Supplementary written evidence from the
Ministry of Defence
MoD response to follow up questions from the House
of Commons Defence Committee 10 November evidence session:
Q.141—The Committee requested sight of the
studies, referred to by witnesses, covering the reaction of the
Afghan people to corruption in Afghanistan
The poll referred to was the Asia Foundation
Survey, a copy of which can be found on the internet at the address
below:
http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2010-poll.php
The study referred to was an independent study on
"Testing the Hypothesis of Radicalisation in Afghanistan",
conducted by the NGO Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU).
A copy of the study report is available on request from CPAU (who
own the copyright) via their website listed below, the Committee
should note that this is a sensitive report.
www.cpau.org.af
Q.143—The witnesses informed the Committee
that the UK tends to follow OECD standards on corruption. Further
information on this is given below:
When interacting with other States, the UK is bound
by the definitions, standards and obligations set out in the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption. The most recent reports
on progress on implementation can be found at the following website:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html
The UK is also a member of the Council of Europe
Group of States against Corruption and has ratified the Council
of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The latest progress
report can be found at the following website:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/3.%20What%20is%20GRECO_en.asp
In addition, under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
the UK is committed to take effective measures to deter, prevent
and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection
with international business transactions. Further information
can be found at the following website:
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_34859_44583772_1_1_1_1,00.html
Q.147—Following a series of questions on
corruption in Afghanistan, the Committee requested the budget
and expenditure of programme funding for 09/10 and 10/11 with
anti-corruption expenditure separately identified
The total amount of programme funding for Afghanistan
available for financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 is:
2009-10
| Conflict Pool | £68 million
|
| Strategic Programme Fund | £20.4 million
|
| Other (Counter Terrorism / Migration / Bilateral Programme Budget)
| £4.8 million |
2010-11
| Conflict Pool (of which £10 million is an uplift for DFID for infrastructure)
| £78.5 million |
| Strategic Programme Fund | £19 million
|
| Other (Counter Terrorism / Migration / Bilateral Programme Budget)
| £7.7 million |
There are a number of projects focused on "anti-corruption"
and expenditure in FY 2009-10 was £1,190,700 and in 2010-11
£2,908,000.
Q.148—The witnesses offered to write to the Committee
with figures on how life has changed for women in Afghanistan.
This information is given below:
The number of children attending school regularly increased by
400,000 from 2009-10 to 2010-11. In 2010-11 5.7 million children
were attending school regularly and 2.1 million of them were girls.
The latest figures show 42% of primary school age girls are enrolled
in school,[3] but this
is still far behind the 83% in South Asia.[4]
A remarkable surge in literacy is seen for younger age groups
(those educated since the fall of the Taliban): more than one
in three girls aged 12-16 are able to read and write (37% ) compared
to just one in ten women in their mid 20s (10%). The youth (aged
15-24) literacy gender gap is gradually closing as the ratio of
literate women to men is increasing; latest figures (2007-08)
show the ratio to be almost 1:2 females to males (45%) compared
to just over 1:3 (37%) in 2005 (37%).[5]
For children around the age of 12, progress is even more evident:
the ratio of literate girls to boys in the 12-14 age group is
63%, reflecting the increase in girls being schooled in recent
years.[6]
A quarter of seats (26%) in the national assembly are held by
women - better than India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 68 out of
249 seats are reserved for women in the Lower House and 23 out
of 102 seats in the Upper House.[7]
In the 2010 Parliamentary elections, for the first time, a female
candidate won an unreserved seat outright in Nimruz province taking
the total number of female MPs in the lower house to 69.
A quarter of births in Afghanistan (24%) are now supervised by
skilled birth attendants—an increase on the 2005 figure
of less than one in six (13%).[8]
Today there are more than four times as many trained midwives
as in 2002 (467 in 2002 rising to 2,200 in 2009).[9]
The latest figures show that today more than one in three pregnant
women (37%) receive antenatal care in Afghanistan[10]
compared to only 16% in 2003.[11]
Despite this, Afghanistan's maternal mortality rate- at 1,400
per 100,000 live births—remains the highest in the world.[12]
Q.153—The Committee has requested further information
on the Helmand Police Training Centre and related statistics
The Helmand Police Training Centre (HPTC) was established in December
2009 and is located in Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of
Helmand Province. It is capable of turning out 150 qualified policemen
every four weeks, following an intensive eight week course. The
training centre currently trains Patrolmen and NCOs. In addition,
it recently completed its first pilot training course for Officers.
The training staff are currently drawn from the Royal Gurkha Rifles,
supported by members of the UK Ministry of Defence Police, ISAF
and Ministry of Interior trainers. The syllabus, approved by the
Afghan Ministry of Interior covers law, arrest and restraint,
search and evidence gathering, patrolling skills, IED awareness,
drill and skill at arms and literacy training.
Over 3000 personnel have graduated in the 16 months that the Centre
has been running.
The HPTC transferred to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)
command on 01 March 2011. The UK will continue to lead the training
effort at the Regional Training Centre South West (RTC-SW), as
the HPTC is now called.
Q.155-156—The Committee has requested further information
on targets and achievements for recruitment of Pashtuns to the
Afghan National Army, including for southern Pashtuns. [Also in
response to Q.233 from 17 November session]
Challenges exist in balancing the ethnic make up of the Afghan
National Army (ANA); currently southern Pashtuns are under-represented
and there is a disproportionately high number of Tajiks. Increasing
recruitment figures in the south is a major focus for NTM-A ,
which, amongst other efforts, has launched recruitment campaigns
to appeal to Pashtuns in the south.
The latest figures [May 11] on ethnic composition for the ANA
are:
| ANA
ACTUAL %
| ANA
TARGET % | Population
ACTUAL^ %
|
| Pashtun | 44* | 44
| 42 |
| Tajik | 32 | 25
| 27 |
| Hazara | 11 | 10
| 9 |
| Uzbek | 7 | 8
| 9 |
| Other | 6 | 13
| 13 |
| ^ Population data is based on the 1979 Afghan census and does not necessarily present an accurate picture of ethnic composition today.
