The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy - Defence Committee Contents

3  National Security Strategy

Foundation of the National Security Strategy

46.  The first National Security Strategy was published by the previous Government in March 2008.[50] An update to the Strategy was published in 2009.[51] The new Coalition Government published a new National Security Strategy, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, on 18 October 2010.[52] In its foreword, the Prime Minister said that:[53]

The National Security Council has overseen the development of a proper National Security Strategy, for the first time in this country's history. To be useful, this strategy must allow the Government to make choices about the risks we face. Of course, in an age of uncertainty the unexpected will happen, and we must be prepared to react to that by making our institutions and infrastructure as resilient as we possibly can. Unlike the last Government, our strategy sets clear priorities—counter-terrorism, cyber, international military crises and disasters such as floods. The highest priority does not always mean the most resources, but it gives a clear focus to the Government's effort.

47.  The NSS asserts that "the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom is: to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen our security".[54] The first two parts of the NSS "outline [the Government's] analysis of the strategic global context and [the Government's] assessment of the UK's place in the world". It goes on to identify the UK's core objectives as: "ensuring a secure and resilient UK" and "shaping a stable world."[55] The next section, "Risks to Our Security", sets out three tiers of risks in order of priority (see below) based on a National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)[56] and then goes on to discuss the tier one risks in more detail.

National Security Strategy: Priority Risks

Tier One: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be those of highest priority for UK national security looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact.

  • International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and/or a significant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.
  • Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber crime.
  • A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response, such as severe coastal flooding affecting three or more regions of the UK, or an influenza pandemic.
  • An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK, and its allies as well as other states and non-state actors.

Tier Two: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be the next highest priority looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact. (For example, a CBRN attack on the UK by a state was judged to be low likelihood, but high impact.)

  • An attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
  • Risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas which creates an environment that terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK.
  • A significant increase in the level of organised crime affecting the UK.
  • Severe disruption to information received, transmitted or collected by satellites, possibly as the result of a deliberate attack by another state.

Tier Three: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be the next highest priority after taking account of both likelihood and impact.

  • A large scale conventional military attack on the UK by another state (not involving the use of CBRN weapons) resulting in fatalities and damage to infrastructure within the UK.
  • A significant increase in the level of terrorists, organised criminals, illegal immigrants and illicit goods trying to cross the UK border to enter the UK.
  • Disruption to oil or gas supplies to the UK, or price instability, as a result of war, accident, major political upheaval or deliberate manipulation of supply by producers.
  • A major release of radioactive material from a civil nuclear site within the UK which affects one or more regions.
  • A conventional attack by a state on another NATO or EU member to which the UK would have to respond.
  • An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider regional conflict.
  • Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (e.g. food, minerals) essential to the UK.

48.  Despite this tiered approach, the NSS asserted that:[57]

All these risk areas are important [...] and all of them require government action to prevent or mitigate the risk. In many cases, we take action precisely to prevent risks that are in Tier Two or Tier Three from rising up the scale to become more pressing and reach Tier One.

49.  The document concludes with details of how the new NSS is to be implemented. It identifies eight "cross cutting National Security Tasks",[58] which will be supported by more "detailed planning guidelines" which are set out in the SDSR.[59] The cross cutting National Security Tasks are:

1. Identify and monitor national security risks and opportunities.

2. Tackle at root the causes of instability.

3. Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks.

4. Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to help tackle those who threaten the UK and our interests.

5. Protect the UK and our interests at home, at our border, and internationally, in order to address physical and electronic threats from state and non-state sources.

6. Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability. Where necessary, intervene overseas, including the legal use of coercive force in support of the UK's vital interests, and to protect our overseas territories and people.

7. Provide resilience for the UK by being prepared for all kinds of emergencies, able to recover from shocks and to maintain essential services.

