3 National Security Strategy
Foundation of the National Security
Strategy
46. The first National Security Strategy was
published by the previous Government in March 2008.[50]
An update to the Strategy was published in 2009.[51]
The new Coalition Government published a new National Security
Strategy, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National
Security Strategy, on 18 October 2010.[52]
In its foreword, the Prime Minister said that:[53]
The National Security Council has overseen the development
of a proper National Security Strategy, for the first time in
this country's history. To be useful, this strategy must allow
the Government to make choices about the risks we face. Of course,
in an age of uncertainty the unexpected will happen, and we must
be prepared to react to that by making our institutions and infrastructure
as resilient as we possibly can. Unlike the last Government, our
strategy sets clear prioritiescounter-terrorism, cyber,
international military crises and disasters such as floods. The
highest priority does not always mean the most resources, but
it gives a clear focus to the Government's effort.
47. The NSS asserts that "the National Security
Strategy of the United Kingdom is: to use all our national capabilities
to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in
the world and strengthen our security".[54]
The first two parts of the NSS "outline [the Government's]
analysis of the strategic global context and [the Government's]
assessment of the UK's place in the world". It goes on to
identify the UK's core objectives as: "ensuring a secure
and resilient UK" and "shaping a stable world."[55]
The next section, "Risks to Our Security", sets out
three tiers of risks in order of priority (see below) based on
a National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)[56]
and then goes on to discuss the tier one risks in more detail.
National Security Strategy: Priority Risks
Tier One: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be those of highest priority for UK national security looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact.
- International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and/or a significant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.
- Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber crime.
- A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response, such as severe coastal flooding affecting three or more regions of the UK, or an influenza pandemic.
- An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK, and its allies as well as other states and non-state actors.
Tier Two: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be the next highest priority looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact. (For example, a CBRN attack on the UK by a state was judged to be low likelihood, but high impact.)
- An attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
- Risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas which creates an environment that terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK.
- A significant increase in the level of organised crime affecting the UK.
- Severe disruption to information received, transmitted or collected by satellites, possibly as the result of a deliberate attack by another state.
Tier Three: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be the next highest priority after taking account of both likelihood and impact.
- A large scale conventional military attack on the UK by another state (not involving the use of CBRN weapons) resulting in fatalities and damage to infrastructure within the UK.
- A significant increase in the level of terrorists, organised criminals, illegal immigrants and illicit goods trying to cross the UK border to enter the UK.
- Disruption to oil or gas supplies to the UK, or price instability, as a result of war, accident, major political upheaval or deliberate manipulation of supply by producers.
- A major release of radioactive material from a civil nuclear site within the UK which affects one or more regions.
- A conventional attack by a state on another NATO or EU member to which the UK would have to respond.
- An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider regional conflict.
- Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (e.g. food, minerals) essential to the UK.
|
48. Despite this tiered approach, the NSS asserted that:[57]
All these risk areas are important [...] and all of them require
government action to prevent or mitigate the risk. In many cases,
we take action precisely to prevent risks that are in Tier Two
or Tier Three from rising up the scale to become more pressing
and reach Tier One.
49. The document concludes with details of how the new NSS
is to be implemented. It identifies eight "cross cutting
National Security Tasks",[58]
which will be supported by more "detailed planning guidelines"
which are set out in the SDSR.[59]
The cross cutting National Security Tasks are:
1. Identify and monitor national security risks and opportunities.
2. Tackle at root the causes of instability.
3. Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks.
4. Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to
help tackle those who threaten the UK and our interests.
5. Protect the UK and our interests at home, at our border, and
internationally, in order to address physical and electronic threats
from state and non-state sources.
6. Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability. Where necessary,
intervene overseas, including the legal use of coercive force
in support of the UK's vital interests, and to protect our overseas
territories and people.
7. Provide resilience for the UK by being prepared for all kinds
of emergencies, able to recover from shocks and to maintain essential
services.
8. Work in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate
stronger responses.
50. The NSS stated that implementation will "need a whole-of-government
approach." In order to ensure that future risks can be anticipated,
the Government "will ensure that strategic all-source assessment,
horizon scanning and early warning feed directly into policy-making
through biennial reviews of the NSRA" and "lead ministers
will take responsibility for co-ordinating areas of work to deliver
the national security tasks." Implementation of the NSS and
SDSR is to be driven "from the centre by a cross departmental
Implementation Board chaired by the Cabinet Office." This
is intended to monitor "progress, risks and issues and to
identify areas of concern".[60]
51. Following publication, immediate reaction to the National
Security Strategy (NSS) varied, with considerable debate about
whether certain risks had been placed in the appropriate tier.
