3 NATO
Initial command and control of
the operation
62. Events in the spring of 2011 developed very quickly.
The UN Security Council having adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March
2011, on 18 March the Prime Minister told the House of Commons
that enforcing the Resolution would be an international operation,
further suggesting that any operations could be led by the US,
France and the UK, with the support of Arab nations. It was initially
uncertain whether NATO would play a formal role.[68]
63. At a meeting in Paris on 19 March the three allies
leading the operation, the US, the UK and France agreed that military
action by French, British and US Forces would begin on 19-20 March,
the aim being to protect Libyan civilians and to degrade the regime's
capability to resist the no-fly zone being implemented under the
UN's Resolution. At this time, the situation in Benghazi was deteriorating
with civilians at immediate risk of massacre by pro-Gaddafi forces.
After that meeting, however, there was some tension between the
three allies following an announcement by the French President,
without prior notification to his partners, that French aircraft
had engaged Gaddafi forces in a series of attacks aimed at halting
the advance of government forces on Benghazi. The Royal United
Services Institute noted that this had had the effect of alerting
all Gaddafi's forces to the fact that action had begun.[69]
64. Command and control of operations initially rested
with the US, under General Carter F. Ham, Head of US Africa Command,
with the tactical joint task force conducting operations led by
Admiral Samuel Locklear aboard USS Mount Whitney, deployed in
the Mediterranean. The US made it clear that it would be handing
over responsibility for the operation "shortly", though
at that stage it was not obvious whether NATO or another individual
country would take control from the US.[70]
65. Negotiations continued until 23 March 2011 when
NATO member states agreed that the Alliance would assume command
of maritime operations to enforce the UN arms embargo in Libya.
On 24 March, NATO leaders also agreed to the transition of command
responsibility for enforcing the Libyan no-fly zone to NATO, while
any ground attacks, for the time being, would continue to be a
coalition responsibility under US command. The compromise was
reportedly reached to allay Turkish concerns within NATO about
the possibility of ground attacks causing civilian casualties.
NATO subsequently assumed command of the no-fly zone on 25 March.[71]
66. On 27 March, despite opposition from some NATO
member nations, NATO leaders agreed that the Alliance would assume
command responsibility for all military operations in support
of Resolution 1973. Mariot Leslie, UK Permanent Representative
to the North Atlantic Council, commented "the decision to
launch the NATO military operation was actually taken by the [NATO]
Council ten days after the second UNSCR. That is a record time".[72]
NATO Command and Control
67. NATO formally assumed sole command of all military
operations in the Libyan area on 31 March 2011. The NATO operation,
known as Operation Unified Protector (OUP), was commanded by Allied
Joint Force Command Naples and fell under the overall purview
of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral Stavridis.[73]
68. NATO allies originally agreed to conduct operations
for a period of 90 days. Both the US and NATO also made it clear
that providing direct close air support to the Libyan opposition
forces was not part of the coalition's mandate and that NATO had
no intention of establishing an occupying force in Libya.[74]
At the beginning of June 2011, NATO allies agreed to extend operations
for a further 90 days from 27 June until the end of September
2011.[75] In evidence
to us on 12 October Mariot Leslie confirmed that on 27 September,
authority was given for a further extension of operations to 26
December 2011, should it still be considered necessary.[76]
69. Mariot Leslie explained the normal process whereby
NATO would generate forces in advance of an operation. Planning
starts before a formal decision to have an operation is made.
Formal planning would start with an initiating directive from
the Council asking commanders to start planning. During that planning
process the commanders would hold a force sensing conference,
when they would ask individual nations "What could you provide?"
This would be followed by a combined joint statement of requirements,
when they will ask nations for specific capabilities, followed
by a force generation conference and revised statements of requirement
as the operation progresses.[77]
70. In this case, there were clearly some problems
in the early days of the operation. As Nick Harvey MP, Minister
for the Armed Forces, pointed out, the allies had to get used
to each other's modus operandi in the early days, particularly
in relation to "basic communications".[78]
Other analyses have reported that there was a potentially
serious lack of co-ordination between French Air Force action
around Benghazi and the rest of the coalition in the early stages
on 19 March.[79] On this
occasion, it was described as representing merely a political
irritation, but in other circumstances could have been extremely
serious given that one ally launched air-to-ground attacks before
the coalition as a whole had attacked the air defence system of
the adversary.
