5 The impact on the civilian population
Civilian
casualties
127. Air Marshal Peach and Karen Pierce both stressed
how seriously the UK take any civilian casualties caused by the
international coalition.[143]
The number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF Forces has decreased
by 30 per cent from 2009 to 2010. The number of civilian casualties
linked to anti-government forces increased by 53 per cent from
2009 to 2010. Insurgents were responsible for some 76 per cent
of all civilian casualties. Overall, the number of civilian casualties
has increased overall by 31 per cent due to the actions of insurgents.[144]
128. General Messenger said that some of the reduction
in civilian casualties caused by ISAF resulted from greater rigour
when using air-delivered weapons, including greater scrutiny and
oversight.[145] Lindy
Cameron said that, in Helmand, Governor Mangal had very much welcomed
General McChrystal's increased focus on preventing civilian casualties.[146]
129. For the civilian population, any increase in
civilian casualties, even caused by insurgents, undermines the
confidence of the local population in the Afghan Government and
NATO as they feel security is poor and the ANSF and ISAF are failing
them. Colonel Langton pointed out that Afghans regard all civilian
casualties, even those caused by the Taliban, as a failure of
the international coalition:
General McChrystal's declared aim of protecting
the population, which is what he said, was welcomed by everybody.
As General Messenger said, he put in place some fairly stringent
rules of engagement—cutting down on the air power being
used and so on. The trouble is that, in Afghanistan, a casualty
caused by somebody in a foreign uniform, which includes the Afghan
National Army, is 10 times worse than a suicide bomber from the
Taliban, who actually gets some credibility because he is a martyr.
Also, the Taliban are very quick to apologise when they get it
wrong. That was brought out in a web message at the time of one
particular disaster—I think it was in Kunduz—when
civilians were killed by the Taliban's own action. Basically,
the message, as I understand it implied, "You can see that
McChrystal's strategy is failing because he isn't protecting the
population." The message wasn't so crude as to say, "We
are still killing them," but you get my message. Civilian
casualties resonate in a much deeper way in Afghanistan, perhaps,
than in many other conflicts with which we may all be familiar.[147]
130. We welcome the reduction in the number of
civilian casualties caused by ISAF and ANSF Forces despite the
increase in operational tempo. We recommend that UK Forces maintain
their focus on reducing civilian casualties whether these are
caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces or by the insurgents. We require
that the MoD should monitor, or encourage NATO to monitor, civilian
casualties caused by insurgents as well as those caused by ISAF
or ANSF Forces.
Strategic Communications
131. The UK Armed Forces have yet to incorporate
fully strategic communications and "information and influence"
operations into their campaigns, although they have recognised
that communication with the local population is crucial. The Armed
Forces' understanding of the Afghan people has improved but could
still be better. The MoD provided us with some good examples of
detailed analyses of elements of the Afghan population (commissioned
by the USA) providing a rich contextual understanding of people
in particular areas.[148]
We were also impressed by examples of how, as when Brigadier Mackay
commanded the UK Forces in Helmand, the Armed Forces could work
more extensively with the Arab media. Commander Tatham told us:
I think they [Taliban] had a very successful
period between 2006 and 2008, when they were very proactive with
the media. They had embeds from Muslim and Arab TV stations. They
improved their web presence. There was a whole host of other measures
that saw their message resonating more widely than it had before.
However, looking back on that now, it was probably a bit of a
blip. I don't think their message has much resonance in the international
community at all. We're well aware of the inaccuracy and, to be
honest, the downright lies that go into many of their press releases,
certainly about Coalition casualties. But it's important to distinguish
between those who support and those who sympathise, and there
is undoubtedly sympathy, particularly in the Muslim world, for
some of the aspirations of the Taliban, if not their methods.