There was also some criticism that both the NSS and SDSR processes
had been unduly rushed in order to facilitate the Comprehensive
Spending Review.[61]
UK influence in the world
DEFICIT REDUCTION
52. In their foreword to the NSS, the Prime Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister stated:[62]
Our ability to meet these current and future threats depends crucially
on tackling the budget deficit. Our national security depends
on our economic security and vice versa. An economic deficit is
also a security deficit. So at the heart of the Strategic Defence
and Security Review are some tough choices to bring the defence
budget back to balance. Those choices are informed by the risks,
analysis and prioritisation set out in this National Security
Strategy.
53. In his evidence Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup stated
that deficit reduction was the overall priority during discussions
on the NSS and SDSR:[63]
One must remember that although people have charged that the SDSR
was not strategic, it most certainly was strategic but the strategy
was to eliminate the deficit. Frankly, even from a security and
defence point of view, I would have to say that that must be the
right objective. Without a strong economy, without growth and
without sound finances we are not going to have secure defences.
It is just not possible, and that has been proved time and again
throughout history. One can argue about the tactics that are employed
to repair the economy and the financesthat is a separate
issuebut strategically it surely must be the right top-level
objective. In all our considerations, the requirement to do that
and, therefore, the requirement to reduce expenditure overrode
just about everything else.
54. We acknowledge that reduction of the budget deficit
is the Government's strategic priority and that not to do so would
have implications for maintaining the nation's security. It is
not for us to discuss in this Report measures used to reduce the
deficit although we have views on the effect on the defence budget.
55. During the lead up to publication of the NSS and SDSR,
Rt Hon William Hague MP, Foreign Secretary, made a series of keynote
speeches on the Government's foreign policy thinking and priorities
which informed debate on the foreign policy baseline for the NSS.
When published, the NSS stated: "The networks we use to build
our prosperity we will also use to build our security".[64]
The NSS also asserted: "The National Security Council has
reached a clear conclusion that Britain's national interest requires
us to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence".[65]
56. During our inquiry, this latter assertion caused much
debate. Professor Michael Clarke of RUSI said that the Foreign
Secretary in his speeches had given a "useful series of shopping
lists saying that we should do lots of things, and do everything
better in a more co-ordinated, efficient way." He went on
to warn that:[66]
Those things are easy to say but the bottom line is about where
the resources are to make things happen. What we have at the moment
is an NSS of no strategic shrinkage which, I have to say, is fairly
aspirational. Some part of those aspirations can be met, but probably
not all of them. What we are engaged in, I guess, between now
and 2014-15, is having to make some pretty hard choices as to
which of those aspirations we are prepared to fund. At the moment,
the NSS would have us do a little bit more of everything with
rather less resource.
57. When we asked the Foreign Secretary about these concerns,
he responded:[67]
That is the objective that I am sure it is right to start with.
If you just left everything to itself, given the shrinking proportion
of the world's economy accounted for by the United Kingdom or
the European Union, our influence would naturally shrink, so we
have to exert ourselves to ensure that it does not. In the case
of the Foreign Office, that means changing budgetary arrangements.
58. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup told us that the statement
had caused much debate in the NSC.[68]
Personally, I did not buy it, and my view is that if the priority
is to eliminate the deficit over the course of a Parliament, the
rather drastic action that will be necessary means a period of
strategic shrinkage. That is my personal view, but that was not
the view that prevailed in the production of the document. As
I said, what we sought to do was reverse that strategic shrinkage
over the second half of the decade, but that is still an open
question.
59. According to Professor Julian Lindley-French from the
Netherlands Defence Academy, the UK's influence was shrinking:[69]
I live in the Netherlands; I have lived abroad now for 25 years.
I am in Washington an awful lot, and believe me our influence
is shrinking rapidly. I am seeing that and hearing that. I am
working closely with the French, who are very frustrated by this
almost pretence that is going on in London.
What strikes me, ladies and gentleman, about the National Security
Strategy is that it paints a very big picture of a big world and
then promptly cuts all the tools available to influence it. That
strikes me as the essential paradox of the two documents.
