2 United Nations
UN Security Council Resolutions
8. The outbreak of civil unrest in Libya in February
2011 and the threat to the civilian population in places such
as Benghazi led to urgent discussions and action by the UN Security
Council. The relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, prior to
the commencement of operations, are Numbers 1970 and 1973.[7]
Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UK Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, explained the sequence thus:
Resolution 1973, which we passed in March, was
the culmination of two previous steps. Once the demonstrations
and protests had broken out in Libya, there was obviously international
concern about the regime's response. In response to that, a press
statement was agreed by the Security Council on 26 February. Then,
when that was ignored by the regime, we escalated the pressure
through Resolution 1970, which imposed an arms embargo and sanctions,
and it referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal
Court. That was a deliberate escalation.
In the context of the discussions and negotiations
on 1970, there was discussion about whether it would be necessary
to authorise all necessary means to ensure humanitarian access
to those who were under threat from the regime, but it was felt
that it was not necessary to do it at that stage, and there was
quite a lot of opposition to it from other countries on the Security
Council at that stage. So we had a very tough sanctions resolution,
and it was the first ever unanimous referral to the ICC. We put
on the regime the obligation to protect their civilians. That
was passed at the end of February.
When the situation deteriorated further, obviously
we needed to give consideration to more dramatic action to protect
civilians. As a result of a request from the Arab League to impose
a no-fly zone, we began to focus on whether it would be possible
to authorise and implement one. In the course of those discussions,
again we looked at a number of different options for a way of
protecting the civilian population in Libya, including the possibility
of humanitarian corridors, safe havens, which had been used in
some previous theatres in the Middle East, and a more broad-brush
authorisation to use all necessary means to protect civilians.
It was that last formula that was then employed in Resolution
1973.[8]
9. Resolution 1973 accordingly established a no-fly
zone and gave authority to use all necessary means to protect
civilians and civilian-populated areas (including in, but not
exclusively in, Benghazi). Sir Mark explained that the other options
of safe havens (as recommended by the Arab League) and humanitarian
corridors would have required the presence of foreign troops on
the ground. Such a presence had been specifically excluded by
the Arab League who had requested intervention.[9]
10. A further Resolution Number 2009 was passed in
September 2011 which established a United Nations Support Mission
and gave some exemptions from the arms embargo to allow weapons
to be brought into the country, for instance for the UN Mission
carrying side arms, having close protection for diplomats, or
offering security assistance to the legitimate Government [of
Libya].[10]
11. The authorisations embodied in the Resolutions
were kept under regular review. As Sir Mark explained:
There is no deadline in the resolutions for the
authorisation of protecting civilians or for the no-fly zone.
In Resolution 2009, it was agreed that we would keep those authorisations
under regular review. In the operative paragraph, we said that
the Security Council "emphasises its intention to keep the
measures…under continuous review and underlines its readiness,
as appropriate and when circumstances permit, to lift those measures
and to terminate authorization given to Member States in paragraph
4 of resolution 1973". That is something that will be kept
under review.[11]
12. We asked Sir Mark about what input individual
countries' Defence Ministries and NATO had on the drafting of
Resolution 1973 and on what was operationally possible. He told
us that "the input was relatively limited in the early stages
because Resolution 1973 was the culmination of two previous steps".[12]
He added:
In the course of those two weeks of the three
different stages—press statement, and Resolutions 1970 and
1973—obviously there was a large amount of co-ordination
and discussion within the British Government and between Britain
and its allies, including the allies in NATO, about what the implications
were of the various measures put into the resolutions. I would
suggest that it was a more informal than formal input, and the
dynamics were a response to the situation on the ground and the
negotiating dynamics in New York.[13]
Sir Mark confirmed that he had a military adviser
advising him on "what was and was not feasible", and
the FCO team in London, who were sending him instructions, were
in touch with the MoD and with NATO allies.[14]
13. We asked how compliance with the UN Resolutions
was monitored in respect of not only pro-Gaddafi forces but also
those of the coalition and the Libyan opposition. Sir Mark explained:
A very complicated series of notifications is
required under 1973, and in terms of the coalition forces, they
are clearly set out in the provisions of 1973. In brief, different
notifications are required for taking military action under operational
paragraph 4, which is on all necessary means to protect civilians.
We had to notify the Secretary-General in advance that we were
planning to take action to implement that aspect of the resolution.
Likewise, on the no-fly zone, there is a requirement to notify
both the Secretary-General and the Arab League about implementation.
In addition, once specific action has been taken, either to enforce
the arms embargo or to protect civilians, the Secretary-General
has to be notified. Obviously, we gave all those notifications.
