3 Military operations since 2009 |
68. In June 2009, General McChrystal, the then US
Commander of ISAF in Afghanistan proposed a new counter-insurgency
NATO's International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable
by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced
and executed through an integrated civilian-military counter-insurgency
campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides
them with a secure environment.
To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve
the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize
resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain
the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment
to see it through to success. Finally we must redefine the nature
of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of
time, and change our operational culture.
69. President Obama approved the strategy and the
deployment of more troops in November 2009. The revised counter-insurgency
strategy subsequently approved by NATO emphasises security of
the local population and the ultimate need to hand over responsibility
for security to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). To deliver
the strategy, troop numbers were increased by 30,000 US personnel
and 10,000 personnel from other members of the coalition (including
500 from the UK), bringing the total ISAF force to some 150,000
by the end of 2010. In June 2010, General Petraeus replaced General
McChrystal as Commander of ISAF Forces but continued to pursue
his predecessor's strategy. He will be replaced as Commander by
General Allen in July 2011.
70. The strategy was formally adopted by Afghanistan
and the coalition at the Lisbon summit in November 2009.
71. We welcome the adoption of the counter-insurgency
strategy by the coalition and recognise that, for UK Forces, it
was a continuation of its previously adopted strategy although
this had been badly under-resourced. It seems to us that the two
crucial aspects of the revised strategy are the decision to put
the security of the local population at its core and the acceptance
of the need to hand over responsibility for security to the Afghan
Government and the ANSF. We also recognise that the McChrystal
Strategy could not work without the accompanying surge in troop
72. Air Marshal Peach told us in November 2010 that
the UK Forces had the correct force levels and that they were
working closely with the ANSF:
We have the correct force levels now in terms
of what we call force density for the tasks that we are undertaking
in central Helmand in three key districts, where the force level,
[...] is around 9,500. Those tasks have evolved since 2006, when
it was an initial deployment. As that deployment has developed,
so has the geography. There has been a steady increase in the
number of troops deployed; there has been a steady increase in
the understanding of where we are and what the local conditions
are; and there has been a steady increase in force density to
understand what we need in that counter-insurgency for that part
of Afghanistan. That assessment varies by district; it is quite
different across the whole of Afghanistan.
We can honestly say that we have the force density
for the tasks that we now need, [...] The task is now increasingly
to bring this partnershipthis integrationof not
just civil and military effect, but of leadership of the Afghans.
That has grown from mentoring at unit level, through support at
battalion level, to support at brigade level in the past year.
There has been a steady process of evolution since the Afghan
Forces started to be developed a few years ago. I am very confident
of that assessment. Of course, situations change, and the situation
could change again in future, and we must be cognisant of that.
73. General Richards told us:
Have we learned the lessons of 2006? Force ratios?
We had 3,000-odd in 2006, today it is just under 11,000, as the
Secretary of State for Defence recently said in Parliament. Britain
has the best force ratios in Afghanistan at the momentindeed,
we are the envy of the Americans, which is worth reminding ourselves
of as they increasingly have a very difficult challenge in the
east of the country.
74. General Parker told us that the UK Forces had
the right number of troops but needed the ANSF to complement UK
Yes. From an ISAF perspective, the South has
just about got it right, but we mustn't be complacent. The effective
growth of the ANSF is critical to start to complement what we
have. As far as the British are concerned, exactly the same philosophy
applies: we must continue to grow an effective ANSF. I could not
commend highly enough the Afghan National Police training organisation
in Helmand. These are really important to continue to put as much
high-quality Afghans among our people as we can.
75. The USA, as part of the surge, has 30,000 troops
in Helmand and some improvements are starting to materialise.
But, as all admit, ISAF still faces huge challenges. General Petraeus,
Commander ISAF, has stated that they have got the inputs right
but that challenges still remain.
In March 2011, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), ISAF
Regional Command (South West) and the Regional Platform (South
West) of the US Mission to Afghanistan jointly prepared a report
entitled the Helmand Annual Review 2010. The report stated that
Challenges remain, and the situation is still
fragile. With ISAF and ANSF working together, security forces
have sufficient numbers and capabilities to prevent the insurgents
from destabilising the central Helmand districts, but a small
number of insurgents can exercise a disproportionate influence
on the public through intimidation and assassination.
76. General McChrystal and others have made it clear
that the military surge has to be accompanied by a political surge.
We have not taken evidence on the political and diplomatic work
in Afghanistan and in the surrounding region but we recognise
the intimate relationship between the political and military parts
of the strategy.