71. The speed at which the necessary forces were
generated by NATO participants was accepted by both participants
and commentators as remarkably quick in the current Alliance context.
Mariot Leslie said:
For this operation they were made extraordinarily
rapidly. I don't think there has ever been an operation when a
crisis has appeared as this one did in mid-February and a matter
of weeks later there is an operation already taking place.[80]
She added that plans being developed in parallel
rather than sequentially had assisted the rapid development of
the required forces:
Nobody was reckless in what they did but there
were times when the rather long chain of military planning had
various bits going on simultaneously rather than sequentially,
so the decisions were made on the basis of things brought together
at the decision point, but had been going on in parallel. We had
people working on concepts of operations for some part of the
operation while simultaneously working out the rules of engagement
for other parts of the operation, and then bringing the strands
together of how you did an arms embargo, how you did a no-fly
zone, how you would conduct attacks or measures to protect civilians.
They were working up the forces required and
the planning often in parallel and then reconciling them just
before the rules of engagement were brought to the council for
decision. It was a remarkable tribute to our military colleagues,
how quickly they worked. In the council, people worked with extraordinary
speed—early, late or weekend—for about three weeks,
to reach the final decisions, which the council took on 27 March.[81]
72. Air Marshal Harper, UK Military Representative
to NATO, commented:
It was incredible, quite frankly.
[...] getting consensus from 28 nations; getting
operational plans drawn together; establishing headquarters and
a bespoke command and control system for a complex operation;
generating the forces; accounting for all of the political nuances;
and bringing in those nations that, in some cases, had some initial
concerns that needed to be explained or discussed. Doing all of
that in 10 days was quite a process.
[...] To generate that in 10 days was quite a
feat. When one casts one's mind back to the Bosnia campaign, the
same process took some 15 months. [82]
This view was confirmed by Lieutenant-General Barrons,
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations):
The hardest part of the command and control [...]
was how to take the range of assets that were provided by nations
and make them operate quickly and effectively in the sort of setting
we found ourselves in, in Libya. That required some really adroit
handling from the commanders, staff and airmen who were flying,
to make that happen. [83]
We asked why the NATO Response Force was not activated
and were advised that "the NRF is largely a land construct,
so it is not ideally suited to an operation of this nature".[84]
73. It was also essential that there was communication
with the National Transitional Council for their awareness of
the location of civilians. Lieutenant-General Barrons said:
In order to prosecute that operation successfully,
it was clearly important that there was some connection between
the National Transitional Council, which has a very good view
of where the civilian population we are trying to protect exists,
and the NATO chain of command. We need to be absolutely clear,
however, that our remit is to protect the civilian population,
no matter who is oppressing it. We are not therefore acting in
any form of military capacity on behalf of the NTC, so it is an
unusual position to be in.[85]
74. We commend NATO and UK Forces for the speed
of the operational deployment in Libya. We are however concerned
about the tensions regarding command of the operation during its
early stages. There was confusion over the command and control
of the operation in the early stages of the operation until NATO
took command. We are particularly concerned at the apparent decision
of the French Government to commence air operations without consulting
allies. We call upon NATO and the Government to look very carefully
at how command and control decisions were made in the early stages
of the operation and to identify the lessons for any future operations
which necessarily begin in an ad hoc manner.
NATO COHESION
75. Our witnesses praised the contribution
of all NATO countries to the operations. Mariot Leslie, cautioning
against drawing conclusions about the role of any one ally from
this operation, said that no country had withdrawn from the command
structure or refused to play its normal part, though some had
played a less visible (and hence less well-reported) role than
others. In some cases this might have been because it did not
have equipment relevant to this particular operation, having agreed
to concentrate on some other part of the NATO remit.[86]
In other cases the contribution had been more by reinforcing parts
of the command structure with specialist skills. Air Marshal Harper
agreed, saying that even countries with domestic political difficulties
had contributed.[87]
"NATO-PLUS"
76. As a result of Arab League concern about developments
in the region and its support for action in Libya, some non-NATO
forces became integrated into the command structure of operations.
