2 Operations in Helmand in 2006
The
decision to move into the South of Afghanistan
17. We attach a timeline of events connected with
operations in Helmand from 2004 to 2007 at the beginning of this
Report.
18. We asked General Fry about the background to
the deployment to Southern Afghanistan in 2006:
On the precise chronology, I cannot give you
exact dates, but to the best of my memory, we first started thinking
about a reinvestment in Afghanistan probably in early 2004. At
that stage, it was very clear that a number of things were happening
in Afghanistan or, more pointedly, not happening. The NATO campaign
looked completely moribund at that stage. It was obvious that
Stage 2, which was the movement into the North and the West, was
taking place, but there was no appetite that it was possible to
discern anywhere in NATO for taking the campaign into the South,
Stage 3, which was then to be followed by Stage 4, which was the
East of the country, [...][17]
19. General Richards said that the decision to go
into Helmand was part of a more important NATO decision fully
supported by Britain:
[...] the decision to go into Helmand was on
the back of a much bigger and more important decision for NATO
to go into the South and East. Britain had been absolutely supportive
of that decision in principle, which, for what it's worth, I thought
at the time was right, because the campaign needed gingering up.[18]
20. General Fry told us why it was of concern that
there appeared to be no appetite in the international coalition
to move into the South:
[...] we had embarked on a campaign in Afghanistan
in the first instance to deny ungoverned space for malevolent
purposes. It seems to us that if NATO was only successful in pursuing
its writ through half of the country, and that part of the country
was almost completely coincidental with the Northern Alliance,
in effect, there was the possibility of creating a semi-autonomous
Pashtunistan, which would be adjacent to Baluchistan and Waziristan
and create a Pashtun belt that not only would be ungoverned, but
in many ways would be more autonomous that it ever had been previously.
Therefore, not to do this would for the alliance, and for us in
purely national terms, be a complete failure of strategic intent.
There was also the fact that if NATO ran out
of fuel [political will] after half a mission, and the easiest,
most benign half of a mission, question marks would be placed
against its efficacy and its future role.[19]
21. We were told by Air Chief Marshal Stirrup and
General Fry that, in 2004 and 2005, the USA was predominantly
focused on the conflict in Iraq and its anti-terrorist operation
in Afghanistan to search for alQaeda (Operation Enduring
Freedom).[20] In particular,
General Fry said:
[...] it seemed to a body of Whitehall opinion
that there was a clear and pressing need to revivify the NATO
campaign in Afghanistan and to try and draw American eyes back
to Afghanistan, which had been fundamentally distracted by events
in Iraq.[21]
22. General Houghton told us:
On the question of whether it was right to go
to Southern Afghanistan at all, that was, in many respects, a
strategic and political level decision, the genesis of which was
within the UNSCR and a discussion at the political level in NATO
to galvanise the nature of both the international community and
NATO, on the international community's behalf, to bring about
strategic change within Afghanistan—in terms of it being
an unsafe place that was host to international terrorism and for
which the delivery of good government and governance was essential.
In terms of going, the genesis of that, from an international
political level, was right.[22]
23. General Fry defended the move into the South
of Afghanistan in 2006:
[...] Had this not happened, there is a chance
that NATO would never have gone into the south of Afghanistan,
with untold consequences for the alliance. We would also have
created, de facto, the very ungoverned space that we went there
in the first instance to deny. What we as a nation achieved during
that period was a very large, bold and imaginative stroke, which
has been lost because of subsequent events.
