2 National Security Council
Status and membership of the National
Security Council
9. Following the 2010 General Election, the new
Coalition Government established the National Security Council
(NSC)[9] with its own secretariat
based in the Cabinet Office. The NSC held its first meeting on
the afternoon of 12 May 2010, the Government's first full day
in office, and continues to hold regular weekly meetings.
10. The NSC is a Cabinet Committee which, in
similar fashion to other such committees, derives its authority
from, and ultimately has its decisions ratified by, the Cabinet.[10]
It is chaired by the Prime Minister and its permanent members
are the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
the Defence, Energy and Climate Change, Foreign Affairs, Home
and International Development Secretaries, the Chief Secretary
to the Treasury and the Cabinet Office Minister of State.[11]
Other Cabinet Ministers are invited to attend if an issue within
their responsibilities is due to be discussed. The Chief of the
Defence Staff, or his Deputy, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee and the Heads of Intelligence Agencies also attend regularly.[12]
11. The October 2010 National Security Strategy
stated that the NSC had been established "to make sure the
government takes decisions properly".[13]
In its written evidence to our earlier inquiry into the processes
followed in the development of the SDSR, the MoD stated that "The
new NSC provides high-level strategic guidance to Departments,
co-ordinates responses to the dangers we face, and identifies
priorities".[14]
12. In his evidence to us, the Foreign Secretary,
Rt Hon William Hague MP, stated that the NSC was an executive
decision making body:[15]
It takes many more decisions and discusses many more
issues than the Cabinet would then go over in detail. The Cabinet
also discusses security issues and international issues of defence
and diplomacy, but not in the same detail as the NSC, which meets
at least once a week to go through a range of subjects. It is
the effective decision-making body on a vast range of the Government's
decisions surrounding these issues. That is why it works, so far.
13. In its written evidence, the MoD expanded
on the work of the NSC and its structures:[16]
The discipline of systematic, weekly consideration
of national security priorities in a Ministerial forum chaired
by the Prime Minister drives a more coherent approach to collective
consideration of strategy across Government Departments. The NSC
ensures Ministers consider national security in the round not
as separate blocs.
The NSC drives and monitors the implementation of
the SDSR and NSS by lead Ministers, officials and Departments.
Lead Ministers, accountable to the NSC, take responsibility for
coordinating priority areas of work to deliver national security
tasks. A series of inter-Departmental committees at senior official
level also support and inform the NSC. They report to the NSC(Officials)
meeting that meets weekly.
14. Work is also being undertaken by individual
Government Departments through departmental boards that are intended
to "provide strategic leadership".[17]
These boards are "responsible for developing the strategies
for their Departments in line with the Government's overarching
strategic agenda".
15. In our Report on the processes followed in
the development of the SDSR, we welcomed the creation of the NSC.[18]
This welcome has been endorsed by our witnesses during this inquiry
who generally thought that the NSC had been broadly acting in
the way set out in the NSS even if they had reservations about
certain aspects of its operation. Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham
told us:[19]
In principle, the NSC is an extremely sound idea.
I have always felt that defence is much too important to be left
to the Ministry of Defence and, quite clearly, security is a much
more wide-ranging business than purely a military one.
16. General Sir Rupert Smith agreed, commenting
that "for about 100 years, we have organised ourselves on
the basis that we can treat defence and security in parallel as
separate activities, and we have been able to understand security
on the basis of home-and-away".[20]
The situation, he argued, had changed:[21]
First, we have not got enough money to do it that
way. Secondly, you cannot treat security on a home-and-away basis
largely because of the speed, reach and range of global communications.
We, of all nations, sit in the centre of the inhabited world,
if you see it on a globe, and are utterly dependent in peace and
war on our ability to trade. We cannot feed ourselves and we cannot
heat ourselves in peace or war unless we trade. We cannot withstand
a siege. So it is in our absolute interest to ensure our security
on that continuum and not on the basis of home-and-away, as we
used to be able to do.
17. Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, former First Sea
Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, thought "it was quite demanding
to ask it, as the very first thing it had to do when it arrived,
immediately to redo the National Security Strategy [...] and then
to conduct a defence review, which is pretty challenging at the
best of times, and particularly so when you do it at the same
time as a CSR. The question the National Security Council was
asked pretty early on was demanding. I think it did not a bad
job [...]".[22]
18. Some doubt has been expressed as to how far
the NSC would be able to break down the departmental-silo mentality
of Whitehall. Professor Michael Clarke from the Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI) told us:[23]
I think the framework of thinking was more coherent
than in previous defence reviews [...] but it is not yet clear
whether that has enough traction within Whitehall, because it's
quite radical. What the NSS says is a pretty radical re-thinking
of the way we should discuss security for a country like Britain
in the 21st century. That is easy to say for a group of clever
people writing a good essay on it, but it's much harder to push
through Whitehall, which is stovepiped for a different sort of
security environment. In the next few years, I think we in the
analytical community will be looking at how far the NSC and the
NSS are able to gain real traction within Whitehall.