A meeting to discuss military operations and participation in
Paris on 19 March was attended by European and North American
ministers, representatives of the EU, UN and Arab League, and
ministers from Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Morocco.
During the weekend of 19-20 March Qatar also joined the coalition.
On 25 March the United Arab Emirates confirmed it would provide
12 fast jets to the operation.[88]
77. The involvement of Arab League countries in the
NATO operation in Libya was significant. Mariot Leslie, UK Permanent
Representative to the North Atlantic Council, said:
That was the great success of NATO's partnership
policy. It is not the first time: we are now—if not this
week, then by next week—up to 50 countries taking part in
the ISAF operations in Afghanistan. I think Bahrain is just about
to join us as No. 50. There are plenty of other operations in
which NATO has partners involved. What was special about this
one is that NATO, right from the start, when the council was looking
at whether or not we were going to take on this operation to enforce
UN Security Council resolutions, and following something that
the British Foreign Secretary had formulated, said that it was
important to us that there was a demonstrable need for military
activity, a clear legal base for it and clear regional support.
We already knew from national contacts that in particular the
Qataris and Emiratis were likely to want to get involved if there
were a NATO operation to plug themselves into. It was an operation
that allowed them to use the types of interoperability with NATO
that our partnership policies already allowed us to practise and
exercise elsewhere. Right from the start, they were around the
table, as were the Swedes, who work very well with NATO, using,
incidentally, elements from the EU battle group— the Nordic
battle group—and so were a number of other Arab countries.
It was the council's intention from the start—indeed, for
some members it was almost a condition from the start—that
there should be demonstrable regional support, which those partnerships
did indeed demonstrate.[89]
78. It is clear from the evidence we received that
real value was added by non-NATO countries, representatives from
the Arab League for example providing support to the NTC on the
ground, and air assets provided by Qatar.
79. Any non-NATO country taking part in Operation
Unified Protector, was expected to abide by the same regulations
as the rest, as Lieutenant-General Barrons, Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff (Operations) made clear.[90]
However we questioned witnesses on how the contributions of non-NATO
nations fitted in with the formal NATO command chain or whether
those nations were acting under bilateral alliances with the NTC.
Lieutenant-General Barrons assured us that "any asset that
was racked into Operation Unified Protector would be playing to
exactly the same regulations" as NATO.[91]
He could not comment on the use of assets under any bilateral
agreement.[92]
80. Witnesses made clear that while the NATO mission
excluded an occupying force, there were a number of allied personnel
in Libya. Arab League countries were also represented on the ground.
Lieutenant-General Barrons said:
there were various forms of European representation
in Benghazi, alongside the NTC. That is one way in which diplomats
and their military advisers can influence and advise the NTC's
senior leadership in Benghazi about how they might choose to conduct
their campaign within the rules that have been set. You are absolutely
right: there were representatives of Qatar and other Arab nations
on the ground; they were there at the request of the NTC, sat
alongside the NTC, and were able to provide advice, encouragement
and guidance. Our contact with General Hamid, for example, and
others meant that we too were able to make suggestions about how
they would be able to conduct their operations and stay within
the terms set.[93]
81. We welcome the significant involvement of
non-NATO countries, particularly those from the Arab League and
Sweden, to operations in Libya. However, we are concerned to establish
how the contributions of non-NATO countries fitted into the NATO
command and control structures and call on the Government to clarify
the command and control structures that were implemented and how
they were coordinated. We also call on the Government to clarify
how it ensured that any bilateral alliances between non-NATO countries
and the National Transitional Council were monitored to ensure
that they did not impact unfavourably on the NATO mission or were
contrary to the measures in the UN Resolutions. An assessment
of the integration of non-NATO countries should be a key part
of the lessons learned exercises undertaken by NATO and the UK.