After a while, when NATO took over the command of the coalition
operations, NATO started to do those notifications on behalf of
the coalition as a whole, but for the first week or so the notifications
were done by individual countries in light of the activities they
took to implement the resolution.[15]
WHY LIBYA?
14. During our inquiry the question was raised as
to whether Resolution 1973 might be a precedent for seeking authorisation
for intervention in other troubled areas, for instance, Syria
where, arguably, even more civilians have been killed by the ruling
regime. We heard from Dr Liam Fox, then Secretary of State for
Defence and Sir Mark that in the case of Libya there were factors
that did not apply elsewhere.[16]
For example, Sir Mark told us that Colonel Gaddafi was deeply
unpopular and did not have the support of regional groups such
as the Arab League and the African Union and that the UN Resolutions
contained measures which the Arab League had requested be implemented.[17]
Also relevant was the defection of the Libyan Ambassador to the
United Nations. Sir Mark added:
Those were three specific factors unique, if
you like, to Libya, and they facilitated agreement on these tough
resolutions. In other circumstances, such as Syria, those circumstances
do not apply. The Syrian ambassador has not defected and the Arab
League does not have such a strong position. Although its position
is getting stronger by the day, it has not called on the Security
Council to impose sanctions, and President Assad still has some
support in the region. That is why it is more difficult to get
strong action taken in the Security Council on Syria.[18]
15. On 21 March 2011, the Prime Minister told the
House of Commons:
We have a specific situation in Libya, whereby
there was a dictator whose people were trying to get rid of him,
who responded with armed violence in the streets. The UN has reached
a conclusion and I think that we should back it. As I said the
other day, just because we cannot do the right thing everywhere
does not mean we should not do it when we have clear permission
for and a national interest in doing so.[19]
16. Witnesses told us that there were unique circumstances
in Libya and, given the gravity of the situation and the potential
consequences of inaction, we agree that the international community
was justified in its response.
LEGALITY OF THE ACTION
17. There are circumstances where no international
authorisation is required for the deployment of UK Forces. The
question of the legality both of the Libyan operation overall
and of individual targeting is vital, not only intrinsically but
also because of the possibility that in future years those who
took part in it might find themselves before the International
Criminal Court.[20] In
his statement to the House on 18 March, the Prime Minister commented
on the UN resolution and asserted the legality of the action:
[...] demonstrable need, regional support and
a clear legal base, the three criteria, are now satisfied in full.
Now that the UN Security Council has reached its decision there
is a responsibility on its members to respond. That is what Britain,
with others, will now do. The Attorney General has been consulted
and the Government are satisfied that there is a clear and unequivocal
legal basis for the deployment of UK forces and military assets.[21]
18. We received evidence that some people nonetheless
regarded the action as illegal. Chris Coverdale on behalf of the
Campaign to Make Wars History and the Stop the War Coalition said
the "the claim that the use of armed force in Libya is authorised
by the Security Council operating under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter is false", as Article 41 of that Chapter states "The
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force [witnesses' emphasis] are to be employed
to give effect to its decisions."[22]
Similarly, Patrick Lavender argued that the involvement of NATO
was ultra vires.[23]
19. The UK Government sought advice from the Attorney
General on the legality of the deployment. The following summary
of his advice was published in March 2011.[24]
| Summary of Attorney General's Legal Advice
Under the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council is the organ conferred with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In carrying out its duties the Security Council acts on behalf of Member States of the United Nations, who agree to accept and carry out its decisions in accordance with the Charter. Among the specific powers granted to the Security Council are those provided in Chapter VII of the Charter which is concerned with action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.
Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011 is annexed to this document [not printed].
In this resolution the Security Council has determined that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council has adopted the resolution as a measure to maintain or restore international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which provides for such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Provision for a No Fly Zone is provided for by operative paragraphs 6 to 12 of the resolution. Operative paragraph 8 authorises Member States that have notified the UN Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements to take all necessary measures to enforce the ban on flights established by operative paragraph 6.
Operative paragraph 4 of the resolution also authorises Member States making the notifications so provided, and acting in co-operation with the UN Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.
Operative paragraph 13 of the resolution, in substituting a replacement operative paragraph 11 in resolution 1970 (2011), further authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out inspections aimed at the enforcement of the arms embargo established by that earlier resolution.
The Attorney General has been consulted and Her Majesty's Government is satisfied that this Chapter VII authorisation to use all necessary measures provides a clear and unequivocal legal basis for deployment of UK forces and military assets to achieve the resolution's objectives.
|
20. On 22 March, we asked the Prime Minister for
sight of the full advice provided by the Attorney General concerning
the legality of the deployment of UK Forces and military assets
in respect of Libya to achieve the objectives of Resolution 1973.
