4 Strategic Defence and Security Review
Background
84. Following the May 2010 General Election,
the new Coalition Government started work on a Strategic Defence
and Security Review. This was the first defence review for 12
years, the last having taken place in 1998. Unlike previous Strategic
Defence Reviews, the review was widened to include security matters
and was to be overseen by the new National Security Council and
developed alongside a new National Security Strategy and a Comprehensive
Spending Review. The Ministry of Defence's written evidence to
our earlier inquiry into the processes followed in the development
of the SDSR stated: [89]
The combination of the SDSR and NSS will provide
a coherent approach to security across Government and ensure the
right balance of resources to meet our commitments. It is a fundamental
objective to ensure that our Armed Forces have what they need
to do what is asked of them.
The approach being taken by the NSC involves analysis
of national security policy and capability across all relevant
Government Departments and agencies. For this reason the Review
is being led from the centre of Government, the Cabinet Office
working with the Treasury. Defence capabilities and resources
are accordingly being considered alongside all other security
capabilities in order to measure the relative cost effectiveness
of each. Cost effectiveness of capabilities will be measured by
what they offer and how effective they are at addressing the defence
and security challenges of the 21st Century. This will enable
Ministers to consider relative priorities across all national
security capabilities in an integrated way. Depending on the outcome
of the SDSR, some national security capabilities may be reduced
to enhance others if that provides the most effective means of
protecting the UK's national security interests.
85. The previous Government had started work
on a new SDR in late 2009 and published a Green Paper in February
2010. When taking up post in May 2011, Rt Hon Liam Fox MP, Secretary
of State for Defence, initiated work in the MoD on the new widened
review. The MoD undertook 41 individual policy and capability
studies in respect of the SDSR. The conclusions of the SDSR were
published as a White Paper[90]
on 19 October 2010 with the Prime Minister making a statement
to the House.[91] It
is proposed that future SDSRs shall be held every five years with
the next one due in 2015.[92]
We commend the Government on the principle of their stated intention
of regular SDSRs every five years. A gap of 12 years between reviews
should never be allowed to occur again. However we have concerns
that future SDSRs will therefore be tied too closely to the electoral
cycle and call on the Government to explore ways of breaking this
link. Whilst welcoming the widening of the scope of the review
to include security issues, we repeat the concern expressed in
our earlier Report on the SDSR process that there is some risk
of dilution of the defence contribution due to possible immediate
or short term threats which may dominate the agenda to the exclusion
of long-term defence assessments by the MoD.
86. The SDSR stated that "Afghanistan remains
the main effort of Defence [...] and the Government is fully committed
to ensuring that the campaign is properly resourced, funded and
equipped".[93] Since
publication of the SDSR, UK Armed Forces have also been committed
to operations in Libya under UN Security Council Resolution 1973.
We assess the impact of this new operation in the context of the
SDSR later in this report. We agree with the Government's statement
in the SDSR that Afghanistan remains the top priority. We shall
continue to monitor the Government's pledge that operations there
will be properly resourced, funded and equipped. We note that
since publication of the SDSR UK Armed Forces have been committed
to operations in Libya. We will monitor this operation closely
and will be conducting an inquiry into Operations in Libya in
October 2011.
87. In November 2010, the then new Chief of the
Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards explained to us his
interpretation of the SDSR:[94]
My interpretation, as we would operate within the
military, is that the Commander's intent is the National Security
Strategy, while our detailed orders are the SDSR document. As
I have said a couple of times, I think the National Security Strategy—we
could debate whether it is a strategy in the sense of a grand
strategy, which is a different issue, but it has clear aiming
points for all of us—is good and clear. We need to get there;
how quickly is the issue. The SDSR is our immediate aiming point—i.e.
Future Force 2020. While we veer and haul around what is deliverable
within the 2020 time line, and I am sure you will want to probe
into that, that is my interpretation of orders. But, as with everything
else in military operations, the enemy has a vote and money is
a factor—all the things we know will make aspects of the
SDSR challenging to deliver.
88. The SDSR started by expanding on the eight
National Security Tasks contained in the NSS and sets out "more
detailed planning guidelines on how they are to be achieved"[95]
and goes on to state that "these will drive detailed decisions
by departments over the next five years on how to prioritise resource
allocation and capability development."[96]
The following sections attempted to "explain how all government
departments will implement these new National Security Tasks and
Planning Guidelines".[97]
These were followed by sections on the implications for alliances
and the structural reforms required to implement these changes.
Military Tasks and Defence Planning
Assumptions
89. The SDSR stated that the UK "will take
a new approach to developing and employing the Armed forces, consistent
with the key elements of the adaptable posture" and will
"deliver a major restructuring of the Armed Forces in order
to generate future military capabilities."[98]
90. The MoD's written evidence stated:[99]
Based on the adaptable posture the NSC agreed a set
of eight cross-cutting National Security Tasks that link to the
priorities set out in NSS, with more detailed Planning Guidelines
on how they are to be achieved. These will drive detailed decisions
by Departments over the next five years on how to prioritise resource
allocation and capability development.
Within the overall framework of the National Security
Tasks the contribution of the Armed Forces is further defined
through Military Tasks, which describe what the Government may
ask the Armed Forces to undertake; and through more detailed Defence
Planning Assumptions about the size of the operations we plan
to undertake, how often we might undertake them, how far away
from permanent bases, with which partners and allies, and how
soon we expect to recover from the effort involved. The seven
Military Tasks are:
- defending the UK and its Overseas
Territories
- providing strategic intelligence
- providing nuclear deterrence
- supporting civil emergency organisations in times
of crisis
- defending our interests by projecting power strategically
and through expeditionary interventions
- providing a defence contribution to UK influence
- providing security for stabilisation.
The new Defence Planning Assumptions envisage that
the Armed Forces in the future will be sized and shaped to conduct:
- an enduring stabilisation operation
at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime
and air support as required, while also conducting:
- one non-enduring complex intervention
(up to 2,000 personnel), and
- one non-enduring simple intervention
(up to 1,000 personnel);
or alternatively:
- three non-enduring operations
if we were not already engaged in an enduring operation;
or:
- for a limited time, and with
sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention
of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around
30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003).
91. The SDSR stated that the new Defence Planning
Assumptions (DPAs) "serve as a planning tool to guide us
in developing our forces rather than a set of fixed operational
plans or a prediction of the precise operations we will undertake".[100]
The SDSR also outlined, for planning purposes, the three types
of operations that the Armed Forces might be required to undertake:[101]
- standing commitments, which
are permanent operations essential to our security or to support
key British interests around the world;
- intervention operations, which
are short-term, high-impact military deployments;
- stabilisation operations, which
are longer-term mainly land-based operations to stabilise and
resolve conflict situations primarily in support of reconstruction
and development and normally in partnership with others.
Operations are further divided into:
- non-enduring operations, which last less than
six months, typically requiring a force to be deployed and then
withdrawn without replacement. Examples might include evacuation
of UK citizens (as in Lebanon in 2006) or a counter-terrorist
strike operation
- enduring operations, which last for more than
six months and normally require units to carry out a tour of duty
and then be replaced by other similar units.
These descriptions help us to structure and scale
our forces, rather than to plan for specific operations. In reality
there is considerable overlap between types of operation and our
forces must be flexible enough to adapt.
92. One of the intentions of the SDSR was to
"confront the legacy of overstretch." It asserted that
"between 2006 and 2009 UK forces were deployed at medium
scale in both Iraq and Afghanistan" and that "this exceeded
the planning assumptions that had set the size of our forces and
placed greater demands both on our people and on their equipment
than had been planned for."[102]
93. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope suggested that
the DPAs demonstrated the UK's national ambition:[103]
Following on from the obvious Afghanistan focus,
national ambition seems to be set by a sense that we are quite
clear that we want to remain a player on the world stage in international
security and defence at a given level. That is defined by the
defence planning assumptions, which are: a stabilisation operation
at a slightly smaller scale than Afghanistan, a complex intervention
for example Libya, and another non-complex operation of an evacuation
scale. Those latter two are timed to be no longer than six months.
There is a clear ambition that this is what we want to achieve,
as well as recognising the day-to-day business.
94. The single Service Chiefs told us that the
current operations in Afghanistan and Libya were within the Defence
Planning Assumptions in the SDSR. Admiral Mark Stanhope noted
that according to the DPAs the Navy was not currently overstretched:[104]
In terms of the defence planning assumption as one
stabilisation operation and two complex and non-complex operations—likening
Libya to a complex operation—according to the requirement,
no, we are not. We are stretched, though, across the other requirements,
which makes it quite challenging.