Capabilities
82. NATO itself had limited military capabilities.
Mariot Leslie said:
Almost the entirety of the military capability
available to NATO belongs to the nations of NATO—so it is
the US defence capability, the British defence capability, French,
German, Polish and so on. Whenever there is a NATO operation,
it is those national capabilities that are brought to bear under
the NATO commanders.[94]
83. It is clear that unexpected operations such as
that in Libya rely on nations agreeing to participate, and then
providing the capability which they have previously notified would
be made available should an operation demand it. Mariot Leslie,
UK Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, said:
What those national capabilities are, including
in peacetime, are part of a defence planning process in which
NATO collectively looks at what it would like to ask of individual
nations. It looks at the best efforts it would like them to make
to assign things for NATO commanders. It gets exercise collectively.
We are familiar with what each other has and what we might make
available.
At the end of the day, on every single NATO operation
and within any NATO operation, a nation could decide for reasons
of its own—legal, political or whatever—that it was
going to withdraw that capability at very short notice. The alliance
solidarity prevents most people from doing that most of the time,
but it is a perpetual tension between national sovereignty and
collective endeavour that is a perennial issue for the alliance.[95]
84. During our inquiry we explored the capability
implications of a nation's decision not to participate in an operation,
for example Germany's abstention in the UN Security vote and Turkey's
opposition to military intervention in Libya, and difficulties
this could cause given NATO's reliance on the pooling and sharing
of military capabilities to undertake operations. Mariot Leslie
said in evidence:
it makes you more reliant on other people. [...]
On the case of Germany, it is worth reminding ourselves that the
Germans did make their AWACS available in Afghanistan at very
short notice to allow other alliance AWACS to be deployed to Libya.
They were helpful over that point.
There is the perennial NATO issue of whether
or not nations are going to make available the assets that they
have assigned to SACEUR. Addressing that is as much a political
question as it is a capabilities question. We have two problems.
Do we have the capabilities—that is what the capabilities
initiative will address—and is there the will to deploy
them?[96]
85. We questioned witnesses on whether there was
any shortfall in assets across NATO during the operation. Air
Marshal Harper, UK Military Representative to NATO, told us this
would not be a matter for NATO as an organisation:
If a NATO member nation is doing its job and
continuing to conduct the mission without declaring a shortfall,
asking to stop, or asking within the alliance for other members
to assist it, it is not NATO's business. [...][97]
but he was not aware of any NATO member declaring
a shortfall:
not to my knowledge. We are aware that nations
help each other out throughout the campaign, but that is only,
if you like, the vibes that one had around the margins of meetings.[98]
86. We asked the Ministry of Defence for further
information on the processes followed by NATO in the event of
a shortfall:
SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]
monitored the CJSOR [Combined Joint Statement of Requirement]
and national contributions on a daily basis, identifying any overall
capability shortages and surpluses, including any shortages reported
by Allies. Where a shortage existed, SHAPE could engage with nations
holding such capabilities to try to obtain additional pledges.[99]
OVER-DEPENDENCE ON THE US
87. It is clear from the evidence we received that
there was concern at the highest level in NATO that there is an
over-reliance on the provision of some capabilities such as unmanned
aerial vehicles, intelligence and refuelling aircraft by the United
States. Air Marshal Harper said:
There is no question but that this operation
throws into stark relief the capability gaps that exist between
the non-US members of NATO and the United States.
The Secretary-General's top priority at the moment
is an initiative called Smart Defence, which looks at the capability
of pooling and sharing initiatives in the future, whereby nations
would get together, multinationally, to provide capabilities.
Issues to be discussed include: assured access to those capabilities
and their availability, and sharing costs with industry. But,
there are significant moves under way at the moment in Allied
Command Transformation to address that. Indeed, the United Kingdom
plays a serious role in bringing those negotiations forward.[100]
Mariot Leslie, UK Permanent Representative to the
North Atlantic Council, added:
That is obviously absolutely right. The capabilities
and the gaps that were shown up by this Libya campaign—not
finished yet—are the ones that had already been identified
by NATO. So, the spotlight was shone on them. There are some others
that did not show up because this was a relatively limited operation
and very close to NATO's shores. But, at last year's Lisbon summit
meeting, a Lisbon capabilities package was adopted by all the
heads of state and Government which included things like the priority
for NATO to have more ISTAR—intelligence, surveillance,
target acquisition and reconnaissance—capabilities available
to it and the need to have more capabilities among its full structure
for air-to-air refuelling. There were other things in that package,
too—missile defence and so on.[101]
88. An Interim Report on Libya by the Royal United
Services Institute concluded that the US provided at least 27%
of the dedicated intelligence assets deployed during the operation.[102]
The NATO Secretary General has said that the "mission could
not have been done without capabilities that only the United States
can offer. Let me put it bluntly: those capabilities are vital
for all of us. More Allies should be willing to obtain them".[103]
89. The publication of the new US Defence Strategic
Guidance for Defence[104]
on 5 January 2012 with its new focus on the Asia-Pacific region
also has potential implications for future NATO operations. Although
the US has re-emphasised its commitment to European security and
to aid NATO allies in the event of attack, the US Administration
acknowledged that its posture in Europe will need to be adapted.