I would even make one greater claim. I think
that we probably made the Americans think more about counter-insurgency
than counter-terrorism. If you recall, in 2004 and 2005, they
were just beginning to make the intellectual leap from counter-terrorism
into counter-insurgency, which later bore fruit in Iraq. I think
that our insistence on approaching Afghanistan as a counter-insurgency
operation played a role in the general intellectual mindset of
America, with consequential results in Iraq and the possibility
of consequential results in Afghanistan as well. If I sum this
up, I thought it was the right thing then, and I think it was
the right thing now, and I make no apology for having been involved
in it.[23]
24. By the end of 2004, it had been decided that
the UK, Canada and the Netherlands would move into the South
of Afghanistan. Canada wanted to play a dominant role in the move
and wanted its forces to go to Kandahar. The Netherlands took
on Uruzgan.[24] General
Peter Wall told us that the UK taking on Helmand was consistent
with the UK's role in counter-narcotics (held since July 2005).[25]
On 10 February 2005 at NATO, Geoff Hoon, the then Secretary of
State, announced the UK's intention to move forces from the North
to the South of Afghanistan.[26]
25. There have been some suggestions in the media
that the British Army was "spoiling for a fight" and
that it wanted to show what it could do in Helmand. Lord Reid's
view was that this was not true, although once the decision had
been taken to deploy, the Armed Forces, understandably, wanted
to take on tasks commensurate with their abilities.[27]
General Jackson told us that it was not true that the Army was
looking for a new operation as they withdrew from Northern Ireland.[28]
26. We asked if it had been sensible for the UK to
go into Helmand when the Armed Forces were still so heavily engaged
in Iraq. Lord Reid told us that he had been assured by the MoD
that going into Helmand was not dependent upon the withdrawal
from Iraq although there might be pinch points such as logistics
and helicopters.[29]
27. General Houghton expressed doubt as to whether
it had been the right time to go into Helmand:
Was it the right time? That is the only thing
over which I might hesitate because, in terms of strategic decision
making relating to committing at that time, some of it—certainly
from my knowledge in 2005—was based on a realistic but subsequently
optimistic view of what our level of commitment in Iraq would
be by then. In actual fact, the level of reduction in commitment
to Iraq that had been forecast and hoped for in 2005 had not actually
materialised in early 2006, but I sense that there was an irreversibility,
given the political and international level of the decision, and
it was at no detriment to the selection of the most robust force
package.[30]
28. Given the demanding nature of the situation
in Iraq, we do not consider that the implications of the decision
to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early
2006 were fully thought through, in particular, the potential
risk to UK Armed Forces personnel. We consider that this criticism
applies equally to the international decision to deploy into the
South, in that all decisions made at such a level inevitably involve
tensions and delay, which contributed in this case to the difficulties
subsequently encountered.
The objectives of the Mission
29. The UK's objective for Operations in Afghanistan
was to conduct security and stabilisation operations within Helmand
and the wider Regional Command South, jointly with Afghan partners,
other Government Departments and multinational partners. The intention
was to support the Government of Afghanistan in improving governance
and development. The initial objective in 2006 was to establish
a central "lozenge of security" around Lashkar Gah,
Gereshk and Camp Bastion and then move out from there as conditions
permitted. The intent was that UK Forces would gain intelligence
and a cultural understanding of the environment and, by developing
a local envelope of security, would be able to help create the
right environment for governance, build Afghan capacity and create
a capacity for economic growth.[31]
Intelligence
30. We recognise that there are always limitations
to intelligence gathered in complex, unfamiliar areas. In his
Committee's report on the review of intelligence on weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq, Lord Butler set out at length many of
the weaknesses of intelligence and the problems in analysing and
assessing such information.[32]
Lord Reid said that intelligence was always less than comprehensive
and that it was difficult to assess the impact of the presence
of the Armed Forces would have on the enemy.[33]
31. The only military activity on the ground in Helmand
prior to 2006 was the USA counter-terrorist operation —
Operation Enduring Freedom—which focused on the search for
al-Qaeda and attempted not to intimidate or alienate the local
population or the Taliban. And the US Forces acted in what General
Fry described as "a profoundly live and let live" way.[34]
Intelligence from such an operation was limited.