The Prime Minister replied that "the long-standing convention
that the Government is entitled to receive legal advice in confidence
is worth upholding" and that "the Government needs sound
legal advice that remains legally privileged". He added that
the Government had exceptionally agreed to confirm that it had
obtained advice from the Attorney General and to make available
a note setting out the legal basis for the deployment of armed
forces. He did not think it appropriate to establish an exception
to "release certain legal advice or release to certain groups".[25]
21. On 3 May, following an attack on a command and
control centre at the end of April which killed members of Colonel
Gaddafi's family, in response to calls for a further summary of
the Attorney General's advice to be published, the Foreign Secretary
said:
Of course, the Government will consider requests
made in the House in respect of the legal advice. We published
very clearly a note on the legal advice at the time of the 21
March debate. However, again, I do not think that it would be
right for Governments to start to publish legal advice on a regular
basis every few days, but we will consider any requests that are
made.[26]
22. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UK Permanent Representative
to the UN, was confident that the military action was legal as
Resolution 1973 incorporated Article 42 of Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.[27] He said:
Resolution 1970 is under chapter VII and article
41, so it expressly excludes the use of force for that reason.
Resolution 1973 is deliberately under chapter VII and makes no
reference to article 41, which means that it incorporates all
of chapter VII that includes article 41 and article 42, which
is the authorisation of the use of force. That is why there is
a difference between Resolutions 1970 and 1973, and Resolution
1973 was the specific military authorisation. Resolution 2009
goes back to chapter VII, but only article 41. There is a very
clear division.[28]
23. Cathy Adams, FCO Legal Adviser, agreed with Sir
Mark's comments. She added that the legality of the operation
was a separate issue from how the operation was carried out:
As far as targeting is concerned, that is actually
a slightly separate issue, because the legality of the operation
is separate from the legality of how the operation is carried
out, which is essentially what the ICC is looking at. It is certainly
a very important issue. I am not from the MoD and I obviously
cannot speak to this, but I know that the process that they go
through in terms of ensuring that the targeting is compatible
with international humanitarian law is scrupulous [...].[29]
24. We note the contrary opinions we have received
regarding the legality of the operation in Libya. It is not for
us to comment on the legality of the operation. We agree that
the legality of the operation is a separate issue to the issue
of the legality of how the operation was undertaken. In response
to our Report, the Ministry of Defence should commit to review
the conduct of the operation and its compliance with international
law. We commend the Government for publishing a summary of the
Attorney General's legal advice and respect the decision not to
publish the advice in full but are disappointed that the Prime
Minister felt unable to share the advice with us on a private
and confidential basis as this would have enabled us to scrutinise
the operation in Libya more effectively. We recommend, however,
that when a summary of legal advice has been published and developments
occur that lead to updated legal advice being sought from the
Attorney General, an updated summary of the advice should be published
as soon as possible.
WAR CRIMES
25. The first UN reaction to the repression by Gaddafi's
forces of the Libyan revolt was the press statement agreed by
the Security Council on 26 February. When this was ignored, the
Council adopted Resolution 1970 on 26 February, which included
the first ever unanimous referral to the International Criminal
Court (ICC).[30] On 3
March the ICC announced that it was investigating alleged crimes
against humanity committed by the Gaddafi family.
26. We expect the international community to be even
handed. It is important that the jurisdiction of the ICC is not
limited to one side of a conflict. Problems may arise however
when UK Armed Forces and NATO are operating with other forces
who may not abide by the same rules. It was reported, for instance
that 53 bodies were found in one hotel in Sirte, apparently murdered
by NTC forces.[31] Nick
Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, agreed that such conduct,
if proven, might potentially constitute a war crime, and said:
The UK Government would deplore mass killing
in any circumstances in which it took place, and we would support
the quest for the truth as to what happened on this occasion.
If it can reputably and reliably be established that a crime has
been committed, we would expect that to be pursued with the same
vigour, whatever the circumstances.[32]
27. It would be impossible for, nor the role of,
the UK to investigate such allegations with its very limited resources
on the ground, but the Minister told us that he certainly hoped
that the Libyan authorities would do so.[33]
Lieutenant-General Barrons, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Operations), confirmed that the matter was regularly raised at
the National Security Council, but, while the FCO and DfID were
in the lead as far as the UK was concerned,[34]
"the lead for this issue would normally sit with the United
Nations and other similar organisations".[35]
He added that in its conduct of military tactical operations the
NTC had been "very alert indeed to the requirement to protect
the civilian population".[36]
28. We welcome the Minister for the Armed Forces'
statement that the Government would expect National Transitional
Council forces to be treated in exactly the same way as pro-Gaddafi
forces with respect to potential war crimes, as it is essential
that both sides in the conflict are treated the same not just
in the interests of justice but also for the credibility and future
of the International Criminal Court and support of the international
community for future operations.