*Of which 5% are Southern Pashtuns
|
There are a number of factors contributing to the low recruitment
of southern Pashtuns including the challenge to security in the
southern provinces, competing (illegal) employment opportunities
and a perception that the ANA is dominated by other ethnic groups.
New initiatives are in place to recruit southern Pashtuns into
the Army, and to allow them to serve in the south.
It must not be forgotten that the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) as a whole, are fighting this campaign. This includes the
Afghan National Police (ANP) in Helmand, who are predominantly
southern Pashtuns.
The Committee was also interested in whether the occurrence of
civilian casualties has had a negative effect on recruiting. Nationally,
ANA recruitment goals are being exceeded. The occurrence of civilian
casualties may be having an effect on recruiting at a district
or village level but specific data on this is not collected.
Q.158—The Committee requested a brief description of
NCO training at the Helmand Police Training Centre, including
attendance and completion figures
The NCO course, which received Ministry of Interior approval in
May 10, gives students an intensive grounding in the theory and
practical application of junior leadership in order to grow the
capability of the ANP through a professionally trained NCO cohort.
The eight week course, which runs alongside the patrolman's course,
has a capacity of 30 students drawn from across Helmand Province.
By December 2010, 216 individuals had attended the course with
a 60% pass rate.
Q.163, 169 & 170—The UK's strategy in Helmand in
2006
Please see separate classified letter.
Q.173—Percentage of personnel breaching harmony guidelines
The table below provides the detail of the percentages of personnel
from each service who have breached harmony guidelines since 2008.
HARMONY STATISTICS—ALL CODES OF SEPARATION
| Royal Marines |
Royal Navy | Army |
RAF |
| As at | Trained
| Trained | UKTAP^
| Trained |
| 01/10/2008 | 0.2% | 0.9%
| * | 5.9% |
| 01/01/2009 | 0.2% | 0.9%
| 5% | 6.1% |
| 01/04/2009 | 0.3% | 1.1%
| 5% | 5.4% |
| 01/07/2009 | 0.3% | 1.2%
| 5% | 5.0% |
| 01/10/2009 | 0.6% | 1.4%
| 6% | 5.0% |
| 01/01/2010 | 0.5% | 1.8%
| 6% | 4.3% |
| 01/04/2010 | 0.3% | 1.6%
| 6% | 3.0% |
| 01/07/2010 | 0.5% | 1.3%
| 6% | 2.8% |
| 01/10/2010 | 0.7% | 1.0%
| * | 2.7% |
Harmony periods
RN/RM—Harmony Snapshots of personnel who had spent more
than 660 days on Separated Service in preceding 3 yrs
Army—30 month rolling period—over 415 days. (source-
Army Separated Service Report, as at 1 July 2010 (Table 2a))
RAF—of personnel breaching 280 days of separated service
in the preceding 24 month period
Notes:
* Denotes not available.
Army figures are to no decimal places.
^UKTAP—UK Trained Army Personnel
The information goes back only as far as 2008. Before then, the
information (where available) was collected and collated in very
different way across the Services which made any considered comparison
impossible.
Q.175—Air Marshall Peach offered to write with the detail
of the numbers of personnel who have been on multiple deployments
and the number of deployments in each case. The Committee has
asked that figures should include deployments to Iraq as well
as those to Afghanistan. The Committee recognises that the tour
length is also a factor here and would welcome the information
broken down by tour length
While information released on the number of personnel identified
as having deployed on operations is co-ordinated centrally by
the Defence Analytical Services and Advice organisation (DASA),
there is currently no single source of information on whether
individuals undertook multiple deployments in operations. In order
for this information to be collated, it would be necessary to
undertake a trawl of the personnel records of all those who have
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan which would be costly in terms
of both time and resources. This situation is exacerbated by the
fact that the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system first
came on line in 2006 and data held before this time on the various
single Service legacy systems would not be directly comparable
with JPA data or between each of the Services, as they recorded
this information differently. Legacy information available to
DASA does not contain deployment dates only recording whether
an individual has deployed and this would not therefore identify
multiple deployments. In addition, it is now difficult to extract
data from these legacy systems and we are aware that there are
some gaps in the historical data. The Air Marshal offered to provide
this information in good faith being unaware of the difficulties
involved in delivering the detail requested.
Duty of care to our personnel, of which harmony guidelines are
an important component, is a major consideration for the Armed
Forces and at unit level care is taken to strike a balance between
deploying people to do the job they joined up for, training or
spending time with their families, wherever possible. Unfortunately,
at a time of high operational commitment, breaches of harmony
guidelines do occur but initiatives and regulators are used to
help ameliorate the situation. These include flexible appointing
between ranks, mobilisation of Reservists, financial retention
and re-engagement incentives, contractorisation, and reviewing
the numbers of posts required for each operation on a regular
basis. Less than 2% of Royal Navy, 6% of Army and 3% of RAF personnel
are operating above harmony guidelines.
Q.177—The Committee requested confirmation that changes
to the operational deployment package have not been to the detriment
of members of the armed forces
Service personnel deployed on operations receive a number of allowances
depending on their posting and work undertaken. These include
Unpleasant Living Allowance, Unpleasant Working Allowance, Longer
Separation Allowance, Operational Allowance and Deployment Welfare
Package (Overseas). The package of allowances that Armed Forces
personnel deploying on Operation HERRICK receive has recently
increased with the doubling of the Operational Allowance.
Q.179-180—The witnesses agreed to write with numbers
on personnel who are fit for service but not for further deployment.
This information is given below:
Statistics verified by Defence Analytical Services and Advice
(DASA) show that, as at 1 August 2010, there were 8,610 full time
UK Armed Forces personnel trained and serving against requirement
who were recorded as fit for Service but Medically Non Deployable
and as having deployed on operations at least once. Of these,
1,940 personnel were recorded as permanently Medically Non Deployable,
6,400 were recorded as temporarily Medically Non Deployable and
for 280 personnel it is not possible to distinguish whether the
downgrading is temporary or permanent.
Q.183—Harmony guidelines for 3 Commando Brigade
Formed Royal Marines units work to the 6:24 ratio ie a six month
deployment followed by an interval of 24 months before the next
six month deployment. 3 Commando Brigade was the lead Brigade
during Herrick 9 (Oct 08-Apr 09) and has returned as part of Herrick
14 (Apr-Oct 11).