"FULL SPECTRUM CAPABILITY"
60. Given the Government's aspiration of no shrinkage of influence
in the world, we sought to explore the defence implications of
this statement with the three Single Service Chiefs. At our evidence
session with them we discussed the notion of "national ambition"
contained in the NSS and SDSR. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope told
us: "Following on from the obvious Afghanistan focus, national
ambition seems to be set by a sense that we are quite clear that
we want to remain a player on the world stage in international
security and defence at a given level."[70]
Chief of the Air Staff Sir Stephen Dalton added: [71]
"[The Government's] national ambition was to focus on this
adaptive posture, where we would have enough to do those committed
and reactive things, but where we also had the ability to do that
bit more. That means that we have to have the ability to be expeditionary.
The ambition was still to be able to have national forces that
could be projected anywhere in the globe."
61. When we also asked the single Service Chiefs whether looking
from now until 2015 they would describe the UK's national ambition
as being a full spectrum capability, each of them answered "no".[72]
When our Chair put their response to the Prime Minister during
his evidence session with the Liaison Committee on 17 May 2011,
the following exchange took place:[73]
Q198 Mr Arbuthnot: Last week, we asked the chiefs of staff
whether they would still describe our national ambition as being
a full spectrum capability, and the answers were as follows. Chief
of the Air Staff: No. First Sea Lord: No. Chief of the General
Staff: No. Would your answer be the same?
Mr Cameron: I would answer yes.
Q199 Chair (Sir Alan Beith):
Just like all Prime Ministers, you get in there, and all of a
sudden we have the importance of intervention, with all the implications
that that has for our defence capability.
Mr Cameron: The question being, are you a full spectrum
defence power, I would answer that literally by saying yes, because
I think if you look at the-
Q200 Mr Arbuthnot: Are you not
a little worried that your chiefs of staff don't share that?
Mr Cameron: I will give a proper answerI
really will, I promise. If you look across the piece, you take
a Navy that has got hunter-killer submarines, that has a nuclear
deterrent that we are renewing, that has two of the most modern
and up-to-date aircraft carriers coming down the track; if you
look at our Air Force, that has got the Typhoon, one of the most
capable and successful aircraft that anyone has anywhere in the
world-
Chair: Prime Minister, everyone knows what we've
got.
Mr Cameron: All right-and through we go and through
we go. And we are spending £900 million on cyber and we have
superb special forces, probably among the best in the world. To
me, that definitely describes the fourth largest defence budget
in the world; the sixth biggest economy. That describes to me
a pretty full spectrum capability. Of course, the defence chiefs-quite
rightly, because they are standing up for their services-will
always want more. I think the relationship between a Prime Minister
and the defence chiefs should be quite a robust one, and I like
the fact that the Chief of the Defence Staff, David Richards,
and I are able to have good, proper arguments and discussions.
That's how it should be.
In the end, the politician is responsible. I am responsible for
the fact we are still in Afghanistan. I am responsible for the
fact that I am putting people's lives at risk in Libya. That is
my responsibility. Our armed services do a fantastic job in delivering
the intent of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, but in the end
it has got to be a relationship where the politicians and the
military are able to have a frank and clear discussion. And we
won't always say precisely the same thing in public, which is
why I am not frightened of giving a different answer publicly
to what they said, because I think, when you look at our £33
billion defence budget as I say, the fourth largest in the world-you
see a pretty full spectrum capability.
Of course, there are additional things you'd like to have. There
is always more that you would like to have. If you were running
the Navy, the Army or the Air Force, and you said, "No, I've
got everything I want," you would have half your people up
in arms, saying, "Hold on, what about this bit of kit or
that bit of kit?" I would say that we still have a very strong
set of military capabilities, the like of which only one or two
other countries in the world have.
62. At our final evidence session, we put these points to
Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, who responded:[74]
Influence is not just a question of the size of our military force.
The UK exerts influence in a variety of ways: diplomatic and economic,
development assistance and technological and cultural exchanges.
Even in the case of our military force, size is only part of the
consideration. What we do with it and our willingness to use it
is part and parcel of our strategic influence. We aim, as the
NSS said, to deliver a distinctive British foreign policy that
extends our influence and, as I said, that covers trade, economic
and all sorts of other considerations. I do not believe, taken
in the round, that the NSS amounts to strategic shrinkage.