32. General Wall, the then deputy Chief of Joint
Operations, admitted that there had been a failure of intelligence
before the deployment of UK Forces into Helmand:
I absolutely accept that what we found when we
had forces on the ground was starkly different from what we had
anticipated and hoped for. [...] We were ready for an adverse
reaction, but to be fair we did not expect it to be as vehement
as it turned out to be.[35]
33. General
Wall stressed how seriously Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)
had viewed the collection of intelligence especially since this
had been one of the things that had not gone "terribly well
in Iraq". He explained what PJHQ had done to gather sufficient
reliable intelligence including sending in a preliminary operations
team. He said that they had recognised there would be a need to
supplement this information when troops were on the ground. In
short, he said that they had anticipated the Taliban's potential
intent but not their capacity.[36]
34. However, Air Chief Marshal Stirrup told us that,
when planning for Helmand, senior military staff had been aware
that Helmand was a hostile environment and had halted planning
for a time because of this. They had resumed planning when they
came under pressure from NATO:
I can recollect a number of discussions around
the Chiefs of Staff Committee table that essentially were along
these lines—I have used these very words myself, so I can
recollect them well—"We don't know much about the South,
but what we do know is that it's not the North. It's real bandit
country." We had a number of intelligence briefings, of course,
from the Chief of Defence Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence
Staff, but one must remember that the international presence in
the South, particularly in Helmand, had been very thin on the
ground right up until the deployment of British troops. There
were something like 100 members of the US special forces, for
example.
[...] I personally said, "We need to call
a halt to our planning. We cannot possibly deploy UK Forces when
we don't know what the environment is going to be like and we
don't know who will be in the adjoining provinces, so we don't
know what the total picture will look like." We did halt
for a time, but then concern grew within NATO, the Dutch resolved
their difficulties and then at that stage we were seen by NATO
as holding up the whole process. We were asked to step forward
again, which we consequently did.[37]
35. Brigadier Butler, the first Commander of UK Forces
in Helmand, told us that it had been assumed that they would deploy
into a permissive environment which turned out not to be so:
What happened was that there was an assumption—I
had a difficulty with this, [...] that we were just going to deploy
the Force into a permissive environment and when we had reached
full operation capability in July 2006 then we would go out and
start engaging with the people.
As soon as we arrived in those conditions—and
as I have said the Province was already in some form of crisis;
they were certainly ready and waiting—of course they wanted
to engage us. We used to say that there would be a reaction to
our size 12 Boots going into Helmand Province, whether from the
Taliban, from the opiate dealers or from the warlords, because
we were threatening their very existence. We were trying to turn
a failed state into a steady and successful one, which was contrary
to all their aims and objectives. We knew full well, as reasonably
experienced military men, that we were going to have a reaction.[38]
36. Notwithstanding
our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations
such as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not
anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might
stir up a hornets' nest especially as much of the intelligence
was contradictory. We consider that if, because it was essential
to support improved governance in Afghanistan, the deployment
could not have been deferred or delayed until the end of the fighting
season in 2006, senior military advisers should nonetheless have
raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the
conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing should have
drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently
robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. We believe that
such concerns as were raised by the Armed Forces were inadequate
at best, and that they were not raised, as they should have been,
to the very highest levels of Government.
Planning
37. Brigadier Butler told us that that the Mission
was far from clear and straightforward because of the many players
involved and there was a split planning effort; the American plan,
including Operation Enduring Freedom, and planning by the Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps, PJHQ, the MoD, the FCO, DfID and Brigadier
Butler's headquarters plus those of allies.[39]
He also told us that they had not known enough to come up with
a coherent, long-term campaign plan, especially as Helmand was
in turmoil before their arrival.[40]
38. The deployment was originally agreed for three
years with force levels capped at 3,150 troops at an estimated
cost of £808 million.[41]
At the planning stage in 2005, the Armed Forces were being asked
to set in place arrangements for one deliberate operation and
three or four reactive ones a month. Brigadier Butler told us
that he had very strongly contested these force numbers with PJHQ
and others but was told he had to manage within the cap of 3,150.[42]
He contrasted this with 30,000 troops in Helmand in 2011 and the
greater understanding of the environment.[43]
39. Brigadier Butler said that he had also raised
with the MoD shortages of some of the enablers such as helicopters,
force protection, ISTAR and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to
undertake the tasks being asked of him in the early stages of
the deployment.[44] When
asked if there had been enough helicopters and other equipment
when he first deployed to Helmand, he replied:
No, we didn't. [...] Going back to my earlier
point: steady state, one deliberate operation a month and three
or four reactive operations—we could do that within Helmand
itself. Everything else you asked us to do above it, or if the
enemy had a vote, which we knew they would, we were going to be
very short. We knew that we were going to [be]short: by May we
could actually say it for sure, but we were saying it in 2005.