29. While we are aware that there are circumstances
where no international authorisation is required for the deployment
of UK Armed Forces, we expect the Government to ensure that UK
military and civilian personnel comply with international law
at all times.
REGIME CHANGE
30. During our inquiry, the Government also defended
itself against the accusation that the coalition was 'taking sides'
in the conflict, for example by the supply of equipment to the
NTC,[37] or that regime
change was an aim of the mission, maintaining throughout that
all its actions were designed to protect civilians and that regime
change was not authorised under Resolution 1973. We asked Rt Hon
Liam Fox MP, then Secretary of State for Defence, what the UK
aims were for the mission. He replied:
The UK aims [...] are for the protection of civilians,
for Gaddafi to comply with UN Resolution 1973 and for the Libyan
people to have the opportunity to choose their own future. Those
are fully in line with NATO's objectives, which are to protect
civilians and civilian population areas under threat of attack
by the regime, to implement a no-fly zone to protect civilians
and to implement the arms embargo. Those aims are set out clearly
under the UN Resolutions.[38]
31. When asked whether self determination for the
people of Libya and regime change was a goal he stated:
[...] I would have thought that a very clear
aim for all of us is that the free decision of people to determine
their own future is something that we would want to see. I would
have hardly thought that required incorporation into the Resolution;
I would have thought that to an extent it was self-evident. But
it is clear that regime change would be a major policy initiative,
and one that is not signed up to in the Resolution.[39]
32. We suggested the coalition was sending mixed
messages as a letter from President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron
and President Sarkozy had said "our duty and our mandate
under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians,
and we are doing that. It is not to remove Gaddafi by force. But
it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in
power".[40] Dr Fox
replied that:
That [the letter] very much echoes the views
that have been put forward by the opposition forces themselves.
They have already witnessed two unilateral ceasefires put forward
by Gaddafi, during which time the population were still being
slaughtered, so I can understand how they feel about having little
faith in the word of a man who has broken it so frequently in
the past. [...][41]
It is also very important to apply psychological
pressure to the regime. One of the ways in which we could hasten
the end of this conflict is for the regime itself to recognise
that there is no long-term future. As long as Colonel Gaddafi
believes there is a future, he is likely to want to continue the
conflict. It is essential that we send clear messages that he
is despised by many of his own people, he is isolated internationally
and there is no future for his regime. If he continues to believe
that there is such a possibility, it is likely that the conflict
will continue.[42]
33. We pursued this with Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UK
Permanent Representative to the UN, who replied:
Other members of the Security Council have made
that precise point [about regime change]. Some members have said,
"You have been targeting civilian infrastructure, you have
been targeting Gaddafi and his family and you are aiming for regime
change. None of those are authorised in the resolution."
We say that we have not been doing that. We have not targeted
civilian infrastructure, which has been remarkably intact. We
have not been targeting Gaddafi. We have not been aiming, through
this resolution and through the military action, at regime change.[43]
However Sir Mark agreed that Colonel Gaddafi and
other members of the regime could be targeted in a command post,
"Of course there are circumstances when, if you can make
that link to the protection of civilians, that military action
is justified".[44]
34. We note the concerns expressed that, although
not authorised under the UN Security Council Resolutions, regime
change was a goal of the mission of Libya. Although it is difficult
to see how the mission could have been successfully completed
without Colonel Gaddafi losing power, we are concerned that this,
rather than the protection of civilians as set out in the Resolution,
came to be seen by some countries as an integral part of the mission.
The apparent conflict between the military and political objectives
meant that the Government failed to ensure that its communication
strategy was effective in setting out the aims of the operation.
In future, the Government's communication strategy needs to be
more effective so that the public are confident of the aims and
goals of such operations.