63. When asked about the Chiefs of Staffs' statements on full
spectrum capability, he appeared to contradict the Prime Minister:[75]
Your question presupposes that we had a full spectrum of capability
prior to the SDSR. I do not think there is a universal definition
of full spectrum capability. If you were to take it as meaning
that we were militarily capable of doing anything that we wanted
in any theatre in the world while being totally self-reliant,
I would suggest to you that it has been decades since we retained
that sort of definition of a full spectrum of capability. If you
were to ask whether our future capability across the air, maritime
and land domains retains a wide spectrum of capabilities, undoubtedly
it does. But I do not think that we have had a full spectrum of
capability in decades.
64. We note the declared aspiration of the NSC that Britain's
national interest requires the rejection of any notion of the
shrinkage of UK influence. We acknowledge that influence should
not only be measured in military hardware or even military capability.
However, given the Government's declared priority of deficit reduction
we conclude that a period of strategic shrinkage is inevitable.
The Government appears to believe that the UK can maintain its
influence while reducing spending, not just in the area of defence
but also at the Foreign Office. We do not agree. If the UK's influence
in the world is to be maintained, the Government must demonstrate
in a clear and convincing way that these reductions have been
offset by identifiable improvements elsewhere rather than imprecise
assertions of an increased reliance on diplomacy and 'soft power'.
If the Government cannot do so, the National Security Strategy
is in danger of becoming a 'wish list' that fails to make the
hard choices necessary to ensure the nation's security.
65. If the UK's influence in the world is to be maintained,
we are concerned that the impact of defence cuts on the UK's defence
commitments and role within NATO and other strategic alliances
does not appear to have been fully addressed. UK defence does
not operate in a vacuum and decisions taken in the UK have repercussions
for the spending commitments and strategic posture of allies and
alliances.
66. We dispute the Prime Minister's assertion that the
UK has a full spectrum defence capability. We note that this view
has been rejected by the single Service Chiefs. Indeed the Armed
Forces Minister acknowledged that the UK has not had a full spectrum
capability for many years, speaking instead of delivering a wide
spectrum of military capabilities in the future. We remain to
be convinced that this aspiration can be achieved. We also have
serious concerns about whether a full spectrum defence capability
can be maintained by co-operation with our allies given the challenges
of aligning political with operational needs.
Strategy: ends, ways and means
67. The NSS stated:[76]
A national security strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination
of ends (what we are seeking to achieve), ways (the
ways in which we seek to achieve those ends) and means (the
resources we can devote to achieving the ends) [...] It must balance
the ends, ways and means. The ways and means by which we seek
to achieve our objectives must be appropriate and sufficient and
the objectives must also be realistic in light of the means available.
68. Professor Michael Clarke, Director of RUSI, wrote immediately
after the NSS was published:[77]
It is an honest attempt to think afresh about British security
[...] The problem with it, as it presently exists, is that it
is not really a strategy as such, but a methodology for a strategy.
It does not make hard choices between real thingswhich
is what strategists have to do [...] Of course, government ministers
have to make the hard choices between real things all the time.
But as we have seen in the last week, when the Prime Minister
had to make a personal judgement between the analysis of his Chancellor
as opposed to the analysis of his Defence Minister, these genuinely
strategic decisions came down to a personal instinct. It is not
clear that the National Security Strategy has yet gained enough
political weight to inform, still less to shape, those personal
instincts.
69. On 17 November 2010, General Sir David Richards, the then
new Chief of the Defence Staff, told us:[78]
I do not think that it is true, though, to say that we have lost
our ability to think strategically. What we need to rediscover
is how to turn that thinking into effectto draw together
the ends, ways and means. The National Security Strategy document
is not a bad objective in terms of our ends, but I would say that
the ways and means are an area of weakness.
70. When we put this to the Foreign Secretary, he replied:[79]
The National Security Strategy is an assessment, largely, of the
risks, the impact and likelihood of the risks, and then in broad
terms, what we need to do about it. The means were more set out
in the following day's publication of the Strategic Defence and
Security Review, so, whether people think that is an area of weakness
depends on what they think about that review. Clearly, these are
things that are being properly tied together for the first time
in government. In your terms, looking today at the processes here,
that assessment of risks, the overall sense of strategy, and then
ensuring that the SDSR supported that is what this process is.