8. Work in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger responses.

50.  The NSS stated that implementation will "need a whole-of-government approach." In order to ensure that future risks can be anticipated, the Government "will ensure that strategic all-source assessment, horizon scanning and early warning feed directly into policy-making through biennial reviews of the NSRA" and "lead ministers will take responsibility for co-ordinating areas of work to deliver the national security tasks." Implementation of the NSS and SDSR is to be driven "from the centre by a cross departmental Implementation Board chaired by the Cabinet Office." This is intended to monitor "progress, risks and issues and to identify areas of concern".[60]

51.  Following publication, immediate reaction to the National Security Strategy (NSS) varied, with considerable debate about whether certain risks had been placed in the appropriate tier. There was also some criticism that both the NSS and SDSR processes had been unduly rushed in order to facilitate the Comprehensive Spending Review.[61]

UK influence in the world


52.  In their foreword to the NSS, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister stated:[62]

Our ability to meet these current and future threats depends crucially on tackling the budget deficit. Our national security depends on our economic security and vice versa. An economic deficit is also a security deficit. So at the heart of the Strategic Defence and Security Review are some tough choices to bring the defence budget back to balance. Those choices are informed by the risks, analysis and prioritisation set out in this National Security Strategy.

53.  In his evidence Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup stated that deficit reduction was the overall priority during discussions on the NSS and SDSR:[63]

One must remember that although people have charged that the SDSR was not strategic, it most certainly was strategic but the strategy was to eliminate the deficit. Frankly, even from a security and defence point of view, I would have to say that that must be the right objective. Without a strong economy, without growth and without sound finances we are not going to have secure defences. It is just not possible, and that has been proved time and again throughout history. One can argue about the tactics that are employed to repair the economy and the finances—that is a separate issue—but strategically it surely must be the right top-level objective. In all our considerations, the requirement to do that and, therefore, the requirement to reduce expenditure overrode just about everything else.

54.  We acknowledge that reduction of the budget deficit is the Government's strategic priority and that not to do so would have implications for maintaining the nation's security. It is not for us to discuss in this Report measures used to reduce the deficit although we have views on the effect on the defence budget.

55.  During the lead up to publication of the NSS and SDSR, Rt Hon William Hague MP, Foreign Secretary, made a series of keynote speeches on the Government's foreign policy thinking and priorities which informed debate on the foreign policy baseline for the NSS. When published, the NSS stated: "The networks we use to build our prosperity we will also use to build our security".[64] The NSS also asserted: "The National Security Council has reached a clear conclusion that Britain's national interest requires us to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence".[65]

56.  During our inquiry, this latter assertion caused much debate. Professor Michael Clarke of RUSI said that the Foreign Secretary in his speeches had given a "useful series of shopping lists saying that we should do lots of things, and do everything better in a more co-ordinated, efficient way." He went on to warn that:[66]

Those things are easy to say but the bottom line is about where the resources are to make things happen. What we have at the moment is an NSS of no strategic shrinkage which, I have to say, is fairly aspirational. Some part of those aspirations can be met, but probably not all of them. What we are engaged in, I guess, between now and 2014-15, is having to make some pretty hard choices as to which of those aspirations we are prepared to fund. At the moment, the NSS would have us do a little bit more of everything with rather less resource.

57.  When we asked the Foreign Secretary about these concerns, he responded:[67]

That is the objective that I am sure it is right to start with. If you just left everything to itself, given the shrinking proportion of the world's economy accounted for by the United Kingdom or the European Union, our influence would naturally shrink, so we have to exert ourselves to ensure that it does not. In the case of the Foreign Office, that means changing budgetary arrangements.

58.  Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup told us that the statement had caused much debate in the NSC.[68]

Personally, I did not buy it, and my view is that if the priority is to eliminate the deficit over the course of a Parliament, the rather drastic action that will be necessary means a period of strategic shrinkage. That is my personal view, but that was not the view that prevailed in the production of the document. As I said, what we sought to do was reverse that strategic shrinkage over the second half of the decade, but that is still an open question.

59.  According to Professor Julian Lindley-French from the Netherlands Defence Academy, the UK's influence was shrinking:[69]

I live in the Netherlands; I have lived abroad now for 25 years. I am in Washington an awful lot, and believe me our influence is shrinking rapidly. I am seeing that and hearing that. I am working closely with the French, who are very frustrated by this almost pretence that is going on in London.

What strikes me, ladies and gentleman, about the National Security Strategy is that it paints a very big picture of a big world and then promptly cuts all the tools available to influence it. That strikes me as the essential paradox of the two documents.