77. General Richards told us he was optimistic that
the conditions were right for success in Afghanistan although
he stressed the need for political engagement:
The enemythe Talibanwill continue
to attack. The question is how we respond to it and increasingly
can the ANSF shoulder the burden? So far, things are looking good,
although I am sure there will be setbacks during the year.
I know we are often charged with being overoptimistic.
What we have always said is that if you resource the operation
properly, then you have a chance of succeeding. We can only set
the conditions for other actors, but particularly in the political
sphere, and I personally have been banging on about the need for
strong political engagement for yearswe have all known
this. But it will not be until September, October, November, after
this full year of the surge on the back of a pretty active winter
campaign, that we will really be able to see whether it is beginning
to come good. All the indicators as we sit here seem to be positive,
but we are the first to be cautious and not to want to fall in
the trap of over-optimism.
78. We consider that it is vital that NATO, ISAF
and UN Missions and the international alliance succeed with this
latest strategy in both political and military terms. We note
the progress already made and that training and support arrangements
may have to continue for some time after the withdrawal of combat
capability. [See Part 6 for further discussion on withdrawal and
Command and control arrangements
in an international coalition
79. There are significant complexities involved in
working in an international coalition, especially one of 47 countries
who provide varying numbers of troops within a NATO chain of command.
The role of NATO is crucial in Afghanistan. Whilst the USA is
effectively the lead nation in the coalition as it supplies the
most troops and the most military assets, the contribution of
other nations is fundamental to success both politically and militarily.
When asked about how such a large coalition works, General Parker
said the following:
It is important to recognise that in military
terms the US is effectively the lead nation. Therefore, automatically,
there is a deferral to them, because they bring the greatest amount
to the operation. Having said that, because the military culture
is pretty consistent across all those nations, people fit into
that well. Provided they believe that they are reasonably represented,
there is no great challenge in the military sense in managing
the Coalition. However, it is something that one has to work on
all the time.
Working on behalf of both General McChrystal
and General Petraeus, I have found that getting nations to reflect
their grand strategic policy inside the theatre-strategic decision-making
process was quite difficult. I would hold fortnightly meetingsI
chose towith the senior national representative of the
eight principal nations, and it was sometimes difficult to get
a dialogue going with them over things where we needed to understand
what their capitals were thinking in order to be able to shape
the military theatre decision making. It works much better than
it might appear, because there is a lead nation. There are eight
principal nations that we need to corral, but that is hard work
and we need to do it better.
80. Professor King told us that there had been an
incoherence and lack of power in the centralised NATO command
from 2006 to 2009.
General McChrystal's introduction of an ISAF Joint Command in
2009, to give greater clarity to the command and control arrangements,
allowed him to tell people what to do rather than to ask and co-ordinate
forces. General Parker
also told us that the introduction of the ISAF Joint Command had
been an important development:
On the system, he introduced the NATO Training
Mission in Afghanistan, [...] and importantly the ISAF Joint Command.
He broke the theatre strategic and operational levels apart to
give greater clarity to the command and control that was necessary.
That was manifested in a much more directive command. He told
the people what to do and where to do it. He elected to undermine
the insurgency in the South. His predecessors had only ever been
able to co-ordinate and ask. That was absolutely nailed by the
introduction of additional forces [...] that gave General McChrystal
the opportunity and the ability to operate in a more aggressive
and forceful way in those areas where he wished to do so. That
was when he started to undermine the insurgency in the South.
81. Professor Farrell told us there had inevitably
been tension between the US Marines and the UK Forces in Helmand
but these had been resolved by the Commander of Regional Command
South West. General
Richards told us that UK military relations with the USA were
central to success in Afghanistan and were excellent although
he had had some concerns about their relationships with the US
Marines in Helmand, which have now been resolved:
US relations are excellent. You have three officers
here among many in the British Armed Forces who have been engaged
in sustained military operations for 10 years. I know Dave Petraeus,
Bill Caldwell and Jim Mattis. They are all friends of ours, so,
at the very highest level, relations could not be closer. I and
CGS had General Mattis in our offices yesterday, and General Rodriguez,
who is the IJC Commander, is a very good friend of ours, too.
At the lower, tactical level, the US Marines
have been outstanding in the way that they, first of all, went
into Helmand alongside us, and now are running that regional command.
The relationship between our forces and theirs, which we were
a bit worried about at one stage, because we were not certain
about it, is also outstanding, so I have absolutely no worries
about our relationship. Indeed, it is very important to us to
preserve that relationship as a strategic requirement, because
its strength is central to our ongoing success.