I think it's finely balanced. I think we are much more persuasive
in our information campaign in the international community, but
we have a cunning adversary who may yet bounce back.[149]
132. Commander Tatham told us that as yet the
Armed Forces did not have a written doctrine for information and
influence operations or the right training to support such operations
although it was being looked at in the MoD.[150]
133. We recommend that the MoD ensure that information
and influence operations are sufficiently resourced both in Afghanistan
and in future operations. Influence operations in Afghanistan
should make extensive use of the informative reports commissioned
by the US Forces on the Afghan population in specific areas of
the country. If no such reports are available for relevant areas,
UK Armed Forces should commission reports independently.
134. Anecdotal evidence and some polling data suggest
that most Afghan people, in areas of high insecurity, want, as
priorities, safety for themselves and their families and the ability
to go about their normal lives. Over time, polling data has shown
varying levels of confidence in security and the acceptance of
international forces in Afghanistan with no consistent trends.[151]
Witnesses reported that the Afghan people did not trust the international
coalition and were worried that the international community might
abandon them, leaving them at the mercy of the Taliban. General
Messenger said that more than 70 per cent of the population in
Helmand were in areas where there was an improving security situation.[152]
Generally, polling data on the views of the Afghan people does
not present a coherent picture over time although some indications
are that the local population are seeing some improvement in security.
135. In trying to work closely with the local population,
it is important for military personnel to be able to communicate
directly with people rather than through an interpreter. This
places a great deal of importance on acquiring the right language
skills quickly.[153]
We recommend that the MoD put into place proper planning for
language skills in theatre for future operations.
The work of the Provincial Reconstruction
Team
Governance and justice
136. The Secretary of State said that improving governance
was one of the three main challenges facing the coalition and
the Government in Afghanistan. Governance was starting to improve
at both the national and local levels. Part of the problem was
a shortage of educated, capable Afghans.[154]
In some ways the coalition contributed to this shortage by employing
many of the competent Afghans and paying them higher wages. The
Secretary of State said that the coalition needed to work with
the Afghan Government to provide three supportive pillars:
- a working judiciary and a concept of law which
applies to the governing as well as the governed;
- economic liberty within a free market;
- a concept of rights.[155]
137. During our visit to Afghanistan, we were told
that areas where civil justice had been weak or corrupt, the Afghan
people turned to the Taliban to resolve disputes. The Secretary
of State said that the rule of law was important as was getting
the local population to use official sources for dispute resolution:
The importance of that process lies in denying
the social space, if we might call it that, to the Taliban, because
many people, especially in the South, were turning to the Taliban
for simple dispute resolution and it was that role that was giving
legitimacy to the Taliban. The 2010 Asia Foundation survey showed
that 42% of people were now turning to the shura for resolution
and 31% were taking disputes to local government institutions,
such as the district authorities, which was certainly a change,
because we know that those institutions were not there before.
We were still seeing some 27% of people going to senior tribal
figures. So there is definitely a shift going on.
However, I think that the important point is
that there are alternatives to dispute resolution through the
Taliban. That is the key and I am not sure that it really matters
which of these methods has a relative position in the league,
if you like. However, the fact is that we are squeezing the Taliban
out and denying them the legitimacy and the space in which to
operate.[156]
138. The MoD does not know how many Afghan people
are now using the formal law sector rather than that of the Taliban
because it had only recently started to track these sectors.[157]
Peter Watkins told us it was also important to build up the informal
sector as well:
[...] If you look at surveys, such as the recent
Asia Foundation survey, the majority of Afghans—40%—when
they have a dispute or whatever, take it to a local shura; they
don't take it through the formal process. So we are trying to
strengthen both of them. [...] The informal sector is very important
as well and arguably more important and so the Provincial Reconstruction
Team is helping to develop community councils and four community
councils have now been set up.[158]
139. We asked General Richards about what the mass
break-out from Kandahar prison in May 2011 said about the ability
of the ANSF to secure prisons. He told us that the audacious break-in
and break-out did not mean that the Afghan Government was useless
and incapable. He said the Afghan Government had reassured the
UK that lessons had been learned and that it would not happen
again.[159]
140. Lindy Cameron, the former head of the PRT, told
us that both security and governance in Helmand had improved:
[...] significantly improved for the better.