We were some 20% over our hours for support helicopter—Chinooks—we
had six of them. We were already 11% over on our attack helicopter
hours. The C-130s were operating at 92% of their maximum output,
so there was the resultant impact on spare parts, crew fatigue
and everything else. We staffed back in May a requirement for
a 30% uplift on all air and aviation capability. We had the hard
facts by that stage; but we knew them already from our estimate
process beforehand.
We also knew before we deployed that we had something
in the order of a 45%—on average—shortfall of vehicles.
We had already identified that Snatch was not an appropriate vehicle
for the desert. We wanted WMIKs and Pinzgauers, logistical vehicles,
DROPS, container vehicles, equipment support vehicles, the small
Scimitar CVRTs. It was on average a 45% shortfall across the fleet.
That was compounding the manoeuvre problem that we had. All those
things were identified and staffed into PJHQ.[45]
40. This contrasts with the testimony from Lord Reid
on helicopters:
On 13 March 2006, just before we went in in the
April, a letter went to the interlocutor [...] about the forthcoming
deployment to Afghanistan, "I undertook to get back to you
in respect of the three points that you raised. The first one
was helicopters" and I was able to say that "On the
matter of helicopter availability, I am reliably informed that
the commanding officer of the helicopter force is content with
the number of flying hours available to him for the prosecution
of the mission. Of course, in common with existing practices in
Iraq, there will be regular force-level reviews of the Forces
in Afghanistan, and this may lead to adjustments to the size and
nature of the forces deployed."[46]
41. Whilst we recognise that senior military staff
have a role in determining the level of resources needed on specific
operations and that this might mean moderating the demands of
commanders in the field, nonetheless, we are disturbed by the
fact that the Secretary of State was being told that commanders
on the ground were content with the support they were being given
in Helmand when clearly they were not. We regard it as
unacceptable that hard pressed Forces in such a difficult operation
as Helmand should have been denied the necessary support to carry
out the Mission from the outset, and that this shortage had not
been brought to the attention of Ministers.
42. Lord Reid told us that he delayed the deployment
into Helmand until three specific conditions had been fulfilled
but then he had come under pressure not to hold the deployment
up:
First, any troop configuration that the Chiefs
decided was necessary for the mission had to be met and financed
in full by the Treasury. Secondly, the external troop configuration
that NATO said was necessary for us, including Canadians to the
east and the Dutch to the north in Uruzgan, was met. That wasn't
the case by the time of our proposed entry, by the way, in September.
That is why I delayed through September, October, November and
December, until the Dutch finally agreed that they would go into
Uruzgan, before we deployed. During that period, I was under immense
pressure—sometimes indirectly—from some people in
the military, [...] that I was holding up the preparations and
asking why wasn't I going in. [...]
The third thing was that we had sufficient resources
from DFID so that we did not have a situation that had developed
sometimes in Iraq where we did not have the capacity and resources
for what Rob [Fry] has called nation-building, by getting DFID
to redeploy its money towards our strategic objectives.