Given the current tempo of operations, the single
Service Chiefs agreed that their respective Services were stretched
but not overstretched.[105]
In June 2011 tensions arose between senior military personnel
and the prime Minister following comments by Admiral Sir Mark
Stanhope and Air Chief Marshal Sir Simon Bryant regarding the
demands being placed on the Armed Forces.
95. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup, former CDS,
was concerned about potential circumstances arising that would
be very serious for UK national security. He commented:[106]
We need to keep something, in terms of contingency,
in reserve to deal with such very serious threats, should they
materialise. So, I get very concerned not only about exceeding
the defence planning assumptions, but about committing everything
we have to continuing operations. This is not about keeping everything
in reserve, just in case something comes up; that clearly does
not make any sense. However, it is about keeping sufficient contingency
to deal with the unexpected when it is very close to home in terms
of our interests.
96. Wing Commander Andrew Brookes, Director,
Air League (which exists to promote the cause of British aviation),
went further and asserted that the UK could not carry out all
the tasks envisaged in the DPAs:[107]
There are three tasks that are laid down: an enduring
stabilisation operation, a non-enduring complex and a non-enduring
civil intervention—that is, an Afghanistan, a Libya and
rescuing everybody out of Zimbabwe. We can no longer do the third;
the third is beyond us. We already do not have the funding to
do what is in there.
97. When he was Shadow Secretary of State for
Defence, on 30 April 2010, the current Secretary of State for
Defence wrote that "a future Conservative Government will
aim to bring commitments and resources into line".[108]
98. While we acknowledge that the Defence
Planning Assumptions in the SDSR serve as a planning tool rather
than a set of fixed operational plans or a prediction of precise
operations that will be undertaken, we are concerned that as currently
applied they suggest that UK Armed Forces will be continually
operating at the maximum level envisaged by the Assumptions. This
has serious implications. The Government should ensure that sufficient
contingency is retained to deal with the unexpected. It is not
sufficient to wait for the end of combat operations in Afghanistan
at the end of 2014.
99. We note the Government's intention to
"confront the legacy of overstretch" citing the operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006-09 as examples. The new Defence
Planning Assumptions in the SDSR suggest that in future the Armed
Forces would not be asked to undertake operations of a similar
nature to Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. The Government
should indicate if this is the case in their response to this
Report.
100. When committing to undertake new operations,
such as Libya, the Government should state from the outset where
that operation fits in the Defence Planning Assumptions and which
of the military tasks it is meeting. This should not be limited
to the numbers of Armed Forces personnel required, but also the
capabilities that will be deployed and the consequences that this
may have for other operations or wider defence-related matters,
such as the defence budget and defence industry priorities. We
can only conclude that the Government has postponed the sensible
aspiration of bringing commitments and resources into line, in
that it has taken on the new commitment of Libya while reducing
the resources available to the MoD.
Decisions affecting Military
capability
101. As part of the move towards Future Force
2020, the SDSR announced several changes to the configuration
of each of the Services.[109]
The recommendations were wide-ranging and some extremely controversial.
Among the proposals were:
- to decommission the UK's current
aircraft carriers and Harrier aircraft, thereby creating a 10-year
gap in Carrier Strike capability.
- To continue with the procurement
of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier and procure the
carrier-variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) from 2020.
- To withdraw all British Forces
in Germany by 2020.
- Immediately to cancel the Nimrod
MRA4 programme.
- To close as surplus to RAF
requirements RAF Kinloss and two other RAF bases
We were unable to cover all the capability decisions
contained in the SDSR, instead concentrating on those listed above
and examining how they flowed from the NSS and the military tasks,
Defence Planning Assumptions and the plans for Future Force 2020
listed in the SDSR.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND CARRIER-STRIKE
CAPABILITY
102. The Aircraft Carrier and Harrier Force decisions
caused much debate during our inquiry and formed the bulk of the
written evidence we received.[110]
We focused on the plan to go ahead with procuring both Queen Elizabeth
carriers, the uncertainty of the future role of the second carrier
and the 10-year gap in carrier-strike capability caused by the
replacement of the Harrier fleet with the carrier-variant of the
JSF and the installation of catapult and arrestor gear.
103. At a strategic level, Professor Chalmers
from RUSI was uncertain how the decisions flowed from the NSS:
"in the discussion of the aircraft carrier decision, there
was an explicit difference drawn out between the threat environment
that we face in the next 10 years, which doesn't require carrier-based
aircraft, and what we anticipate after that, which does. But that
isn't related back to the analysis in the NSS."[111]
A single operational carrier
104. The SDSR announced that HMS Ark Royal would
be decommissioned immediately. Following a short further study
after the SDSR, the MoD announced that HMS Illustrious would leave
service in 2014 after Helicopter carrier HMS Ocean returned to
service after a planned refit and that HMS Ocean would be retained
to provide a helicopter platform capability in the longer term.[112]
105. The Government decided to continue with
the procurement, started under the previous Administration, of
two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers which would provide
the carrier strike capability from 2020. Although the SDSR accepted
the "strategic requirement for a future carrier strike capability",
it could not foresee circumstances in which the UK would require
the scale of strike capability planned by the procurement of two
Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. It is therefore planned
to operate only one of the aircraft carriers with the other held
at extended readiness which left open the options "to rotate
them, to ensure a continuous UK carrier-strike capability; or
to regenerate more quickly a two-carrier strike capability."
The SDSR also stated that one of the carriers might be sold and
the UK would rely on cooperation with a 'close ally' to provide
continuous carrier-strike capability. The next SDSR in 2015 would
review these options to take account of how the "future strategic
environment develops".[113]
106. First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff,
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, commented on having only one operational
carrier:[114]
I'm very clear that if you want to have a capability
that's available to this nation continuously, you can't do that
with one carrier. The French one is a good example. You have your
capability five years in eight, because three years, roughly,
are taken up either maintaining it or working it up. So if you
want a continuous capability, you need both carriers. The options
sit in the SDSR, and you're quite right: there is some indecision.
But we're building both carriers, and that's the way ahead at
the moment.
107. Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, former First
Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, agreed that it would be "very
challenging to run the carrier force that we want on one ship
only".[115]
108. At our final evidence session General Houghton,
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, stated that:[116]
We proceed to abide by the SDSR outcome that one
will be in operational use and a second at extended readiness.
But we sensibly delayed till 2015 a decision on whether or not
to keep it in extended readiness in perpetuity or actually to
use the existence of the second carrier in the context of what
might be a different financial situation, whether or not we want
to make operational use of it. Therefore, we give ourselves the
ability to have a carrier available 100% of the time rather than
just what would be five years out of seven.
109. We believe that for an aircraft carrier
to be held in a state of extended readiness it must be fitted
with catapults and arrestor gear.
110. We challenged General Houghton that if the
UK only had one aircraft carrier, every time it went into refit
it would prove to the Treasury that it was not needed. He responded:[117]
That is palpably a serious risk. That is one of the
areas where, as it were, in international collaboration, it would
make sense—would it not?—between, for example, ourselves
and the French, that we made certain, in terms of the availability
of our single carriers, that we so rostered them that there was
a seamless availability between the two nations.
111. We explored this proposed interoperability
further in terms of the capability of UK and French carriers.
General Houghton agreed that it would not be possible to 'fight'
from the French carrier, Charles de Gaulle, and that a fully laden
JSF would also be unable to land.[118]
Despite these caveats General Houghton asserted:[119]
If there is a political agreement that there will
be defence co-operation and political decision making about the
commitment of a coalition force, everything flows from that. We
cannot just say, "I'm not certain that we get on with the
French." There will be issues of interoperability, but if
the political will is there to make the defence co-operation treaty
a reality of political will in real-time scenarios, we would salute,
turn to the right and match our capabilities accordingly.
112. We note that the MoD is still examining
the options to bring into service the Queen Elizabeth class carriers.
We understand that this includes the timing of fitting the catapults
and arrestor gear, including whether one or both carriers should
have the system fitted. We have received no evidence that any
analysis has been carried out on the cost and scope of work required,
or on the financial and technical consequences of switching JSF
variant at the time of the SDSR. We expect the MoD to publish
its work programme and final requirements for the conversion of
the carriers and JSF by the end of 2012.
