1 Introduction
1. At the outset of our Report, we wish to pay
tribute to the UK Armed Forces and civilian personnel who contributed
to operations in Libya. They continue to impress us with the courage,
dedication and professionalism with which they undertook this
operation which we are convinced saved thousands of civilian lives.
We also wish to acknowledge the contribution of the families of
Armed Forces personnel.
Background
2. In February 2011, civilian unrest and protests
against Colonel Gaddafi's regime began in Libya. On 24 February
the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force began evacuating UK nationals
from Libya.[1] In the space
of a few days, the UK was able to evacuate over 800 UK nationals
and over 1,000 other nationals.[2]
On 26 February, an arms embargo on Libya was adopted in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. On 5 March, the Libyan
opposition to Colonel Gaddafi officially established the National
Transitional Council (NTC). On 17 March, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 1973 which reinforced and tightened
the arms embargo, established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace
and authorised "all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory".[3]
The weekend of 19-20 March saw US, British and French military
action to establish the no-fly zone over Libya begin under the
names Operation Odyssey Dawn [US], Operation ELLAMY [UK] and Operation
Harmattan [FR]. On 31 March, NATO took command of the operation
under the name Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Operations concluded
on 31 October 2011, after the capture and death of Colonel Gaddafi
in Sirte on 20 October and the declaration of liberation by the
National Transitional Council on 23 October. A detailed timeline
of operations in Libya is below.
Timeline
15 February 2011
| Protests begin in Benghazi against the Gaddafi regime, and in the following days spread across Libya
|
23 February-
1 March
| Chartered planes, military flights and military ships evacuate British and other nationals from Libya
|
26 February
| UN passes Resolution 1970 imposing an arms embargo and other arms restrictions, freezing the assets of the Gaddafi family, and referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court
|
5 March
| Libyan opposition National Transitional Council (NTC) established and convenes first meeting
|
6 March
| Counter-offensive launched by Gaddafi, retaking Ras Lanuf and Brega and pushing towards Ajdabiya and Benghazi
|
8 March
| NATO steps up its surveillance operations in the central Mediterranean, deploying AWACS aircraft to provide round-the-clock observation of movements in Libyan airspace
|
10 March
| France recognises NTC as 'legitimate representative of the Libyan people'
|
12 March
| Arab League requests that the UN Security Council impose a No Fly Zone in Libyan airspace
|
17 March
| UN passes Resolution 1973 authorising a No Fly Zone over Libya; China, Russia, Germany, India and Brazil abstain
|
19 March
| US, UK and French military assets begin bombing campaign. First RAF Tornado aircraft arrive at Gioia del Colle, Southern Italy
|
20 March
| French carrier Charles de Gaulle leaves Toulon Naval Base for Libya. First RAF Typhoon aircraft arrive at Gioia del Colle, Southen Italy
|
21 March
| The House of Commons votes in favour of military action to implement UNSCR 1973
|
23 March
| NATO ships and aircraft begin operating in the central Mediterranean to enforce the arms embargo by sea
|
24 March
| NATO decides to enforce the UN-mandated No Fly Zone
|
25 March
| NATO takes over from the US command enforcing the No Fly Zone
|
31 March
| NATO takes command of coalition air operations in Libya. Subsequent operations are carried out as part of Operation Unified Protector
|
13 April
| First meeting of the Libya Contact Group in Doha
|
14 April
| First meeting of the Cairo Group of International Organisations. Foreign Ministers from NATO Allies and non-NATO contributors meet in Berlin; they commit to using all necessary resources and maximum operational flexibility to meet the UN mandate until such time as all attacks on civilians and civilian-populated areas have ended, the Gaddafi regime withdraws all military and para-military forces to bases, and the Gaddafi regime permits immediate, full, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian aid for the Libyan people
|
19 April
| UK announces it is sending military advisers to Libya to help the opposition forces improve their organisation and communications, but not to train or arm them
|
30 April
| NATO airstrike reported to have killed Gaddafi's youngest son and three of his grandchildren. Subsequent attacks on British and other Embassies.
|
26 May
| NATO warplanes bomb more than twenty targets in Tripoli; widely described as the heaviest attack on the city since the campaigns began
|
1 June
| International Commission of Inquiry into the Human Rights situation in Libya says that both Government forces and the opposition have committed war crimes in Libya, but notes fewer reports from opposition forces
|
4 June
| First strikes by UK Apache attack helicopters, near the town of Brega
|
27 June
| International Criminal Court issues a warrant for the arrest of Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and head of intelligence Abdullah Senussi
|
29 June
| French military officials confirm that weapons have been air-dropped to opposition forces in the Nafusa Mountains
|
15 July
| Libya Contact Group meets in Istanbul. Recognises NTC as the "legitimate governing authority in Libya"
|
27 July
| UK recognises NTC |
20 August
| Opposition forces push into Tripoli
|
22-23 August
| Tripoli falls; Opposition forces enter Gaddafi's compound in Bab al-Aziza
|
5 September
| Paris Conference on Libya; over 60 countries attend
|
16 September
| UNSCR 2009 agreed by consensus: establishes a UN mission in Libya and creates a mechanism for unfreezing assets. Leaves mandate to protect civilians in place. UN General Assembly votes in favour of NTC taking up the Libyan seat at the UN.