60.  Given the Government's aspiration of no shrinkage of influence in the world, we sought to explore the defence implications of this statement with the three Single Service Chiefs. At our evidence session with them we discussed the notion of "national ambition" contained in the NSS and SDSR. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope told us: "Following on from the obvious Afghanistan focus, national ambition seems to be set by a sense that we are quite clear that we want to remain a player on the world stage in international security and defence at a given level."[70] Chief of the Air Staff Sir Stephen Dalton added: [71]

"[The Government's] national ambition was to focus on this adaptive posture, where we would have enough to do those committed and reactive things, but where we also had the ability to do that bit more. That means that we have to have the ability to be expeditionary. The ambition was still to be able to have national forces that could be projected anywhere in the globe."

61.  When we also asked the single Service Chiefs whether looking from now until 2015 they would describe the UK's national ambition as being a full spectrum capability, each of them answered "no".[72] When our Chair put their response to the Prime Minister during his evidence session with the Liaison Committee on 17 May 2011, the following exchange took place:[73]

Q198 Mr Arbuthnot: Last week, we asked the chiefs of staff whether they would still describe our national ambition as being a full spectrum capability, and the answers were as follows. Chief of the Air Staff: No. First Sea Lord: No. Chief of the General Staff: No. Would your answer be the same?

Mr Cameron: I would answer yes.

Q199 Chair (Sir Alan Beith): Just like all Prime Ministers, you get in there, and all of a sudden we have the importance of intervention, with all the implications that that has for our defence capability.

Mr Cameron: The question being, are you a full spectrum defence power, I would answer that literally by saying yes, because I think if you look at the-

Q200 Mr Arbuthnot: Are you not a little worried that your chiefs of staff don't share that?

Mr Cameron: I will give a proper answer—I really will, I promise. If you look across the piece, you take a Navy that has got hunter-killer submarines, that has a nuclear deterrent that we are renewing, that has two of the most modern and up-to-date aircraft carriers coming down the track; if you look at our Air Force, that has got the Typhoon, one of the most capable and successful aircraft that anyone has anywhere in the world-

Chair: Prime Minister, everyone knows what we've got.

Mr Cameron: All right-and through we go and through we go. And we are spending £900 million on cyber and we have superb special forces, probably among the best in the world. To me, that definitely describes the fourth largest defence budget in the world; the sixth biggest economy. That describes to me a pretty full spectrum capability. Of course, the defence chiefs-quite rightly, because they are standing up for their services-will always want more. I think the relationship between a Prime Minister and the defence chiefs should be quite a robust one, and I like the fact that the Chief of the Defence Staff, David Richards, and I are able to have good, proper arguments and discussions. That's how it should be.

In the end, the politician is responsible. I am responsible for the fact we are still in Afghanistan. I am responsible for the fact that I am putting people's lives at risk in Libya. That is my responsibility. Our armed services do a fantastic job in delivering the intent of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, but in the end it has got to be a relationship where the politicians and the military are able to have a frank and clear discussion. And we won't always say precisely the same thing in public, which is why I am not frightened of giving a different answer publicly to what they said, because I think, when you look at our £33 billion defence budget as I say, the fourth largest in the world-you see a pretty full spectrum capability.

Of course, there are additional things you'd like to have. There is always more that you would like to have. If you were running the Navy, the Army or the Air Force, and you said, "No, I've got everything I want," you would have half your people up in arms, saying, "Hold on, what about this bit of kit or that bit of kit?" I would say that we still have a very strong set of military capabilities, the like of which only one or two other countries in the world have.

62.  At our final evidence session, we put these points to Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, who responded:[74]

Influence is not just a question of the size of our military force. The UK exerts influence in a variety of ways: diplomatic and economic, development assistance and technological and cultural exchanges. Even in the case of our military force, size is only part of the consideration. What we do with it and our willingness to use it is part and parcel of our strategic influence. We aim, as the NSS said, to deliver a distinctive British foreign policy that extends our influence and, as I said, that covers trade, economic and all sorts of other considerations. I do not believe, taken in the round, that the NSS amounts to strategic shrinkage.