So those three conditions were laid down at my
first meeting, and we did not go in until they were met. On the
third one, we had a long series of meetings in the Cabinet Office
under an Afghanistan group to try to focus the DFID effort, because
I am afraid my view of DFID throughout that period was that it
was sometimes pursuing objectives which, however worthy they were
in themselves, did not always accord with the rest of the British
foreign policy, including where we were putting our military emphasis.[47]
These conditions were finally met in early 2006.[48]
Challenges faced by the initial
deployment
43. General Houghton pointed out that a number of
factors came together to make the situation particularly difficult
in the early months:
- Poppy eradication—the fear of locals that
their livelihoods would be taken away, which was fuelled by Taliban
propaganda;
- Some of the 200,000 casual labourers who migrated
from Pakistan for the poppy harvest had stayed behind as guns
for hire;
- In preparation for the arrival of UK Forces,
the Americans had conducted a number of kinetic operations culminating
in Operation Mountain Thrust which had stirred up the local population;
and
- The removal of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada as Governor
and his replacement by Governor Daoud had destabilised the tribal
balance and the balance of power within northern Helmand.[49]
44. Brigadier Butler told us that he had barely enough
troops to do the tasks required of them at the start of the deployment.[50]
He also told us that the necessary delay, whilst waiting for the
Dutch to deploy, had meant UK Forces deployed nearer the fighting
season and that the initial operational capability (late April
2006), when deployed, struggled to cope. The Taliban and drug
lords were waiting to engage with UK Forces as they arrived.[51]
The UK Forces were not at full operational capability until July
2006.[52] Governor Daoud
was frustrated by the late arrival of UK Forces and by the dawning
reality that he was not getting 3,000 "warriors" but
rather 600 paratroopers—the actual number of fighting troops
—with all the support elements.[53]
The move to north Helmand and
the development of the 'Platoon Houses Strategy'
45. General Fry said that the key question about
the events of 2006 was how did UK Forces get from the original
plan to provide security in a small area to "fighting for
their lives no less than two months later in a series of Alamos
in the north of the province".[54]
46. It is clear from the evidence we received that,
once in theatre, UK Forces came under pressure from Governor Daoud
and President Karzai to provide security in a wider geographical
area. We fully recognise the pressures on Brigadier Butler to
support development of governance and to win what the MoD described
as the totemic battle of the flagpoles—preventing Government
flags from being replaced by those of the Taliban.[55]
Brigadier Butler told us that Governor Daoud had said:
"We need you to support governance. We
need you to protect us. You need to give us the freedom of movement.
You must support me to be allowed to go round my own constituency.
If I can't do that, why are you here?" [...] "If the
black flag of Mullah Omar flies over any of the district centres,
you may as well go home because we'll have lost our authority
to govern in Helmand, and if we lose our authority to govern and
our ability to govern, then that will threaten the south. Kandahar
will be next. We'll lose the south before you've even started.
What are you going to do about it?"[56]
47. Lord Reid said that, prior to the original deployment,
the MoD had considered that any demands placed on UK Forces to
move further or faster than planned should be resisted. He also
believed that the move into the north of Helmand had come about
as the result of an operational decision which had changed the
strategic nature of the Mission:
Just prior to me leaving the MoD, I recall being
briefed that, while Permanent Joint Headquarters regarded Governor
Daoud, the Governor of Helmand Province, as an honest man, he
needed to be strongly discouraged from making gestures—for
example, the idea of a forward operating base at Sangin—that
were unsustainable. Not long after this, I left the MoD for the
Home Office. You can imagine that when, five weeks later, sitting
in the Home Office, I heard that we were fighting for our lives
in Sangin, I could not entirely understand it.
I understand from inquiries that I made then
and subsequently that the matter was not referred to the Secretary
of State for Defence who succeeded me. It was never brought to
his attention, except in retrospect. Undoubtedly, in my view,
it was an operational decision which may or may not have been
right. Let us assume that the commanders on the spot got it right;
but it was an operational decision that changed the strategic
nature of the mission, and when you change the nature of a mission,
there is an obligation to change all sorts of things such as the
force configuration, the resources and so on.[57]
48. General Richards said that the move to the north
of Helmand was not a change of mission but a change of tactics.[58]
But General Wall said that UK Forces had ended up in a situation
that turned out to be strategically very different from the one
that was anticipated.[59]
49. There has been some speculation in the press
and elsewhere that Brigadier Butler and the other commanders on
the ground made the decision to deploy out from the security lozenge
in isolation from those above them in the command chain, thereby
changing the nature of the operation. Brigadier Butler told us
that General Wall, his immediate superior, was with him during
one of the key meetings with Governor Daoud. He also told us that
he wrote daily reports and weekly assessments and conducted video
conferences with General Houghton, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)
and with his deputy General Wall.[60]
General Wall told us that he was on a programmed visit to Helmand
at that time:
[...] I was on a programmed visit to Lashkar
Gah at the point when this crisis started to unfold. The timing
of it was driven because the Taliban had the district centres
in Northern Helmand under pressure. On Governor Daoud's perception,
particularly bearing in mind his lack of tribal influence, [...]
that he was not able to pull this off with behind-the-scenes politicking.[61]
Brigadier Butler also commented:
[...] in terms of the command and control arrangements
in theatre we had the Helmand Executive Group and the Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gah. They were privy to all these
discussions. They were represented at the same meeting with myself,
Colonel Knaggs, Tom Tugendhat, who was Governor Daoud's adviser,
Department for International Development representatives and Foreign
Office representatives. We had the same representation at Kandahar,
but the Southern Afghanistan Group was not really established
at that stage. It spent more of its time in Helmand. We had the
Kabul Steering Group, chaired by the Ambassador, with cross-Government
representation. We then had the Afghan Steering Group in London.