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
35. Resolution 1973 authorised all necessary measures,
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form, to protect civilians
in Libya. The Government maintained that at all times UK Forces
had acted within the terms of the Resolution and had gone to extreme
lengths to ensure that civilian loss of life was kept to an absolute
minimum. For example, Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, UK Military
Representative to NATO, told us of an occasion when an attack
was stopped due to civilians being in the target area:
Those forces that we did apply conducted themselves
in an exemplary manner and, indeed, in full line with all the
direction that came from the North Atlantic Council to make sure
that we protected civilians. [...] A minute before weapon release,
they found out that there was a possibility of there being civilians
in the target area, stopped prosecuting the attack and brought
the weapons all the way back home to the United Kingdom. [...][45]
36. Mariot Leslie, UK Permanent Representative to
the North Atlantic Council, outlined the difficulties of avoiding
civilian casualties saying "you then cannot see inside every
single building to be absolutely sure that a shard of glass has
not gone through somebody you cannot see, so you cannot say with
honesty and certainty "I know for a fact that I have not
killed a civilian." We do not know that we have, and we believe
that there would be very few, if we have at all".[46]
On the other hand, an article in the New York Times suggested
that:
at least 40 civilians, and perhaps more than
70, were killed by NATO at [certain] sites, available evidence
suggests. While that total is not high compared with other conflicts
in which Western powers have relied heavily on air power, and
less than the exaggerated accounts circulated by the Qaddafi government,
it is also not a complete accounting. Survivors and doctors working
for the anti-Qaddafi interim authorities point to dozens more
civilians wounded in these and other strikes, and they referred
reporters to other sites where civilian casualties were suspected.[47]
37. In its interim Report on Libya, the Royal United
Services Institute suggested that Colonel Gaddafi had made it
"easy" for the coalition to maintain the legitimacy
of continuing the operation by continuing to target civilians:
As it happened, Libyan forces made it easy for
them by relentlessly attacking population centres wherever they
operated; and Qadhafi played into their hands by continuing with
his delusional bluster and threats. A more subtle dictator could
have put the three principal allies under far greater political
pressure when the Arab League blanched as it confronted the realities
of what it had advocated, and voices in Europe and the US warned
of a dangerous military stalemate.[48]
38. We accept that the coalition forces did their
best to prevent and minimise civilian casualties and we commend
them for this approach. This lesson, taken from Iraq and Afghanistan,
will, we hope make the building of the subsequent peace in Libya
significantly easier. Nonetheless, it is at least possible that
some civilian casualties were caused by coalition actions. In
the absence of observers on the ground it is impossible to say
whether, despite the best efforts of coalition forces, any civilian
casualties were caused by coalition action and if so how many.
39. We particularly asked about the action towards
the end of the conflict when NTC forces shelled pro-Gaddafi forces
in Sirte. It was alleged that this was outside the terms of the
UN Resolution in that given that Gaddafi's forces no longer posed
a threat to civilians and indeed, that it was now the NTC forces
which posed the threat to civilians by their continued bombardment.
Christian Turner, Director, Middle East and North Africa, FCO,
said that it was not the Government's assessment that Gaddafi's
forces were in fact neutralised, saying there was still (as at
12 October) a rump of resistance from pro-Gaddafi forces both
in Sirte and Bani Walid and that there was continuing evidence
coming out about civilian casualties.[49]
40. We suggested to Government witnesses that under
Resolution 1973 the coalition was supposed to be protecting civilians
from casualties caused by NTC action as well as pro-Gaddafi forces.
Christian Turner said:
That is absolutely right. As a result, the targeting
that is still being carried out under the OUP [Operation Unified
Protector] mandate has to be incredibly careful in built-up areas
like Sirte. It is hard for us. We do not have people on the ground
to provide that monitoring. We are trying to co-ordinate closely
with the National Transitional Council to ensure that any allegations
of civilian casualties caused by Free Libya forces, as we call
them, are properly scrutinised and held accountable.[50]
41. We note that under Resolution 1973, the coalition
was obliged to protect civilians from casualties caused by National
Transitional Council forces as well as pro-Gaddafi forces. In
response to our Report the Government should set out how this
obligation was carried out. Although we acknowledge that it is
difficult to estimate numbers, this should include an assessment
of the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces,
pro-Gaddafi forces and NTC forces.
MISSING WEAPONS
42. In October 2011 reports emerged that large numbers
of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, previously in the armament
of pro-Gaddafi forces, were missing in Libya. The consensus among
witnesses was that this problem was for the National Transition
Council to resolve, although help should be available from the
United Nations and elsewhere. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen said at a press conference: "It is a matter of
concern if stockpiles of weapons are not properly controlled and
monitored". He added since NATO did not have any troops on
the ground, it was the responsibility of the post-Gaddafi leadership—the
National Transitional Council—to ensure that all weapons
stocks are properly controlled and monitored and that "individual
allies are in contact with the NTC to make sure they address this
issue properly."[51]
43. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UK Permanent Representative
to the UN, said that Resolution 2009 had recognised weapons proliferation
as a concern:
[...] there is a limited amount I can say about
that from the UN perspective, but we recognised in the most recent
resolution, 2009, that there was a deep concern about proliferation
of weapons, including MANPADS [Man-portable air defence systems].