When Governor Mangal arrived, there were district governors in
six of the 14 districts of Helmand. There are now district governors
in 12. There are four district community councils. If you look
at Nad-e-Ali as a case study, participation in governance has
gone up significantly. People now engage with the district community
council and the district governor in a way that is a significant
change even from when I arrived last July for my recce visit.
I remember sitting in Nad-e-Ali for a security shura, listening
to gunfire on the perimeter that was being held. I contrast that
with walking into the district governor's office now, looking
at the row of offices where there are staff from various Government
Ministries in a way [...] the like of which it had not seen in
any other district in Afghanistan, let alone in Helmand. I think
we've really helped Governor Mangal achieve the kind of district
government and district community councils that have shown a significant
improvement in governance in the last couple of years.[160]
141. We were told in Afghanistan that it was important
to assist the Afghan Government to develop a functioning non-corrupt
democratic system adapted to local conditions. On elections, General
Messenger told us that the Parliamentary elections had been better
than the previous Presidential ones:
[...] On the elections, there was a lot of negative
reporting of the Presidential Elections last year, and we had
the Parliamentary Elections most recently. Going back to your
previous point, I am not saying that those were entirely without
mishap and incident, but the elections and the process itself
were planned and delivered by the Afghans. The security was planned
and delivered by the Afghans, with the international community
completely on the back seat ready to deploy should it be required,
but it was not. Despite their best intentions, the Taliban were
unable to influence the elections to any degree. [...] there were
a greater number of incidents on the day of the elections, but
they took place some distance away from the polling, and were
unable to affect the conduct of the elections on the day. I am
not saying that it was a perfectly delivered democratic event,
but the view on the ground, of the Afghans, the international
forces there and the independent international observers, was
that there were positive things that came out of it and considerable
grounds for optimism.[161]
142. Professor Farrell thought that corruption and
criminal networks were still an important issue for ISAF:
The second issue is corruption and criminal networks.
This is now a major theme for ISAF under General Petraeus. Corruption
has been referred to by the other speakers, both political corruption
at the national, provincial and district levels, and economic
corruption, which is endemic in that part of the world—Pakistan
is full of it. There is an issue there about how much corruption
we can accept and how much is normal for a functioning system,
as opposed to how much is actually causing Afghanistan to grind
to a halt economically and politically. Criminal networks will
be the big theme for ISAF's new military plan. [...] The big focus
going forward is on criminal networks and the challenges that
that is going to present in protecting the population.[162]
143. Professor King said that any plans to tackle
corruption had to be realistic and in line with the Afghan culture:
I emphasise strongly that the regime we should
realistically be looking at in Afghanistan is one that may not
be particularly palatable to us in the West, namely, a patrimony,
in which kin and tribal relations determine appointments and people
use their offices of state as benefices. However, if the right
people are appointed and take responsibility for their areas,
there is nothing wrong with patrimonies. They can be stable. [...]
We need to be very clear about what we mean by corruption and
how that informs our planning and operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan
has always been a patrimonial society, and the patrimony that
has been established there is substantially a response to our
interventions and to the 30-year war. There is a level of activity
within the nascent political regime that is emerging that is certainly
corrupt by our standards, but it is seen as legitimate and proper
by Afghans. There is another form of corruption that is certainly
not seen as legitimate by local Afghans, [...]such as the political
appropriation of certain kinds of offices and the appropriation
of land. There are massive disputes and discontent about land
ownership around Kandahar, where certain power brokers have just
seized land by fiat.
Of course, that leads to questions of economic
corruption, and this is where we need to be extremely careful,
namely in the area of narcotics. We immediately associate narcotics
with corruption, and there is undoubtedly an association between
the Taliban and the insurgency and the narcotics industry. It
is part of the nexus of that insurgency. However, the figures
that we were working on down in Regional Command South for this
year show that about 80% of the GDP of the South is based on narcotics.