19. In evidence to the Joint Committee on the
National Security Strategy, Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones, former
Security Minister and NSC member, commented that another potential
problem was the way budgets are allocated on a departmental basis:[24]
Perhaps I might say that the one thing that has not
happenedthe party canvassed this in oppositionwas
the notion of a single budget. There is indeed the single security
account, but there is no wider pooling of moneys, as they are
still departmentally allocated. We need to see how that works
out in practice. The previous Government tried the experiment
of pooling, which I do not think worked terribly well, and there
is of course a constitutional problem, which is that parliamentary
committees want to see accountability to them, so perhaps this
Committee may be able to do something in that area. It is a fairly
difficult one and it is not easy to see sweeping solutions that
are compatible with a Secretary of State's responsibilities. But
we need to devise some measure of flexibility so that we can allocate
resources at mid-term or according to need, if it arises. That
is because one thing that a national security concept should be
able to give us in policy-making is greater flexibility than perhaps
we have had in the past.
20. In evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Sir Peter Ricketts, National Security Adviser, commented "that
the NSC can be an influence to make sure that the top priorities
that are set are then funded." He gave the example that cross-departmental
discussion of the SDSR in the NSC had probably enabled Ministers
"to find £650 million for cross-Government cyber-work
which wouldn't have fitted into any single budget". However,
he thought that the "great majority" of Government security
spending would continue to be done through departments.[25]
Also in evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Rt
Hon William Hague MP, Foreign Secretary, noted that there was
'good scope for interdepartmental budgeting' and that 'through
the National Security Council we are able to take a broader view
across Government of where our resources are being directed'.[26]
21. We repeat our welcome for the establishment
of the National Security Council and its taking the strategic
lead for defence and security issues. It must continue its work
to break down the silo-mentality and departmental rivalry in Whitehall.
We recommend that the Government, when responding to this Report,
should identify appropriate areas for interdepartmental budgeting
while maintaining proper accountability and not increasing levels
of bureaucracy. The Government should provide us with further
information on how it envisages the role of the NSC in terms of
the prioritisation and allocation of resources.
National Security Strategy and
the Strategic Defence and Security Review
22. Although its foremost priority was Afghanistan,
an early task for NSC was the development of a new National Security
Strategy and undertaking a Strategic Defence and Security Review.
In our earlier report on the SDSR process in September 2010, we
regretted that the NSS had still to be published, although it
was clear from briefings we received from the then MoD Permanent
Secretary that it existed in substantial outline and we understood
it had been the Government's intention to publish it before Summer
2010.[27] It was subsequently
published on the day before the SDSR. In response to our Report
the Government stated:[28]
The NSS and SDSR were developed together and were
both coherent and consistent. Crucially, the strategic approach
of the NSS and its priorities fed directly into SDSR decisions.
Clearly both the NSS and SDSR had to make hard choices about which
capabilities to protect, which to enhance, and which to cut back,
and therefore they both had to be developed in close coordination
with the Spending Review. It thus made sense to publish them in
October when their shared strategic approach could best be demonstrated.
23. During our inquiry we explored the contribution
of the NSC to the development of the NSS and SDSR. At our first
evidence session, Professor Michael Clarke commented on the linkage
between the NSC and the NSS and SDSR:[29]
If you are talking directly about the NSC, I would
say that that encapsulated quite a lot of good thinking in the
NSS. It certainly was relevant to the SDSR, but the SDSR itself
had to be handled in such a truncated way because of the time
problem that I am not convinced that the NSC had the sort of input
to the SDSR that it would have wanted, or that certainly the Ministry
of Defence would have wanted it to have. The NSC and the NSS are
very closely connected, but the NSC and the defence review are
less connected than they should have been.
