Operations in Afghanistan - Defence Committee Contents


Supplementary written evidence from the Ministry of Defence

MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons Defence Committee 10 November evidence session:

Q.141—The Committee requested sight of the studies, referred to by witnesses, covering the reaction of the Afghan people to corruption in Afghanistan

The poll referred to was the Asia Foundation Survey, a copy of which can be found on the internet at the address below:

http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2010-poll.php

The study referred to was an independent study on "Testing the Hypothesis of Radicalisation in Afghanistan", conducted by the NGO Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU). A copy of the study report is available on request from CPAU (who own the copyright) via their website listed below, the Committee should note that this is a sensitive report.

www.cpau.org.af

Q.143—The witnesses informed the Committee that the UK tends to follow OECD standards on corruption. Further information on this is given below:

When interacting with other States, the UK is bound by the definitions, standards and obligations set out in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The most recent reports on progress on implementation can be found at the following website:

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html

The UK is also a member of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption and has ratified the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The latest progress report can be found at the following website:

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/3.%20What%20is%20GRECO_en.asp

In addition, under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the UK is committed to take effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection with international business transactions. Further information can be found at the following website:

http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_34859_44583772_1_1_1_1,00.html

Q.147—Following a series of questions on corruption in Afghanistan, the Committee requested the budget and expenditure of programme funding for 09/10 and 10/11 with anti-corruption expenditure separately identified

The total amount of programme funding for Afghanistan available for financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 is:

2009-10
Conflict Pool£68 million
Strategic Programme Fund£20.4 million
Other (Counter Terrorism / Migration / Bilateral Programme Budget) £4.8 million

2010-11
Conflict Pool (of which £10 million is an uplift for DFID for infrastructure) £78.5 million
Strategic Programme Fund £19 million
Other (Counter Terrorism / Migration / Bilateral Programme Budget) £7.7 million

There are a number of projects focused on "anti-corruption" and expenditure in FY 2009-10 was £1,190,700 and in 2010-11 £2,908,000.

Q.148—The witnesses offered to write to the Committee with figures on how life has changed for women in Afghanistan. This information is given below:

The number of children attending school regularly increased by 400,000 from 2009-10 to 2010-11. In 2010-11 5.7 million children were attending school regularly and 2.1 million of them were girls.

The latest figures show 42% of primary school age girls are enrolled in school,[3] but this is still far behind the 83% in South Asia.[4]

A remarkable surge in literacy is seen for younger age groups (those educated since the fall of the Taliban): more than one in three girls aged 12-16 are able to read and write (37% ) compared to just one in ten women in their mid 20s (10%). The youth (aged 15-24) literacy gender gap is gradually closing as the ratio of literate women to men is increasing; latest figures (2007-08) show the ratio to be almost 1:2 females to males (45%) compared to just over 1:3 (37%) in 2005 (37%).[5] For children around the age of 12, progress is even more evident: the ratio of literate girls to boys in the 12-14 age group is 63%, reflecting the increase in girls being schooled in recent years.[6]

A quarter of seats (26%) in the national assembly are held by women - better than India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 68 out of 249 seats are reserved for women in the Lower House and 23 out of 102 seats in the Upper House.[7] In the 2010 Parliamentary elections, for the first time, a female candidate won an unreserved seat outright in Nimruz province taking the total number of female MPs in the lower house to 69.

A quarter of births in Afghanistan (24%) are now supervised by skilled birth attendants—an increase on the 2005 figure of less than one in six (13%).[8] Today there are more than four times as many trained midwives as in 2002 (467 in 2002 rising to 2,200 in 2009).[9] The latest figures show that today more than one in three pregnant women (37%) receive antenatal care in Afghanistan[10] compared to only 16% in 2003.[11] Despite this, Afghanistan's maternal mortality rate- at 1,400 per 100,000 live births—remains the highest in the world.[12]

Q.153—The Committee has requested further information on the Helmand Police Training Centre and related statistics

The Helmand Police Training Centre (HPTC) was established in December 2009 and is located in Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand Province. It is capable of turning out 150 qualified policemen every four weeks, following an intensive eight week course. The training centre currently trains Patrolmen and NCOs. In addition, it recently completed its first pilot training course for Officers. The training staff are currently drawn from the Royal Gurkha Rifles, supported by members of the UK Ministry of Defence Police, ISAF and Ministry of Interior trainers. The syllabus, approved by the Afghan Ministry of Interior covers law, arrest and restraint, search and evidence gathering, patrolling skills, IED awareness, drill and skill at arms and literacy training.

Over 3000 personnel have graduated in the 16 months that the Centre has been running.

The HPTC transferred to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) command on 01 March 2011. The UK will continue to lead the training effort at the Regional Training Centre South West (RTC-SW), as the HPTC is now called.

Q.155-156—The Committee has requested further information on targets and achievements for recruitment of Pashtuns to the Afghan National Army, including for southern Pashtuns. [Also in response to Q.233 from 17 November session]

Challenges exist in balancing the ethnic make up of the Afghan National Army (ANA); currently southern Pashtuns are under-represented and there is a disproportionately high number of Tajiks. Increasing recruitment figures in the south is a major focus for NTM-A , which, amongst other efforts, has launched recruitment campaigns to appeal to Pashtuns in the south.

The latest figures [May 11] on ethnic composition for the ANA are:

ANA
ACTUAL %
ANA
TARGET %
Population
ACTUAL^ %
Pashtun44*44 42
Tajik3225 27
Hazara1110 9
Uzbek78 9
Other613 13

^ Population data is based on the 1979 Afghan census and does not necessarily present an accurate picture of ethnic composition today.