It is not an illegal, corrupt form of economic activity, ultimately,
at that level; it is just economic activity. The point is that
corruption affects us as westerners very severely, and in some
cases it distorts what we are trying to achieve there.[163]
144. Karen Pierce told us that warlords had held
sway over many districts in Afghanistan for a long time and that
it would take a long time for corruption to fall although some
improvements were starting to be seen.[164]
145. In his statement in Kabul on 5 July 2011, the
UK Prime Minister said:
We're not here to create a perfect democracy,
we're not here to create a perfect country, but we are doing great
things here in Afghanistan in terms of their country, their schooling
and everything else. We're really here to try to make sure that
their country can look after its own security and keep terrorists
and terrorist training camps out of this country.[165]
146. We accept that it would not be possible,
even were it desirable, to turn Afghanistan into the type of modern
democracy to be seen in Europe. It would be preferable —and
more likely to be successful—to build on local traditional
structures which are accepted by the people of Afghanistan. These
structures are not for ISAF to determine.
RELATIONSHIP OF THE UK PRT WITH
US AND UK FORCES
147. Lindy Cameron told us that the working relationship
between the military and civilian personnel was working well:
I have to say that it is extraordinary. I have
never seen civilian-military co-operation work this well. I think
that we've really got to a place where we've got the funding,
staffing and the personal relationships right. I felt very supported
by the whole range of Government Departments back here in Whitehall
in my role inside the PRT, and equally by the military and civilians.
We've evolved that relationship, so we have essentially gone from
being a PRT that partners only a single British brigade to being
a PRT that partners a divisional-level regional command led by
General Mills. In a sense, the scale of the challenge has increased,
but I think we've managed to maintain those excellent relationships.
Fundamentally, if you look at how Operation Moshtarak played out,
for example, I think that my military colleagues [...] felt that
they were able to rely on a PRT that was able to both plan and
deliver the civilian side of that operation very effectively.[166]
148. With the arrival of the US Marine Corps headquarters
with its civilian side in 2010, it has been necessary to develop
how civilians and the military work together. Lindy Cameron told
us that it had been a challenge not being collocated with the
military headquarters. She also told us that it had taken six
months for them to arrive at a system that was operating well.[167]
The civilian-military relationship is focused on supporting the
Afghan Government.[168]
We understand that the relationship between the UK PRT and
the US Forces took some time to bed down and we commend all parties
for making this work.
149. Lindy Cameron said that the PRT had sufficient
resources and capabilities. During Operation Moshtarak, it was
supplied with extra resources on request. It also had access to
international funds and the US provided significant Commander
Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds and USAID money for work
in Helmand.[169]
150. The UK-led Helmand PRT has been held up as
a model of how a PRT can work. We commend the work of the PRT
and the way in which civilian and military personnel have worked
together. We also look to the MoD to continue to provide the appropriate
resources and capabilities in support of the PRT and to prepare
for a smooth transition in transferring PRT responsibilities to
the Afghan authorities.
The role of women in Afghan society
151. We recognise that Afghanistan is a culturally
conservative country and that Helmand is even more so. There have
been some minor improvements in the role and status of women in
some parts of Afghan society since the fall of the Taliban, due
in part to the involvement and resources of the international
community. Nevertheless, significant problems remain, particularly
in the fields of health, education, employment, security and access
to justice. If Afghanistan is to become a stable and even partially
functioning society, it is vital that women are involved in the
process and feel they have a stake in it. If, as feared, women
are largely excluded from peace negotiations, coupled with the
re-engagement of the Taliban in government, then the progress
made so far could easily unravel. UN Resolution 1325 requires
that in all peace negotiations in regions affected by conflict,
women's voices must be heard to ensure the long-term stability
of any negotiated settlement. Afghanistan is no different.
152. We were told that, within Helmand, the role
women play in Lashkar Gah is different from that in Musa Qala
which is much more conservative and a rural district. Lindy Cameron
told us that improvement in security was a key thing for women
much like everyone. She also told us that there had been a significant
improvement from Taliban times. She illustrated this with the
example on a meeting for international women's day last year when
600 women gathered together in the provincial council building.