Now action is being taken to address that [...].[52]
44. Christian Turner, Director, Middle East and North
Africa, FCO, thought that over the longer term the UN would take
a lead on the issue:
Yes, there was a specific Libyan request for
help on this. Obviously, it is a priority concern. Many of these
weapons are old and difficult to handle. They need to be located
and then dismantled. We assisted by putting in four experts to
work alongside the Libyans and, also, with some US experts. That
will hopefully provide the immediate location and demobilisation
of those weapons. Over the longer term, I expect that to become
part of a UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
programme, as part of the broad post-conflict settlement.
[53]
Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, said:
Undoubtedly, this is a major concern for NATO
and for the National Transitional Council and, frankly, it should
be a major concern for the UN and other countries around the world.
Your basic premise is broadly correct that there are munitions
at large within the Libyan territory on a scale which is concerning.
We are doing what we can to support international efforts. We
have committed some personnel. The Americans are taking a lead
on that because, unless we can succeed in working with the NTC
to get this situation under control, the danger of those munitions
and that equipment finding their way around the world is very
real and everybody ought to take it seriously.[54]
Lieutenant-General Barrons, Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff (Operations), added:
Of particular concern is the substantial number
of man-portable air defence systems known to exist in Libya before
the conflict and, as the Minister mentioned, that has already
led to a US-led, UK-supported project to which we have currently
committed four people and the Government have committed £1.5
million. With others, that team is scoping the problem. By that,
I mean a survey of literally hundreds of bunkers is being conducted.[55]
45. We are concerned by reports that large numbers
of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, previously in the armament
of pro-Gaddafi forces, are missing in Libya. We accept that the
Government, the UN and NATO have acknowledged that this is a major
concern for security in the region and the wider world. We expect
the international community to support and maintain pressure on
the new Libyan regime to ensure that these weapons are held securely
and safely. We agree this should be part of a UN-led disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration programme, as part of the broad
post-conflict settlement. We expect an update on progress on this
in the Government's response to our Report.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
46. Colonel Gaddafi was well-known to possess weapons
of mass destruction, that had included nuclear and still included
chemical, of which some had been given up before February 2011
following the UK Government's engagement with Libya on the issue.
We asked our witnesses about the security of remaining weapons
of this kind. Lieutenant-General Barrons said:
It was known in advance of the conflict that
Libya held and had declared some stocks of chemical weapons. It
was known where they were. They are still there, and a very close
eye was kept on that stuff. They are currently under control and
the ambition is to very quickly restart the Italian-led project
that was setting about destroying them. Were there to be in the
future undeclared stocks of chemical weapons, the NTC is completely
clear that they would have to be dealt with in the same way, and
obviously, since they are undeclared, we don't yet know.[56]
47. In a written parliamentary answer on 29 November,
Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), gave an update on chemical weapons
in Libya in which he confirmed the discovery in Libya by the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of what might be such
weapons, which suggested that Colonel Gaddafi had not kept all
the promises he had made in this regard. He added that the UK
Government would continue to monitor the situation with international
partners and expected the Libyan Government to ensure the safety
and security of all stocks.[57]
The FCO subsequently confirmed to us that the new discovery included
chemical agents and chemical weapons and that the Libyan Government
would officially declare them in due course and incorporate them
into the destruction plan.
48. We acknowledge that the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed, following an on-site
inspection, that the remains of the chemical weapons stocks declared
by the Gaddafi regime were intact and secure, pending completion
of destruction. We note with particular concern the discovery
of a previously undeclared stock of chemical weapons. We also
note that the Government stated that it would monitor the situation
closely with international partners. In its response to our Report
the Government should state what further measures it has taken
to address this issue and the progress made in the destruction
plan.
ROLE OF WOMEN
49. We note that women played an important role in
supporting the uprising in Libya, moving out of their traditional
roles and expectations to take a front-line role for example by
carrying munitions, and providing medical care and support. We
are encouraged that NATO has recognised the role of women in such
situations with the acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution
1325 on the role of women in armed conflicts. Mariot Leslie, UK
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, told us:
That resolution is embedded in everything NATO
does when it approaches conflicts and operations. When NATO enters
partnership arrangements with other countries, to help with security
sector reform, for example, it ensures that all considerations
in that UNSCR are taken into account in the way in which it does
its training and mentoring programmes, its operations with other
countries, its exercises and so on.[58]
50. The international community must help and
support Libyan women in the future to ensure that there are opportunities
for them to have a wider role in the building of the new Libya.