*Of which 5% are Southern Pashtuns

There are a number of factors contributing to the low recruitment of southern Pashtuns including the challenge to security in the southern provinces, competing (illegal) employment opportunities and a perception that the ANA is dominated by other ethnic groups. New initiatives are in place to recruit southern Pashtuns into the Army, and to allow them to serve in the south.

It must not be forgotten that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as a whole, are fighting this campaign. This includes the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Helmand, who are predominantly southern Pashtuns.

The Committee was also interested in whether the occurrence of civilian casualties has had a negative effect on recruiting. Nationally, ANA recruitment goals are being exceeded. The occurrence of civilian casualties may be having an effect on recruiting at a district or village level but specific data on this is not collected.

Q.158—The Committee requested a brief description of NCO training at the Helmand Police Training Centre, including attendance and completion figures

The NCO course, which received Ministry of Interior approval in May 10, gives students an intensive grounding in the theory and practical application of junior leadership in order to grow the capability of the ANP through a professionally trained NCO cohort. The eight week course, which runs alongside the patrolman's course, has a capacity of 30 students drawn from across Helmand Province. By December 2010, 216 individuals had attended the course with a 60% pass rate.

Q.163, 169 & 170—The UK's strategy in Helmand in 2006

Please see separate classified letter.

Q.173—Percentage of personnel breaching harmony guidelines

The table below provides the detail of the percentages of personnel from each service who have breached harmony guidelines since 2008.

HARMONY STATISTICS—ALL CODES OF SEPARATION
Royal Marines Royal NavyArmy RAF
As atTrained TrainedUKTAP^ Trained
01/10/20080.2%0.9% *5.9%
01/01/20090.2%0.9% 5%6.1%
01/04/20090.3%1.1% 5%5.4%
01/07/20090.3%1.2% 5%5.0%
01/10/20090.6%1.4% 6%5.0%
01/01/20100.5%1.8% 6%4.3%
01/04/20100.3%1.6% 6%3.0%
01/07/20100.5%1.3% 6%2.8%
01/10/20100.7%1.0% *2.7%

Harmony periods

RN/RM—Harmony Snapshots of personnel who had spent more than 660 days on Separated Service in preceding 3 yrs

Army—30 month rolling period—over 415 days. (source- Army Separated Service Report, as at 1 July 2010 (Table 2a))

RAF—of personnel breaching 280 days of separated service in the preceding 24 month period

Notes:

* Denotes not available.

Army figures are to no decimal places.

^UKTAP—UK Trained Army Personnel

The information goes back only as far as 2008. Before then, the information (where available) was collected and collated in very different way across the Services which made any considered comparison impossible.

Q.175—Air Marshall Peach offered to write with the detail of the numbers of personnel who have been on multiple deployments and the number of deployments in each case. The Committee has asked that figures should include deployments to Iraq as well as those to Afghanistan. The Committee recognises that the tour length is also a factor here and would welcome the information broken down by tour length

While information released on the number of personnel identified as having deployed on operations is co-ordinated centrally by the Defence Analytical Services and Advice organisation (DASA), there is currently no single source of information on whether individuals undertook multiple deployments in operations. In order for this information to be collated, it would be necessary to undertake a trawl of the personnel records of all those who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan which would be costly in terms of both time and resources. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system first came on line in 2006 and data held before this time on the various single Service legacy systems would not be directly comparable with JPA data or between each of the Services, as they recorded this information differently. Legacy information available to DASA does not contain deployment dates only recording whether an individual has deployed and this would not therefore identify multiple deployments. In addition, it is now difficult to extract data from these legacy systems and we are aware that there are some gaps in the historical data. The Air Marshal offered to provide this information in good faith being unaware of the difficulties involved in delivering the detail requested.

Duty of care to our personnel, of which harmony guidelines are an important component, is a major consideration for the Armed Forces and at unit level care is taken to strike a balance between deploying people to do the job they joined up for, training or spending time with their families, wherever possible. Unfortunately, at a time of high operational commitment, breaches of harmony guidelines do occur but initiatives and regulators are used to help ameliorate the situation. These include flexible appointing between ranks, mobilisation of Reservists, financial retention and re-engagement incentives, contractorisation, and reviewing the numbers of posts required for each operation on a regular basis. Less than 2% of Royal Navy, 6% of Army and 3% of RAF personnel are operating above harmony guidelines.

Q.177—The Committee requested confirmation that changes to the operational deployment package have not been to the detriment of members of the armed forces

Service personnel deployed on operations receive a number of allowances depending on their posting and work undertaken. These include Unpleasant Living Allowance, Unpleasant Working Allowance, Longer Separation Allowance, Operational Allowance and Deployment Welfare Package (Overseas). The package of allowances that Armed Forces personnel deploying on Operation HERRICK receive has recently increased with the doubling of the Operational Allowance.

Q.179-180—The witnesses agreed to write with numbers on personnel who are fit for service but not for further deployment. This information is given below:

Statistics verified by Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) show that, as at 1 August 2010, there were 8,610 full time UK Armed Forces personnel trained and serving against requirement who were recorded as fit for Service but Medically Non Deployable and as having deployed on operations at least once. Of these, 1,940 personnel were recorded as permanently Medically Non Deployable, 6,400 were recorded as temporarily Medically Non Deployable and for 280 personnel it is not possible to distinguish whether the downgrading is temporary or permanent.