24. When we put this possible lack of connection
to Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, First Sea Lord and Chief of the
Naval Staff, he responded "I am not entirely in agreement
that they are completely divorced from one another".[30]
He added that a "connection strategy is an ends, ways and
means product. The National Security Strategy itself, as a paper,
gave us the ends. The ways and the means were connected through
the publication, or the formulation, of the SDSR. I didn't necessarily
say [...] that all the consequences are perfect".[31]
25. Professor Hew Strachan, Professor of the
History of War, Oxford University, commented on the "amount
of misplaced effort that occurred because the NSC was not able
to produce a National Security Strategy in enough time to co-ordinate
what was happening in the defence review process".[32]
26. We put it to Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup,
former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and attendee at the NSC,
that the complexity of defence issues meant that the NSC inevitably
took some time to become familiar with them, and to begin to address
the most pressing problems. He acknowledged that there was a knowledge
gap when the NSC was established and that it had undergone a learning
curve which was still continuing when he stepped down as CDS.
He commented that the gap was "not so much defence, but the
complex issues of the security issues facing the UK". He
added: [33]
The NSC spent a great deal of time in the early days
focusing on AfghanistanI would say quite rightlyand
on gathering evidence from a variety of people and on developing
its thoughts and understanding of the challenges of Afghanistan.
That did not leave much time for other parts of the world, but
of course one has to prioritise. An area that we then needed to
turn toand had done only partially by the end of my timewas
Pakistan. That is a hugely complex issue and a very difficult
area, but of great importance to our national security in the
UK. There are many others besides. The NSC got to grips with the
issues as quickly as it could, and prioritised them rightly. However,
they are so many and so complex that it was inevitably going to
take time.
27. The NSC was, in our opinion, right to
prioritise operations in Afghanistan. But we are concerned that
the NSC did not appreciate the complexities of defence and security
issues and had to undergo a steep learning curve. As a result
we are not convinced that the NSC provided, at an early enough
stage, the guidance and input that were necessary for formulating
the SDSR, particularly given a truncated review period running
alongside the Comprehensive Spending Review. We note that the
next SDSR is due to be held shortly after the General Election
in 2015. We recommend that steps should be taken to ensure that
the lessons learned by the NSC and its secretariat are not lost.
Whitehall structure
28. Following the 2010 General Election, Rt Hon
Baroness Neville-Jones was appointed to the Government as Security
Minister, based in the Home Office, and a member of the NSC. At
the same time Sir Peter Ricketts KCMG, a former Foreign Office
Permanent Secretary, was appointed to the new position of National
Security Adviser.
A DEPARTMENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY?
29. During our inquiry, we considered the Whitehall
structure for addressing security issues, including the possibility
of the establishment of a separate Department for National Security
to break down the departmental-silo attitude when dealing with
national security issues. Ministers argued that the NSC had meant
that Ministers worked collectively and had not tackled issues
just from the point of view of their department. Rt Hon Oliver
Letwin MP, Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, told us:[34]
May I add something as the outsider, observing the
various Departments? What has really struck me is that we have
gone through many discussions in the National Security Council
on a wide range of issues and you cannot predict in advance "the
Foreign Office view", or "the Defence view", or
whatever. This is not operating as a series of departmental silos
with their own views. We genuinely have a discussion about how
we want to move forward on any given question and what resources
we have available to us. At that stage, people talk in terms of
what their Department can contribute. Without you being there,
I can't adequately convey this to you, but I have been enormously
impressed by the extent to which simply having this form of meeting,
the fact that it is continuousas well as having the meeting
discuss many things, rather than just one set of thingsmakes
it the case that people stop thinking of themselves simply as
departmental Ministers. They don't come and read out briefs from
their Department. They really engage togetherwe engage
togetheras a manifestation of the Government trying to
solve a national problem.
30. We do not propose the Government should
establish a separate Department for National Security. This would
be a major change, particularly when UK Armed Forces are committed
on two major operations and given the current economic situation.
However this should be kept under review as part of a continuous
assessment of the effectiveness of the NSC, particularly as new
and unexpected threats emerge.
MINISTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
31. Witnesses generally welcomed the appointment
of a National Security Adviser, but also raised doubts about whether
this should be a senior civil servant. They argued that the role
needed to be filled by a political heavyweight with the prominence
to take the lead on the national security agenda and with the
leverage to resolve disputes between departments.[35]
Some suggested that a senior official could then be appointed
as Deputy National Security Adviser.[36]
32. We put the suggestion of a Cabinet Minister
for National Security to the Foreign Secretary who replied:[37]
Maybe it is beyond our pay grades, but it is something
that we have discussed in the past. I discussed it with the Prime
Minister, particularly before we came to power. We take the view
that a Minister for Security in the Home Office is the right way
to have a Security Minister, which is what we have, and that Minister
is a member of the NSC. To operate satisfactorily, Ministers with
responsibilities in these areas need the presence in a Department
and the leverage and weight in Whitehall that comes from membership.