Command and control arrangements
for UK Forces in Afghanistan and the role of the Permanent Joint
82. General Parker was sent to Afghanistan as the
UK National Contingent Commander and the deputy Commander of ISAF
in September 2009. General Parker said that the post of UK National
Contingent Commander had been created to achieve a greater understanding
of the critical nature of influence in Kabul. But he had not been
given sufficient resources to do the job as actively as he would
My professional opinion is that we do not yet
understand the theatre-strategic level clearly enough in the British
Armed Forces. There needs to be a greater understanding of the
importance of the decision making that takes place, in this case
in Kabul. The linkages between Kabul and the grand strategic or
military strategic decision making in London need to be clearer
and better understood. I believe that that was a reflection of
why I was sent out as the National Contingent Commander, although
I don't believe I was given sufficient resource to do the job
as actively as I needed to. There is a need for greater understanding
of the critical nature of pulling levers in Kabul because you
can pull as many levers as you like in Helmand, but it won't make
any difference to the way that the campaign is being run by the
big command level. That is very important.
83. When asked about how the UK chain of command
works, General Parker said that he believed that there was a role
for PJHQ to deploy, sustain and recover forces but not a command
relationshipcommand should rest in Afghanistan:
I was not in a position to deploy, sustain and
recover a very complicated British Force. There is no way that
that could have been done effectively in Kabul. In my current
job, where I am generating the land element of this force, I need
to feed it through an organisation that can consolidate it, can
ensure that what is being done is correct, and then deploy it
and sustain it effectively. I firmly believe that there is a role
for the Permanent Joint Headquarters to deploy, sustain and recover,
and it needs to understand what's going on, but I think we should
look carefully at its true pure command relationship because it
cannot influence decisions that are made inside the Coalition
84. Air Marshal Peach, Chief of Joint Operations
at PJHQ explained that operational control is now delegated forward
Operational control of the force is delegated
forward to Afghanistan, so command in that sense is exercised
in Afghanistan through the national contingent. That is held,
[...] by a British three-star general forward in Kabul, who is
also double-hatted as the deputy commander of the international
force. Operational command sets the conditions and enables command.
85. General Parker said that he felt that the UK
Armed Forces misunderstood the importance of hierarchy and the
need for clarity in the chain of command:
My professional observation is that we misunderstand
the importance of hierarchy. I am concerned that we may have allowed
brigadiers to make decisions that are beyond their capacity or
capability. I feel very strongly that, when we operate in a coalition
environment, we must still make sure that there is a hierarchy
of wisdom within the UK commitment that ensures that the right
decisions are made. We did not have such clarity at the two-star
level in the chain of command during our early days in Afghanistan.
[...] I think that it is very important that we support the perspective
that allows us to make really difficult military judgments about
capability and tasks.
86. Professors Farrell and King both reported that
the introduction of a "two star" command of Regional
Command South, in the person of General Carter, had improved the
command of operations in Helmand:
Professor Farrell The point [...] of my
previous study, "Appraising Moshtarak", was that we
tend to lose sight of the fact that we deployed a proper divisional
headquarters for 6 Division in RC South. RC South was then the
centre of the whole campaign, it was the main effort. We had,
for the first time, a proper divisional headquarters running the
campaign. There is clear evidence [...] of command leadership
going down into Task Forces. So you invariably had tension between
the Marine Task Forces and Task Force Helmand, the British Task
Force, over who would do what and who would get which resources.
For the first time, instead of the Task Force commanders sorting
that out between them, you would have General Nick Carter, who
was the superior commander, coming down to say, "No, that
is what's going to happen."
Professor King There was an incoherence,
a lack of power, in the centralised NATO command from 2006 to
2009. The centralisation of power into the regional commands has
been extremely important. For a clear example of that, compare
Operation Panther's Claw last summer with Operation Moshtarak.
Overwhelmingly, the Helmand [...] is operating
in accordance with the overarching campaign plan that really General
Carter developed, and predominantly autonomously.
87. In our inquiry into the Strategic Defence and
Security Review, we asked General Wall about the provision of
"two star" headquarters following the cuts in the SDSR,
he told us
We would certainly be able to do one at a relatively
high readiness. Generating a second to take over from it will,
in future, require a bit more warning than was required in the
88. We welcome the introduction of the role of
the UK National Contingent Commander and the "two star"
headquarters for Regional Command South. We also conclude that
the command and control arrangements for operations in Afghanistan
in 2006 were deficient. Following the review of the operational
role of PJHQ, we require a clear description of the revised command
and control arrangements for Afghanistan including the role of
the PJHQ and its relationship with headquarters in theatre. We
recognise the importance of having a readily available and capable
"two star" headquarters for these types of deployments
and are concerned about the reduction in the number of such headquarters
following the SDSR.