63.  When asked about the Chiefs of Staffs' statements on full spectrum capability, he appeared to contradict the Prime Minister:[75]

Your question presupposes that we had a full spectrum of capability prior to the SDSR. I do not think there is a universal definition of full spectrum capability. If you were to take it as meaning that we were militarily capable of doing anything that we wanted in any theatre in the world while being totally self-reliant, I would suggest to you that it has been decades since we retained that sort of definition of a full spectrum of capability. If you were to ask whether our future capability across the air, maritime and land domains retains a wide spectrum of capabilities, undoubtedly it does. But I do not think that we have had a full spectrum of capability in decades.

64.  We note the declared aspiration of the NSC that Britain's national interest requires the rejection of any notion of the shrinkage of UK influence. We acknowledge that influence should not only be measured in military hardware or even military capability. However, given the Government's declared priority of deficit reduction we conclude that a period of strategic shrinkage is inevitable. The Government appears to believe that the UK can maintain its influence while reducing spending, not just in the area of defence but also at the Foreign Office. We do not agree. If the UK's influence in the world is to be maintained, the Government must demonstrate in a clear and convincing way that these reductions have been offset by identifiable improvements elsewhere rather than imprecise assertions of an increased reliance on diplomacy and 'soft power'. If the Government cannot do so, the National Security Strategy is in danger of becoming a 'wish list' that fails to make the hard choices necessary to ensure the nation's security.

65.  If the UK's influence in the world is to be maintained, we are concerned that the impact of defence cuts on the UK's defence commitments and role within NATO and other strategic alliances does not appear to have been fully addressed. UK defence does not operate in a vacuum and decisions taken in the UK have repercussions for the spending commitments and strategic posture of allies and alliances.

66.  We dispute the Prime Minister's assertion that the UK has a full spectrum defence capability. We note that this view has been rejected by the single Service Chiefs. Indeed the Armed Forces Minister acknowledged that the UK has not had a full spectrum capability for many years, speaking instead of delivering a wide spectrum of military capabilities in the future. We remain to be convinced that this aspiration can be achieved. We also have serious concerns about whether a full spectrum defence capability can be maintained by co-operation with our allies given the challenges of aligning political with operational needs.

Strategy: ends, ways and means

67.  The NSS stated:[76]

A national security strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination of ends (what we are seeking to achieve), ways (the ways in which we seek to achieve those ends) and means (the resources we can devote to achieving the ends) [...] It must balance the ends, ways and means. The ways and means by which we seek to achieve our objectives must be appropriate and sufficient and the objectives must also be realistic in light of the means available.

68.  Professor Michael Clarke, Director of RUSI, wrote immediately after the NSS was published:[77]

It is an honest attempt to think afresh about British security [...] The problem with it, as it presently exists, is that it is not really a strategy as such, but a methodology for a strategy. It does not make hard choices between real things—which is what strategists have to do [...] Of course, government ministers have to make the hard choices between real things all the time. But as we have seen in the last week, when the Prime Minister had to make a personal judgement between the analysis of his Chancellor as opposed to the analysis of his Defence Minister, these genuinely strategic decisions came down to a personal instinct. It is not clear that the National Security Strategy has yet gained enough political weight to inform, still less to shape, those personal instincts.

69.  On 17 November 2010, General Sir David Richards, the then new Chief of the Defence Staff, told us:[78]

I do not think that it is true, though, to say that we have lost our ability to think strategically. What we need to rediscover is how to turn that thinking into effect—to draw together the ends, ways and means. The National Security Strategy document is not a bad objective in terms of our ends, but I would say that the ways and means are an area of weakness.

70.  When we put this to the Foreign Secretary, he replied:[79]

The National Security Strategy is an assessment, largely, of the risks, the impact and likelihood of the risks, and then in broad terms, what we need to do about it. The means were more set out in the following day's publication of the Strategic Defence and Security Review, so, whether people think that is an area of weakness depends on what they think about that review. Clearly, these are things that are being properly tied together for the first time in government. In your terms, looking today at the processes here, that assessment of risks, the overall sense of strategy, and then ensuring that the SDSR supported that is what this process is.