71. The Secretary of State for Defence added:[80]
[The then CDS] took part fully in the NSC itself in the formation
of the Security Strategy and, of course, he was central to the
SDSR itself. If you are interpreting the comment to mean that
the military think that it would be nice to have an unlimited
budget I am sure you are correct.
72. Air Marshal Lord Stirrup, former Chief of the Defence
Staff said:[81]
The NSS talks about priorities, but it does not say that you have
to be able to deal with every one of those priorities to the same
degree. Clearly, the amount of effort you put into the priorities
depends on circumstances at the time. It depends on the international
situation, but it also depends on how much you have to invest.
If you have less to invest, you can cover fewer of the bets. I
do not think they became disconnected; there was never a sense,
going back to my earlier answer, that the NSS was going to provide
you with a set answer that was going to cost a set amount and
that if you did not provide that money you could not have the
answer. It is scalable to a very large extent, but the significant
reduction in the budget meant that the sliding scale was going
to be downwards rather than upwards.
73. Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham was critical of the NSS
in terms of ways, means and ends: [82]
It seems that the NSS does not, in fact, specify the ways and
means. It specifies ends, but there is very little about ways
and means. Indeed, as I said in my opening remarks, there is a
range of instruments that are necessary to preserve a nation's
security, but I find missing from the NSS any assessment of what
these ways and means actually are and what the potential penalties
of not doing certain things are. Of course, I accept the right
of any Governmentand, more particularly, any Parliamentto
decide what the national stance should be and what we are prepared
to do and what we are not, but I am concerned that the NSS makes
a claim that we will do something, which it then fails to support
with the ways and means that it proposes, and, of course, with
the finance that it has available to it.
74. We note the Government's assertion that the NSS is
the ends and the SDSR is the ways and means in terms of the delivery
of national strategy. However when developing the NSS in future
years, the Government should identify with greater clarity the
resources required and available to achieve the desired outcomes
within the framework of the national security tasks. This analysis
would enable the SDSR to take informed resourcing decisions.
National Security Risk Assessment
75. As part of the development of the NSS the Government "conducted
the first ever National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) to assess
and prioritise all major areas of national security riskdomestic
and overseas". As part of the process:[83]
Subject-matter experts, analysts and intelligence specialists
were asked to identify the full range of existing and potential
risks to our national security which might materialise over a
five and 20 year horizon. All potential risks of sufficient scale
or impact so as to require action from government and/or which
had an ideological, international or political dimension were
assessed, based on their relative likelihood and relative impact.
Impact was assessed based on the potential direct harm a risk
would cause to the UK's people, territories, economy, key institutions
and infrastructure.
76. The NSS states that "the [NSRA] process of identifying,
assessing and prioritising risks is intended to give us strategic
notice about future threats to enable us to plan our response
and capabilities in advance". However the NSS states that
there are "limits" to this process as "we cannot
predict every risk that might occur, as there is intrinsic uncertainty
in human events. We must be alert to change. We will continue
to assess the risks facing us." The NSS commits to a full
review of the NSRA every two years.[84]
77. In his evidence to the Committee, Professor Malcolm Chalmers
said:[85]
One of the main innovations in the NSS is the attempt in
the National Security Risk Assessmentto prioritise across
risks. [...]
The NSS, therefore, is a work in progress. One of the main tasks
for the NSRA update, planned for 2012, should be to find methodologies
that allow the Strategy to take greater account of the longer
term risks that, rightly, underpin the SDSR's commitment to an
Adaptable Posture.
78. General Rupert Smith had concerns about this process taking
place every two years:[86]
We have arrived at a methodology that is not, in itself, wrong,
but it is a recognition of our vulnerabilitiesit is about
our vulnerabilities within the strategic base as opposed to out
there, where, as you have said, half our objectives are. In the
methodology, it assumes a threat and it assumes a context, but
we do not know what the threats are. We acknowledge in the National
Security Strategy that we have to manage the context, so we cannot
be sure of what that is either. Those two sets of assumptions
are likely to be ignored, particularly if we are going to address
our risk assessment only every two years, which I think is very
dodgy in a volatile world.
79. We commend the Government on the recognition of newly
acknowledged threats, such as cyber crime, in the NSS. It is important
that the right risks are identified and resources prioritised
accordingly.