Armed Forces personnel
89. The Armed Forces have been involved in the two
major theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan since the early 2000s.
They have been operating above the previously determined Defence
Planning Assumptions for much of that time. This has necessarily
put pressure on Armed Forces personnel. Harmony guidelines
have been breached significantly for many years. We recognise
that the percentage of personnel for whom harmony guidelines have
been breached has been falling since the withdrawal from Iraq,
however, such guidelines are still being breached for some pinch
point trades. And with operations in Libya, pressure will again
mount on Armed Forces personnel.
The numbers of personnel for whom harmony guidelines are being
broken (as at October 2010) are six per cent for the Army; three
per cent for the Royal Air Force and one per cent for the Royal
Navy and the Royal Marines. These average percentages are still
high in most Services and the levels for some pinch point trades
are considerably higher.
90. We recommend that the MoD make greater efforts
to reduce breaches of harmony guidelines for all personnel and
take these breaches into account when deciding which trades and
groups of Armed Forces personnel should be subject to redundancies.
91. The MoD does not record centrally how many
Armed Forces personnel have been on multiple deployments to Afghanistan
and Iraq and other operational theatres. Such information is vital
to allow the Armed Forces to judge the load on individual personnel.
We recommend that this information is collated and should be considered
alongside breaches of harmony guidelines when judging the pressures
on the Armed Forces, and on individuals when deciding on posting.
92. Transporting troops back to the UK, for mid-tour
leave and at the end of their tour, is very important. The role
of the airbridge is also critical in deploying the force and providing
equipment and supplies. The MoD recognises that there have been
problems with the effectiveness of the airbridge. Air Marshal
Peach said that the MoD took the return of troops to the UK very
seriously. During the volcano ash cloud in 2010 it had, for example,
deployed ships to get troops back and few people had been delayed.
93. General Capewell told us that the performance
of the airbridge had improved but there was still a gap caused
by shortage of aircraft:
[...] The joint commander has just conducted
a major relief in place between two brigades [...] In broad terms,
if the judgment of whether this airbridge is successful is the
achievement of the transfer of military authority at the right
time and the right place, that mission was a success.
In so far as the downstream replacement of VC10
and increasingly obsolete Hercules aircraft, there is SDSR work
in place now to address the spending round requirements to look
at that gap. Some of that gap is to do with the delivery from
commercial contracts of new aircraft, which can be solved by spending.
Some of that gap is to do with the retrofitting of theatre-entry
standard defensive aids suites, which I am not prepared to go
into. Some of that gap is simply to do with the management of
the fleet across the national requirement, so it is being looked
We look forward to seeing the results of the work
being done to improve the effectiveness of the airbridge. In the
meantime, we recommend that the MoD negotiate with allies to permit
the use of their resources to plug any gaps in the airbridge.
Support for operations
Close air support
94. Close air support in Helmand is being delivered
in an integrated approach from the Royal Air Force, the Army Air
Corps and the Fleet Air Arm, with the US Marine Corps. Air Marshal
Peach told us that the UK's contribution could be singled out
for its accuracy and precision and is being used with discernment
in line with the policy on courageous restraint:
Close Air Support by aeroplanes and Close Air
Support by aviation helicopters are complementary. The Close Air
Support delivered by the Apache helicopter in an integrated fashion
with the US Marine Corpswith their own helicopter gunshipsis
important, as is air. The UK air contribution is delivered by
the Tornado. The Tornado has a range of options of weapons; [...]
the Close Air Support delivered by Tornado has been singled out
a number of times for its accuracy and discretion. I mean discretion
in the sense of being able to discern what is going on on the
ground before lethal force is applied. I know both of those statements
would be supported by NATO commanders.
[...] So, it is a team effort; it gets better
all the time; and it is applied with discernment, not only in
the sense of rules of engagement, but in the sense of understanding
what is going on on the ground before lethal force is applied.
In other words, there is courageous restraint being applied from
the air to the ground. I think the UK's contribution can be compared
to any in that regard.
95. We recognise the importance of close air support
and the skill and bravery of those providing it. We would like
confirmation from the MoD that the Armed Forces in Afghanistan
now have access to sufficient and timely close air support.