As alluded to by Maj Gen Capewell, due to normal manpower movements,
a small minority of individuals may have experienced a higher
operational tempo than this rotation implies. These cases are
in the minority and are not unique to the Royal Marines, usually
occurring at the request of the individual concerned or in response
to promotion.
Q.191—Profile of WARTHOG delivery to training and theatre
We have delivered WARTHOG, a new tracked armoured vehicle which
is better protected and has greater capacity than VIKING which
it has replaced in Afghanistan. The exact number of Warthogs in
theatre is operationally sensitive information and cannot be released
but all required vehicles have been delivered. WARTHOG has gained
a high degree of confidence from users; it is doing an excellent
job and is proving to be a world-class vehicle.
Additional Question—The Committee would like further
information on the challenges of operating with contractors and
contractor casualties
Contractors provide invaluable support to the Ministry of Defence
on operations overseas. Recent trends have been for a greater
use of contractors on operations. One reason for this is the trend
towards longer operations and the existence of some benign locations
in operational areas which provide industry an opportunity to
deploy
The resilience shown by our contractors has been impressive and
we regularly review the level of service provided by our contractors
to ensure delivery against requirements
We do not collate figures on contractor injuries and fatalities.
There would be inherent difficulties in doing this - our ability
to track is limited to the reporting of incidents by contractors
themselves. Due to the inability to be wholly accurate in reporting
contractor casualty figures, we refrain from publishing any information
which may ultimately be misleading.
MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons
Defence Committee 17 November evidence session:
Q.233—Statistics on the training of the Afghan National
Army:
Development and progress of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
Nov 2009-Nov 2010
Between November 2009 and November 2010, the ANA grew from 95,523
to 146,352, an increase of 53%. ANA daily training capacity grew
from 15,440 to 22,442 (as of 5 November 2010), a 45% increase,
and the number of ANA Instructors grew from 459 to 1946, a 324%
increase.
The Basic Rifle Marksmanship qualification rates of ANA recruits
has grown from 35% to 94% indicating the increasing professionalism
and capabilities of ANA instructors.
Since November 2009, the ANA has fielded a Corps HQ, 10 Brigade
HQs, 26 Infantry Kandaks, six Combat Service Support Kandaks,
eight Garrison Support Units, three Commando Kandaks, 42 Companies,
and eight Special Forces Teams.
[Data correct as of 14 November 2010]
As of May 2011, ANA strength was 168,037.
Branch Schools
Branch Schools are the backbone of training the ANA and reflect
a shift in focus from quantity to enduring quality. As at May
2011, all 12 of the planned ANA branch schools are open and delivering
trained "specialists" to the ANA. Mobile Education Training
Teams (METTs) are "re-training" already fielded forces.
The focus for 2011 is "balancing the force" through
a focus on fielding and training the critical supporting enablers.
Women in the ANA
The female Officer Candidate School (OCS) is now established at
Kabul Military Training Centre and a female Programme of Instruction
(POI) is complete. The POI is divided into two, ten-week sections:
- Phase
I includes ANA policies, knowledge, and leadership; self defense,
weapons familiarization and range (M-9 and M-16 rifles), map reading,
signal communications and counterinsurgency training.
- Phase
II prepares the cadets for their military jobs in the finance
or logistical branch.
The first female course ran in September 2010 and
29 female OCS cadets commissioned as Second Lieutenants in the
Afghan National Army. The second class started on 27 November
2010 and graduated 19 May.
ANA Literacy Training
Literacy training is given as a component of training
and promotion courses as follows:
- Basic
Warrior Training (8-Wk)—64 hours literacy training.
- NCO
Leaders Course (4-Wk)—48 hours literacy training.
- NCO
Battle Course (8-Wk)—40 hours literacy training.
- Sgt
Majors' Course (22-Wk)—120 hours literacy training.
- 1st
Sgts' Course (10-Wk)—120 hours literacy training.
- Training
Sgts' Course—120 hours literacy training.
- Legal
School—40 hours literacy.
Recruitment of Southern Pashtuns
[Please see Q155-6 from 10 November session].
ANA Readiness for Transition
Assessment of readiness is a series of judgments
against detailed key capabilities and goals for each institution.
Once an institution is assessed as capable, it will transition,
but not until it is capable. The strategic transition plan is
led and synchronized by ISAF HQ in close cooperation with the
Afghans and is based on three pillars:
- Ministerial
transition (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior)—led
by NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A).
- Institutional
transition (institutions like the ANSF school)—led by NTM-A.
- Operational
transition (district and region)—led by ISAF Joint Command.
The Institutional Development Plan sets the concrete
actions necessary for transition and progress is tracked through
a standardized, objective assessment tool, updated quarterly
ANA Monthly Attrition Goals
The objective for ANA attrition is 1.4% per month.
The table below gives monthly attrition rates since November 2009.
Attrition is the percentage of losses relative to overall force,
calculated as a sum of losses divided by average strength over
one time period. It does not include separations due to retirement
or completion of service contract.
ATTRITION RATES FROM NOVEMBER 10 TO MAY 11
| November 2009 | 3.1%
|
| December | 1.9% |
| January 2010 | 1.9% |
| February | 2.2% |
| March | 1.2% |
| April | 1.7% |
| May | 1.2% |
| June | 1.6% |
| July | 3.0% |
| August | 2.4% |
| September | 2.0% |
| October | 2.8% |
| November | 3.2% |
| December | 2.7% |
| January 2011 | 2.7% |
| February | 2.8% |
| March | 2.6% |
| April | 1.9% |
| May | 1.3% |
ANA Retention
The table below gives ANA retention levels since November 2009.
| November 2009 | 65% |
| December | 62% |
| January 2010 | 68% |
| February | 71% |
| March | 85% |
| April | 83% |
| May | 86% |
| June | 54% |
| July | 68% |
| August | 55% |
| September | 58% |
| October | 76% |
| November | 66% |
| December | 70% |
| January 2011 | 70% |
| February | 65% |
| March | 77% |
| April | 70% |
| May | 61% |
Q. 253-254—Statistics on the training of the Afghan National
Police
There are currently over 128,500 (31 May 11) police officers in
the Afghan National Police (ANP), ahead of the growth rate required
to meet the target of 134,000 by October 2011.
