Map of Libya - PDF Version 
UK Deployments in Support of Operations in Libya - map - PDF Version
Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. At
the outset of our Report, we wish to pay tribute to the UK Armed
Forces and civilian personnel who contributed to operations in
Libya. They continue to impress us with the courage, dedication
and professionalism with which they undertook this operation which
we are convinced saved thousands of civilian lives. We also wish
to acknowledge the contribution of the families of Armed Forces
personnel. (Paragraph 1)
2. We support the
principle that Parliament should whenever possible be consulted
and authorise the use of military force prior to its deployment.
However, given the Prime Minister's statement on 18 March 2011
and the debate in the House of Commons on 21 March and that urgent
action was required to safeguard civilians in Libya, we are content
that Parliament was consulted as soon as practicable. (Paragraph
4)
United Nations
3. Witnesses
told us that there were unique circumstances in Libya and, given
the gravity of the situation and the potential consequences of
inaction, we agree that the international community was justified
in its response. (Paragraph 16)
4. We note the contrary
opinions we have received regarding the legality of the operation
in Libya. It is not for us to comment on the legality of the operation.
We agree that the legality of the operation is a separate issue
to the issue of the legality of how the operation was undertaken.
In response to our Report, the Ministry of Defence should commit
to review the conduct of the operation and its compliance with
international law. We commend the Government for publishing a
summary of the Attorney General's legal advice and respect the
decision not to publish the advice in full but are disappointed
that the Prime Minister felt unable to share the advice with us
on a private and confidential basis as this would have enabled
us to scrutinise the operation in Libya more effectively. We recommend,
however, that when a summary of legal advice has been published
and developments occur that lead to updated legal advice being
sought from the Attorney General, an updated summary of the advice
should be published as soon as possible. (Paragraph 24)
5. We welcome the
Minister for the Armed Forces' statement that the Government would
expect National Transitional Council forces to be treated in exactly
the same way as pro-Gaddafi forces with respect to potential war
crimes, as it is essential that both sides in the conflict are
treated the same not just in the interests of justice but also
for the credibility and future of the International Criminal Court
and support of the international community for future operations.
(Paragraph 28)
6. While we are aware
that there are circumstances where no international authorisation
is required for the deployment of UK Armed Forces, we expect the
Government to ensure that UK military and civilian personnel comply
with international law at all times. (Paragraph 29)
7. We note the concerns
expressed that, although not authorised under the UN Security
Council Resolutions, regime change was a goal of the mission of
Libya. Although it is difficult to see how the mission could have
been successfully completed without Colonel Gaddafi losing power,
we are concerned that this, rather than the protection of civilians
as set out in the Resolution, came to be seen by some countries
as an integral part of the mission. The apparent conflict between
the military and political objectives meant that the Government
failed to ensure that its communication strategy was effective
in setting out the aims of the operation. In future, the Government's
communication strategy needs to be more effective so that the
public are confident of the aims and goals of such operations.
(Paragraph 34)
8. We accept that
the coalition forces did their best to prevent and minimise civilian
casualties and we commend them for this approach. This lesson,
taken from Iraq and Afghanistan, will, we hope make the building
of the subsequent peace in Libya significantly easier. Nonetheless,
it is at least possible that some civilian casualties were caused
by coalition actions. In the absence of observers on the ground
it is impossible to say whether, despite the best efforts of coalition
forces, any civilian casualties were caused by coalition action
and if so how many. (Paragraph 38)
9. We note that under
Resolution 1973, the coalition was obliged to protect civilians
from casualties caused by National Transitional Council forces
as well as pro-Gaddafi forces. In response to our Report the Government
should set out how this obligation was carried out. Although we
acknowledge that it is difficult to estimate numbers, this should
include an assessment of the number of civilian casualties caused
by coalition forces, pro-Gaddafi forces and NTC forces. (Paragraph
41)
10. We are concerned
by reports that large numbers of man-portable surface-to-air missiles,
previously in the armament of pro-Gaddafi forces, are missing
in Libya. We accept that the Government, the UN and NATO have
acknowledged that this is a major concern for security in the
region and the wider world. We expect the international community
to support and maintain pressure on the new Libyan regime to ensure
that these weapons are held securely and safely. We agree this
should be part of a UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
programme, as part of the broad post-conflict settlement. We expect
an update on progress on this in the Government's response to
our Report. (Paragraph 45)
11. We acknowledge
that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
confirmed, following an on-site inspection, that the remains of
the chemical weapons stocks declared by the Gaddafi regime were
intact and secure, pending completion of destruction. We note