Entry and exit strategy
51. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review
stated that the UK would be:
more selective in our use of the Armed Forces,
deploying them decisively at the right time but only where key
UK national interests are at stake; where we have a clear strategic
aim; where the likely political, economic and human costs are
in proportion to the likely benefits; where we have a viable exit
strategy; and where justifiable under international law.[59]
52. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UK Permanent Representative
to the UN, set out how the Libyan operation could be ended:
The authorisation in the resolutions is for member
states and organisations as appropriate; it does not mention NATO.
Of course, NATO can stop doing what it is doing at any time it
so decides. That is one decision point. Secondly, the Security
Council could terminate the authorisations. As I mentioned, we
will keep the measure under constant review and it will certainly
be reviewed in mid-December, if not before, because that is the
one timeline that is already included in the resolutions. If the
UN terminates those authorisations, the only way that military
action could continue to be taken is at the request of the legitimate
Government of Libya.[60]
53. In the event, the UN Security Council voted unanimously
on 27 October 2011 in Resolution 2016 to terminate the provisions
of Resolution 1973 which provided the legal basis for military
intervention and the no-fly zone at 11.59 p.m., Libyan local time,
on 31 October 2011. This was despite a reported request from the
National Transitional Council at a conference in Doha on 26 October
for operations to be continued.[61]
54. When we put it to Nick Harvey MP, the Minister
for the Armed Forces, that the exit strategy from Libya had not
been clear, he replied:
I think we had a clear aim. In the exit strategy,
the objective was to prevent an atrocity against civilian life.
That was not an open-ended commitment. It could have ended in
a variety of different ways. It was always clear that this was
at most a medium-scale engagement. The aims were entirely clear.
[...][62]
There must be a limit to the number of engagements
that you take on at the outset knowing with absolute clarity what
the exit strategy would be at the end of it. [...][63]
The defence planning assumption is that, at any
given point in time, we can sustain one medium-scale enduring
operation and two other smaller-scale operations. This fitted,
I think, the description of what one of those smaller-scale operations
would have been. If the aim is clear, there are a range of exit
strategies that you can adduce from that. The fact that you do
not know for certain which of those it was going to be cannot
be taken as invalidating the action or meaning that you should
not be willing to embark.[64]
55. We note that the 2010 Strategic Defence and
Security Review stated that the UK would be more selective in
its deployment of UK Armed Forces and would do so where there
was a "clear strategic aim...and a viable exit strategy".
Whilst accepting that operations should have a clear strategic
aim, we recommend that the Government should develop this concept
by undertaking a more detailed, comprehensive and strategic assessment
before deciding to intervene. We also note the Minister for the
Armed Forces' comments that the operation could have ended in
a variety of ways and that there is a limit to the number of engagements
that can be undertaken where the exit strategy is known with complete
clarity at the outset. Whilst recognising that the changing circumstances
of operations may require exit strategies to be reviewed and updated,
we are concerned that the Minister's comments invalidate the SDSR's
assertion that UK Armed Forces will be deployed only where "we
have a viable exit strategy".
Implications for future UN actions
56. The adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 was
not without difficulties. Sir Mark Lyall Grant explained that
in the context of negotiations on Resolution 1970 there had been
discussion about whether it would be necessary to authorise all
necessary means to ensure humanitarian access to all those who
were under threat from the regime and there had been quite a lot
of opposition to the proposal from other countries on the Security
Council at that stage.[65]
He explained that there had been unanimous support for strengthening
the assets freeze, the arms embargo and the sanctions, and for
setting up a panel of experts, but that there had been quite a
lot of debate on the paragraphs referring to the no-fly zone and
the protection of civilians, which several countries felt went
too far. In the event, Resolution 1973 was adopted by a vote of
10-0, with five abstentions: Brazil, China, Germany, India and
Russia.
57. It was clear that there was not unanimity in
favour of military intervention. Five countries, including two
veto-wielding powers, Russia and China, abstained on resolution
1973, and it is clear that the concerns of the doubters were not
allayed as the operation unfolded, amid concerns that the Resolution
had been stretched to the limit.
58. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UK Permanent Representative
to the UN, said:
As I mentioned before, there has been some concern
on the part of veto-wielding powers in the Security Council about
how Resolution 1973 was implemented, and I think they will be
more cautious in the future about authorising military action.
We will have to see. The fact that they vetoed a Syria resolution
last week is a signal that there is some concern on their part.