Between November 2010 and April 2011, 18,519 ANP were recruited
by the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A).
Between November 2009 and April 2011, NTM-A trained the following:
| Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) | 91,731
|
| Afghan Border Police (ABP) | 19,638
|
| Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) |
10,123 |
On 16 May 2011, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) announced an increase
in the length of the basic Patrolman's course from six to eight
weeks. This will increase the core police training from 200 to
268 hours, broadening the curriculum to include important courses
on Human Rights and Gender Integration; Transparency and Accountability;
The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program; and Intelligence-Led
Policing.
ANP Attrition
The monthly ANP attrition rate has been decreasing over time.
In recent months it has matched is matching or been lower than
the target of 1.4%. In April the overall ANP attrition rate was
1.4% and was less than 1% in March 2011, significantly lower than
the set target of 1.4%. Even the Afghan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP)—the gendarme style arm of the ANP—which had
unacceptable levels of attrition has seen attrition rates reduced
to 1.3% per month by April 2011. Attrition within the Afghan National
Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is still at unacceptably high levels.
ANCOP attrition was at 85.2% per annum in November 2009 and was
reduced to 55.85% per annum by September 2010. Using the last
six months of attrition data, annualized attrition within ANCOP
was 35.96%; this illustrates the steady, slow decline of attrition.
High operational tempo, casualty rates, attractive pay from private
security companies and consistent deployments are common contributing
factors to ANP attrition levels. The Afghan Government, together
with international partners, have implemented a range of measures
that are successfully reducing levels of attrition. These include
an increase in pay to close the pay gap between the army and the
police, and more effective training programmes which have raised
standards of leadership and discipline and are helping police
to defend themselves. A recent increase in pay has brought ANP
salaries in line with the ANA, and more effective training programmes
have raised standards of leadership and discipline and helped
police to defend themselves. Though still a work in progress,
we are also working to implement an operational deployment cycle.
Growth targets for the ANP have been exceeded and attrition rates
have significantly reduced, showing that these measures are having
a positive effect.
Women in the ANP
In line with the Afghan National Police Strategy, the Government
of Afghanistan and International Community are working to create
opportunities for women within the police force. At the end of
2010 there were approximately 1,000 female officers in the ANP.
310 of these joined in 2010—a 45% increase from 2009 strength—and
the Ministry of Interior is working to reach their target of 52,000
female recruits in the ANP (by April 2013). Latest figures for
women trained by NTM-A are 133 Basic Patrolmen, four non-commissioned
officers and eight Officers.
In 2010, the Jalalabad Women's Training Centre opened its doors
and trained a total of 458 female ANP. In May 2011, EUPOL conducted
a one-week Mobile Support Unit course for female police officers
and the Mission is also opening a dedicated female police training
academy in Bamyan province.
In Helmand, UK police officers are providing support and training
to the 14 female police officers in the province. The women have
their own training facility at Provincial Headquarters and the
PRT Rule of Law team also fund a scholarship programme to support
the next intake of women to the AUP. Four females are in the current
scholarship scheme in Lashkar Gah which is due to finish in June.
A further seven females are due to take part in the next scholarship
scheme which will begin in July.
Q.256—Details of the five pillars of the Police Force
The five pillars of the Afghan National Police are the Afghan
Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP),
the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP)
and the Ministry of Interior / Enablers.
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)
The AUP provides community policing, traffic policing, and the
fire service.
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
ANCOP provides civil order patrols, an anti-riot capability and
a crisis or counter terror response capability within urban and
metropolitan areas. It is the principle element of the ANP for
counterinsurgency operations.
Afghan Border Police (ABP)
The ABP provides legal freedom of movement, encourages the development
of commerce, the prevention of illegal border crossings and the
policing of airport points of entry.
Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP)
The AACP provides specialist police expertise, counter terrorism,
counter narcotics, Major Crime Task Force (governance and anti-corruption)
and forensics. The AACP Special Support Units (SSU) conduct limited
undercover, surveillance and tactical operations in support of
the Anti-Crime capability areas.
Ministry of Interior / Enablers
This includes logistics and support, medical, training and education,
and fire and rescue.
Q.257—Information on the Pol-i-Charki prison facility
We estimate that prison capacity in Afghanistan is currently around
9,260 places. The Afghan Government does not have precise details
on the number of prison places. This is due in part to the security
situation in some areas where correctional facilities are situated
and in part to the ongoing nature of prison building and refurbishment
programmes in Afghanistan.
Pol-i-Charki prison is currently undergoing extensive refurbishment
which will increase capacity from 5000 to 10,000 prison spaces.
The US is looking at rebuilding or extending prison capacity across
Afghanistan. This US-led programme is expected to produce 4,000
extra prison spaces, taking the total number of available prison
spaces to around 18,000.
Her Majesty's Government recognises that a functioning Justice
sector is fundamental to creating lasting stability in Afghanistan.
We know that the prison sector is an essential link in the Criminal
Justice chain. This is why the UK has provided two Senior Prisons
Managers, two Operational Managers and two Senior Prison Officers
to promote the development of a fair and robust prison sector
by sharing best practise through training and mentoring. The UK
also co-funded the building of a High Security Unit within Pol-i-Charki
which we continue to support and structurally maintain. We work
closely with the US, the main international partner on prison
reform, and the Afghan Central Prison Department.
MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons
Defence Committee 15 December evidence session:
Q.314—The Committee has requested information on the
number of judges and prosecutors in Afghanistan today and comparative
figures for 2008
See information provided in confidence to the Committee from the
Afghan Government.
Q.318—The Committee has requested information on the
number of prison places in Afghanistan with additional context
on the number of prisons and the situation in Helmand province
A functioning prison sector is an essential part of the Criminal
Justice system. In January 2011 there were 8,763[13]
official prison places in Afghanistan across 34 provincial prisons
with an actual prison population of 17,132. Historically, the
prisons sector in Afghanistan has been severely under-resourced
leading to issues of non-existent or poor infrastructure, overcrowding,
little separate provision for women and children and a lack of
accountability.