Q.183—Harmony guidelines for 3 Commando Brigade

Formed Royal Marines units work to the 6:24 ratio ie a six month deployment followed by an interval of 24 months before the next six month deployment. 3 Commando Brigade was the lead Brigade during Herrick 9 (Oct 08-Apr 09) and has returned as part of Herrick 14 (Apr-Oct 11).

As alluded to by Maj Gen Capewell, due to normal manpower movements, a small minority of individuals may have experienced a higher operational tempo than this rotation implies. These cases are in the minority and are not unique to the Royal Marines, usually occurring at the request of the individual concerned or in response to promotion.

Q.191—Profile of WARTHOG delivery to training and theatre

We have delivered WARTHOG, a new tracked armoured vehicle which is better protected and has greater capacity than VIKING which it has replaced in Afghanistan. The exact number of Warthogs in theatre is operationally sensitive information and cannot be released but all required vehicles have been delivered. WARTHOG has gained a high degree of confidence from users; it is doing an excellent job and is proving to be a world-class vehicle.

Additional Question—The Committee would like further information on the challenges of operating with contractors and contractor casualties

Contractors provide invaluable support to the Ministry of Defence on operations overseas. Recent trends have been for a greater use of contractors on operations. One reason for this is the trend towards longer operations and the existence of some benign locations in operational areas which provide industry an opportunity to deploy

The resilience shown by our contractors has been impressive and we regularly review the level of service provided by our contractors to ensure delivery against requirements

We do not collate figures on contractor injuries and fatalities. There would be inherent difficulties in doing this - our ability to track is limited to the reporting of incidents by contractors themselves. Due to the inability to be wholly accurate in reporting contractor casualty figures, we refrain from publishing any information which may ultimately be misleading.

MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons Defence Committee 17 November evidence session:

Q.233—Statistics on the training of the Afghan National Army:

Development and progress of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
Nov 2009-Nov 2010

Between November 2009 and November 2010, the ANA grew from 95,523 to 146,352, an increase of 53%. ANA daily training capacity grew from 15,440 to 22,442 (as of 5 November 2010), a 45% increase, and the number of ANA Instructors grew from 459 to 1946, a 324% increase.

The Basic Rifle Marksmanship qualification rates of ANA recruits has grown from 35% to 94% indicating the increasing professionalism and capabilities of ANA instructors.

Since November 2009, the ANA has fielded a Corps HQ, 10 Brigade HQs, 26 Infantry Kandaks, six Combat Service Support Kandaks, eight Garrison Support Units, three Commando Kandaks, 42 Companies, and eight Special Forces Teams.

[Data correct as of 14 November 2010]

As of May 2011, ANA strength was 168,037.

Branch Schools

Branch Schools are the backbone of training the ANA and reflect a shift in focus from quantity to enduring quality. As at May 2011, all 12 of the planned ANA branch schools are open and delivering trained "specialists" to the ANA. Mobile Education Training Teams (METTs) are "re-training" already fielded forces.

The focus for 2011 is "balancing the force" through a focus on fielding and training the critical supporting enablers.

Women in the ANA

The female Officer Candidate School (OCS) is now established at Kabul Military Training Centre and a female Programme of Instruction (POI) is complete. The POI is divided into two, ten-week sections:

  1.   Phase I includes ANA policies, knowledge, and leadership; self defense, weapons familiarization and range (M-9 and M-16 rifles), map reading, signal communications and counterinsurgency training.
  2.   Phase II prepares the cadets for their military jobs in the finance or logistical branch.

The first female course ran in September 2010 and 29 female OCS cadets commissioned as Second Lieutenants in the Afghan National Army. The second class started on 27 November 2010 and graduated 19 May.

ANA Literacy Training

Literacy training is given as a component of training and promotion courses as follows:

  •   Basic Warrior Training (8-Wk)—64 hours literacy training.
  •   NCO Leaders Course (4-Wk)—48 hours literacy training.
  •   NCO Battle Course (8-Wk)—40 hours literacy training.
  •   Sgt Majors' Course (22-Wk)—120 hours literacy training.
  •   1st Sgts' Course (10-Wk)—120 hours literacy training.
  •   Training Sgts' Course—120 hours literacy training.
  •   Legal School—40 hours literacy.

Recruitment of Southern Pashtuns

[Please see Q155-6 from 10 November session].

ANA Readiness for Transition

Assessment of readiness is a series of judgments against detailed key capabilities and goals for each institution. Once an institution is assessed as capable, it will transition, but not until it is capable. The strategic transition plan is led and synchronized by ISAF HQ in close cooperation with the Afghans and is based on three pillars:

  •   Ministerial transition (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior)—led by NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A).
  •   Institutional transition (institutions like the ANSF school)—led by NTM-A.
  •   Operational transition (district and region)—led by ISAF Joint Command.

The Institutional Development Plan sets the concrete actions necessary for transition and progress is tracked through a standardized, objective assessment tool, updated quarterly

ANA Monthly Attrition Goals

The objective for ANA attrition is 1.4% per month. The table below gives monthly attrition rates since November 2009. Attrition is the percentage of losses relative to overall force, calculated as a sum of losses divided by average strength over one time period. It does not include separations due to retirement or completion of service contract.

ATTRITION RATES FROM NOVEMBER 10 TO MAY 11
November 20093.1%
December1.9%
January 20101.9%
February2.2%
March1.2%
April1.7%
May1.2%
June1.6%
July3.0%
August2.4%
September2.0%
October2.8%
November3.2%
December2.7%
January 20112.7%
February2.8%
March2.6%
April1.9%
May1.3%

ANA Retention

The table below gives ANA retention levels since November 2009.