71.  The Secretary of State for Defence added:[80]

[The then CDS] took part fully in the NSC itself in the formation of the Security Strategy and, of course, he was central to the SDSR itself. If you are interpreting the comment to mean that the military think that it would be nice to have an unlimited budget I am sure you are correct.

72.  Air Marshal Lord Stirrup, former Chief of the Defence Staff said:[81]

The NSS talks about priorities, but it does not say that you have to be able to deal with every one of those priorities to the same degree. Clearly, the amount of effort you put into the priorities depends on circumstances at the time. It depends on the international situation, but it also depends on how much you have to invest. If you have less to invest, you can cover fewer of the bets. I do not think they became disconnected; there was never a sense, going back to my earlier answer, that the NSS was going to provide you with a set answer that was going to cost a set amount and that if you did not provide that money you could not have the answer. It is scalable to a very large extent, but the significant reduction in the budget meant that the sliding scale was going to be downwards rather than upwards.

73.  Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham was critical of the NSS in terms of ways, means and ends: [82]

It seems that the NSS does not, in fact, specify the ways and means. It specifies ends, but there is very little about ways and means. Indeed, as I said in my opening remarks, there is a range of instruments that are necessary to preserve a nation's security, but I find missing from the NSS any assessment of what these ways and means actually are and what the potential penalties of not doing certain things are. Of course, I accept the right of any Government—and, more particularly, any Parliament—to decide what the national stance should be and what we are prepared to do and what we are not, but I am concerned that the NSS makes a claim that we will do something, which it then fails to support with the ways and means that it proposes, and, of course, with the finance that it has available to it.

74.  We note the Government's assertion that the NSS is the ends and the SDSR is the ways and means in terms of the delivery of national strategy. However when developing the NSS in future years, the Government should identify with greater clarity the resources required and available to achieve the desired outcomes within the framework of the national security tasks. This analysis would enable the SDSR to take informed resourcing decisions.

National Security Risk Assessment

75.  As part of the development of the NSS the Government "conducted the first ever National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) to assess and prioritise all major areas of national security risk—domestic and overseas". As part of the process:[83]

Subject-matter experts, analysts and intelligence specialists were asked to identify the full range of existing and potential risks to our national security which might materialise over a five and 20 year horizon. All potential risks of sufficient scale or impact so as to require action from government and/or which had an ideological, international or political dimension were assessed, based on their relative likelihood and relative impact. Impact was assessed based on the potential direct harm a risk would cause to the UK's people, territories, economy, key institutions and infrastructure.

76.  The NSS states that "the [NSRA] process of identifying, assessing and prioritising risks is intended to give us strategic notice about future threats to enable us to plan our response and capabilities in advance". However the NSS states that there are "limits" to this process as "we cannot predict every risk that might occur, as there is intrinsic uncertainty in human events. We must be alert to change. We will continue to assess the risks facing us." The NSS commits to a full review of the NSRA every two years.[84]

77.  In his evidence to the Committee, Professor Malcolm Chalmers said:[85]

One of the main innovations in the NSS is the attempt —in the National Security Risk Assessment—to prioritise across risks. [...]

The NSS, therefore, is a work in progress. One of the main tasks for the NSRA update, planned for 2012, should be to find methodologies that allow the Strategy to take greater account of the longer term risks that, rightly, underpin the SDSR's commitment to an Adaptable Posture.

78.  General Rupert Smith had concerns about this process taking place every two years:[86]

We have arrived at a methodology that is not, in itself, wrong, but it is a recognition of our vulnerabilities—it is about our vulnerabilities within the strategic base as opposed to out there, where, as you have said, half our objectives are. In the methodology, it assumes a threat and it assumes a context, but we do not know what the threats are. We acknowledge in the National Security Strategy that we have to manage the context, so we cannot be sure of what that is either. Those two sets of assumptions are likely to be ignored, particularly if we are going to address our risk assessment only every two years, which I think is very dodgy in a volatile world.

79.  We commend the Government on the recognition of newly acknowledged threats, such as cyber crime, in the NSS. It is important that the right risks are identified and resources prioritised accordingly.