UK Offender Management experts have been working closely with
the US, the main international partner on prison reform, to promote
the development of a safe and secure prison sector and there has
been some progress in this area:
- 95%
of prison staff now have basic standardised training, some secure
transportation training, and emergency response capability;
- oversight
of prisons is greater; and
- some
infrastructure projects have been completed.
The standard of prison facilities in Helmand is in
line with that in other provinces. To help address the issues
referred to above, the UK is funding the construction of a prison
in Lashkar Gah which will conform to international standards.
Phase 1 of the Lashkar-Gar prison build was completed in 2009
and provided 350 spaces. Phase 2 is due for completion June 2011
and will provide 350 additional spaces. The build includes High
Security, Pre-Trial and additional Residential Wings, Administration,
Guards Barracks, Healthcare, Reception and a Kitchen. Although
the prison was originally designed for 700, we envisage the facility
detaining 1,000 prisoners comfortably, remaining within advised
guidelines of the International Committee of the Red Cross Guidelines
on space per prisoner.
The main prison (which ultimately will hold men only)
will be completed in June 2011. On completion of the main prison,
the facility will continue to hold females and juveniles in separate
dedicated temporary facilities until the permanent female and
juvenile facilities are completed. The new female and juvenile
prisons will be in the same area as the main prison, but outside
the main wall of the main prison, in dedicated and secure areas.
A new dedicated juvenile facility will be completed by Spring
2012 and will provide 60 spaces for boys and 20 for girls. We
now expect the new dedicated female facility to be started in
2012 (subject to funding). We are also working on rehabilitation
programmes to prepare prisoners for release and divert them away
from crime. The build of a separate National Directorate of Security
facility with a capacity of 152 spaces has been completed.
The Lashkar Gah prison is benefitting from ongoing
prison building and refurbishment programmes in Afghanistan designed
to tackle overcrowding and poor infrastructure. Pol-e-Charki prison
is also undergoing extensive refurbishment to increase capacity
from 5,000 to 10,000 prison spaces. The US led programme looking
at improving capacity across Afghanistan is expected to produce
4,000 extra prison spaces, taking the total number of available
prison spaces to around 18,000.
Q.336-339—The Committee has requested information
on the level of ex-gratia and other payments for civilian casualties
or damage caused by UK Forces annually for the financial years
2006-07 to 2010-11 (to date)
The table below shows total expenditure on compensation
and ex-gratia payments in Afghanistan, broken down by financial
year, since FY06/07:
| 2006-07 | 2007-08
| 2008-09 | 2009-10
| 2010-11
(as at 30 Nov) |
| £136,361 | £380,569
| £452,707 | £1,142,000
| £1,049,000 |
Q.346—The Committee has requested details of the DFID
system for monitoring aid money passed to the Afghan Government
Virtually all UK aid money provided to the Government of Afghanistan
is channelled through a multi-donor trust fund (Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund), managed by the World Bank and monitored by an external
agent, or through other third party mechanisms. Money from the
ARTF is provided on a reimbursement basis and only released once
proof of legitimate expenditure has been provided. All funding
is subject to strict accountability requirements. We are confident
that we have the right safeguards in place given the security
and governance situation. Note—we have delayed our most
recent payment to the ARTF because Afghanistan currently does
not have an IMF programme in place. We will resume routine payments
when a new programme has been agreed.
Q.348—The Committee would like to know what percentage
of all UK development aid for women is passed through the Ministry
of Women's Affairs and what percentage is passed through NGOs
or other agencies
DFID does not channel any funding directly through the Ministry
of Women's Affairs (MoWA). However, donors including the Canadian
International Development Agency, Swedish International Development
Agency and UNIFEM (the women's fund at the United Nations), do
provide Technical Assistance to MoWA and several line ministries
to help mainstream gender across departmental strategies and their
implementation.
DFID is providing support to WomenKind and International Planned
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) both of whom are trying to address
the human rights and practical needs of women in Afghanistan.
This funding is detailed below:
Direct:
Womenkind Worldwide
£234,271 (This is the total project figure for a one year
project covering seven countries, including Afghanistan).
IPPF
£3.6 million (This is the total project figure for a one
year period, covering 10 countries including Afghanistan.
Indirect:
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
Since 2002, DFID has invested around $837 million (around £517
million at current exchange rates) through the ARTF. We have delayed
the most recent payment to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund as Afghanistan does not have an IMF programme in place at
the moment. We fully expect to continue routine payments to the
ARTF when the IMF programme is agreed.
Q.352—The Committee has requested the latest figures
on the recruitment of Pashtuns to the Afghan National Security
Forces
The strength of the Afghan National Police in May 2011 was 126,880
policemen. The ethnic makeup of the total force is 43% Pashtun,
42% Tajik, 5% Hazara, 5% Usbek, and 5% other. The other Category
includes: Turkman, Balooch, Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee,
Arab, and Alevi people. Police training is provided to both new
recruits and to "serving-but-untrained" policemen.
For information on ethnic composition in the Afghan National Army,
please see the information supplied to the Committee following
the 10 November [Q155-6] session.
Q.385-389—The Committee has requested a definition of
Urgent Defence Requirements as opposed to Urgent Operational requirements.
It would also like a copy of the agreement with the Treasury about
Urgent Defence Requirements. The Committee would also like further
explanation of the transition from the UOR funding mechanism to
that of the UDR as the Armed Forces come closer to the point when
there are no longer combat troops in Afghanistan
Urgent Operational Requirements:
The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process is used for the
rapid purchase or modification of equipment to address urgent
and unforeseen theatre specific capability gaps in support of
a current or imminent military operation. To qualify as a UOR,
it must be possible to introduce the equipment within the urgent
time frame in order to make a contribution to the operation. UOR
capability will often be delivered within six to eight months
of the requirement being raised. However, for complex integration
challenges and large fleet fits, this may, by exception, increase
to up to 18 months.
UOR equipment must be theatre specific. The Reserve will not fund
a generic capability that could be widely deployed on future operations.
UOR business cases have to clearly articulate why it is theatre
specific.
In 2009-10 we provided the Treasury with an estimate of UOR expenditure
with an agreement that MoD would contribute towards any overspend
in financial year 2011-12. In the event MoD did not overspend
in 2009-10.