November 200965%
December62%
January 201068%
February71%
March85%
April83%
May86%
June54%
July68%
August55%
September58%
October76%
November66%
December70%
January 201170%
February65%
March77%
April70%
May61%

Q. 253-254—Statistics on the training of the Afghan National Police

There are currently over 128,500 (31 May 11) police officers in the Afghan National Police (ANP), ahead of the growth rate required to meet the target of 134,000 by October 2011.

Between November 2010 and April 2011, 18,519 ANP were recruited by the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A).

Between November 2009 and April 2011, NTM-A trained the following:

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)91,731
Afghan Border Police (ABP)19,638
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) 10,123

On 16 May 2011, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) announced an increase in the length of the basic Patrolman's course from six to eight weeks. This will increase the core police training from 200 to 268 hours, broadening the curriculum to include important courses on Human Rights and Gender Integration; Transparency and Accountability; The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program; and Intelligence-Led Policing.

ANP Attrition

The monthly ANP attrition rate has been decreasing over time. In recent months it has matched is matching or been lower than the target of 1.4%. In April the overall ANP attrition rate was 1.4% and was less than 1% in March 2011, significantly lower than the set target of 1.4%. Even the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—the gendarme style arm of the ANP—which had unacceptable levels of attrition has seen attrition rates reduced to 1.3% per month by April 2011. Attrition within the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is still at unacceptably high levels. ANCOP attrition was at 85.2% per annum in November 2009 and was reduced to 55.85% per annum by September 2010. Using the last six months of attrition data, annualized attrition within ANCOP was 35.96%; this illustrates the steady, slow decline of attrition.

High operational tempo, casualty rates, attractive pay from private security companies and consistent deployments are common contributing factors to ANP attrition levels. The Afghan Government, together with international partners, have implemented a range of measures that are successfully reducing levels of attrition. These include an increase in pay to close the pay gap between the army and the police, and more effective training programmes which have raised standards of leadership and discipline and are helping police to defend themselves. A recent increase in pay has brought ANP salaries in line with the ANA, and more effective training programmes have raised standards of leadership and discipline and helped police to defend themselves. Though still a work in progress, we are also working to implement an operational deployment cycle. Growth targets for the ANP have been exceeded and attrition rates have significantly reduced, showing that these measures are having a positive effect.

Women in the ANP

In line with the Afghan National Police Strategy, the Government of Afghanistan and International Community are working to create opportunities for women within the police force. At the end of 2010 there were approximately 1,000 female officers in the ANP. 310 of these joined in 2010—a 45% increase from 2009 strength—and the Ministry of Interior is working to reach their target of 52,000 female recruits in the ANP (by April 2013). Latest figures for women trained by NTM-A are 133 Basic Patrolmen, four non-commissioned officers and eight Officers.

In 2010, the Jalalabad Women's Training Centre opened its doors and trained a total of 458 female ANP. In May 2011, EUPOL conducted a one-week Mobile Support Unit course for female police officers and the Mission is also opening a dedicated female police training academy in Bamyan province.

In Helmand, UK police officers are providing support and training to the 14 female police officers in the province. The women have their own training facility at Provincial Headquarters and the PRT Rule of Law team also fund a scholarship programme to support the next intake of women to the AUP. Four females are in the current scholarship scheme in Lashkar Gah which is due to finish in June. A further seven females are due to take part in the next scholarship scheme which will begin in July.

Q.256—Details of the five pillars of the Police Force

The five pillars of the Afghan National Police are the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) and the Ministry of Interior / Enablers.

Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)

The AUP provides community policing, traffic policing, and the fire service.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

ANCOP provides civil order patrols, an anti-riot capability and a crisis or counter terror response capability within urban and metropolitan areas. It is the principle element of the ANP for counterinsurgency operations.

Afghan Border Police (ABP)

The ABP provides legal freedom of movement, encourages the development of commerce, the prevention of illegal border crossings and the policing of airport points of entry.

Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP)

The AACP provides specialist police expertise, counter terrorism, counter narcotics, Major Crime Task Force (governance and anti-corruption) and forensics. The AACP Special Support Units (SSU) conduct limited undercover, surveillance and tactical operations in support of the Anti-Crime capability areas.

Ministry of Interior / Enablers

This includes logistics and support, medical, training and education, and fire and rescue.

Q.257—Information on the Pol-i-Charki prison facility

We estimate that prison capacity in Afghanistan is currently around 9,260 places. The Afghan Government does not have precise details on the number of prison places. This is due in part to the security situation in some areas where correctional facilities are situated and in part to the ongoing nature of prison building and refurbishment programmes in Afghanistan.

Pol-i-Charki prison is currently undergoing extensive refurbishment which will increase capacity from 5000 to 10,000 prison spaces. The US is looking at rebuilding or extending prison capacity across Afghanistan. This US-led programme is expected to produce 4,000 extra prison spaces, taking the total number of available prison spaces to around 18,000.

Her Majesty's Government recognises that a functioning Justice sector is fundamental to creating lasting stability in Afghanistan. We know that the prison sector is an essential link in the Criminal Justice chain. This is why the UK has provided two Senior Prisons Managers, two Operational Managers and two Senior Prison Officers to promote the development of a fair and robust prison sector by sharing best practise through training and mentoring. The UK also co-funded the building of a High Security Unit within Pol-i-Charki which we continue to support and structurally maintain. We work closely with the US, the main international partner on prison reform, and the Afghan Central Prison Department.

MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons Defence Committee 15 December evidence session:

Q.314—The Committee has requested information on the number of judges and prosecutors in Afghanistan today and comparative figures for 2008

See information provided in confidence to the Committee from the Afghan Government.

Q.318—The Committee has requested information on the number of prison places in Afghanistan with additional context on the number of prisons and the situation in Helmand province

A functioning prison sector is an essential part of the Criminal Justice system. In January 2011 there were 8,763[13] official prison places in Afghanistan across 34 provincial prisons with an actual prison population of 17,132. Historically, the prisons sector in Afghanistan has been severely under-resourced leading to issues of non-existent or poor infrastructure, overcrowding, little separate provision for women and children and a lack of accountability.

UK Offender Management experts have been working closely with the US, the main international partner on prison reform, to promote the development of a safe and secure prison sector and there has been some progress in this area:

  •   95% of prison staff now have basic standardised training, some secure transportation training, and emergency response capability;
  •   oversight of prisons is greater; and
  •   some infrastructure projects have been completed.

The standard of prison facilities in Helmand is in line with that in other provinces. To help address the issues referred to above, the UK is funding the construction of a prison in Lashkar Gah which will conform to international standards. Phase 1 of the Lashkar-Gar prison build was completed in 2009 and provided 350 spaces. Phase 2 is due for completion June 2011 and will provide 350 additional spaces. The build includes High Security, Pre-Trial and additional Residential Wings, Administration, Guards Barracks, Healthcare, Reception and a Kitchen. Although the prison was originally designed for 700, we envisage the facility detaining 1,000 prisoners comfortably, remaining within advised guidelines of the International Committee of the Red Cross Guidelines on space per prisoner.

The main prison (which ultimately will hold men only) will be completed in June 2011. On completion of the main prison, the facility will continue to hold females and juveniles in separate dedicated temporary facilities until the permanent female and juvenile facilities are completed. The new female and juvenile prisons will be in the same area as the main prison, but outside the main wall of the main prison, in dedicated and secure areas. A new dedicated juvenile facility will be completed by Spring 2012 and will provide 60 spaces for boys and 20 for girls. We now expect the new dedicated female facility to be started in 2012 (subject to funding). We are also working on rehabilitation programmes to prepare prisoners for release and divert them away from crime. The build of a separate National Directorate of Security facility with a capacity of 152 spaces has been completed.

The Lashkar Gah prison is benefitting from ongoing prison building and refurbishment programmes in Afghanistan designed to tackle overcrowding and poor infrastructure. Pol-e-Charki prison is also undergoing extensive refurbishment to increase capacity from 5,000 to 10,000 prison spaces. The US led programme looking at improving capacity across Afghanistan is expected to produce 4,000 extra prison spaces, taking the total number of available prison spaces to around 18,000.

Q.336-339—The Committee has requested information on the level of ex-gratia and other payments for civilian casualties or damage caused by UK Forces annually for the financial years 2006-07 to 2010-11 (to date)

The table below shows total expenditure on compensation and ex-gratia payments in Afghanistan, broken down by financial year, since FY06/07:

2006-072007-08 2008-092009-10 2010-11
(as at 30 Nov)
£136,361£380,569 £452,707£1,142,000 £1,049,000

Q.346—The Committee has requested details of the DFID system for monitoring aid money passed to the Afghan Government

Virtually all UK aid money provided to the Government of Afghanistan is channelled through a multi-donor trust fund (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund), managed by the World Bank and monitored by an external agent, or through other third party mechanisms. Money from the ARTF is provided on a reimbursement basis and only released once proof of legitimate expenditure has been provided. All funding is subject to strict accountability requirements. We are confident that we have the right safeguards in place given the security and governance situation. Note—we have delayed our most recent payment to the ARTF because Afghanistan currently does not have an IMF programme in place. We will resume routine payments when a new programme has been agreed.

Q.348—The Committee would like to know what percentage of all UK development aid for women is passed through the Ministry of Women's Affairs and what percentage is passed through NGOs or other agencies

DFID does not channel any funding directly through the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA). However, donors including the Canadian International Development Agency, Swedish International Development Agency and UNIFEM (the women's fund at the United Nations), do provide Technical Assistance to MoWA and several line ministries to help mainstream gender across departmental strategies and their implementation.

DFID is providing support to WomenKind and International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) both of whom are trying to address the human rights and practical needs of women in Afghanistan. This funding is detailed below:

Direct:

Womenkind Worldwide

£234,271 (This is the total project figure for a one year project covering seven countries, including Afghanistan).

IPPF

£3.6 million (This is the total project figure for a one year period, covering 10 countries including Afghanistan.

Indirect:

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).

Since 2002, DFID has invested around $837 million (around £517 million at current exchange rates) through the ARTF. We have delayed the most recent payment to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund as Afghanistan does not have an IMF programme in place at the moment. We fully expect to continue routine payments to the ARTF when the IMF programme is agreed.

Q.352—The Committee has requested the latest figures on the recruitment of Pashtuns to the Afghan National Security Forces

The strength of the Afghan National Police in May 2011 was 126,880 policemen. The ethnic makeup of the total force is 43% Pashtun, 42% Tajik, 5% Hazara, 5% Usbek, and 5% other. The other Category includes: Turkman, Balooch, Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee, Arab, and Alevi people. Police training is provided to both new recruits and to "serving-but-untrained" policemen.