|
21 September
| NATO extends Operation Unified Protector for up to 90 days
|
20 October
| Colonel Gaddafi and his son Mutassim captured and killed in Sirte
|
23 October
| Liberation declared by NTC Chair Abdul Jalil
|
28 October
| NATO agrees to end military action on 31 October
|
31 October
| End of NATO Operation Unified Protector
|
Data sources: Accidental Heroes: Britain, France
and the Libya Operation, Interim RUSI Campaign Report, September
2011; Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser's Review of Central
Co-ordination and Lessons Learned, December 2011
Parliamentary approval
3. The Prime Minister made a statement to the House
of Commons on 18 March which outlined UN Security Council Resolution
1973 and the UK's intention to contribute to operations.[4]
Military operations by UK Armed Forces commenced the following
day. A vote in the House of Commons on 21 March gave approval
for military action, with 557 Ayes to 13 Noes. However, the Government
faced some criticism that Parliament had not been recalled on
Saturday 19 March to give approval prior to deployment of UK forces.[5]
4. We support the principle that Parliament should
whenever possible be consulted and authorise the use of military
force prior to its deployment. However, given the Prime Minister's
statement on 18 March 2011 and the debate in the House of Commons
on 21 March and that urgent action was required to safeguard civilians
in Libya, we are content that Parliament was consulted as soon
as practicable.
Our Inquiry
5. On 27 April 2011, we held a one-off evidence session
with the then Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Liam Fox
MP, and Ministry of Defence officials, to examine how the operation
was progressing and the role and contribution of UK Armed Forces.
That evidence is published with this report. On 19 July, with
operations still ongoing, we announced an inquiry into the effectiveness
of the operation and the role of UK Forces in Libya. We were particularly
interested in establishing:
- the effectiveness of the continuing
mission to protect civilians in Libyathe extent and success
of coordination of efforts with French and US forces in particular;
- the costs of the operation and its implications
for other UK operations;
- how capability decisions taken in the Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and subsequent policy documents
had affected the UK contribution in Libya;
- the implications of this operation for the outcomes
of the SDSR;
- the effectiveness of NATO command structures
in the preparation and conduct of operations in Libya;
- the "end game": what would a successful
outcome look like and how did current operations contribute to
achieving this?;
- the extent to which the UK and NATO were interacting
with and supporting the opposition forces in Libya;
- whether the necessary planning was being done
to ensure the long-term stability of Libya when the military effort
was completed;
- what was the exit strategy?;
- the contributions of allies and partner nations
in delivering a successful military intervention; and
- the broader implications of the intervention
in Libya in the context of reacting to instability in the wider
region.
6. Although our inquiry focused mainly on operational
aspects of the mission, we were also keen to examine wider issues
arising from the mission such as how the capability decisions
in the SDSR and subsequent announcements had affected the UK contribution
to operations in Libya. Our Report covers the development and
adoption of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and NATO's
operational implementation of the Resolutions, including command
and control structures and decisions, and the potential impact
on the future of the Alliance, particularly the involvement of
non-member nations. We then discuss the UK's involvement in, and
the lessons learned from, the mission.
7. We held three oral evidence sessions and our witnesses
included the former Secretary of State for Defence, the Minister
for the Armed Forces, the UK Permanent Representatives to the
UN and the North Atlantic Council, the UK Military Representative
to NATO, the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Air Staff. We
received written evidence from 12 individuals and organisations.
We are grateful to all those who submitted evidence to our inquiry.
A list of our witnesses and those who submitted written evidence
can be found on pages 68-69. We are also grateful for the assistance
of our Specialist Advisers and staff during this inquiry.[6]
1 Ev 53 Back
2
HM Government, Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser's Review
of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned, December 2011.
Available at: www.number10.gov.uk/news/report-on-libya/ Back
3
The full text of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and
1973 are available at: www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm
Back
4
HC Deb, 18 March 2011, cols 611-613 Back
5
For example, see Early Day Motion 1560 of Session 2010-12 and
also HC Deb, 21 March 2011, col 699 Back
6
The Specialist Advisers' declarations of relevant interests are
recorded in the Committee's Formal Minutes which are available
on the Committee's website. Back
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