Urgent Defence Requirements
For financial year 2010-11 only, the Treasury has, exceptionally,
provided up to £150 million of additional Reserve funding
for Urgent Defence Requirements (UDRs), which will be paid back
in full from the Defence budget in financial year 2012-13.
This money is for requirements that meet most of the UOR criteria
but which are not theatre specific and thus have an enduring utility
to Defence, or for accelerating core programmes. It formalises
the arrangements through which MoD has previously contributed,
using its core budget, to fund equipment urgently needed for operations
but which would have wider utility within the core defence programme.
It is a long established principle that Defence should contribute
funding towards measures which accelerate delivery of equipment
which is either in future procurement plans or will have utility
beyond the current operation.
To date, we have approved over £53 million for Urgent Defence
Requirements such as upgrading Chinook helicopter engines, improving
information and communications services and procuring additional
Surveillance and Target Acquisition equipment.
We based the £150 million estimate on our anticipated spend.
It is right that MoD should help the Treasury manage the Government's
spending and these financial arrangements encourage us to do so
whilst not limiting our in-year spend.
There are currently no plans to extend the UDR arrangements into
financial year 2011-12, although this will be subject to discussion
with the Treasury during negotiations to establish the agreed
2011-12 UOR estimate.
There are no plans to transition from UORs to UDRs and where requirements
meet the UOR criteria we can expect the Treasury to meet the full
costs from the Reserve. All the Net Additional Costs of Military
Operations in Afghanistan will continue to be met in full by the
Treasury Reserve next year.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED ON DESERTION, ABSENCE
WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL), INITIAL TRAINING WASTAGE RATES AND VOLUNTARY
OUTFLOW
The Committee has been provided with information regarding Afghan
National Army and Afghan National Police attrition. The British
Army does not apply a comparable all encompassing term. Rather
it looks at the individual elements separately. It is therefore
difficult to draw a direct comparison with the Afghan Forces.
Data for desertion, absence without leave and voluntary outflow
(retention) for the UK Army is provided below.
UK ARMY PERSONNEL
CONVICTED OF
DESERTION AT
COURT MARTIAL
BETWEEN NOVEMBER
2009-NOVEMBER 2010
An absentee can become a deserter if it is proven that they have
no intention of returning to Her Majesty's Service or intend to
evade duty before the enemy.
| Month | Number of
Personnel Convicted
|
| Nov 09 | 1 |
| Dec 09 | 0 |
| Jan 10 | 2 |
| Feb 10 | 2 |
| Mar 10 | 3 |
| Apr 10 | 1 |
| May 10 | 2 |
| Jun 10 | 1 |
| Jul 10 | 4 |
| Aug 10 | 2 |
| Sept 10 | 3 |
| Oct 10 | 1 |
| Nov 10 | 2 |
Please note that the Court Martial statistics are based on date
of sentencing and not all convictions for desertion result in
discharge from the Army.
ABSENCE WITHOUT
LEAVE (AWOL)
There are many types of absence, ranging from unavoidable (being
absent through factors beyond a soldier's control, eg, transport
problems) to short-term (periods up to 48 hours) and long-term
(periods in excess of 48 hours). In more serious cases, an absentee
is the term applied to a person subject to Military law who absents
himself from the place at which his duty requires him to be, without
leave to do so. To be guilty of this offence a soldier must knowingly
and intentionally be away from his unit, or place of duty, without
reasonable explanation.
The figures for the Army only are as follows:
AWOL STATISTICS (UK ARMY) FOR THE PERIOD 2009-10
Statistical Year
(a) | Incidents of Reported AWOL
(b)
| No of personnel remaining AWOL
(c)
|
| 2009 | 2129 | 102
|
| 2010 | 1941 | 344
|
Please note column (b) is the number of incidents of reported
AWOL. The number of personnel who remain AWOL from a given calendar
year is at column (c). Of the reported numbers at column (b) a
percentage of these will include those reported in error (extensions
of leave, sick at home, clerical errors or discharged Service
Personnel, etc). Therefore the figure that should be considered
relevant is column (c).
To protect the integrity of the data it must be explained that
REDCAP is a policing tool and database which has been used to
provide the data. It is a live policing tool and therefore the
figures extracted may change with a greater frequency than daily.
Although column (b) is unlikely to fluctuate (it is improbable
that someone would be reported AWOL now from previous years),
column (c) will however change as Service personnel return to
duty from periods of absence or are discharged and therefore to
provide these figures as definitive and without explanation could
be decidedly misleading.
Please note that not all incidences of AWOL will result in discharge
from the Army.
WASTAGE IN
INITIAL TRAINING
The current rate for wastage in initial training for the UK Army—based
on a 12-month rolling figure—is 27.1%. As at 4 January,
32.18% of those who have dropped out of initial training during
the course of this financial year have been because of voluntary
outflow.
VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW
Information on voluntary outflow is provided in the tables attached.
These are produced in the "UK Armed Forces—Quarterly
Manning Report" which is available—on the DASA website,
www.dasa.mod.uk.
Table 7a
OUTFLOW FROM TRAINED UK REGULAR FORCES1 OFFICERS
BY EXIT REASON
| Financial Year
| 12 months ending
| Number and rate
|
| | |
| 2009 | 2009 |
2010 | 2010 | 2010
|
| 2007-08 | 2008-09
| | 30 Sep | 31 Dec
| 31 Mar | 30 Jun
| 30 Sep |
| All Services | |
| | | |
| | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 2,340
| 2,120 | ll | 1,860
| 1,740 | 1,620 | 1,530
| 1,540 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 8.1
| 7.4 | ll | 6.5
| 6.1 | 5.6 |
5.3 | 5.3 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | .. |
1,260 | | 1,030 |
900 | 830 | 750 |
760 |
| VO4 rate3 |
.. | 4.4 |
| 3.6 | 3.2 |
2.9 | 2.6 | 2.6
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number | .. |
.. | | .. | ..
| .. | .. | .. |
| Time Expiry rate3 | ..
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | .. | -
| | - | - |
- | - | - |
| Redundancy rate3 | ..
| - | | - |
- | - | - | -
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number | .. |
.. | | .. | ..
| .. | .. | .. |
| Other Wastage rate3 | ..