For information on ethnic composition in the Afghan National Army, please see the information supplied to the Committee following the 10 November [Q155-6] session.

Q.385-389—The Committee has requested a definition of Urgent Defence Requirements as opposed to Urgent Operational requirements. It would also like a copy of the agreement with the Treasury about Urgent Defence Requirements. The Committee would also like further explanation of the transition from the UOR funding mechanism to that of the UDR as the Armed Forces come closer to the point when there are no longer combat troops in Afghanistan

Urgent Operational Requirements:

The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process is used for the rapid purchase or modification of equipment to address urgent and unforeseen theatre specific capability gaps in support of a current or imminent military operation. To qualify as a UOR, it must be possible to introduce the equipment within the urgent time frame in order to make a contribution to the operation. UOR capability will often be delivered within six to eight months of the requirement being raised. However, for complex integration challenges and large fleet fits, this may, by exception, increase to up to 18 months.

UOR equipment must be theatre specific. The Reserve will not fund a generic capability that could be widely deployed on future operations. UOR business cases have to clearly articulate why it is theatre specific.

In 2009-10 we provided the Treasury with an estimate of UOR expenditure with an agreement that MoD would contribute towards any overspend in financial year 2011-12. In the event MoD did not overspend in 2009-10.

Urgent Defence Requirements

For financial year 2010-11 only, the Treasury has, exceptionally, provided up to £150 million of additional Reserve funding for Urgent Defence Requirements (UDRs), which will be paid back in full from the Defence budget in financial year 2012-13.

This money is for requirements that meet most of the UOR criteria but which are not theatre specific and thus have an enduring utility to Defence, or for accelerating core programmes. It formalises the arrangements through which MoD has previously contributed, using its core budget, to fund equipment urgently needed for operations but which would have wider utility within the core defence programme. It is a long established principle that Defence should contribute funding towards measures which accelerate delivery of equipment which is either in future procurement plans or will have utility beyond the current operation.

To date, we have approved over £53 million for Urgent Defence Requirements such as upgrading Chinook helicopter engines, improving information and communications services and procuring additional Surveillance and Target Acquisition equipment.

We based the £150 million estimate on our anticipated spend. It is right that MoD should help the Treasury manage the Government's spending and these financial arrangements encourage us to do so whilst not limiting our in-year spend.

There are currently no plans to extend the UDR arrangements into financial year 2011-12, although this will be subject to discussion with the Treasury during negotiations to establish the agreed 2011-12 UOR estimate.

There are no plans to transition from UORs to UDRs and where requirements meet the UOR criteria we can expect the Treasury to meet the full costs from the Reserve. All the Net Additional Costs of Military Operations in Afghanistan will continue to be met in full by the Treasury Reserve next year.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED ON DESERTION, ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL), INITIAL TRAINING WASTAGE RATES AND VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW

The Committee has been provided with information regarding Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police attrition. The British Army does not apply a comparable all encompassing term. Rather it looks at the individual elements separately. It is therefore difficult to draw a direct comparison with the Afghan Forces. Data for desertion, absence without leave and voluntary outflow (retention) for the UK Army is provided below.

UK ARMY PERSONNEL CONVICTED OF DESERTION AT COURT MARTIAL BETWEEN NOVEMBER 2009-NOVEMBER 2010

An absentee can become a deserter if it is proven that they have no intention of returning to Her Majesty's Service or intend to evade duty before the enemy.

MonthNumber of
Personnel Convicted
Nov 091
Dec 090
Jan 102
Feb 102
Mar 103
Apr 101
May 102
Jun 101
Jul 104
Aug 102
Sept 103
Oct 101
Nov 102

Please note that the Court Martial statistics are based on date of sentencing and not all convictions for desertion result in discharge from the Army.

ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL)

There are many types of absence, ranging from unavoidable (being absent through factors beyond a soldier's control, eg, transport problems) to short-term (periods up to 48 hours) and long-term (periods in excess of 48 hours). In more serious cases, an absentee is the term applied to a person subject to Military law who absents himself from the place at which his duty requires him to be, without leave to do so. To be guilty of this offence a soldier must knowingly and intentionally be away from his unit, or place of duty, without reasonable explanation.

The figures for the Army only are as follows:

AWOL STATISTICS (UK ARMY) FOR THE PERIOD 2009-10
Statistical Year
(a)
Incidents of Reported AWOL
(b)
No of personnel remaining AWOL
(c)
20092129102
20101941344

Please note column (b) is the number of incidents of reported AWOL. The number of personnel who remain AWOL from a given calendar year is at column (c). Of the reported numbers at column (b) a percentage of these will include those reported in error (extensions of leave, sick at home, clerical errors or discharged Service Personnel, etc). Therefore the figure that should be considered relevant is column (c).

To protect the integrity of the data it must be explained that REDCAP is a policing tool and database which has been used to provide the data. It is a live policing tool and therefore the figures extracted may change with a greater frequency than daily. Although column (b) is unlikely to fluctuate (it is improbable that someone would be reported AWOL now from previous years), column (c) will however change as Service personnel return to duty from periods of absence or are discharged and therefore to provide these figures as definitive and without explanation could be decidedly misleading.

Please note that not all incidences of AWOL will result in discharge from the Army.

WASTAGE IN INITIAL TRAINING

The current rate for wastage in initial training for the UK Army—based on a 12-month rolling figure—is 27.1%. As at 4 January, 32.18% of those who have dropped out of initial training during the course of this financial year have been because of voluntary outflow.

VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW

Information on voluntary outflow is provided in the tables attached. These are produced in the "UK Armed Forces—Quarterly Manning Report" which is available—on the DASA website, www.dasa.mod.uk.

Table 7a

OUTFLOW FROM TRAINED UK REGULAR FORCES1 OFFICERS BY EXIT REASON
Financial Year
12 months ending
Number and rate
20092009 201020102010
2007-082008-09 30 Sep31 Dec 31 Mar30 Jun 30 Sep
All Services
 
Total Outflow number22,340 2,120ll1,860 1,7401,6201,530 1,540
Total Outflow rate38.1 7.4ll6.5 6.15.6 5.35.3
 
VO4 number.. 1,2601,030 900830750 760
VO4 rate3 ..4.4 3.63.2 2.92.62.6
 
Time Expiry number.. ...... ......
Time Expiry rate3.. .... ........
 
Redundancy number..- -- ---
Redundancy rate3.. -- ----
 
Other Wastage number.. ...... ......
Other Wastage rate3.. .... ........
 
Naval Service
 
Total Outflow number2460 410390 380360300 310
Total Outflow rate37.0 6.46.1 5.85.5 4.64.8
 
VO4 number280 260260240 220160160
VO4 rate3 4.34.0 4.03.7 3.42.52.5
 
Time Expiry number140 130120130 120120130
Time Expiry rate32.2 2.01.9 2.01.81.8 2.0
 
Redundancy number-- -- ---
Redundancy rate3- -- ----
 
Other Wastage number30 201010 202020
Other Wastage rate30.5 0.30.2 0.20.20.3 0.4
 
Army5,6
 
Total Outflow number21,160 1,110ll960 900840840 820
Total Outflow rate38.4 8.1ll7.0 6.56.1 6.05.9
 
VO4 number.. 750570490 450440440
VO4 rate3 ..5.5 4.23.5 3.23.23.2
 
Time Expiry number.. 210260280 340340330
Time Expiry rate3.. 1.51.9 2.12.42.4 2.4
 
Redundancy number..- -- ---
Redundancy rate3.. -- ----
 
Other Wastage number.. 150130130 606050
Other Wastage rate3.. 1.10.9 0.90.40.4 0.4
 
Royal Air Force
 
Total Outflow number2720 590500 470420390 400
Total Outflow rate38.3 7.05.9 5.55.0 4.64.7
 
VO4 number260 250190180 160140160
VO4 rate3 3.02.9 2.32.1 1.91.61.8
 
Time Expiry number7320 .... ........
Time Expiry rate33.7 .... ........
 
Redundancy number60- -- ---
Redundancy rate30.7 -- ----
 
Other Wastage number780 .... ........
Other Wastage rate31.0 .... ........

Source: DASA (Quad-Service)

1. UK Regular Forces comprises trained and untrained personnel. It does not include Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service personnel and mobilised reservists.

2. Figures show outflow from the trained UK Regular Forces, including personnel leaving the Services, deaths, recalled reservists on release and outflow to the Home Service battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment (which disbanded on 31 March 2008). They do not include promotion from ranks to officers or flows between Services.

3. Rates are the number of people who leave per 100 of the trained strength.

4. Voluntary Outflow is defined as all exits from trained UK Regular Forces which are voluntarily generated by the individual before the end of their agreed engagement or commission period.

5. Outflow figures up to and including 12 months ending 31 March 2009 include the net flow of between 100 and 200 personnel from the Regular Army to Long-term Absentee (LTA). Outflow figures for 12 month periods ending after 31 March 2009 do not include this net flow to LTA. See glossary for more details.

6. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, Army Officer reasons for exit, including VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007 to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008.

7. "Time Expiry" and "Other Wastage" exit reason totals and rates for RAF Officers and Other Ranks personnel for the 12 month ending periods post 30 June 2008 have been excluded. Since 1 July 2008 there has been an increase in "Unknowns" (which are grouped in the "Other Wastage" category), which has had a significant effect on "Other Wastage" and "Time Expiry" exit reason totals and rates.

Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, all statistics shown in this table are provisional and subject to review.

Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the UK Armed Forces Monthly Manning Report Table 4 which can be found at www.dasa.mod.uk.

Table 7b

OUTFLOW FROM TRAINED UK REGULAR FORCES1 OTHER RANKS BY EXIT REASON
Financial Year
12 months ending
Number and rate
20092009 201020102010
2007-082008-09 30 Sep31 Dec 31 Mar30 Jun 30 Sep
All Services
 
Total Outflow number215,670 13,950ll11,770 11,23010,66010,650 11,140
Total Outflow rate311.1 10.0ll 8.48.07.5 7.57.7
 
VO4 number.. 7,7106,470 5,9305,6005,320 5,500
VO4 rate3 ..5.5 4.64.2 4.03.73.8
 
Time Expiry number.. ...... ......
Time Expiry rate3.. .... ........
 
Redundancy number..- -- ---
Redundancy rate3.. -- ----
 
Other Wastage number.. ...... ......
Other Wastage rate3.. .... ........
 