On the other hand, Resolution 2009 was unanimously agreed, and
it has brought the Security Council back together again on the
future of Libya. I hope that if there are circumstances in which
civilians are under threat of widespread massacre, the Security
Council will have the courage to authorise intervention again.
The examples of Rwanda and others where we did not intervene are
still very strongly held in the psyche of the United Nations.[66]
59. Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces,
told the Committee:
On the politics of future UN resolutions, I would
say never say never. We just don't know what circumstances might
obtain in the future that might cause different countries to view
things in particular ways. You have touched on the issue of Syria,
and I would have to concur with your implied judgment that there
appears to be no prospect whatever that the Russians—or
possibly the Chinese either—would allow another resolution
of that sort, given that there is opposition even to drafts of
resolutions that are mildly critical of the Syrian regime.[67]
60. While we do not regard a UN Security Council
Resolution as a prerequisite for military action by UK Armed Forces
in all cases, we commend the Government for obtaining UN Security
Council approval for operations in Libya. However we are concerned
that the abstentions of five Council members, particularly the
veto-wielding countries of Russia and China, may make obtaining
United Nations support more difficult for similar situations in
the future.
61. We note that some commentators have suggested
that the action in Libya may have made it impossible (as evidenced
by the Russian and Chinese concerns over Syria) for the international
community to take decisive action over other countries. The implication
contained in that suggestion, that we should therefore not have
supported the action in Libya, is one we reject. It is impossible
for us to tell what the consequences would have been of allowing
the killing of civilians in Benghazi, but we consider that the
determination of the Arab League and of most countries of the
United Nations that a massacre would be unacceptable was an example
of the international community acting as it should. It was acting
in a coordinated way to reflect the adoption by the United Nations
in 2005 of the "Responsibility to Protect" enshrined
in Resolution 1674.
7 Two further Resolutions were passed: on 27 October
2011, Resolution 2016, to terminate the provisions of Resolution
1973, which provided the legal basis for military intervention
and the no-fly zone, at 11.59 p.m., Libyan local time, on 31 October
2011 and Resolution 2022 on 2 December 2011 which welcomed the
establishment of the Transitional Government of Libya and extended
the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission to 20 March
2012. Available at: www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm
Back
8
Q 78 Back
9
Q 79 Back
10
Q 89 Back
11
Q 87 Back
12
Q 78 Back
13
Q 78 Back
14
Q 79 Back
15
Q 82 Back
16
Q 53 and Qq 103-104 Back
17
Q 104 Back
18
Q 104 Back
19
HC Deb 21 March 2011, col 708 Back
20
Qq 106-120 Back
21
HC Deb, 18 March 2011, col 613 Back
22
Ev w20-21 [Note: references to Ev wXX are references to written
evidence published in the volume of additional written evidence
published on the Committee's website] Back
23
Ev w69 Back
24
The text of the summary of the Attorney General's legal advice
can be found in the House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5909,
Military Operations in Libya, October 2011, pp 3-4 Back
25
Ev 57 Back
26
HC Deb, 3 May 2011, Col 439 Back
27
Article 42 of the UN Charter states: "Should the Security
Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations". Back
28
Q 116 Back
29
Q 115 Back
30
Q 78 Back
31
BBC News, "Bodies of Gaddafi supporters 'found executed'
in Sirte", 24 October 2011. Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15428360
Back
32
Q 228 Back
33
Q 225 Back
34
Q 227 Back
35
Q 226 Back
36
Q 226 Back
37
Qq 5-6, 109-113 and Ev 55 [para 8.2] Back
38
Q 17 Back
39
Q 19 Back
40
Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13090646 Back
41
Q 20 Back
42
Q 21 Back
43
Q 111 Back
44
Q 113 Back
45
Q 161 Back
46
Q 177 Back
47
New York Times, 17 December 2011. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-war-in-libya.html?pagewanted=all
Back
48
Royal United Services Institute Interim Campaign Report, Accidental
Heroes, Britain, France and the Libya Operation, September
2011, p 4 Back
49
Q 107 Back
50
Q 108 Back
51
NATO press conference, 3 October 2011. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_78678.htm
Back
52
Q 94 Back
53
Q 94 Back
54
Q 231 Back
55
Q 231; see also HC Deb, 21 November 2011, col 33W Back
56
Q 232 Back
57
HC Deb, 29 November 2011, cols 864-5W Back
58
Q 156 Back
59
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, para 2.10 Back
60
Q 91 Back
61
Qq 219-221 Back
62
Q 199 Back
63
Q 200 Back
64
Q 201 Back
65
Q 78 Back
66
Q 102 Back
67
Q 240 Back
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