She also told us that in terms of governance women were participating:
two MPs, two provincial councillors; and five councillors on the
community council in Gereshk.[170]
153. Karen Pierce, the UK Special Representative
to Afghanistan and Pakistan, told us that there was still a long
way to go but that the women's voice was getting stronger. We
were told that, at the May 2010 peace jirga, a high proportion
of the provincial delegates were women. Initially there were tensions
between the women and the mullahs which started to dissipate by
the second day.[171]
154. The MoD wrote to us illustrating some of the
ways in which life for women had changed in Afghanistan:
- In 2010-11, 5.7 million children were attending
school regularly of whom 2.1 million were girls. 46 per cent of
girls of primary school age are enrolled in school but this is
still far behind the average of 83 per cent for South Asia.
- A quarter of the seats in the national assembly
are held by women - 68 of 249 seats are reserved for women in
the Lower House and 23 out of 103 in the Upper House and one women
won an unreserved seat in the Lower House in 2010.
- A quarter of births are supervised by skilled
birth attendants, up from 13 per cent in 2005. There has been
an increase in the availability of antenatal care but the maternal
mortality rate at 1,400 per 100,000 live births in 2008 is the
highest in the world.[172]
155. However, other reports suggest that the role
of women is not being developed satisfactorily. We have heard
of some worrying examples such the Afghan Government taking over
the running of domestic violence shelters. We recognise that
progress in the development of the role of women is important
to the evolution of a democratic state in Afghanistan even if
the form of democracy it takes is one more suited to Afghan traditions
than to Western models.
156. In October 2010, the Government issued a revised
national action plan for the implementation of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325) covering the subject
of Women Peace and Security. The Plan incorporates commitments
to improve the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in three main areas
of activity:
National action
- Gender considerations will be incorporated into
training on conflict in the FCO, DFID, the Stabilisation Unit
and the MoD;
- Programmes to address conflict will consider
the needs of women and girls;
- Gender considerations will be incorporated into
core working practices on operations, for example, the deployment
of female engagement officers in support of UK Forces, to improve
military engagement with Afghan women;
On Afghanistan
- Actions to support Afghan women's civil society
organisations, the influence of Afghan women in public life and
to enhance their protection through support to legal reforms and
other programmes;
Multilateral action
- To provide political support through the UN Security
Council;
- To provide political support for measures to
incorporate UNSCR 1325 into the political and operational activities
of the EU and NATO.
157. The MoD reports that, whilst Armed Forces personnel
do not currently get training on UNSCR 1325, pre-deployment preparation
does include training on the law of armed conflict which covers
such aspects as the status of protected persons including women
and children. The MoD is currently developing training in line
with the commitments given in the national action plan on UNSCR
1352 described above.[173]
We do not think that the MoD has taken the needs of women in
Afghanistan as seriously as it should. We recommend that in its
response to this Report, the Government provide a progress report
on the number of female engagement officers currently in Afghanistan
and on the development of relevant pre-deployment training on
cultural awareness including the role of women. We recommend that
the MoD takes a more comprehensive view of the issues relating
to women when it develops its training.
143 Q 152 Back
144
UNAMA Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
2010,unama.unmissions.org Back
145
Q 43 Back
146
Q 151 Back
147
Q 44 Back
148
Q 50 Back
149
Q 34 Back
150
Q 61 Back
151
BBC/ABC/ARD polling data June 2011, www.bbc.co.uk Back
152
Q 49 Back
153
Q 58 Back
154
Q 309 Back
155
Q 314 Back
156
Q 317 Back
157
Q 317 Back
158
Q 314 Back
159
Q 698 Back
160
Q 118 Back
161
Q 52 Back
162
Q 67 Back
163
Q 68 Back
164
Qq 141-142 Back
165
Prime Minister's statement on Afghanistan 5 July 2011, www.Number10.gov.uk Back
166
Q 122 Back
167
Q 132 Back
168
Q 129 Back
169
Qq 125-126 Back
170
Qq 119-121 Back
171
Q 148 Back
172
Ev 197 Back
173
UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace
and Security, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=211370682 Back
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