96. Helicopters are a critical component of operations
in Afghanistan. General Capewell told us that the UK Forces had
sufficient helicopters in Afghanistan, in particular, with the
delivery of further Chinook helicopters:
If you spoke to any commander today on the ground
they would say the same as I am about to say. There are sufficient
aviation assets across the whole range of helicopter requirements
to deliver the mission.
97. The MoD told us that since November 2006, it
has doubled the number of battlefield helicopters and increased
the number of helicopter flying hours by 140 per cent (October
2010) - achieved through an increase in the number of aircraft
and improved logistic support. Further helicopters have since
been delivered to theatre.
We are conscious that our predecessor Committee was told in
previous inquiries that UK Forces have enough helicopters only
to discover subsequently that this was not true. We are not convinced
that UK Forces yet have access to sufficient helicopter hours.
We recommend that, in response to this Report, the MoD set out
how the new helicopters delivered into theatre have impacted on
the availability of helicopter hours, any outstanding delivery
of helicopters and how much reliance and use we are making of
helicopters from the USA and other countries.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET
ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE
98. Our predecessor Committee has raised concerns
about the availability of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability. When we asked
General Capewell about the availability of ISTAR he told us that
the MoD was making substantial efforts to ensure that the ISTAR
requirement was properly resourced and that the networks required
to handle the increase in information and intelligence were also
increasing. He also said that the intelligence architecture was
properly centralised and controlled by the Americans as its capacity
and technology was substantially greater than the sum of the other
nations. He also told us that bandwidth was increasing but that
it was never possible to have enough bandwidth.
General Parker said that bandwidth had been an issue up to 2009:
There have been some remarkable advances. In
2009, when I came in, it was poor. I think we have shown a capacity
to increase our bandwidth, thank goodness, which allows us to
operate in a much more effective way. Fusing information in order
to stay on top of it is critical. I believe that the culture of
communication in my part of the Armed Forces is wrong. We have
to take a very different approach to communication [...] and it
is in that culture and that attitude, the willingness to use the
sorts of technology that are available to allow us to communicate
today, that we have to change the way we do our business.
99. The tactics and equipment required in any campaign
are to some extent dictated by the methods of the enemy. General
Jackson explained that the Taliban had moved from direct fighting
to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which had changed
the need for equipment:
[...] If you recall, in the first two summers
the Taliban took us on, basically using fire and manoeuvresmall
arms, basicallyand each and every time, they were defeated
tactically. We can discuss whether any operational-level progress
had been made, but they were defeated tactically. It took them
rather longer, looking back, than one might have expected, but
they obviously thought very hard, particularly after the second
summer, 2007, and said, "We're not going to get anywhere
taking on the British soldiers at what they do best; ergo we will
find another way." That brings us to the IED. That changes
priorities on our side. Armoured vehicles suddenly go right up
in terms of priority, because that is the way you protect the
force. As I've already touched on, the dispersion put a greater
premium on helicopters. Tactics and equipment will vary according
to the operational circumstances. One has to respond. Ideally,
you need to be one foot ahead, but that's not always possible.
100. General Capewell told us that the IED had become
the weapon of choice for insurgents and terrorists globally and
that the UK took the threat very seriously:
[...] I think it is also fair to say that it's
only in the last four or five years that we have institutionalised
an approach to this internationally. I can give you an example:
there is a counter-IED Task Force in NATO now. Each nation has
a counter-IED Task Force. It is institutionalised across NATO
and, particularly in the US and the UK, we have very regular sharing
of expertise and technological exchange, which deals with this
not only in a technological sense, but in an upstream threat sensethe
intelligence required to deliver against thisas well as
the defensive techniques required in theatre.
The Prime Minister announced £67 million
in June  for the counter-IED piece. £40 million of
that has gone to EOD teams and the Mastiff vehicles. £11
million has gone to remote control vehicles and some of the residue
has gone to military working dogs.
101. We were told by the MoD that the Warthog, a
tracked armoured vehicle which is better protected, was delivered
into Afghanistan in 2011. The Warthog replaced the less capable
Viking which had less capacity.
102. We recognise that the Taliban continues to
change its tactics and methods and that the extent of the use
of IEDs has changed and developed since 2007. However, we believe
that the MoD did not respond quickly enough to these challenges
as they developed. We continue to be concerned about the time
taken to get a suitably capable vehicle fleet into theatre. Protecting
Armed Forces personnel is a critical duty of the MoD. We recommend,
in its response to this Report, the MoD explains how current equipment
levels are providing the Armed Forces with the necessary protected
vehicles, body armour and counter-IED support. The MoD should
prioritise the protection of personnel when considering the funding
of such needs that emerge in the future.