Harrier Force and the JSF
113. The SDSR also announced that the Harrier,
which provided the carrier-strike capability, would be retired
from service by April 2011. A smaller Tornado fleet would provide
more diverse fast jet capability in the near term in respect of
Afghanistan and any other concurrent operational requirement.[120]
114. The SDSR also announced that catapult and
arrestor gear would be installed on the single operational carrier.
This would delay the in-service date from 2016 to 2020 and mean
a ten year gap in carrier-strike capability but would allow "greater
interoperability with US and French carriers and naval jets"
which would "ensure continuous carrier strike capability
and reduce the overall carrier protection requirements on the
rest of the fleet". The installation of catapult and arrestor
gear would also allow the acquisition of the carrier-variant of
the JSF instead of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL)
variant to replace the Harrier Force. The SDSR asserted that this
version of the JSF had a longer range and greater payload which
was the "critical requirement for precision strike operations
in the future".[121]
It is envisaged that the single carrier would routinely carry
12 fast jets for operations while retaining the capacity to deploy
up to 36 as previously planned.
115. Wing Commander Andrew Brookes thought that:[122]
The JSF decision was exactly the right one. The carrier
variant goes further and carries more; it is far more potent and
has much more utility. Once you have decided to go for the 65,000-tonne
carrier, you don't even need the jumping bean up-and-down capability
that the other carrier had, so I think that is a very good decision.
116. Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham agreed:[123]
I have always believed that the provision of a conventionally
catapult-launched aircraft added vastly to the capability of any
aircraft carrier. The payload is greater, the range is greater,
you can recover them more easily and so on and so forth. So I
think that decision is extremely sensible in principle, although
it does, to my mind, open the question as to which aircraft we
should buy, because the Joint Strike Fighter would not be the
only possible contender for such a role. But it is certainly the
most expensive.
117. However, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band was critical
of the late decision to convert to catapult and arrestor gear:[124]
My view is that that was quite a late call in the
SDSR process, from all indications; I don't know, but I think
it was a fairly late call. To make the change of variant call
and at the same time to get rid of your Harrier force, which would
have helped you to get there, is unfortunately a strange set of
decisions—let me put it that way—in my view. The Navy
has got the will, as I have said to one of your colleagues, to
get over that problem, but in my view it is not a clever way of
doing it; it is a destructive way.
[...] I was absolutely clear—this is exactly
what I said when I was First Sea Lord on whether we could afford
to keep the Tornado and the Harrier going—that we needed
that sovereign capability and a route to the new carrier capability,
so we should keep a small Harrier force going, operating off the
CVSs. When Queen
Elizabeth
arrives, she should be a Harrier carrier. If at some stage someone
wanted to do a cats and traps change, it should go into the Prince
of Wales, which would be worked up as the first JSF carrier, and
then, if you could afford it, you convert Queen Elizabeth. That
was a very, very simple plot, which I'd guess—though I don't
have my hands on the figures—would be the cheapest decision,
too.
118. We discussed with Vice Admiral Jeremy Blackham
whether a small number of Harriers should have been retained to
meet the capability gap. He commented:[125]
We have Illustrious, which has just come out of refit
this week, I think, and will be able to be in service for quite
a long time yet, if we wanted to do that. So it would have been
possible to keep a ship that was prepared, ready and able. Temporary
detachments to other ships work, but they are not the real thing.
It would be very difficult to maintain the skills that way. What
I am saying is that we have allowed short-term considerations—because
the SDSR is dominated by short-term considerations—to undermine
our long-term vision. That seems to me to be anything but strategic.
119. In response Wing Commander Andrew Brookes
stated: "Although I hear everything that everyone is saying,
we have probably gone past the point of no return. I think you
will find that the crews who flew the Harriers are now going through
Typhoon training. Much as I agree with him entirely—it is
a bit silly to have an aircraft carrier with no aircraft on it—I
think that that is past".[126]
120. We acknowledge the major contribution
of the Harrier Force to the Armed Forces and to the security of
the UK. We regret that it has been removed from service. We acknowledge
the many pieces of evidence that called for the reintroduction
of the Harrier Force. However we agree with our witnesses who
stated that it is too late to do so due to the cost, industry
losing the relevant personnel and the pilots being redeployed.
We call on the Government to ensure that the best deal possible
is achieved in the disposal of the Harrier fleet and expect the
Government to provide us with full details as soon as any agreement
is reached.
Carrier strike capability gap and regeneration
121. We asked Sir Jonathon Band about the effect
of a 10-year capability gap on the ability to conduct expeditionary
operations:[127]
If you haven't got carrier air, and you have a worry
either that you don't get the overflight or it comes too late
for the operations, you have answered your own question. You are
seriously limited. We can still do expeditionary operations. The
challenge will be how high in intensity they can be without an
aircraft carrier of your own, or without relying on the French
or Americans to do it for you. If the members of the right partnership
all agree the mission, we can probably still do quite a lot, and
what we provide will be high quality. When it comes to doing something
that only worries Britain, then we are badly placed.
He added "for the period that we do not have
any carrier capability, you could not do a rerun of something
like Sierra Leone. We can't do anything by ourselves where there
is serious risk, because you would not do that without a carrier."[128]
122. At our session with the single Service Chiefs
we discussed plans for regenerating the carrier-strike capability.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton commented:[129]
The key for getting the capability together is to
ensure that we have the ability to regrow the proficiency not
only to fly aeroplanes, but to operate aeroplane—in other
words, all the people who make up the capability. People tend
to think that is the pilots, but there are also the engineering
personnel on board a carrier and the personnel who direct assets
on and off the carrier. We need to make sure, as we are doing,
that we are putting together a coherent plan that makes sure that
we can develop those people and give them the necessary experience
so that we keep them available to us for when we have the capability
in place. That is part of the strategy we're working right now
to achieve.
123. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope added:[130]
That is a very important point. In terms of working
it up, it is not just the carrier that is not available; you have
no way of maintaining competencies, which is something that requires
constant training, in the three-year down period. You may be able
to leverage off your allies, which of course we would do, but
you can never leverage enough, nor would they be willing to supply
that much. Then you would have a long period of getting back into
the saddle again.
124. At our final evidence session, we asked
the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff about the plan for regenerating
the capability and when it would be available for us to examine:[131]
My personal ambition is to scrutinise the plan at
the DOB Carrier Strike—subsequently re-titled DOB Carrier
Enabled Capability—on about 13 July, when the senior responsible
officer, Rear-Admiral Amjad Hussain, is presenting his Level 0
Plan to me. I am absolutely confident that there will be some
holes in that plan; of that, I have absolutely no doubt. But I
am also pretty confident that sub-strands of work will be beavering
away to plug the holes in that plan. I recognise most of what
you said as some of the challenges of bringing about the regeneration
of this capability in a 2020 time frame. It is significant. [...]
In terms of complexity, this thing is about the size
of putting on the Olympics. Do not underestimate the complexity
of this thing; I am sure you do not. The closer we can get—the
more time you give, the more robust the plan will be—and,
therefore, please wait until the autumn at least, so that we are
confidently maturing it.
125. According to the recent National Audit Office's
report on the value for money of the carrier programme,[132]
when the main investment decision was made in respect of the two
Queen Elizabeth carriers in 2007, the estimated cost was £3.65
billion. In July 2010, prior to the SDSR, this had risen to £5.24
billion and following the SDSR rose to £6.24 billion which
included the additional £1 billion cost of converting one
carrier to catapult and arrestor gear. The report suggests that
SDSR decisions should realise savings of some £3.4 billion
over ten years. The report raised concerns that the SDSR is unaffordable
unless there is a real terms increase in defence funding from
2015 onwards and that continuing problems faced by the MoD in
balancing its budget means that the programme is vulnerable to
further change. It also noted that the decisions in the SDSR had
introduced additional technical, cost and schedule uncertainty
and there were concerns regarding the regeneration of the capability
especially as the ways they may be used operationally is still
developing.
126. We support the decision to proceed with
both the Queen Elizabeth class carriers and to develop the JSF
carrier strike capability. We share the concerns of allies regarding
the lifetime costs of the JSF.[133]
We expect the MoD to take action to ensure that the costs
are controlled and to update us on this work on a regular basis.
We note that the MoD is currently developing a plan for the regeneration
of this capability and expect to have a sight of it at an early
stage. The scale of the challenge the Ministry of Defence faces
in generating the complex network of skills involved in flying
fast jets from carriers in a manner not undertaken by the UK for
many years is so great that this plan needs to be subjected to
robust scrutiny both in Parliament and elsewhere. The plan must
provide clarity of the steps being taken, specific milestones
and dates and what funding is required and whether it is in place.