Future budget cuts would put "added pressure on all of us
collectively to come up with some innovative pooling, sharing
[and] multilateral procurement" as well as innovative approaches
to "doing more with less." The Administration has added
that these issues will need to be addressed at the NATO summit
in Chicago in May 2012.[105]
90. For the time being, there will still be a
heavy reliance on US command and control functions for future
operations. It should be a priority for NATO to examine this.
However, whilst accepting the current economic climate and its
implications for defence capabilities, we are concerned that future
operations will not be possible if the US is not willing or able
to provide capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence
and refuelling aircraft. It should be a priority for NATO to examine
this over-reliance on US capabilities and assets. This challenge
will be heightened by the US stated intention to shift its military,
geographic and strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region.
91. We have no evidence of any shortfalls in military
assets held by NATO nations needed for operations in Libya. Nonetheless
we seek assurances that the UK is pressing NATO to consider the
issue of over-reliance on any single nation, and is itself considering
the balance of its future forces and how it can best add to the
overall mix of NATO capabilities and command and control capacity.
68 HC Deb, 18 March 2011, col 613 Back
69
Royal United Services Institute Interim Campaign Report, Accidental
Heroes, Britain, France and the Libya Operation, September
2011, p 4 Back
70
US Department of Defense, Briefing by Vice Admiral Gortney on
Operation Odyssey Dawn, 19 March 2011, and House of Commons Library
Standard Note SN/IA/5909, Military Operations in Libya,
October 2011, p 10 Back
71
Ibid, pp 10-11 Back
72
Q 153 Back
73
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5909, Military
Operations in Libya, October 2011, p 11 Back
74
Ibid, p 12 and see US Department of Defense News briefing
with Vice Adm. Gortney from the Pentagon on Libya Operation Odyssey
Dawn, 28 March 2011; "NATO will not arm Libyan opposition,
Rasmussen says", Trend News Agency, 31 March 2011; and NATO
and Libya: Key Facts and Figures available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71641.htm.
Back
75
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5909, Military
Operations in Libya, October 2011, p 20 Back
76
Q 144 Back
77
Q 189 Back
78
Q 270 Back
79
Royal United Services Institute Interim Campaign Report, Accidental
Heroes, Britain, France and the Libya Operation, September
2011, p 4 Back
80
Q 153 Back
81
Ibid. Back
82
Ibid. Back
83
Q 237 Back
84
Q 169 Back
85
Q 237 Back
86
Q 128 Back
87
Qq 153, 159 & 194 Back
88
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5909, Military
Operations in Libya, October 2011, pp 5-6 Back
89
Q 131 Back
90
Qq 248-251 Back
91
Q 250 Back
92
Q 251 Back
93
Q 248 Back
94
Q 186 Back
95
Q 186 Back
96
Q 185 Back
97
Q 188 Back
98
Q 189 Back
99
Ev 56 Back
100
Q 180 Back
101
Q 180 Back
102
Royal United Services Institute Interim Campaign Report, Accidental
Heroes, Britain, France and the Libya Operation, September
2011, p 6 Back
103
NATO Secretary General monthly press briefing, 5 September 2011.
Available at: www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-FB3BDFC5-DEB36199/natolive/opinions_77640.htm
Back
104
US Defense Department, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense, January 2012 Back
105
US Defense Department Press Release, Official: Strategic Guidance
Recognizes U.S. NATO Commitments, 9 January 2012. Available
at www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66729 Back
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