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Naval Service | |
| | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 460
| 410 | | 390 |
380 | 360 | 300 |
310 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 7.0
| 6.4 | | 6.1
| 5.8 | 5.5 |
4.6 | 4.8 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | 280 |
260 | | 260 | 240
| 220 | 160 | 160
|
| VO4 rate3 |
4.3 | 4.0 |
| 4.0 | 3.7 |
3.4 | 2.5 | 2.5
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number | 140 |
130 | | 120 | 130
| 120 | 120 | 130
|
| Time Expiry rate3 | 2.2
| 2.0 | | 1.9 |
2.0 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
2.0 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | - | -
| | - | - |
- | - | - |
| Redundancy rate3 | -
| - | | - |
- | - | - | -
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number | 30 |
20 | | 10 | 10
| 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Other Wastage rate3 | 0.5
| 0.3 | | 0.2 |
0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
0.4 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Army5,6 |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 1,160
| 1,110 | ll | 960
| 900 | 840 | 840
| 820 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 8.4
| 8.1 | ll | 7.0
| 6.5 | 6.1 |
6.0 | 5.9 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | .. |
750 | | 570 | 490
| 450 | 440 | 440
|
| VO4 rate3 |
.. | 5.5 |
| 4.2 | 3.5 |
3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number | .. |
210 | | 260 | 280
| 340 | 340 | 330
|
| Time Expiry rate3 | ..
| 1.5 | | 1.9 |
2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
2.4 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | .. | -
| | - | - |
- | - | - |
| Redundancy rate3 | ..
| - | | - |
- | - | - | -
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number | .. |
150 | | 130 | 130
| 60 | 60 | 50 |
| Other Wastage rate3 | ..
| 1.1 | | 0.9 |
0.9 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
0.4 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Royal Air Force | |
| | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 720
| 590 | | 500 |
470 | 420 | 390 |
400 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 8.3
| 7.0 | | 5.9
| 5.5 | 5.0 |
4.6 | 4.7 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | 260 |
250 | | 190 | 180
| 160 | 140 | 160
|
| VO4 rate3 |
3.0 | 2.9 |
| 2.3 | 2.1 |
1.9 | 1.6 | 1.8
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number7 | 320
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| Time Expiry rate3 | 3.7
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | 60 | -
| | - | - |
- | - | - |
| Redundancy rate3 | 0.7
| - | | - |
- | - | - | -
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number7 | 80
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| Other Wastage rate3 | 1.0
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
Source: DASA (Quad-Service)
1. UK Regular Forces comprises trained and untrained personnel.
It does not include Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service personnel
and mobilised reservists.
2. Figures show outflow from the trained UK Regular Forces, including
personnel leaving the Services, deaths, recalled reservists on
release and outflow to the Home Service battalions of the Royal
Irish Regiment (which disbanded on 31 March 2008). They do not
include promotion from ranks to officers or flows between Services.
3. Rates are the number of people who leave per 100 of the trained
strength.
4. Voluntary Outflow is defined as all exits from trained UK Regular
Forces which are voluntarily generated by the individual before
the end of their agreed engagement or commission period.
5. Outflow figures up to and including 12 months ending 31 March
2009 include the net flow of between 100 and 200 personnel from
the Regular Army to Long-term Absentee (LTA). Outflow figures
for 12 month periods ending after 31 March 2009 do not include
this net flow to LTA. See glossary for more details.
6. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel
Administration System, Army Officer reasons for exit, including
VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007
to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008.
7. "Time Expiry" and "Other Wastage" exit
reason totals and rates for RAF Officers and Other Ranks personnel
for the 12 month ending periods post 30 June 2008 have been excluded.
Since 1 July 2008 there has been an increase in "Unknowns"
(which are grouped in the "Other Wastage" category),
which has had a significant effect on "Other Wastage"
and "Time Expiry" exit reason totals and rates.
Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration
System, all statistics shown in this table are provisional and
subject to review.
Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the UK
Armed Forces Monthly Manning Report Table 4 which can be found
at www.dasa.mod.uk.
Table 7b
OUTFLOW FROM TRAINED UK REGULAR FORCES1 OTHER
RANKS BY EXIT REASON
| Financial Year
| 12 months ending
| Number and rate
|
| | |
| 2009 | 2009 |
2010 | 2010 | 2010
|
| 2007-08 | 2008-09
| | 30 Sep | 31 Dec
| 31 Mar | 30 Jun
| 30 Sep |
| All Services | |
| | | |
| | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 15,670
| 13,950 | ll | 11,770
| 11,230 | 10,660 | 10,650
| 11,140 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 11.1
| 10.0 | ll |
8.4 | 8.0 | 7.5
| 7.5 | 7.7 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | .. |
7,710 | | 6,470 |
5,930 | 5,600 | 5,320
| 5,500 |
| VO4 rate3 |
.. | 5.5 |
| 4.6 | 4.2 |
4.0 | 3.7 | 3.8
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number | .. |
.. | | .. | ..
| .. | .. | .. |
| Time Expiry rate3 | ..
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | .. | -
| | - | - |
- | - | - |
| Redundancy rate3 | ..
| - | | - |
- | - | - | -
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number | .. |
.. | | .. | ..
| .. | .. | .. |
| Other Wastage rate3 | ..
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Naval Service | |
| | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 2,660
| 2,840 | | 2,440
| 2,280 | 2,080 | 2,020
| 2,010 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 9.5
| 10.2 | | 8.7
| 8.2 | 7.4 |
7.1 | 7.0 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | 1,760
| 1,680 | | 1,450
| 1,300 | 1,170 | 1,060
| 1,000 |
| VO4 rate3 |
6.3 | 6.0 |
| 5.2 | 4.7 |
4.2 | 3.7 | 3.5
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number | 380 |
520 | | 510 | 520
| 500 | 530 | 500
|
| Time Expiry rate3 | 1.4
| 1.9 | | 1.8 |
1.9 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
1.8 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | - | -
| | - | - |
- | - | - |
| Redundancy rate3 | -
| - | | - |
- | - | - | -
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number | 520 |
630 | | 480 | 460
| 410 | 440 | 500
|
| Other Wastage rate3 | 1.8
| 2.3 | | 1.7 |
1.6 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
1.8 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Army 5,6 |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 9,310
| 8,240 | ll | 6,980
| 6,840 | 6,730 | 6,880
| 7,340 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 11.6
| 10.2 | ll |
8.6 | 8.4 | 8.2
| 8.3 | 8.8 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | .. |
4,310 | | 3,730 |
3,530 | 3,510 | 3,480
| 3,700 |
| VO4 rate3 |
.. | 5.4 |
| 4.6 | 4.3 |
4.3 | 4.2 | 4.4
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number | .. |
1,400 | | 1,160 |
1,100 | 1,270 | 1,300
| 1,390 |
| Time Expiry rate3 | ..