We also note concerns regarding the future use of the second carrier
and call on the Government to keep us informed of its plans as
they progress.
Nimrod MRA4
127. The SDSR announced that the Nimrod MRA4
maritime aircraft programme would not be brought into service.[134]
This is expected to save over £2 billion over the next ten
years.[135]
128. This rebuilt aircraft would have extended
the operating life of the Nimrod fleet by several decades. It
would have had more efficient jet engines, thus increasing its
flight range, and an improved flight deck to simplify control
operations and reduce crew requirements. New detection systems
would have been installed, as well as additional weapons for anti-submarine
warfare. It had, however, been subject to significant delays and
cost overruns.
129. On his appointment as Chief of the Defence
Staff in November 2010, General Sir David Richards, told us the
decision to dispense with this programme had been "very difficult".
He considered the decision an acceptable risk but not a gamble.[136]
We live within a financial envelope and the key requirement,
if you are going to make big savings, is to take out a whole capability.
It hasn't been a happy acquisition story. Given that its primary
role is to do with the deterrent, of which it is one of five layers
that do that sort of thing [...] the view was that it was a risk
that was acceptable, and we have all signed up to that. I cannot
go into the detail of those layers of activity, but people who
know much more about it than me were of a view that, in this respect,
it was a risk but it was not a gamble.
In regard to the Nimrod MRA4's wider role, he added:[137]
On its wider role in things like counter-piracy,
what we will have to do—and it is one reason why we have
enthusiastically entered the Anglo-French arrangement, the new
treaty—is to look at how we can, in an alliance, start to
compensate for areas that we might not have enough of, or have
at all, but that other countries have. That is going to be a reality
as we take all this forward, as equipment gets more expensive
and all that sort of thing.
130. The single Service Chiefs gave some examples
of the measures being taken to mitigate the risks associated with
this loss of capability. Air Chief Marshal Stephen Dalton commented
that "in support of operations and submarine activity, the
Navy are making greater use of frigates and of their Merlin helicopters
to protect the sea lanes and prosecution of identification and
attacks on submarines". In respect of long range search and
rescue capability he described the use of "E-3D command and
control radar aeroplanes [as the] co-ordinator and control of
the search and rescue efforts" and "the ability of [...]Hercules
to launch life rafts into the sea".[138]
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope added:[139]
The loss of the risk can be mitigated under the current
threat levels that we are expecting to envisage and we are into
security areas here which I do not want to go into. So we can
mitigate in terms of the delivery of the strategic deterrent as
well as in terms of the force protection of deployed task groups.
In respect of counter-piracy he agreed with General
Sir David Richards that this was an "area in which [...]
we will have to rely a lot more on our allies than we have in
the past".[140]
131. We questioned witnesses whether the removal
of the Nimrod MRA4 was consistent with the military tasks in the
SDSR of providing a nuclear deterrent, gathering strategic intelligence,
protecting the UK and providing security for stabilisation (for
example anti-piracy operations). Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup
stated that:[141]
Anti-submarine warfare is one of the most difficult
military tasks that the Armed Forces carry out. It is very complex
and requires a layered approach. That has been demonstrated clearly
over the years, and wide area surveillance is a very important
element within that. [...] We have now lost that. In the light
of current threats, it is not a critical weakness, but should
the threat re-emerge—it could well re-emerge—it would
become an important weakness.
132. Wing Commander Andrew Brookes commented
on the decision in respect of the priority risks listed in the
NSS:[142]
There are 15 security priority risks. I have gone
through and listed the ones that require the maritime reconnaissance,
and eight out of 15 require that. Here we have over half the tasks,
and they are not being met because the MPA aren't used. I remember
the Falklands; we only retook the Falklands, arguably, because
we had the Nimrod and we had the Victor with its radar in the
front that could sweep everywhere around the Falklands and South
Georgia to make sure there were no naval vessels in the area.
That capability is gone. We're a maritime nation, and we do not
have that capability. That seems the biggest sin of all.
133. Our inquiry also explored how this capability
and the required skills base could be regenerated. Air Chief Marshal
Lord Stirrup noted:[143]
It would be very difficult to recover from because
it is a very specialised field. It requires a great deal of expertise
and quite a lot of experience. I cannot give a specific answer
on a plan to recover a wider surveillance capability for anti-submarine
warfare, because it is not yet clear how it is to be done. I suspect
that inevitably it will involve bringing in help from allies,
who have retained their capability and building upon that, and
slowly rebuilding the UK's own seed corn.
134. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup commented
on the area of the SDSR which he would revisit if more money became
available:[144]
I think probably the whole area of intelligence surveillance,
targeting and reconnaissance. It was an area that we wanted to
protect in the SDSR. It was set out as a clear policy decision
not only to protect it but, if possible, to improve it. That was
not possible, given the financial constraints. So we have reduced
in those areas, and I suspect that my first area of concern would
be to reverse some of those reductions.
He added that this might include some of the maritime
patrol capability:[145]
I am not clear at the moment what stage they have
reached in the examination of the ability of unmanned vehicles
to help in this area. As you know, we have expanded the number
of unmanned aero vehicles over recent years in this area in particular.
They are so valuable predominantly because of their endurance,
and the fact that they can stay up for so long. They have been
critical to current operations, and they will be critical to other
operations as well. It would not necessarily be a reversal of
the Nimrod decision, not that I think that that is feasible since
they have been cut up, but it might be putting some of that capability
into the unmanned arena.
135. We questioned whether the complex systems
envisaged for the Nimrod MRA4 could have been deployed in a different
platform such as an Airbus. Professor Julian Lindley-French commented:[146]
A representative of a certain American company asked
me whether its platform could take that equipment, and the answer
would appear to be yes. Again, what saddened me was that I approached
the Dutch and spoke to the French about offsetting operating costs
with potential multinational forces. The initial response was
very interested; the French told me that they would even offer
the Breguet Atlantics that they had in store if we upgraded their
electronics suites. I don't know whether that is possible, but
the point is that of the seven military tasks in the SDSR, the
MRA4 could have played a very important role in all of them. It
was the loss of the enablers, because the single services were
forced back to defend their own core competencies by the process,
which for me was the biggest failing of the SDSR process. Forget
all the strategic stuff: there was a haggle at that last weekend,
which was utterly unacceptable in terms of the national strategic
requirements.
136. When we asked General Houghton, VCDS, about
the Nimrod decision he commented:[147]
It would be fair to say that among the Chiefs of
Staff and in the military advice, it was one of the most difficult
decisions to come to terms with, because it has multiple uses.
It was made easier by the fact that there were still some residual
challenges—there is still a bit of a debate about that—so
it was not a capability in hand but one that was promised downstream.
There was still a significant amount of money involved in bringing
it into service and then running it. It was a difficult decision
for the Chiefs of Staff to support because of its multiple uses,
but the ultimate judgment was that there was manageable risk in
all those areas of use, including deterrence, where you know there
are several layers to it—not for discussion in open session.
137. We deeply regret the decision to dispense
with the Nimrod MRA4 and have serious concerns regarding the capability
gaps this has created in the ability to undertake the military
tasks envisaged in the SDSR. This appears to be a clear example
of the need to make large savings overriding the strategic security
of the UK and the capability requirements of the Armed Forces.
We are not convinced that UK Armed Forces can manage this capability
gap within existing resources. We call on the Government to outline
its plans to manage the gap left by the loss of this capability,
including the possible use of unmanned vehicles and collaboration
with allies. In addition, the Government should outline its plans
for the regeneration of this capability, including the skills
and knowledge required to provide it.
Basing Review and the return
of UK Armed Forces from Germany
138. The SDSR also discussed the future basing
requirements for the Armed Forces. The SDSR stated that as a result
of the "withdrawal of Nimrod MRA4 and Harrier, as well as
the reduction in size of the Tornado fleet" RAF Kinloss and
two other bases would no longer be required. The SDSR went on
to state: "However, we have not made decisions on the future
use of any of these bases. It is likely that some of the estate
vacated as a result of the changes announced in this White Paper
will be used by units returning from Germany or retained for other
purposes".[148]
139. We asked Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the
Air Staff, for an update on progress on decisions on RAF bases:[149]
The decision has been made that we will no longer
need some of our air bases for the foreseeable future, and three
in particular. Of course, the decision on the first one was made
some while ago, and it was the decision that RAF Lyneham will
close as an air base next year. We will move our air transport
assets to RAF Brize Norton. More relevantly in terms of the SDSR,
you will have read that the air base at Kinloss will no longer
be required for the RAF as of the middle of next year. The decision
about what that air base will be used for has still to be made.