with particular concern the discovery of a previously undeclared
stock of chemical weapons. We also note that the Government stated
that it would monitor the situation closely with international
partners. In its response to our Report the Government should
state what further measures it has taken to address this issue
and the progress made in the destruction plan. (Paragraph 48)
12. The international
community must help and support Libyan women in the future to
ensure that there are opportunities for them to have a wider role
in the building of the new Libya. (Paragraph 50)
13. We note that the
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that the UK
would be more selective in its deployment of UK Armed Forces and
would do so where there was a "clear strategic aim...and
a viable exit strategy". Whilst accepting that operations
should have a clear strategic aim, we recommend that the Government
should develop this concept by undertaking a more detailed, comprehensive
and strategic assessment before deciding to intervene. We also
note the Minister for the Armed Forces' comments that the operation
could have ended in a variety of ways and that there is a limit
to the number of engagements that can be undertaken where the
exit strategy is known with complete clarity at the outset. Whilst
recognising that the changing circumstances of operations may
require exit strategies to be reviewed and updated, we are concerned
that the Minister's comments invalidate the SDSR's assertion that
UK Armed Forces will be deployed only where "we have a viable
exit strategy". (Paragraph 55)
14. While we do not
regard a UN Security Council Resolution as a prerequisite for
military action by UK Armed Forces in all cases, we commend the
Government for obtaining UN Security Council approval for operations
in Libya. However we are concerned that the abstentions of five
Council members, particularly the veto-wielding countries of Russia
and China, may make obtaining United Nations support more difficult
for similar situations in the future. (Paragraph 60)
15. We note that some
commentators have suggested that the action in Libya may have
made it impossible (as evidenced by the Russian and Chinese concerns
over Syria) for the international community to take decisive action
over other countries. The implication contained in that suggestion,
that we should therefore not have supported the action in Libya,
is one we reject. It is impossible for us to tell what the consequences
would have been of allowing the killing of civilians in Benghazi,
but we consider that the determination of the Arab League and
of most countries of the United Nations that a massacre would
be unacceptable was an example of the international community
acting as it should. It was acting in a coordinated way to reflect
the adoption by the United Nations in 2005 of the "Responsibility
to Protect" enshrined in Resolution 1674. (Paragraph 61)
NATO
16. We
commend NATO and UK Forces for the speed of the operational deployment
in Libya. We are however concerned about the tensions regarding
command of the operation during its early stages. There was confusion
over the command and control of the operation in the early stages
of the operation until NATO took command. We are particularly
concerned at the apparent decision of the French Government to
commence air operations without consulting allies. We call upon
NATO and the Government to look very carefully at how command
and control decisions were made in the early stages of the operation
and to identify the lessons for any future operations which necessarily
begin in an ad hoc manner. (Paragraph 74)
17. We welcome the
significant involvement of non-NATO countries, particularly those
from the Arab League and Sweden, to operations in Libya. However,
we are concerned to establish how the contributions of non-NATO
countries fitted into the NATO command and control structures
and call on the Government to clarify the command and control
structures that were implemented and how they were coordinated.
We also call on the Government to clarify how it ensured that
any bilateral alliances between non-NATO countries and the National
Transitional Council were monitored to ensure that they did not
impact unfavourably on the NATO mission or were contrary to the
measures in the UN Resolutions. An assessment of the integration
of non-NATO countries should be a key part of the lessons learned
exercises undertaken by NATO and the UK. (Paragraph 81)
18. For the time being,
there will still be a heavy reliance on US command and control
functions for future operations. It should be a priority for NATO
to examine this. However, whilst accepting the current economic
climate and its implications for defence capabilities, we are
concerned that future operations will not be possible if the US
is not willing or able to provide capabilities such as unmanned
aerial vehicles, intelligence and refuelling aircraft. It should
be a priority for NATO to examine this over-reliance on US capabilities
and assets. This challenge will be heightened by the US stated
intention to shift its military, geographic and strategic focus
to the Asia-Pacific region. (Paragraph 90)
19. We have no evidence
of any shortfalls in military assets held by NATO nations needed
for operations in Libya. Nonetheless we seek assurances that the
UK is pressing NATO to consider the issue of over-reliance on
any single nation, and is itself considering the balance of its
future forces and how it can best add to the overall mix of NATO
capabilities and command and control capacity. (Paragraph
91)
UK contribution to the operation
20. The
National Security Council appears to have worked well in respect
of the situation in Libya, particularly in coordinating the response
of Government Departments. This was important as the mission in
Libya had many component parts, not just the military operation.