80. We agree that the NSRA should be formally updated every
two years but this must not be at the expense of being able to
adapt the National Security Strategy to meet new threats or changing
situations. We recommend that the NSC should keep the NSRA methodology
under review and consider adapting it to take account of longer
term risks in line with the commitment to an adaptable posture.
Adaptable Posture
81. Although the NSS ranked current risks, it also acknowledged
that over the next 20 years the UK would face threats from a variety
of sources. The NSS recognised preventative action, such as conflict
prevention, international aid and defence diplomacy, as major
objectives. The ability to identify threats at an early stage
and be adaptable to them remained, however, a crucial component
of the NSS:[87]
Our ability to remain adaptable for the future will be fundamental,
as will our ability to identify risks and opportunities at the
earliest possible stage. It will also be essential to maintain
highly capable and flexible Armed Forces so that we can exercise
military power when necessary.
82. The Secretary of State for Defence outlined the alternative
postures considered by the NSC and the reasons for rejecting them
and opting for the 'adaptable posture':[88]
There were two other postures quite strongly advocated by some.
One was that we should invest in what you might call "Fortress
Britain", withdrawing back closer to home and investing in
the appropriate assets in that direction. There were others who
said to go exactly the other way, and that we should have a highly
committed posture. Assume that the conflicts of the future would
be like the ones we face in Afghanistan now, and there would be
no requirement for widespread maritime capabilities, for example.
We purposely chose an adaptable posture, recognising that there
are always limitations on the amount of money we have available.
What posture would give us the best capability to respond to the
lack of predictability that exists out there?
[...]
I think that the broad decision to go for an adaptable posture
was correct. Will we have to keep that constantly reviewed as
the risk assessment is done every two years, and as the NSS and
the SDSR are done every four years? Of course we will, but I don't
see any reason, in light of experience, to change the assumptions
on which the SDSR is undertaken.
83. We support the Government's adoption of an 'adaptable
posture'. Given that the nature of security threats are becoming
more global, less predictable and less visible it is vital to
maintain a strong pool of resources on which we can draw in order
to provide the capability to adapt to changing situations. We
reject any notion that the UK can just retreat and defend its
borders and those of its overseas territories. However there needs
to be a full assessment of what the 'adaptable posture' will cost;
defining the future state without attaching an accurate assessment
of the resources required undermines the authority of the Government's
intentions.
50 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy
of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world,
Cm 7291, March 2008 Back
51
Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United
Kingdom: Update 2009 Security for the Next Generation Cm 7590,
June 2009 Back
52
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010. The
House of Commons was notified of the publication of the NSS through
a Written Statement by the Prime Minister. See HC Deb 18 October
2010 c48WS. A number of relevant factsheets have also been published
online by the Cabinet Office Back
53
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 5 Back
54
Ibid., para 0.5 Back
55
Ibid., para 0.16 Back
56
Ibid., pp 26-27, The methodology used for the NSRA is set
out in more detail in paras 3.7-3.14 and Annex A of the NSS Back
57
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras
3.15-3.16 Back
58
Ibid., p 33 Back
59
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, pp 10-12 Back
60
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras
4.09-4.13 Back
61
For examples of reaction to National Security Strategy see House
of Commons Library Research Paper 11/10, UK Defence and Security
Policy: A New Approach, January 2011, pp 19-21 Back
62
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 4 Back
63
Q 273 Back
64
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para
0.5 Back
65
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para
0.8 Back
66
Q 15 [Professor Michael Clarke] Back
67
Q 81 Back
68
Qq 274-275 Back
69
Q 454 [Professor Julian Lindley-French] Back
70
Q 189 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back
71
Q 189 [Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton] Back
72
Q 200 Back
73
Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee on 17 May 2011,
HC (2010-12) 608-ii Back
74
Q 519 Back
75
Q 522 Back
76
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para
0.14 Back
77
Professor Michael Clarke, Preliminary RUSI Briefing: The National
Security Strategy 2010, RUSI Back
78
Defence Committee, Appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff,
Oral and written evidence, HC 600-i, Session 2010-11, Q 3 Back
79
Q 73 Back
80
Q 74 Back
81
Q 271 Back
82
Q 467 Back
83
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras
3.6-3.7 Back
84
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, paras
3.10-3.11 Back
85
Ev 119 and Ev 120 Back
86
Q 342 Back
87
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, para
1.33 Back
88
Q 94 Back
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