The process is ongoing, and I think that the decision is coming
nearer, but it has certainly not yet been made.
Under the SDSR, we are due to lose one more air base.
The decision on that one is moving ahead. It is still in the process
of being staffed. I do not know when that will be made clear [...]
it is quite a complex process, not least because, as CGS has just
pointed out, some of them will potentially be required for Army
units to move into. Therefore rebrigading, as we are doing now,
is necessary to match the requirement from the RAF point of view
and for the other flying elements of the Army and Navy. There
is a complex study going on, depending on what we will do with
the whole site, so I do not expect many decisions to be made before
the middle of this year.
140. The SDSR also included plans for half of
UK Armed Forces (approximately 20,000 Service personnel) in Germany
to return by 2015 and the remainder by 2020. In the SDSR, the
Government stated "there is no longer any operational requirement
for UK forces to be based there, and the current arrangements
impose financial costs on the UK, disruption on personnel and
their families and opportunity costs in terms of wider Army coherence".[150]
141. During our inquiry Professor Hew Strachan
commented that if the aspiration of real terms increase in defence
funding from 2015 was not achieved "the thing that seems
to me most undeliverable by 2020, if this uplift doesn't happen,
is the commitment to bring the Army back from Germany, because
the accommodation simply won't be there to enable it to return."[151]
142. We discussed progress in this area with
General Sir Peter Wall, Chief of the General Staff, who commented:[152]
As far as repatriating the 20,000 or so soldiers
and 23,000 dependants, who we have living in Germany thanks to
the hospitality of the Federal Government, there is indeed a plan
to do that over the next 10 or so years. Some of those numbers
will be reduced by the units being disbanded, though none will
be combat units that have served in Afghanistan; they will be
more part of the support structure, but nevertheless very important.
The rest will be moved back to new garrison locations in the United
Kingdom, which is subject to an ongoing study, and no decisions
have yet been made.
143. We asked whether the Government had given
the German authorities the required two year's notice of its plans.
General Wall replied:[153]
We are in active discussions with the Germans, at
both the Federal level and the Länder level. That is how
I know that we have got the support that we have from them for
our plans, whatever the time frame is. In fact, they would prefer
things to go more slowly.
144. We also asked General Wall on whether there
would be some co-ordination between the closure of RAF bases and
the return of UK Personnel from Germany. He commented:[154]
I think that that is going to depend on the situation
in each base, in terms of how much additional work is required
to convert a base from one role to another; on whether the people
who might be coming back are on operations; and on how much we
decide that we are going to split our formations and have moves
over a protracted period, which is obviously not very good for
cohesion for the next turn of the handle in Afghanistan, and all
that sort of stuff. At the moment, that is all being worked upon
in the context of a defence-led plan.
145. In a statement to the House of Commons on
18 July 2011, the Secretary of State for Defence announced further
decisions on the future of RAF Kinloss, Leuchars, Lossiemouth
and Marham:[155]
RAF Kinloss will be used to house Army units from
approximately 2014-15 (subject to further detailed planning);
RAF Leuchars will cease to be an air base but will
remain in military use and be used to site two major Army units
joining from between 2015-17 with a formation headquarters before
2015;
RAF Lossiemouth would be retained as a long-term
RAF base with Typhoon force being built up and providing the location
for the Northern Quick Reaction Alert task; and
RAF Marham would remain as a Tornado GR4 main operating
base.
146. The Secretary of State also gave an update
on plans for the return of UK Armed Forces from Germany, and issued
a Written Ministerial Statement which gave additional information:[156]
The Defence of the United Kingdom, and wider military
tasks, including the capacity to support the civil authorities
in times of crisis, requires a strong military presence across
the entire country. We have also considered the impact of changes
on local communities. Finally, we have taken into account the
need to make the maximum use of existing defence estate and to
dispose of that which is not required.
Much detailed planning remains to be done, both to
identify the most effective drawdown plan for the forces currently
in Germany and to determine which units are the best match for
which sites. We will also need to take into account the potential
changes in the balance between the Regular and Reserve forces
I have also announced today. And there will be a need for the
appropriate level of engagement with local authorities, including
the preparation of sustainability assessments and the other work
needed to meet our obligations. This means that some uncertainties
remain, particularly about the timescales in which the necessary
moves will take place. But our strategic objective and the key
building blocks of our plan are clear. I will set these out, together
with indicative timescales we are currently assuming for planning
purposes".
147. The Secretary of State confirmed that the
disposition of the Army would be based on five Multi-role Brigades
of which two would be centred on Salisbury Plain, a third at Catterick,
a fourth in the East Midlands centred on the former RAF Cottesmore
and the fifth in a new garrison at Kirknewton in Scotland. It
is intended to use other former RAF bases and existing Army bases
including North Luffenham (Rutland), Bassingbourn (Cambridgeshire)
and Woodbridge (Suffolk) to begin accommodating units from Germany
between 2015-18.
148. Other sites mentioned by the Secretary of
State to accommodate Army units returning from Germany are Aldergrove
in Northern Ireland in 2015 and Pirbright (Surrey) in 2013.
149. The Secretary of State stated: "Routine
business on basing and further work on disposals will continue.
[...] This will be done in close consultation with the German
authorities, which will continue as the Army now draws up its
plans for how to draw down from Germany in a sensible and coherent
way."[157]
150. In conclusion the Secretary of State for
Defence stated:[158]
The detailed planning work, including the investment
required to adapt sites, will now get under way based on this
strategic direction. The Ministry of Defence will now begin the
process of detailed planning and the appropriate and necessary
engagement with the Devolved Administrations and local authorities
concerned around the country.
Further work will be done to draw up individual project
plans and determine the timing and sequencing of the Army moves,
and this may affect some of the indicative timescales set out
here. Once completed, this will deliver the military requirement
for basing and estate, which will facilitate our work to maximise
the effectiveness of our Armed Forces under the adaptable posture
set out in the SDSR. It will rebalance the Defence footprint across
the UK, offer stability to our Armed Forces, and deliver better
value for money for the taxpayer.
151. We are conscious of the uncertainty that
the basing review has created for Service personnel, their families,
local communities and businesses. We will monitor the outcomes
of the review. We call on the Government to outline its proposals
to assist the Service personnel, families and communities affected
at an early stage in line with the obligations outlined in the
Armed Forces Covenant.
152. We note the MoD's update on 18 July 2011
of the plans for the withdrawal of UK Forces from Germany. However,
given that half of UK Forces are due to return by 2015, we are
concerned that the plans are not further advanced. We note that
the required two years notice has not been given to the German
authorities. We call on the Government to set out with clarity
the costs and benefits of this project in terms of providing accommodation,
infrastructure and training facilities which are already available
to the United Kingdom in Germany. The MoD should provide us with
a full implementation plan, its funding and method of attaining
the stated goals, at the earliest opportunity and deliver clear
communication of these plans for Service personnel, their families,
local communities and businesses. The elements of the SDSR are
interlinked and failure in one area may mean failure elsewhere.
153. On 18 July 2011, The Secretary of State
also confirmed that:[159]
RAF Lyneham is the preferred location for future
defence technical training. This confirms that the Department
will withdraw from Arborfield in Berkshire and Bordon in Hampshire,
releasing the sites for sale by 2014-15 at the latest. This announcement
in no way threatens the existing defence presence at St Athan.
There are no plans to move or reduce the 300 technical training
posts as part of the rationalisation to Lyneham. Indeed plans
to relocate additional defence units to St Athan are being developed,
and if those plans come to fruition, they will bring a major uplift
in employment at that base. We intend to make an announcement
before the end of the year.
154. We expect to be regularly updated on
these plans. We are concerned about the future of defence technical
training and request an early statement on how it is to be taken
forward and will continue to monitor this vital aspect of defence
reform.
REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE SDSR AND
BASING REVIEW
155. In written evidence, it was asserted that
some regions of the UK had seen a reduction in their defence footprint
and that this had not been addressed by the outcomes of the SDSR.[160]
156. Responding to this assertion, Peter Rogers,
Chief Executive Officer, Babcock, commented:[161]
I would like to see some evidence that proves that
is the case, because I don't have any. We have 3,000 people in
defence in Scotland; we had 3,000 people there six months ago;
and we still expect to have 3,000 or more in a year's time. I
don't see any evidence of Scotland being picked on or suffering
more than any other region.
Ian Godden, Chairman, ADS, added:[162]
The ADS Scotland Council—we have a council
of 50 companies in Scotland—has never raised that subject
with me, and we have not debated it at any of our last four meetings.
If it is an issue, it is in somebody else's mind not ours at the
moment.
157. During his statement to the House of Commons
on 18 July, the Secretary of State was questioned on the regional
impact of the outcomes of the basing review. He responded:[163]
The security of the nation and the requirements of
defence were paramount in our analysis, but we have also considered
the impact of changes on local communities, the impact on service
personnel and their families and the current pattern of the armed
forces in Britain.
158. The Secretary of State also noted in the
House that Scotland would gain some 2,500 new Army posts, and
that of the 20,000 personnel currently serving in Germany, some
6,500 to 7,000 were likely to return to Scotland.[164]
159. In response to a request for research to
be carried out on the defence estates and the industrial footprint
of UK defence in Scotland, the Secretary of State undertook to
look at the footprint across the United Kingdom. We welcome the
Secretary of State's undertaking to carry out an assessment into
the defence and industrial footprint of United Kingdom defence
across the UK.[165]
Review of Reserve Forces
160. In October 2010, following the announcement
of the outcomes of the SDSR, the Prime Minister commissioned a
review of Reserve Forces to be undertaken by an Independent Commission.
The Review was to look at the balance between Regular and Reserve
Forces, and whether in the context of modern threats and modern
skills, optimum use was being made of reservists and the volunteer
ethos in society. The Review reported on 18 July 2011 and reached
"four broad conclusions":[166]
- Our Reserves are in decline;
- We have failed to modernise
reservist Roles;
- We are not exploiting the
potential of our Reserves; and
- We are not using the Reserves
efficiently.
The Review then made a number of recommendations
to address these issues.
161. Following publication of the Review, the
Government stated that it would proceed with a £1.5 billion
investment package over 10 years to enhance the capability of
the Reserves. We welcome the Government's commitment to the
reform of the Reserve Forces and the investment of £1.5 billion
over the next 10 years. However we wish to see more detail on
the planning and timing of the shift towards greater reliance
on Reserve Forces.
162. The Committee notes the conclusions and
recommendations of the Independent Commission's Report, in particular
that the internal governance process should be administered by
a Board, chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. We particularly
note the recommendation that the Council of Reserve Forces and
Cadets Associations should report annually to Parliament on progress
in implementing the recommendations of the Review.
Future Force 2020
163. The SDSR stated that the planning framework
of Military Tasks and DPAs had enabled the Government to "identify
the Armed Forces we will need over the next ten years and the
changes that are required to deliver them."[167]
These are set out in the SDSR as Future Force 2020. The SDSR states
that Future Force 2020 will, in general, comprise three broad
elements:[168]
Data source: HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic
Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, p 20
FUTURE FORCE 2020 AND "CRITICAL
MASS" OF UK ARMED FORCES
164. Given the single Service Chiefs' rejection
of the UK national ambition to 2015 as being a full spectrum capability
(see paragraphs 60-66), we attempted to establish whether Future
Force 2020 could be described as full spectrum. Nick Harvey MP,
Minister for the Armed Forces believed "it will have a wide
spectrum of capability".[169]
General Houghton added:[170]
If it is positive, made affordable and delivered,
you can have a dance about the meaning of full spectrum. I read
what Sir Rupert Smith said, and full spectrum is, in many respects,
relative to one's enemy, not to the universe. You have to constrain
your boundaries. It meets the National Security Council's adaptive
posture in its considerations of the time. So it still has the
ability to project power in all three environments at a strategic
distance, and the ability to commit to a sustained operation on
the land in the messy environment as depicted in our "Future
Character of Conflict". In that respect, it would be full
spectrum within sensible bounds; it must be bounded in the reality
of national ambition.
165. We asked Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup
about the robustness of the Future Force 2020 goals and their
susceptibility to events. He described them as "reflect[ing]
a robust military thinking on what balance of capability, given
that we have a balanced approach to this as a strategy baseline,
can be afforded within the defence budget that we are envisaging
in the 2020 time frame."[171]
166. Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, former First
Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, commented:[172]
What I would say is that for the level of ambition
that I still read into the NSS, and the sort of activities in
the past two months of our Prime Minister and statements from
our Foreign Secretary, it seems we need a set of defence forces
certainly nothing smaller than 2020 force structure. My personal
view is that in some areas that is too tight. However, that is
the choice of the Government of the day.
167. In our examination of Future Force 2020
proposed in the SDSR we also discussed with General Sir Nicholas
Houghton, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, what his assessment
was of the "critical mass", that is the threshold of
operational effectiveness, of UK Armed Forces and how this translated
into Future Force 2020. General Houghton set out his assessment
at three levels: that of each Service, the combined Armed Forces
and the adaptive element of the force in the 2020 outcome.[173]
In respect of the three Services he commented:
If you take the Royal Navy, it needs to have a finite
number of frigates and destroyers. I think the First Sea Lord
would say that the 19 frigates and destroyers that are posited
for the 2020 force structure are at about the critical mass of
that element of the Navy. You would say the same for the amphibious
capability, the carrier strike and the strategic submarine force.
Similarly, the Army would probably speak to a critical mass of
being able to conduct combined arms manoeuvres at brigade level
and being able to sustain that brigade level over time on a long-term
operation. The RAF, as well, will have its own sense of what the
critical mass of its service is institutionally. It would speak
to that better than I can, but I give you a flavour of it. The
number of fast jets posited for the 2020 force structure is close
to what that institutional sense of the critical mass would be.
168. In terms of the combined Armed Forces he
defined "critical mass" as:
[T]he critical mass of the combined Armed Forces—the
combination of all the Armed Forces of the country—in meeting
what is expected of them in terms of the military tasks. Here,
you can sensibly break out critical mass between those things
which, if you like, are nationally non-discretionary, which relate
to the committed force—the security of the United Kingdom,
the security of the overseas territories, the maintenance of the
nuclear deterrent and a whole range of standing commitments—and
those things that, on a wholly national basis and on a non-discretionary
footing, we would need to do.
169. General Houghton rejected the suggestion
that UK Armed Forces were currently below "critical mass"
as "we are drawing down elements of the force to the 2020
structure in terms of numbers of destroyers, the size of the Army
and those sorts of things."[174]
We put to him concerns that the additional calls being placed
on the Armed Forces could distort priorities and impact on the
aspirations of Future Force 2020. He acknowledged these concerns,
but stated that "ultimately that decision is made politically"
with advice from the Armed Forces to Ministers on "the degree
to which running two operations hot over a period of time would
stress the force structure". When pressed on whether a critical
stage was approaching in terms of force structure, he replied
"no. I do not think it is. It does involve the requirement
to run elements of the services hot for a sustained period of
time, but the force structure is sufficiently resilient enough
to do that."[175]
170. We note the observation in the Future
Reserves 2020 Report that the costings on the manpower element
of the defence budget, amounting to one-third of the total, need
further work. We endorse the study's recommendation that detailed
costing of Regular and Reserve units be prepared.
171. We are not convinced, given the current
financial climate and the drawdown of capabilities arising from
the SDSR, that from 2015 the Armed Forces will maintain the capability
to undertake all that is being asked of them. We note that there
is mounting concern that the UK Armed Forces may be falling below
the minimum utility required to deliver the commitments that they
are currently being tasked to carry out let alone the tasks they
are likely to face between 2015 to 2020 when it is acknowledged
that there will be capability gaps.
172. We are concerned that, on the one hand,
Future Force 2020 seems to be regarded as a "wide spectrum"
force able to undertake the security tasks required by the adaptable
posture envisaged by the NSS while at the same time being regarded
as the "critical mass" of the Armed Forces with some
spare capacity that may be achieved by the establishment of alliances
and bilateral operations.
173. We recommend that the MoD should develop
further the concept of a "critical mass" for the Armed
Forces and establish a clearer measurable statement of what constitutes
"critical mass" to allow verification and monitoring
by Parliament. This should include not just the roles and structures
of Regular and Reserve Forces but should be expanded to encompass
enablers such as DSTL, industry, academia, the scientific and
research community and the development of the defence knowledge
base especially amongst the military and civil servants.