| 1.7 | | 1.4 |
1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
1.7 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | |
| | | |
| | |
| Redundancy rate3 |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number | .. |
2,530 | | 2,090 |
2,260 | 1,940 | 2,090
| 2,250 |
| Other Wastage rate3 | ..
| 3.1 | | 2.6 |
2.8 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
2.7 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Royal Air Force | |
| | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Total Outflow number2 | 3,710
| 2,880 | | 2,360
| 2,100 | 1,850 | 1,750
| 1,790 |
| Total Outflow rate3 | 11.3
| 9.3 | | 7.7
| 6.8 | 6.0 |
5.6 | 5.7 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| VO4 number | 1,670
| 1,720 | | 1,290
| 1,100 | 910 | 780
| 800 |
| VO4 rate3 |
5.1 | 5.5 |
| 4.2 | 3.6 |
2.9 | 2.5 | 2.5
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Time Expiry number7 | 900
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| Time Expiry rate3 | 2.8
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Redundancy number | 740 |
- | | - | -
| - | - | - |
| Redundancy rate3 | 2.3
| - | | - |
- | - | - | -
|
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Other Wastage number7 | 400
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
| Other Wastage rate3 | 1.2
| .. | | .. |
.. | .. | .. | ..
|
Source: DASA (Quad-Service)
1. UK Regular Forces comprises trained and untrained personnel.
It does not include Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service personnel
and mobilised reservists.
2. Figures show outflow from trained UK Regular Forces, including
personnel leaving the Services, deaths, recalled reservists on
release and outflow to the Home Service battalions of the Royal
Irish Regiment (which disbanded on 31 March 2008). They do not
include promotion from ranks to officers or flows between Services.
3. Rates are the number of people who leave per 100 of the trained
strength.
4. Voluntary Outflow is defined as all exits from trained UK Regular
Forces which are voluntarily generated by the individual before
the end of their agreed engagement or commission period.
5. Outflow figures up to and including 12 months ending 31 March
2009 include the net flow of between 100 and 200 personnel from
the Regular Army to Long-term Absentee (LTA). Outflow figures
for 12 month periods ending after 31 March 2009 do not include
this net flow to LTA. See glossary for more details.
6. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel
Administration System, Army Other Ranks reasons for exit, including
VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007
to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008.
7. "Time Expiry" and "Other Wastage" exit
reason totals and rates for RAF Officers and Other Ranks personnel
for the 12 month ending periods post 30 June 2008 have been excluded.
Since 1 July 2008 there has been an increase in "Unknowns"
(which are grouped in the "Other Wastage" category),
which has had a significant effect on "Other Wastage"
and "Time Expiry" exit reason totals and rates.
Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration
System, all statistics shown in this table are provisional and
subject to review.
Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the UK
Armed Forces Monthly Manning Report Table 4 which can be found
at www.dasa.mod.uk.
VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW
RATE FROM
THE UK REGULAR
FORCES
Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration
System, Army reasons for exit, including VO, are unavailable from
the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007 to the 12 month period
ending 31 December 2008.
Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the monthly
TSP graphs 4.1-4.3 which can be found at www.dasa.mod.uk.
22 June 2011
3 NRVA 2007/08, P. 69. Central Statistics Organisation,
Afghanistan. http://nrva.cso.gov.af/ The National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessment (NRVA) is the only nationwide socio-economic household
survey in Afghanistan, and provides the best available demographic
and household characteristics data available in the country. The
results published in Oct 2009 were collected over a year from
August 2007, and involve 20,000 respondents. The survey has been
completed three times since 2003, but this year's showed significant
improvement in methodology and robustness-next due to be published
end 2010. Back
4
Global Monitoring report on MDG Progress, 2008, World Bank Back
5
NRVA 2007/8 P. 106 Back
6
NRVA 2007/8 P. 106 Back
7
Women and Men in Afghanistan: Baseline Statistics on Gender, 2008,
Ministry of Women's Affairs, GIRoA Back
8
NRVA 2007/8 P. 84 (Overall proportion of births attended by skilled
birth attendants is 24% up from 15.%) Back
9
Afghan Midwifery Association Report 2009 Back
10
NRVA 2007/8 P. 84 Back
11
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003, Central Statistics Office,
UNICEF Back
12
WHO, Trends in Mortality, 1990 to 2008 Back
13
Information previously given to the Committee gave the number
of official prison places as 9,260. The discrepancy reflects the
fact that the Afghan Government does not have precise details
on the number of prison places in Afghanistan: the Afghan Central
Prisons Directorate (CPD) has no formal system of monitoring the
number of spaces. Instead, they rely on estimates of spaces made
by the International Committee of the Red Cross or members of
the International Community who are funding the construction of
prisons. Improving the capacity of the CPD is central to ensuring
long-term sustainability of the prisons sector.
The figure of 8,763 prison spaces is an estimate by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This estimate was made two
years ago. The 9,260 figure is based on estimates of additional
capacity which has been built since. Since the above evidence
was first submitted to the Committee, the UN Organisation on Drugs
and Crime have published new figures on prison spaces in Afghanistan.
In March 2011, UNODC put prison capacity at 10,000 spaces. As
with previous figures, this is an estimate only.
Figures on prison spaces in Afghanistan should be treated with
caution. The task of estimating prison places is complicated by
security concerns restricting access to prisons in some areas
and ongoing building and refurbishment programmes. In addition,
figures quoted vary depending on different methods of estimating
prisons spaces by different sources. Some, for example, do not
include separate female or juvenile facilities in estimates. Back
| 