103. The MoD told us that contractors provide valuable
support to the Armed Forces on operations and that they have shown
impressive resilience. Despite the reliance on contractors, the
MoD does not collate figures on contractor injuries or fatalities.
We recognise that civilian contractors provide valuable support
to the MoD. We require that the MoD should monitor and report
on casualties of contractors working on behalf of the UK Government.
Funding and costs of operations
104. Conventionally, the financing of the additional
costs of operations, including urgent operational requirements
(UORs), has always been met by the Treasury from the General Reserve.
In 2009-10, the MoD and the Treasury agreed that any expenditure
above the estimate for UORs predicted before the start of the
financial year would have to be repaid to the Treasury two years
later. The MoD did not overspend in 2009-10 and so need not repay
any money in 2011-12.
105. In 2010-11, the MoD and the Treasury defined
a new concept - urgent defence requirements (UDRs). The MoD told
us that UDRs were requirements which met most of the UOR criteria
but were not theatre specific and will have an enduring utility
to Defence. It also told us there were no plans to extend the
arrangements for UDRs into 2011-12. For 2010-11, the Treasury
provided the MoD with £150 million for UDRs which it will
have to repay in full in 2012-13. To date, the MoD has approved
£53 million to be spent on upgrading Chinook helicopters,
improving information and communications services and procuring
additional surveillance and target acquisition equipment.
It seems to us that the convention under which all additional
costs of operations should be met from the Treasury reserve has
been breached with the introduction of the concept of 'urgent
defence requirements' and the requirement to pay back expenditure
on UORs over the estimate. We recommend that the classification
of UDRs be dropped permanently and that the MoD be not required
to pay back expenditure on equipment needed on operations. We
would like confirmation that all additional costs for Afghanistan
are being met and will continue to be met from the General Reserve.
We seek a similar confirmation for the costs of the Libya operation.
FINANCIAL COST OF OPERATIONS IN
106. The MoD does not know the full financial cost
of operations in Afghanistan. The additional costs of operations
in Afghanistan such as required equipment, allowances and fuel
are met from the Treasury Reserve. Other costs such as salaries
and training are met from the MoD's budget.
107. Expenditure on additional costs by year from
the start of operations in 2001-02 to 2009-10 are set out in the
table below. The MoD estimates that a further £4,436 million
was spent in 2010-11 of which £1,496 million were capital
costs. This brings the total estimated additional costs of operations
in Afghanistan to 31 March 2011 to some £14 billion.
Table: Additional costs of Afghanistan since 2001-02
Source: MoD memorandum
108. The MoD does not collate financial information
by activity and, therefore, cannot accurately calculate the full
costs of operations. However, we do not accept that it is not
possible for the MoD to estimate the full costs of operations
in Afghanistan. Whilst we recognise that the MoD cannot calculate
accurately the full cost of operations, we nevertheless ask the
MoD to provide us with a broad estimate of the total costs of
operations in Afghanistan. We also ask the NAO to do a study into
the level of costs of Afghanistan.
84 General McChrystal: Commander's Initial Assessment,
30 August 2009, www.media.washingtonpost.com Back
NATO Lisbon Summit declaration 2009 Back
Q 164 Back
Force ratio is the ratio of troop numbers to population Back
Q 694 Back
Q 257 Back
General Petraeus' talks to RUSI 23 March 2011 and 15 October 2010,
Helmand Annual Review 2010, www.mod.uk/aboutdefence/corporatepublications Back
Q 699 Back
Q 236 Back
Q 94 Back
Q 229 Back
Q 239 Back
Q 93 Back
Q 694 Back
Q 240 Back
Q 240 Back
Q 137 Back
Q 261 Back
Q 93 Back
Q 94 Back
Oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee on 11 May 2011,
HC 761-iii, Q 238 Back
Harmony guidelines are the MoD's desired maximum time that Armed
Forces personnel should spend away from home on operational deployment
within a given timeframe. The definition is different for each
Qq 173-174 Back
Ev 198-199 Back
Q 198 Back
Qq 197-198 Back
Q 195 Back
Qq 184-187 Back
Ev 183 Back
Q 202 Back
Q 270 Back
Q 536 Back
Q 181 Back
Ev 200 Back
Ev 200 Back
Ev 206 Back
Ev 179 Back
Ev 179 Back