(Paragraph 95)
21. We commend all
air units on their role in the operation, both in a combat role
and in the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations for UK and other
civilians by Hercules prior to the commencement of combat operations.
We note the Chief of the Air Staff's view that both Tornado and
Typhoon had operated well. We particularly note that in its first
operational role Typhoon performed very reliably. We also note
that the Joint Helicopter Command was able to deploy successfully
Apache helicopters to the Mediterranean Sea as well as maintain
numbers in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 106)
22. ISTAR capabilities
are vital to the ability of UK Armed Forces to undertake operations
such as those in Libya. We note that it was necessary as part
of the mission to extend the service life of the Nimrod R1 signals
intelligence aircraft. We expect the MoD to give a higher priority
to the development of such capabilities in advance of the next
SDSR. In response to this report we also expect the MoD to clarify
the position on the future of Sentinel and whether consideration
is being given to its retention and what impact retention would
have on other budget areas. (Paragraph 110)
23. We commend the
actions of the Royal Navy in the operation particularly in respect
of the evacuation of civilians from Benghazi, the enforcement
of the arms embargo and the early deployment of the first Response
Force Task Group. However we note that important tasks, such as
the Fleet Ready Escort and counter drugs operations, were not
able to be carried out due to meeting the Libya commitment. Given
the continued high levels of standing maritime commitments it
is likely that this type of risk taking will occur more frequently
as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented. This will be a significant
challenge for the Royal Navy and the MoD who should outline their
plans to meet this challenge in response to our Report. (Paragraph
114)
24. In our SDSR report
we noted the decommissioning of the Harrier Force. Whilst none
of our witnesses told us that the Libya operation could not have
succeeded without a fixed wing aircraft carrier, we note that
three ships capable of carrying aircraft were deployed in theatre
as well as the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean. We also note that
the First Sea Lord told us that if a carrier with Harrier Force
capability had been available it would probably have been used.
In response to our Report the Government should indicate if the
operation could have been carried out more effectively and efficiently
with an aircraft carrier. We repeat our support for proceeding
with both Queen Elizabeth class carriers to ensure one is always
available for operations. (Paragraph 116)
25. We note the high
reliability and accuracy of the principal air munitions employed,
but we also note reports regarding shortages of munitions, such
as the new variant Brimstone missile, during the operation. UK
Armed Forces require large enough stocks of 'Warlike Materiel'
which can be quickly replenished when used. This requires larger
stocks of those items which are more difficult to procure or slower
to produce. In response to this report the Government should outline
the contingency measures that are in place and whether it has
any plans to review them. We accept that that it was necessary
for UK Armed Forces to use costly precision guided weapons on
some missions in order to minimise or avoid civilian casualties
and collateral damage. In response to our Report, we request a
detailed explanation on how decisions on which munitions to deploy
are made, and at what command level, and whether cost is one of
the factors considered. (Paragraph 125)
26. Although the UK
was able to satisfy both operations in Libya and the Military
Standing Tasks and other operational commitments, Operation ELLAMY
was conducted prior to the implementation of many of the Strategic
Defence and Security Review decisions on capability reductions.