80.  We agree that the NSRA should be formally updated every two years but this must not be at the expense of being able to adapt the National Security Strategy to meet new threats or changing situations. We recommend that the NSC should keep the NSRA methodology under review and consider adapting it to take account of longer term risks in line with the commitment to an adaptable posture.

Adaptable Posture

81.  Although the NSS ranked current risks, it also acknowledged that over the next 20 years the UK would face threats from a variety of sources. The NSS recognised preventative action, such as conflict prevention, international aid and defence diplomacy, as major objectives. The ability to identify threats at an early stage and be adaptable to them remained, however, a crucial component of the NSS:[87]

Our ability to remain adaptable for the future will be fundamental, as will our ability to identify risks and opportunities at the earliest possible stage. It will also be essential to maintain highly capable and flexible Armed Forces so that we can exercise military power when necessary.

82.  The Secretary of State for Defence outlined the alternative postures considered by the NSC and the reasons for rejecting them and opting for the 'adaptable posture':[88]

There were two other postures quite strongly advocated by some. One was that we should invest in what you might call "Fortress Britain", withdrawing back closer to home and investing in the appropriate assets in that direction. There were others who said to go exactly the other way, and that we should have a highly committed posture. Assume that the conflicts of the future would be like the ones we face in Afghanistan now, and there would be no requirement for widespread maritime capabilities, for example. We purposely chose an adaptable posture, recognising that there are always limitations on the amount of money we have available. What posture would give us the best capability to respond to the lack of predictability that exists out there?


I think that the broad decision to go for an adaptable posture was correct. Will we have to keep that constantly reviewed as the risk assessment is done every two years, and as the NSS and the SDSR are done every four years? Of course we will, but I don't see any reason, in light of experience, to change the assumptions on which the SDSR is undertaken.

83.  We support the Government's adoption of an 'adaptable posture'. Given that the nature of security threats are becoming more global, less predictable and less visible it is vital to maintain a strong pool of resources on which we can draw in order to provide the capability to adapt to changing situations. We reject any notion that the UK can just retreat and defend its borders and those of its overseas territories. However there needs to be a full assessment of what the 'adaptable posture' will cost; defining the future state without attaching an accurate assessment of the resources required undermines the authority of the Government's intentions.

50   Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, Cm 7291, March 2008 Back

51   Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 Security for the Next Generation Cm 7590, June 2009 Back

52   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010. The House of Commons was notified of the publication of the NSS through a Written Statement by the Prime Minister. See HC Deb 18 October 2010 c48WS. A number of relevant factsheets have also been published online by the Cabinet Office Back

53   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 5 Back

54   Ibid., para 0.5 Back

55   Ibid., para 0.16 Back

56   Ibid., pp 26-27, The methodology used for the NSRA is set out in more detail in paras 3.7-3.14 and Annex A of the NSS Back

57   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras 3.15-3.16 Back

58   Ibid., p 33 Back

59   HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, pp 10-12 Back

60   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras 4.09-4.13 Back

61   For examples of reaction to National Security Strategy see House of Commons Library Research Paper 11/10, UK Defence and Security Policy: A New Approach, January 2011, pp 19-21 Back

62   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 4 Back

63   Q 273 Back

64   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para 0.5  Back

65   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para 0.8 Back

66   Q 15 [Professor Michael Clarke] Back

67   Q 81 Back

68   Qq 274-275  Back

69   Q 454 [Professor Julian Lindley-French] Back

70   Q 189 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back

71   Q 189 [Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton] Back

72   Q 200 Back

73   Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee on 17 May 2011, HC (2010-12) 608-ii  Back

74   Q 519 Back

75   Q 522 Back

76   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para 0.14  Back

77   Professor Michael Clarke, Preliminary RUSI Briefing: The National Security Strategy 2010, RUSI  Back

78   Defence Committee, Appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff, Oral and written evidence, HC 600-i, Session 2010-11, Q 3 Back

79   Q 73 Back

80   Q 74 Back

81   Q 271 Back

82   Q 467 Back

83   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras 3.6-3.7 Back

84   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras 3.10-3.11 Back

85   Ev 119 and Ev 120 Back

86   Q 342 Back

87   HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para 1.33  Back

88   Q 94 Back

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Prepared 3 August 2011