FUNDING FOR FUTURE FORCE 2020
174. When announcing the outcomes of the SDSR
to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister set out his aspiration
for real terms increases in the defence budget from 2015.[176]
The White Paper we have published today sets out
a clear vision for the future structure of our armed forces. The
precise budgets beyond 2015 will be agreed in future spending
reviews. My own strong view is that this structure will require
year-on-year real-terms growth in the defence budget in the years
beyond 2015. Between now and then the Government are committed
to the vision of 2020 set out in the review and we will make decisions
accordingly. We are also absolutely determined that the Ministry
of Defence will become much more commercially hard-headed in future
and will adopt a much more aggressive drive for efficiencies.
175. On 4 November 2010, in a debate on the SDSR,
the Secretary of State for Defence restated the requirement for
real terms funding increases from 2015: "my very strong belief,
which the Prime Minister shares, is that the structure that we
have agreed for 2020 will require year-on-year real-terms growth
in the defence budget beyond 2015."[177]
176. We discussed the ambition of real terms
increases in defence spending with ministerial witnesses on 9
March. While they all agreed with the aspiration, they argued
that it could not be made Government policy as it was not possible
for the Government to commit to spending outside the period of
the current Comprehensive Spending Review settlement nor commit
any future government following a probable General Election in
2015. Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP, Minister of State at the Cabinet
Office commented:[178]
It is not possible for the machinery of government
to set expenditure decisions across a longer range than the spending
review range—that is the whole structure of our machinery
of government. We set expenditures according to spending review
patterns. So, SR10—spending review 2010—sets a pattern
for four years. It does not stretch to 2020, and I don't know
of any Government in the world who could do that.
He added "It is inevitable, isn't it, if there
is an election, that whoever emerges as the Government after that
election will take a view on expenditure beyond that election?"[179]
177. Several of our witnesses expressed concern
about what would happen if a real terms increase in funding was
not possible. Vice Admiral Jeremy Blackham commented that, if
real terms increases from 2015 were not forthcoming, "in
brief, the risk seems to me, in a word, to be incoherence".[180]
Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup noted "the reality is that
Future Force 2020 would be completely unaffordable and the Armed
Forces would have to be substantially smaller than is currently
planned."[181]
178. Witnesses also remarked that there was a
lack of clarity on the level of real terms increase required to
deliver Future Force 2020. Professor Malcolm Chalmers stated:[182]
The first point that I would make in relation to
that commitment, which was made in the SDSR debate by the Prime
Minister, is that it is very close to the wording the Government
used for the national health service. The Government are committed
to real-terms, year-on-year increases for the NHS which, in practice,
in the spending review, is translated into real growth of about
0.2% per annum. So I think that we can take from the Prime Minister's
commitment a clear statement that there will not be a real-terms
reduction after 2014, but I don't think we can read anything from
it about how big the real-terms growth that he is committing to
is. For the MoD to be able to afford its current plans up to 2020
would, as far as I understand it, require real-terms growth after
2014 of the order of 2% per annum. I think it will be pretty difficult
to reach that level of real-terms growth, but it depends on the
broader geopolitical climate and on the country's economic prospects.
179. James Blitz from the Financial Times agreed:[183]
I don't see the Prime Minister's commitment with
the statement on the SDSR as a bankable commitment in any way.
[...] It is, first of all, completely dependent on the Prime Minister
being there in 2015, which may or may not be the case. It is also
completely dependent on the economic environment. We may well
be in a more benign economic environment, but we may well not
be. [...] The question that I think arises, given this uncertainty,
is how will Defence be able to press ahead with programming in
the next year or two? That is the concern of the chiefs, because
what they are saying is, "We have to know where we're going
to be in 2016-17". My own view is that they are just going
to have to muddle through, because I cannot imagine a situation
in which the Treasury will turn around and say to Defence, "We
will guarantee you a number and not do that for any other Government
Department".
180. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief
of the Air Staff, was asked what would happen if the Prime Minister's
wish for an increase in the Defence budget from 2015 were not
to be achieved. He responded:[184]
The most important thing is the question of whether
that is decided now and something is put against that statement.
In other words, are we going to see a figure put against that
and an allowance made so that we can plan against that figure?
If not and the question will be decided only once we have had
the next election, the implications are that we will have to plan
on the assumption that there won't be any increase because the
Treasury, naturally enough, will not allow us to plan on something
that does not exist in policy terms. So that will have an effect
on what programmes we need to have in the future, in terms of
both people and equipment, because that planning is critical if
we are to get through the initial stages of understanding capabilities
for the future without actually buying equipment. You have to
have some sort of research and development in relation to what
is going on and some evaluation of the options that are there.
If that is not given some meat in the foreseeable future, the
most important consequence is that we will have to plan on the
assumption that there won't be an increase, even if there subsequently
is to be one.
181. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup commented
that:[185]
"all this depends on meaningful real-terms growth
in the second half of the decade, and I cannot give you a figure
for that. Well, I could give you a figure, but I do not mean 0.2%
a year in real terms; I mean something substantially more than
that. [...] It would be enormously welcome if there were a degree
of cross-party support for that particular proposition. I do not
think that there necessarily is such support at the moment, not
least because the Ministry of Defence has to plan now for certain
aspects of the force structure beyond 2015. It can only plan on
what it knows, so at the moment it is planning on the basis of
a flat real budget from 2015 onwards. At the moment, the Ministry
of Defence is planning not to achieve Future Force 2020.
Three month review of the SDSR
182. In a speech at Chatham House on 19 May 2011,
the Secretary of State for Defence announced that he had initiated
a three month review of the SDSR:[186]
Having completed the current planning round, we have
started the next Planning Round to take forward the work needed
to balance defence priorities and the budget over the long-term.
The Department has recently initiated a three month exercise as
part of that work to ensure we match our assumptions with our
spending settlement. This allows us to draw all this work together
to inform the next planning round and to avoid the mistakes of
the previous government in building up to an unsustainable Defence
programme We have made it clear that while the SDSR had made substantial
inroads into the £38bn funding deficit, there is still more
to be done. Given the mess we inherited putting Defence on a sure
footing, with a predictable budget, was always going to take time,
but we believe it is better to be thorough than quick.
183. During our final evidence session it became
clear that part of the three month review was to establish the
level of funding required to reach Future Force 2020. The Vice
Chief of the Defence Staff stated:[187]
You have referred back to the point of the three-month
exercise. In the absence of any other financial direction from
the Treasury, we could only plan on an increase—of flat
real—from 2015 onwards. Patently, SDSR force structure 2020
is not affordable on a flat real profile. [...]
In the process of the three-month exercise, we are
trying to absolutely understand what that delta is to inform the
debate. Hopefully, we can then get the planning authority from
the Treasury to plan with confidence against those out-years.
184. We asked Bernard Gray, Chief of Defence
Materiel, whether he had calculated the real terms increases required
to achieve Future Force 2020:[188]
No, because we are working through all the exercises,
not only on the underlying funding assumptions, but on the equipment
structure possibilities and the real cost of equipment. I have
been conducting an exercise to re-test the costing proposals for
each of the individual programmes from the bottom up, for example.
I have been looking at what we might do through efficiency savings,
what the Reserves review might generate and so on. A bunch of
moving parts within this are being brought together as part of
the three-month exercise to determine what it would be. As the
Secretary of State and the Prime Minister have said, it will require
significant real-terms increases.
185. On 18 July 2011, despite the earlier assertion
to us by Ministers that it was not possible for the Government
to commit to spending outside the current CSR period, the Secretary
of State for Defence in announcing the outcome of the three months
review to the House of Commons stated:[189]
Commitments must match resources in order to achieve
a balanced budget. As part of preparation for this year's planning
round, we have identified a number of adjustments to the Defence
programme. This includes rationalising vehicle acquisition to
make best use of those we have procured to support operations
in Afghanistan and continuing to bear down on non-front line costs,
where we will aim to deliver further substantial efficiencies
in support, estate spending and IT provision. Against this background,
and as part of the overall approach to balancing the programme,
I have agreed with the Treasury that the MoD can plan on the Defence
equipment and the equipment support budget increasing by 1 per
cent a year in real terms from 2015-16 and 2020-21. [...] Such
a long-term planning horizon will give greater stability and predictability,
and stop the old practice of simply pushing programmes into future
years. These and other changes will enable us to proceed with
a range of high priority programmes set out in the SDSR. I can
now give the go ahead for the procurement of 14 additional Chinook
Helicopters, the upgrade of the Army Warrior's vehicles, spending
on the Joint Strike Fighter, the procurement of the Rivet Joint
Intelligence and surveillance aircraft, the cats and traps for
the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers and the development of the
Global Combat Ship. The equipment can now be bought with confidence
ending a decade of uncertainty for our Armed Forces, and for industry.