33. On 9 May 2011, Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones,
Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home
Office and a member of the National Security Council, stepped
down from the Government. James Brokenshire MP, an existing Home
Office Minister, was appointed as Parliamentary Under-Secretary
for Crime and Security, but without a seat on the National Security
Council. On 24 June, the Prime Minister announced that the tenure
of Sir Peter Ricketts as National Security Adviser would end in
January 2012 when he would become the UK Ambassador to France,
having held post for 21 months. His replacement was announced
as Sir Kim Darroch, currently the UK's Permanent Representative
to the EU.[38]
34. We welcome the appointment of a National
Security Adviser as a major advance. However we believe that a
dedicated, powerful and independent long-term voice for national
security should exist within Government and recommend that the
Prime Minister appoint a National Security Minister, separate
from the Home Office, to act as National Security Adviser with
a seat on the National Security Council.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT
35. The NSC is supported by a National Security
Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. The Secretariat has been created
largely from previously existing structures in the Cabinet Office.
The National Security Secretariat is headed by the National Security
Adviser. Meetings of the NSC are prepared by a weekly meeting
of officials at Permanent Under-Secretary level (NSC (Officials)),
chaired by the NSA. The MoD's written evidence stated that "[the
NSC (Officials)] meeting coordinates Government policy across
a wide range of national security issues and assesses how significant
policy questions should be presented to Ministers [and] also coordinates
the NSC forward work programme, which is agreed with the Prime
Minister".[39]
36. The organisation of the NSC secretariat was
reviewed after completion of the SDSR. The team that had been
brought together to develop the NSS and SDSR was disbanded and
the secretariat reverted to the pre-SDSR structure of five Directorates:
Foreign and Defence Policy; Strategy and Counter-terrorism; Security
and Intelligence; Cyber Security & Information Assurance;
and Civil Contingencies. The secretariat currently employs 195
people.[40] Concern has
been expressed that the NSC secretariat does not undertake its
own analysis or commission research. Professor Hew Strachan commented:[41]
I think the crucial question is the composition of
the Secretariat and how you wish to put it together. Professor
Clarke has just spoken about the inputs and the way the Secretariat
can draw things together, but we should think about how it can
generate its own inputs if there are areas it feels it should
look at, rather than be reactive to things that have been put
into it. How far can it create a demand? How far can it generate
its own demands?
37. We recommend that the NSC secretariat
be given the resources to undertake its own analysis and commission
research, with appropriate precautions put in place to avoid duplication
of work already being undertaken by individual Government Departments
and increased bureaucracy.
THE NSC AND COBR
38. It is intended that in times of emergency
the NSC sets the strategic direction and priorities, and COBR
deals with the day to day planning of operations to meet these
challenges. This was made clear in the Prime Minister's statement
to the House of Commons on Libya and the Middle East on 28 February
2011 in the context of the evacuation of UK citizens from Libya:[42]
The Government will continue to focus on ensuring
that our citizens are safe. Cobra has met regularly to co-ordinate
the effort, and I personally chaired three meetings over the weekend.
The National Security Council is looking at the overall strategic
picture, and it met last Friday and again today, not least to
look at other risks to British citizens in countries in the wider
region.
39. We agree with the separation of responsibilities
and roles between the NSC and COBR in respect of emergencies and
recommend that measures be put in place to guard against any blurring
of this in future.
Parliamentary scrutiny of the
National Security Council
40. The MoD's written evidence told us that the
NSC's effectiveness is:[43]
[...] assessed by the Cabinet through the routine
reporting of Council conclusions at each meeting. NSC discussions
can also be elevated to Cabinet when issues require the broader
collective attention of Cabinet or when outcomes of discussions
are relevant to a wider audience. This has taken place on a number
of occasions including before publication of the SDSR.
41. In our Report on the SDSR process, we stated
that we had concerns regarding how effective Parliamentary scrutiny
of the National Security Council would be carried out.[44]
The National Security Strategy included a commitment to parliamentary
scrutiny in the form of an annual report of progress of implementation
on the SDSR and the NSS for scrutiny by the Joint Committee on
the National Security Strategy.[45]
In addition, in its written evidence, the MoD stated that:[46]
Oversight of policy operation, including of decisions
reached by the NSC, is undertaken by Parliamentary Select Committees
such as the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
(JCNSS). [...] As Secretary to the NSC, the National Security
Adviser (NSA) has provided evidence to a number of Select Committees
on the effectiveness of the NSC.