Naval Service
 
Total Outflow number22,660 2,8402,440 2,2802,0802,020 2,010
Total Outflow rate39.5 10.28.7 8.27.4 7.17.0
 
VO4 number1,760 1,6801,450 1,3001,1701,060 1,000
VO4 rate3 6.36.0 5.24.7 4.23.73.5
 
Time Expiry number380 520510520 500530500
Time Expiry rate31.4 1.91.8 1.91.81.9 1.8
 
Redundancy number-- -- ---
Redundancy rate3- -- ----
 
Other Wastage number520 630480460 410440500
Other Wastage rate31.8 2.31.7 1.61.51.6 1.8
 
Army 5,6
 
Total Outflow number29,310 8,240ll6,980 6,8406,7306,880 7,340
Total Outflow rate311.6 10.2ll 8.68.48.2 8.38.8
 
VO4 number.. 4,3103,730 3,5303,5103,480 3,700
VO4 rate3 ..5.4 4.64.3 4.34.24.4
 
Time Expiry number.. 1,4001,160 1,1001,2701,300 1,390
Time Expiry rate3.. 1.71.4 1.31.51.6 1.7
 
Redundancy number
Redundancy rate3
 
Other Wastage number.. 2,5302,090 2,2601,9402,090 2,250
Other Wastage rate3.. 3.12.6 2.82.42.5 2.7
 
Royal Air Force
 
Total Outflow number23,710 2,8802,360 2,1001,8501,750 1,790
Total Outflow rate311.3 9.37.7 6.86.0 5.65.7
 
VO4 number1,670 1,7201,290 1,100910780 800
VO4 rate3 5.15.5 4.23.6 2.92.52.5
 
Time Expiry number7900 .... ........
Time Expiry rate32.8 .... ........
 
Redundancy number740 --- ---
Redundancy rate32.3 -- ----
 
Other Wastage number7400 .... ........
Other Wastage rate31.2 .... ........

Source: DASA (Quad-Service)

1. UK Regular Forces comprises trained and untrained personnel. It does not include Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service personnel and mobilised reservists.

2. Figures show outflow from trained UK Regular Forces, including personnel leaving the Services, deaths, recalled reservists on release and outflow to the Home Service battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment (which disbanded on 31 March 2008). They do not include promotion from ranks to officers or flows between Services.

3. Rates are the number of people who leave per 100 of the trained strength.

4. Voluntary Outflow is defined as all exits from trained UK Regular Forces which are voluntarily generated by the individual before the end of their agreed engagement or commission period.

5. Outflow figures up to and including 12 months ending 31 March 2009 include the net flow of between 100 and 200 personnel from the Regular Army to Long-term Absentee (LTA). Outflow figures for 12 month periods ending after 31 March 2009 do not include this net flow to LTA. See glossary for more details.

6. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, Army Other Ranks reasons for exit, including VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007 to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008.

7. "Time Expiry" and "Other Wastage" exit reason totals and rates for RAF Officers and Other Ranks personnel for the 12 month ending periods post 30 June 2008 have been excluded. Since 1 July 2008 there has been an increase in "Unknowns" (which are grouped in the "Other Wastage" category), which has had a significant effect on "Other Wastage" and "Time Expiry" exit reason totals and rates.

Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, all statistics shown in this table are provisional and subject to review.

Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the UK Armed Forces Monthly Manning Report Table 4 which can be found at www.dasa.mod.uk.

VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW RATE FROM THE UK REGULAR FORCES




Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, Army reasons for exit, including VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007 to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008.

Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the monthly TSP graphs 4.1-4.3 which can be found at www.dasa.mod.uk.

22 June 2011



3   NRVA 2007/08, P. 69. Central Statistics Organisation, Afghanistan. http://nrva.cso.gov.af/ The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) is the only nationwide socio-economic household survey in Afghanistan, and provides the best available demographic and household characteristics data available in the country. The results published in Oct 2009 were collected over a year from August 2007, and involve 20,000 respondents. The survey has been completed three times since 2003, but this year's showed significant improvement in methodology and robustness-next due to be published end 2010. Back

4   Global Monitoring report on MDG Progress, 2008, World Bank Back

5   NRVA 2007/8 P. 106 Back

6   NRVA 2007/8 P. 106 Back

7   Women and Men in Afghanistan: Baseline Statistics on Gender, 2008, Ministry of Women's Affairs, GIRoA Back

8   NRVA 2007/8 P. 84 (Overall proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants is 24% up from 15.%) Back

9   Afghan Midwifery Association Report 2009 Back

10   NRVA 2007/8 P. 84 Back

11   Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003, Central Statistics Office, UNICEF Back

12   WHO, Trends in Mortality, 1990 to 2008 Back

13   Information previously given to the Committee gave the number of official prison places as 9,260. The discrepancy reflects the fact that the Afghan Government does not have precise details on the number of prison places in Afghanistan: the Afghan Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) has no formal system of monitoring the number of spaces. Instead, they rely on estimates of spaces made by the International Committee of the Red Cross or members of the International Community who are funding the construction of prisons. Improving the capacity of the CPD is central to ensuring long-term sustainability of the prisons sector.
The figure of 8,763 prison spaces is an estimate by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This estimate was made two years ago. The 9,260 figure is based on estimates of additional capacity which has been built since. Since the above evidence was first submitted to the Committee, the UN Organisation on Drugs and Crime have published new figures on prison spaces in Afghanistan. In March 2011, UNODC put prison capacity at 10,000 spaces. As with previous figures, this is an estimate only.
Figures on prison spaces in Afghanistan should be treated with caution. The task of estimating prison places is complicated by security concerns restricting access to prisons in some areas and ongoing building and refurbishment programmes. In addition, figures quoted vary depending on different methods of estimating prisons spaces by different sources. Some, for example, do not include separate female or juvenile facilities in estimates. 
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