186. We note the outcome of the Government's
three month review of the SDSR. We acknowledge the planned 1%
real terms increase in the defence equipment and equipment support
budget between 2015-16 and 2020-21. However we note that this
is based on a number of adjustments to the Defence programme,
including rationalising vehicle acquisition and continuing efficiency
savings from non-front-line costs. Although we welcome the additional
certainty that this will bring in respect of the defence equipment
and equipment support budget, we are concerned that this increase
is simply a reallocation of resources and does not represent the
real terms increase in funding required to deliver Future Force
2020. In its response to this Report, the Government should also
set out in much greater detail the baseline for the calculation
of the 1% real terms increase in the defence equipment and defence
support budget and the savings that will be made to realise it.
187. We are concerned at the lack of information
in the SDSR on the levels of funding required to deliver Future
Force 2020 and the increase in defence spending that this would
represent. The Government should provide an estimate of these
in its response to this Report and the figures should be updated
in the annual updates on implementation of the SDSR. We regard
defence planning and procurement as being of a unique nature,
particularly given the long timescales associated with it, and
recommend that the Government should initiate ways of allowing
the MoD to proceed with implementing Future Force 2020 with budgetary
certainty outside the normal CSR timetable.
188. We share witnesses' concerns that there
are serious risks if Future Force 2020 is not achieved. A failure
to achieve Future Force 2020 would represent a fall below "critical
mass" and a reduction in the influence that the NSS and SDSR
set out as desirable. We fully support the Prime Minister and
the Secretary of State for Defence in their personal aspirations
for real terms increases in defence funding from 2015 that will
enable the commitments made in the SDSR for Future Force 2020
to be realised. However this is meaningless without a concrete
commitment that these increases will be delivered. Decisions for
post 2015 funding will have to be made in the very near future
to ensure progress towards Future Force 2020. If the ambition
of a real term funding increase is not realised, we will have
failed our Armed Forces.
189. We questioned Ministers about how the public
would perceive a real terms increase in defence spending in 2015
at the same time as UK Armed Forces ended their combat role in
Afghanistan. The Secretary of State for Defence responded:[190]
We have set out what we believe to be the correct
posture and force balance for the United Kingdom going ahead.
In the SDSR, we had three options: first, to salami-slice everything
and try to keep our heads above water year by year; secondly,
to freeze capabilities where they were and not to sign future
contracts or invest in future capabilities; and thirdly, to say,
"We're in a hole. Let's find a strategic aiming point,"
which was 2020, "Let's set out what we think is the appropriate
force balance for the UK in that year and then work our way towards
it." That was always going to be a difficult course to take,
but I still believe it was the right one.
190. We note that a real terms increase in
defence funding from 2015 will coincide with the withdrawal from
a combat role in Afghanistan and anticipate that the UK public,
whilst being passionate in their support for the Armed Forces,
will question this decision. The Government must ensure that the
reasons for the increase are effectively communicated to the public.
This should begin now.
89 Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2010-11,
The Strategic Defence and Security Review, HC 345, Ev 13 Back
90
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948 Back
91
HC Deb, 19 October 2010, cols 797-801 Back
92
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, para 1.3 Back
93
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, paras 2.2-2.3 Back
94
Defence Committee, Appointment of the Chief of the Defence
Staff, Oral and written evidence, HC 600-i, Session 2010-11,
Q 2 Back
95
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, pp 10-12 Back
96
Ibid., para 1.6 Back
97
Ibid., para 1.7 Back
98
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, pp 10-12,
paras 2.10-2.11 Back
99
Ev 125-126 Back
100
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, para 2.13 Back
101
Ibid., p 18 Back
102
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, para 2.5 Back
103
Q 189 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back
104
Q 201 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back
105
Qq 201-214 Back
106
Q 281 Back
107
Q 504 Back
108
"A Conservative Strategic Defence and Security Review",
Defence Management.com, 30 April 2010. See also Conservative Party,
A new Covenant for our Armed Forces and their Families: The
Conservative Armed Forces Manifesto, 2010, p 15. Back
109
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, pp 19-34 Back
110
Ev w1, Ev w5, Ev w7, Ev w12, Ev w60, Ev w77, Ev w115, and Ev w120
ff Back
111
Q 8 Back
112
The announcement regarding HMS Illustrious and HMS Ocean was
made on 15 December 2010 after a short study to determine which
platform would provide the most effective helicopter platform
capability (HC Deb 15 December 2010, 103WS). Back
113
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, pp 22-23 Back
114
Q 215 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back
115
Q 423 Back
116
Q 578 Back
117
Q 579 Back
118
Qq 580-582 Back
119
Q 584 Back
120
The SDSR committed to a fast jet capability of Typhoon and JSF
with Harrier being withdrawn immediately and a smaller Tornado
fleet being retained as an interim measure. See also HM Government,
Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence
and Security Review, Cm 7948, pp 25-26. Back
121
The SDSR committed to a fast jet capability of Typhoon and JSF
with Harrier being withdrawn immediately and a smaller Tornado
fleet being retained as an interim measure. See also HM Government,
Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence
and Security Review, Cm 7948, p 23 Back
122
Q 494 Back
123
Q 497 Back
124
Q 441 and Q 446 Back
125
Q 499 [Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham] Back
126
Q 499 [Wing Commander Andrew Brookes] Back
127
Q 419 Back
128
Q 420 Back
129
Q 215 [Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton] Back
130
Q 215 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back
131
Q 604 and Q 607 Back
132
National Audit Office, Carrier Strike, July 2011, HC 1092 Back
133
Q 609 Back
134
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, p 27 Back
135
SDSR Briefing Pack: RAF, October 2010 Back
136
Defence Committee, Appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff,
Oral and written evidence, HC 600-i, Session 2010-11, Q 38 Back
137
Defence Committee, Appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff,
Oral and written evidence, HC 600-i, Session 2010-11, Q 38 Back
138
Q 241 [Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton] Back
139
Q 241 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back
140
Q 241 [Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope] Back
141
Qq 276-277 Back
142
Q 510 [Wing Commander Andrew Brookes] Back
143
Q 290 Back
144
Q 293 Back
145
Q 294 Back
146
Q 510 [Professor Julian Lindley-French] Back
147
Q 597 Back
148
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, para 2.D.13 Back
149
Q 232 Back
150
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, p 28 Back
151
Q 45 Back
152
Q 230 Back
153
Q 237 Back
154
Q 236 Back
155
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 643-645 and Ev 158 ff Back
156
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 67WS Back
157
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 69WS Back
158
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 70WS Back
159
HC Deb, 18 Jul 2011, col 69WS Back
160
Ev w71 Back
161
Q 388 [Peter Rogers] Back
162
Q 388 [Ian Godden] Back
163
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 644 Back
164
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 645, 649 and 655 Back
165
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 647 Back
166
The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve
Forces, Future Reserves 2020 , July 2011, p 4 Back
167
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, para 2.A.1 Back
168
Ibid., para 2.A.2 Back
169
Q 551 [Nick Harvey MP] Back
170
Q 551 [General Sir Nicholas Houghton] Back
171
Q 281 Back
172
Q 423 Back
173
Q 528 Back
174
Q 529 Back
175
Qq 532-533 Back
176
HC Deb, 19 October 2010, col 799 Back
177
HC Deb, 4 November 2010, col 1069 Back
178
Q 152 Back
179
Q 155 Back
180
Q 482 Back
181
Q 284 Back
182
Q 43 [Professor Malcolm Chalmers] Back
183
Q 43 [James Blitz] Back
184
Q 252 [Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton] Back
185
Q 287 Back
186
"Strong economy, Strong Defence, Strategic Reach: Protecting
National Security in the 21st Century", Speech by Rt Hon
Liam Fox MP, Secretary of State for Defence, on 19 May at Chatham
House. Available at: www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/Speeches.htm. Back
187
Qq 543-544 Back
188
Q 553 Back
189
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 643-644 and Ev 158 ff Back
190
Q 163 Back
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