And we had weekly tele-conferences with London.[62]
50. General Houghton agreed that this was not a decision
taken by Brigadier Butler alone. Both he and General Wall recognised
the considerable pressure coming from Governor Daoud and President
Karzai to support the local government and governance. They also
thought that failure to support Governor Daoud would have resulted
in "a political failure and significant credibility problems
in terms of the UK initiative in the South".[63]
51. Lord Browne, former Secretary of State, said
that a tactical decision was made to deploy forces beyond the
lozenge. He told us that he was briefed about this retrospectively
and informed by those in command that, in military terms, this
was an operational decision.[64]
Lord Reid said that no decision had been taken to move into north
Helmand while he was Secretary of State:
[...] Just prior to me leaving the MoD, I recall
being briefed that, while Permanent Joint Headquarters regarded
Governor Daoud, the Governor of Helmand Province, as an honest
man, he needed to be strongly discouraged from making gestures—for
example, the idea of a forward operating base at Sangin—that
were unsustainable.[65]
He left the office of Secretary of State for Defence
just three days after he was briefed as above.[66]
52. Air Chief Marshal Stirrup, on the other hand,
said that he thought that Lord Reid would have been involved in
the discussions on the move to the north of Helmand although in
his role as CDS, he had only overlapped with Lord Reid for a matter
of days.[67] Air Chief
Marshal Stirrup went out to visit UK Forces in Afghanistan on
his appointment, approximately three weeks before the move North
occurred and so held discussions with key players including Brigadier
Butler.[68]
53. General Houghton told us, from his rereading
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes, that Brigadier Butler
had briefed the Chiefs of Staff on 24 May 2006 on the platoon
house concept[69]. He
had also noted in the minutes of 3 May that there might be a requirement
for an earlier than planned and more significant deployment to
the north of Helmand to support the governance of Governor Daoud.
The actual moves to the north of Helmand took place in late May—on
26 to 27 May to Sangin and 28 May to Musa Qala and Now Zad—although
there had been a presence in these areas and some fighting in
the build up period.[70]
54. General Houghton told us that, at that stage,
it was proposed to do that move for only one month to see if the
new disposition would work. It was subsequently decided to remain
in Sangin but to leave Musa Qala and Now Zad.[71]
We are not clear that the decision to deploy for only one month
was briefed to ministers, even though it seems very important.
55. Whilst the top level objective of the Mission
might not have changed, the operation clearly changed radically
with the move into the north of Helmand. It appears to us that
this radical change was not referred back to the Secretary of
State or the Cabinet for endorsement until after the move into
the north of Helmand, including deployments into Sangin and Musa
Qala, had happened. We consider it to be unlikely that this
fundamental change to the operation was put to Ministers for a
decision as to whether to proceed. We cannot be more certain on
this because we have been denied sight of the relevant minutes
(see paragraph 15). As the change put the lives of Armed Forces
personnel at much greater risk, it should surely have gone to
the Cabinet for endorsement. Subsequent to the decision, the new
Secretary of State was told in retrospect but we do not believe
that senior military advisers briefed their Ministers with sufficient
force as to the strategic implications of the operational change
which had already been made. The MoD should tell us how relevant
lessons have been learnt.
Turnover of key personnel
56. In 2006, there was a significant changeover of
senior staff in the Armed Forces and in the ministerial team.
John Reid was replaced by Des Browne as the Secretary of State
in early May 2006. The Chief of Defence Staff changed from General
Walker to Air Chief Marshal Stirrup in April 2006. General Houghton
replaced Air Marshal Torpy as Chief of Joint Operations in March
2006. All these changes took place within a few weeks when much
of the attention and most of the resources were focused on Iraq.