We believe the Government will face significantly greater challenges
should an operation of similar size be necessary in the future
and it will need to be prepared for some difficult decisions on
prioritisation. We consider that Operation ELLAMY raises important
questions as to the extent of the United Kingdom's national contingent
capability. We urge the Government to review the United Kingdom's
capacity to respond to concurrent threats. This work should be
conducted as a matter of urgency before the next Strategic Defence
and Security Review. (Paragraph 127)
27. We welcome the
successful interoperability of Anglo-French Forces during the
operation, particularly in respect of maritime-based attack helicopter
operations. We note the Minister's comments that there were some
problems in the early stages of the operation and request an account
of what these were and how resolved. We will continue our scrutiny
of the Anglo-French Defence Treaties. (Paragraph 129)
28. We note that in
December 2011 the Government stated the estimate for the whole
operation was £212 million, made up of £145 million
of operating costs, plus a further £67 million on the cost
of replenishing munitions used in Libya. We also note that the
Secretary of State for Defence announced that fully audited figures
would be produced as part of the annual accounts. We expect the
details included in the accounts to be as complete as possible
and should include a detailed explanation of the component parts
of the additional costs, including those of replenishing munitions.
In response to our Report the MoD should indicate the timetable
for them being reimbursed the additional costs by HM Treasury.
In light of the fact that other commentators have estimated the
cost of operations to be much higher than the MoD estimate, we
expect the MoD and HM Treasury to provide us with a detailed and
transparent explanation of the methodology used when calculating
its figures. We remain concerned that the MoD does not understand
the full costs of operations in Libya. (Paragraph 135)
Implications for future operations
29. Some
aspects of NATO's involvement in operations in Libya were particularly
positive, especially the involvement at an early stage of non-NATO
nations. However, we also note concerns expressed to us that the
US "handed off" the operation to European allies and
that NATO is a divided Alliance. We consider that the US decision
not to lead the engagement in Libya was positively beneficial,
in that it forced European members of NATO to face their own responsibilities,
and shone a light on the gaps in European capabilities—gaps
which we consider it essential to be plugged. Experiences from
operations in Libya have revealed challenges for the political
and military future of NATO, including the requirement to develop
new ways of working especially if the US does not participate
in operations and there is further involvement of non-NATO countries.
These challenges must be considered as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph
143)
30. We commend the
Government for commissioning a lessons learned exercise undertaken
by the National Security Adviser. We request a list of all those
consulted as part of this exercise. We note that the review stated
that "overall the central co-ordination mechanisms worked
well". However we also note that the review highlighted a
number of lessons for handling future conflicts. In response to
our Report, the Government should set out the steps to be taken
and timescales involved to resolve these concerns. We look forward
to hearing how the Government proposes to "ensure that it
obtains key command positions in those parts of a reformed NATO
Command Structure that are most likely to be relevant to the conduct
of future operations", including clarification of which key
command positions. (Paragraph 147)
31. We note that the
National Security Adviser's review stated that individual departments
would conduct their own lessons learned exercises. The MoD should
clarify the remit, format and schedule of the reviews it has carried
out or will be undertaking and we expect to see the reports. We
request a briefing from the MoD's Defence Operational Capability
on the lessons learned from the Libya operation. (Paragraph 148)
32. We commend the
Minister for the Armed Forces' commitment to include the costs
of the operation in the lessons learned process. This should include
an assessment of cost effectiveness and value for money of the
assets deployed. We note his comment that cost comparisons with
allies on different types of operations are only valid if comparing
like with like (including the difficulty of the operation), but
recommend that where possible these comparisons should be undertaken.
(Paragraph 150)
33. We note the concerns
of witnesses regarding the operation, but believe that the mission
in Libya should be regarded as a success. NATO and other nations
acting under the authority of the United Nations have ensured
the safety of Libyan civilians who would otherwise have been at
risk of being killed by pro-Gaddafi forces. (Paragraph 155)
34. UK Armed Forces
have contributed significantly to the successful conclusion of
the operation. UK Service personnel have yet again performed their
duties in a professional and dedicated manner. The capabilities
deployed by NATO and the UK performed well, minimising civilian
deaths and collateral damage. However the mission has also highlighted
challenges and issues that need to be addressed and taken forward
by the United Nations, NATO and the UK Government. The mission
in Libya was successful in discharging the UN mandate. The real
test is whether the success of this mission was a one-off or whether
the lessons it has highlighted mean that future such missions
can be successfully undertaken, whilst maintaining the UK's capability
to protect its interests elsewhere. (Paragraph 156)
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