
civilian contractors provide valuable support to the MoD. We require
that the MoD should monitor and report on casualties of contractors
working on behalf of the UK Government. (Paragraph 103)
22. It seems to us
that the convention under which all additional costs of operations
should be met from the Treasury reserve has been breached with
the introduction of the concept of 'urgent defence requirements'
and the requirement to pay back expenditure on UORs over the estimate.
We recommend that the classification of UDRs be dropped permanently
and that the MoD be not required to pay back expenditure on equipment
needed on operations. We would like confirmation that all additional
costs for Afghanistan are being met and will continue to be met
from the General Reserve. We seek a similar confirmation for the
costs of the Libya operation. (Paragraph 105)
23. Whilst we recognise
that the MoD cannot calculate accurately the full cost of operations,
we nevertheless ask the MoD to provide us with a broad estimate
of the total costs of operations in Afghanistan. We also ask the
NAO to do a study into the level of costs of Afghanistan. (Paragraph
108)
Training of the Afghan National Security Forces
24. There
have been significant improvements in the training of the ANA
but there is much progress yet to be made before the ANA is ready
to take over responsibility for security in Afghanistan by the
end of 2014. We welcome General Richards' assurance that the aim
of a sustainable ANA is being aggressively pursued but the MoD
must maintain its focus on training the ANA, in qualitative as
well as quantitative terms. (Paragraph 116)
25. There is much
progress yet to be made before the ANP is sufficiently reliable
to take on its share of the responsibility for security by the
end of 2014. The UK should continue to insist that the international
coalition maintain the momentum on training the ANP and, in particular,
on reducing the level of corruption in the ANP. (Paragraph 122)
26. We recognise that
much hard work has gone into the training and partnering with
the ANSF, in particular, in enabling the physical and conceptual
components of fighting power but we remain concerned that the
training and development of what the British Army calls the moral
componentleadership, discipline, culture, ethics and anti-corruptionis
crucial to ensure the long term professional capability of the
ANSF. (Paragraph 125)
27. We are of the
opinion that the ANSF will require significant support after the
transition. We await with interest the assessment of the success
of the transition of the first seven areas, in particular that
of Lashkar Gah. (Paragraph 126)
The impact on the civilian population
28. We
welcome the reduction in the number of civilian casualties caused
by ISAF and ANSF Forces despite the increase in operational tempo.
We recommend that UK Forces maintain their focus on reducing civilian
casualties whether these are caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces or
by the insurgents. We require that the MoD should monitor, or
encourage NATO to monitor, civilian casualties caused by insurgents
as well as those caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces. (Paragraph 130)
29. We recommend that
the MoD ensure that information and influence operations are sufficiently
resourced both in Afghanistan and in future operations. Influence
operations in Afghanistan should make extensive use of the informative
reports commissioned by the US Forces on the Afghan population
in specific areas of the country. If no such reports are available
for relevant areas, UK Armed Forces should commission reports
independently. (Paragraph 133)
30. Generally, polling
data on the views of the Afghan people does not present a coherent
picture over time although some indications are that the local
population are seeing some improvement in security. (Paragraph
134)
31. We recommend that
the MoD put into place proper planning for language skills in
theatre for future operations. (Paragraph 135)
32. We accept that
it would not be possible, even were it desirable, to turn Afghanistan
into the type of modern democracy to be seen in Europe. It would
be preferable and more likely to be successfulto
build on local traditional structures which are accepted by the
people of Afghanistan. These structures are not for ISAF to determine.
(Paragraph 146)
33. We understand
that the relationship between the UK PRT and the US Forces took
some time to bed down and we commend all parties for making this
work. (Paragraph 148)
34. The UK-led Helmand
PRT has been held up as a model of how a PRT can work. We commend
the work of the PRT and the way in which civilian and military
personnel have worked together. We also look to the MoD to continue
to provide the appropriate resources and capabilities in support
of the PRT and to prepare for a smooth transition in transferring
PRT responsibilities to the Afghan authorities. (Paragraph 150)
35. If Afghanistan
is to become a stable and even partially functioning society,
it is vital that women are involved in the process and feel they
have a stake in it. If, as feared, women are largely excluded
from peace negotiations, coupled with the re-engagement of
the Taliban in government, then the progress made so far could
easily unravel. UN Resolution 1325 requires that in all peace
negotiations in regions affected by conflict, women's voices must
be heard to ensure the long-term stability of any negotiated settlement.
Afghanistan is no different. (Paragraph 151)
36. We recognise that
progress in the development of the role of women is important
to the evolution of a democratic state in Afghanistan even if
the form of democracy it takes is one more suited to Afghan traditions
than to Western models. (Paragraph 155)
37. We do not think
that the MoD has taken the needs of women in Afghanistan as seriously
as it should. We recommend that in its response to this Report,
the Government provide a progress report on the number of female
engagement officers currently in Afghanistan and on the development
of relevant pre-deployment training on cultural awareness including
the role of women. We recommend that the MoD takes a more comprehensive
view of the issues relating to women when it develops its training.
(Paragraph 157)
Transition and withdrawal
38. We
are concerned that, as any refocusing of US Forces is planned,
any redeployments should be properly sequenced with UK planning
for the withdrawal of UK Forces in the South of Afghanistan, and
that UK Forces are not left exposed. (Paragraph 168)
39. The Government's
room for manoeuvre regarding the number of troops that could be
withdrawn from Afghanistan as part of an immediate transition
is necessarily limited. The withdrawal of a few hundred troops
in support roles is feasible and would not significantly affect
the combat capability of those remaining. A more significant drawdown,
however, would have to involve a complete battle group. Weakening
any battle group to withdraw numbers would be a dangerous move.
A troop withdrawal that involved numbers in the low thousands,
therefore, would depend on a geographical reorganisation of the
battle groups and the withdrawal from combat duties of at least
one of them. (Paragraph 169)
40. We believe that
the NATO ISAF "conditions-based approach" to withdrawal
is a suitable one. Withdrawal must have due regard to the circumstances
at the time. There are still many challenges facing the ANSF and
Afghan Government before proper transition can take place. (Paragraph
170)
41. While we recognise
that the Government believes that the UK public would like certainty
as to when UK Forces will be out of danger, we also recognise
that some level of uncertainty is inevitable. It is important
that the Government's clear determination to withdraw combat forces
should not undermine the military strategy by causing the Afghan
population to fear that the international coalition might abandon
them or by allowing the Taliban and others to think that all they
have to do is bide their time until ISAF Forces withdraw. (Paragraph
171)
42. We recognise that
much progress has been made towards the development of governance
arrangements but have yet to be convinced that the arrangements
are sufficiently robust, transparent or accountable in terms of
their capacity to take on the full range of responsibilities that
will fall to them after 2014. Added to this is the uncertainty
as to how these governance arrangements will develop following
the end of the second constitutional term of President Karzai.
It is essential that a comprehensive approach is taken to the
transitional arrangements that will need to be put in place leading
up to 2014 and beyond. UK Government Departments other than the
MoD will also have a part to play in helping to build the capacity
necessary to ensure that stability is maintained under Afghan
control. We have seen some evidence of such a comprehensive approach
but feel that more emphasis needs to be placed on capacity building
within the political system if long-term success is to be achieved.
(Paragraph 172)
43. We expect the
Government to set out in a timely fashion, the milestones it expects
to reach and the progress it expects to make against them as 2014
approaches. We will continue to scrutinise closely developments
in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 173)
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