The significant transfer of such senior key personnel, both
political and military would increase risks in the administration
of the Armed Forces at any time but, in 2006 at such a crucial
stage in both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it gave
rise to unacceptable risks. We conclude that these risks were
realised. We recommend that the Government should avoid moving
so many senior military personnel at a time when Ministers are
being moved as well.
Increased troop numbers and further
support
57. The UK increased the number of troops by 1,300
in Autumn 2006, several months after the initial deployment to
the north of Helmand, when the second brigade was deployed. Lord
Browne told us that, retrospectively, it was clear that there
were still not enough troops.[72]
General Fry said any change in the deployment would result in
different resource and equipment needs:
[...] We were completely dislocated geographically
from where we went in, thereby placing a hugely greater emphasis
not only on the fighting power of the troops but on the requirements
for things such as protective mobility, autonomous logistics and
aviation. You can only fight in as many places as you have the
ability to extract your casualties from.[73]
58. Lord Reid said:
[...] Let us assume that the commanders on the
spot got it right; but it was an operational decision that changed
the strategic nature of the mission, and when you change the nature
of a mission, there is an obligation to change all sorts of things
such as the force configuration, the resources and so on.[74]
59. In describing the deployment to the north of
Helmand in the middle of 2006, Air Chief Marshal Stirrup told
us that the majority of the force became fixed and the issue became
resupplying it rather than manoeuvring it and limitations on support
helicopters and protected mobility restricted the options available
to the commander on the ground.[75]
60. General Wall said that he saw the original
force size of 3,150 as a constraint and the Armed Forces did not
have resources such as combat units or enabling activity standing
by capable of deploying to Afghanistan.[76]
He also told us that it would not have been easy to find extra
troops who could be deployed quickly or additional equipment:
[...] it was not easy for us to find a net theatre-ready
uplift instantaneously. I cannot remember the airlift situation,
but it probably would not have been easy to get it there either,
in an acclimatised and suitably trained way. [...] On enablers,
however, which were the critical drivers here—as Ed Butler
has told you—this was going to be incremental. Not quite
a game of inches, but incremental. It was not about more airframes;
it was about more hours. It was about more spares, more fluid
ammunition supply, and logistics and that sort of stuff.[77]
61. General Houghton said that he had discussed
the necessity for additional resources with the Chiefs of Staff
on 31 May 2006:
At the following meeting, on 31 May, I was able
to report that the platoon house concept was bedding down well.
There had been a good local reaction to it. I think at that time
I raised the first concern. The Chiefs had previously persuaded
themselves that this would probably be resource-neutral. I said,
"No, if this is to be sustained over time, it will put additional
pressure on our logistics and sustainability in manpower terms."
That was reinforced a week later—on 7 June—when I
said, "Yes, and there's a helicopter dimension to this."
At that stage, it was proposed to do it for only one month, due
to the initial political concern that Engineer Daoud's governorship
would be undermined [...]there was a sensible conversation that
the nature of the platoon house concept would be resource-intensive.
To the tactical commander and to me—and I think to David
[General Richards], with whom we were having conversations off—the
bigger concern was that it would come to a situation where too
great a percentage of the force was fixed in place, rather than
being able to manoeuvre. The narrative and dialogue of whether
we were over-fixed and needed to manoeuvre more played out during
the summer and informed various troop uplifts.[78]
62. What is particularly worrying is that the
much increased requirement for additional resources and support,
in particular for additional troops and helicopters, was not acted
upon quickly enough. Whilst we accept that it is not possible
to prepare and train soldiers quickly to reinforce those on the
ground when circumstances change, we are, nonetheless, concerned
that no strategic reserve had been trained and prepared in order
to be readily available, particularly as this Mission had been
planned for some considerable time. There should always be a contingency
reserve available with the resources to support it. If it is used,
immediate plans to restore it should be in place.
Continuation of the Mission to
2009
63. The UK Armed Forces have made valiant efforts
to provide security in Helmand and have worked closely with civilian
colleagues to secure improvements in the area and have had some
measure of success in operations such as Operation Moshtarak[79].