42. We note the Government's commitment to
an annual report of progress of implementation of the SDSR and
NSS for scrutiny by the Joint Committee on the National Security
Strategy (JCNSS). We request more information on the format and
status of this report. We will also continue to undertake scrutiny
of the implementation of the NSS and SDSR. We also recommend that
an annual debate should be held on the annual report on progress
of implementation of the NSS and SDSR. This should be in Government
time and held in the main House of Commons Chamber.
43. We recognise the willingness of ministerial
members of the National Security Council and the National Security
Adviser to appear before select committees, other than the JCNSS,
and expect this to continue. We also expect the Government to
explore with the JCNSS and other parliamentary committees ways
of improving the National Security Council's accountability and
transparency.
ATTENDANCE OF THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION
44. In January 2010, the Prime Minister, when
Leader of the Opposition, stated that the "NSC will be responsible
as a de facto 'War Cabinet' for the conduct of the UK contribution
to the mission in Afghanistan" and that "if elected,
we will invite the leaders of the main opposition parties to attend
the war cabinet on a regular basis so they can offer their advice
and insights".[47]
At our evidence session on 9 March, we were told that the "Opposition
had been invited to meetings of the NSC" and that Rt Hon
Harriet Harman MP, when acting Leader of the Labour Party, had
attended a meeting in the early summer.[48]
Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP, Minister of State at the Cabinet Office,
explained that invitations would continue to be issued by the
Prime Minister from time to time "if there was a particular
issue on which he thought there was likely to be a huge national
advantage in doing so".[49]
We understand from the Cabinet Office that since our evidence
session, Rt Hon Edward Miliband MP, Leader of the Opposition,
attended a meeting of the NSC on 12 April 2011.
45. We commend the Prime Minister's initiative
of inviting the Leader of the Opposition to attend the NSC. We
hope that such invitations will become more frequent and that
the Leader of the Opposition will accept them.
9 Three sub-committees were also established: Threats,
Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies; Nuclear; and Emerging Powers Back
10
Q 50 Back
11
Ev 129-131; When the National Security Council was established,
the Security Minister in the Home Office, Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones
was also a member. However when Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones
left the Government on 9 May 2011 she was not replaced on the
NSC (See also para 33). Back
12
Q 52 Back
13
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, p 5 Back
14
Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2010-11, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review, HC 345, Ev 13 Back
15
Q 58 Back
16
Ev 124 and Ev 129-131 Back
17
Ev 124 and Ev 129 Back
18
Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2010-11, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review, HC 345, para 4 Back
19
Q 452 [Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackman] Back
20
Q 302 Back
21
Q 302 Back
22
Q 402 Back
23
Q 4 [Professor Michael Clarke] Back
24
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Joint
Committee on the National Security Strategy on 4 July 2011, HC
(2010-12) 1384-i, Q 2 Back
25
Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2010-12,
The Role of the FCO in UK Government, HC 665, Qq 207-210
Back
26
HC (2010-12) 665, Q 288 Back
27
Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2010-11, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review, HC 345, para 15 Back
28
Defence Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2010-11, The
Strategic Defence and Security Review: Government response to
the Committee's First Report of Session 2010-11, HC 638, p
5 Back
29
Q 3 [Professor Michael Clarke] Back
30
Q 176 Back
31
Q 177 Back
32
Q 3 [Professor Hew Strachan] Back
33
Q 260 Back
34
Q 109 [Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP] Back
35
Qq 452-453 and Ev w9 [Nigel Hall] [Note: references to Ev wXX
are references to written evidence published in the volume of
additional written evidence published on the Committee's website] Back
36
Qq 452 [Professor Julian Lindley-French] Back
37
Q 57 [Rt Hon William Hague MP] Back
38
"Senior Diplomatic Appointments", Prime Minister's press
release, 24 June 2011 Back
39
Ev 124 Back
40
However, following a review, the NSC structure would see a reduction
in staff of around 25% and the number of Directorates reduced
from five to four. See Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report
of Session 2010-12, The Role of the FCO in UK Government,
HC 665, Ev 137-138 & Ev 140. Back
41
Q 5 [Professor Hew Strachan] Back
42
HC Deb, 28 February 2011, col 24 Back
43
Ev 123 Back
44
Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2010-11, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review, HC 345, para 8 Back
45
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, para 0.21 Back
46
Ev 124 Back
47
Conservative Party, A Resilient Nation: National security Green
Paper No.13, January 2010 Back
48
Q 62 Back
49
Q 63 Back
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