Professor Farrell described his analysis of the planning and conduct
of Operation Moshtarak and reported on its success in winning
local support for the operation and defeating the local Taliban
insurgency.[80]
64. Forces in Helmand were able to clear certain
areas, such as Musa Qala and Now Zad, but did not have sufficient
forces to hold them. However, had UK Forces not been able to clear
these areas, the situation in Helmand could have been much worse.
As General Wall said:
We could be having an even more difficult conversation
about this had our soldiers not stepped up to the plate and delivered
in a situation that turned out to be strategically very different
from the one that was anticipated.[81]
65. When asked, Air Chief Marshal Stirrup agreed
that without overwhelming force in such circumstances, there were
likely to be more casualties. He also agreed that there had needed
to be an immediate assessment of the resources devoted to the
operation.[82]
66. General Messenger told us that when he was commanding
in Helmand in the six months to April 2009, he had insufficient
resources:
I came back in April '09 [...] At the time, insufficient
resources were being allocated to the challenge in Southern Afghanistan.
I commanded a brigade, alongside an Afghan brigade commander,
that was stretched and not able to go to certain key areas where
we knew we would ultimately have to go to secure the population.
What has happened since has been an enormous inflow, principally
American but also from other NATO nations, and a huge upsurge
in the number of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police
who are in the line providing that security.[83]
67. It is clear that the situation in Helmand did
not develop as envisaged. Armed Forces personnel achieved the
best tactical outcomes possible in very difficult circumstances
in no small measure due to the high quality and training of the
troops themselves. But it must be acknowledged that the force
levels deployed throughout 2006, 2007 and 2008 were never going
to achieve what was being demanded of the Armed Forces by the
UK, NATO and the Afghan Government. We view it as unacceptable
that UK Forces were deployed in Helmand for three years, as a
result of a failure of military and political coordination,
without the necessary personnel and equipment to succeed in their
Mission.
17 Q 397 Back
18
Q 670 Back
19
Q 397 Back
20
Qq 398, 462, 599, 604 Back
21
Q 398 Back
22
Q 670 Back
23
Q 462 Back
24
Qq 408-409, 670 Back
25
Q 670 Back
26
Q 401 Back
27
Q 409 Back
28
Qq 409, 537 Back
29
Qq 445, 450 Back
30
Q 670 Back
31
Qq 415, 479, 611, 672 Back
32
Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence
on Weapons of Mass Destruction , 14 July 2004, HC 898 Back
33
Q 440 Back
34
Q 401 Back
35
Q 672 Back
36
Ibid. Back
37
Q 599 Back
38
Q 481 Back
39
Qq 473-4 Back
40
Q 477 Back
41
Ibid. Back
42
Q 490 Back
43
Qq 491-2 Back
44
Qq 493-3 Back
45
Q 493 Back
46
Q 456 Back
47
Q 408 Back
48
Q 412 Back
49
Q 674 Back
50
Q 490 Back
51
Q 481 Back
52
Q 497 Back
53
Ibid. Back
54
Q 415 Back
55
Q 676 Back
56
Q 497 Back
57
Q 415 Back
58
Q 676 Back
59
Q 684 Back
60
Q 497 Back
61
Q 676 Back
62
Q 497 Back
63
Q 676 Back
64
Q 582 Back
65
Q 415 Back
66
Qq 415, 421 Back
67
Qq 641-6 Back
68
Q 642 Back
69
Platoon house concept is the defence by the Armed Forces of small
isolated and fortified bases Back
70
Q 676 Back
71
Q 678 Back
72
Q 581 Back
73
Q 415 Back
7 74 4
Q 415 Back
75
Q 636 Back
76
Q 684 Back
77
Q 683 Back
78
Q 677 Back
79
Operation Moshtarak was a three phase regional operation to provide
security in central Helmand and Kandahar and to enable freedom
of movement on main routes. Phase 2 began in February 2010 and
was planned and conducted by the ANSF in partnership with ISAF. Back
80
Q 71 Back
81
Q 684 Back
82
Qq 637, 649 Back
83
Q 6 Back
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