4 UK contribution to the operation
Role of the National Security
Council
92. The operation in Libya was the first new operation
since the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in May
2010. In the early days of the operation we asked the then Secretary
of State, Dr Liam Fox MP, about the role of the NSC. He told us:
As well as the National Security Council itself,
the sub-committee, the NSC(L)[National Security Council(Libya)],
has met on a very regular basis, and the NSC(LO) [NSC(Libya Officials)]
for officials meets on an even more regular basis. For my own
part [...] the flow of information that comes to us to help us
to understand what is happening on the ground and the decisions
that we will have to take come in a timely way. The process is
now getting into a rhythm where the meetings are in a predictable
timescale. The NSC has adapted quickly to what has been [...]
a major challenge early on in its existence.[106]
93. We also asked Dr Fox whether the NSC was "on
top of" the overall strategy for the region (Middle East
and North Africa). He replied:
The NSC does look at, and has looked at, the
region as a whole. It would simply be untrue, Chairman, to say
that any policy maker in the western world has been on top of
the speed at which events have happened in the Middle East and
North Africa. None of the self-professed experts whom I have been
able to talk to predicted Tunisia or Egypt, or the speed of what
has happened in Syria or Libya.
At my talks in the United States yesterday, the
speed of the change of events is such that everybody is having
to assess and reassess the impacts, as we go on; what it will
mean for security in the region; what it will mean for our national
security, as has already been alluded to during this session,
and what it will mean for the UK and our allied interests abroad.
If there is one thing that politicians would be wise to have in
view of the speed of events, it is a little humility. We are not
always quite as able to understand what is about to happen next
as politicians sometimes like to pretend.[107]
94. The NSC was also instrumental in promoting interdepartmental
cooperation. Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, said:
Principally, that was co-ordinated through the
National Security Council and its Libya sub-committee, which met
on a very regular basis. For a long time, it met daily; thereafter
it met at least twice a week. There was a lot of contact between
officials, hour by hour, throughout the campaign, including not
only those in the Foreign Office but those in the Department for
International Development and, at different points, the Treasury
and other Departments. There were many different aspects to the
engagement in Libya, of which the military component was but one.[108]
95. The National Security Council appears to have
worked well in respect of the situation in Libya, particularly
in coordinating the response of Government Departments. This was
important as the mission in Libya had many component parts, not
just the military operation.
Capabilities deployed
96. In answer to a written Parliamentary Question,
the Ministry of Defence gave the following information about the
capabilities deployed for Operation ELLAMY:
At its peak, some 2,300 British servicemen and
women were deployed on Operation ELLAMY. We deployed 32 aircraft
including 16 Tornado GR4s, six Typhoons, five attack helicopters,
refuelling tankers and specialist surveillance aircraft and helicopters.
Over the course of the operation we also deployed eight warships
and attack submarines.[109]
The UK's contribution to the coalition firepower
also included the use of Storm Shadow and Brimstone air-launched
missiles.
97. In a statement on 21 October the Defence Secretary,
Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, stated that the UK had flown over 3,000
sorties over Libya, more than 2,000 of which had been strike sorties.[110]
Of the total NATO sorties conducted (26,281 sorties and 9,646
strike sorties as of 23 October 2011) the UK's contribution totals
approximately 11% of overall sorties and 20% of strike sorties.[111]
98. In response to a written Parliamentary Question,
the MoD gave the following breakdown about the number of sorties
carried out by UK Forces during Operation ELLAMY:
The approximate number of air sorties flown by
the UK armed forces by month in support of operations in Libya
is given in the following table: Table
1: UK sorties
Month Number
of Sorties
March 2011 180
April 2011 430
May 2011 440
June 2011 490
July 2011 510
August 2011 540
September 2011 390
October 2011 240
Data source: HC Deb, 1 December
2011, cols 1059-60W
In addition, from 19 March to 31 October 2011,
C130 and C-17 aircraft flew 25 operational sorties that landed
in Libya; and, Lynx helicopters also flew 172 sorties in support
of operations in Libya. Flights in support of Operation ELLAMY
have also been flown to and from Italy and Cyprus but the information
on these sorties is not held in the format requested.[112]
99. Since operations began, the UK has contributed
a total of 16 Royal Navy warships, submarines and Royal Fleet
Auxillary vessels to humanitarian, combat and embargo operations
off Libya.[113]
100. On 21 September 2011, the North Atlantic Council
agreed to extend NATO's mission in Libya for a further 90 days.
With the extension of operations in September, the UK altered
its deployed assets slightly. The MoD withdrew its Typhoon jets
and three Apache attack helicopters from theatre, leaving a remaining
fast jet contingent of 16 Tornados and two attack helicopters.[114]
101. In October 2011, the UK had the following assets
deployed on Operation ELLAMY:
- RAF Tornado aircraft based
at Gioia del Colle in Italy
- RAF VC10 and TriStar air-to-air refuelling tankers
based in Sicily and the UK
- RAF Sentry and Sentinel surveillance aircraft
based in Sicily and Gioia del Colle. Sentinel aircraft were re-deployed
from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus to Italy on 18 October
- HMS Ocean (helicopter carrier), deployed
with two Apache attack helicopters
- HMS York (Type 42 destroyer)deployed
to the Mediterranean to replace HMS Liverpool on 18 October
- HMS Bangor (Sandown Class minehunter)
- Fleet Air Arm Sea King helicopters (Airborne
Surveillance and Area Control role)
- RAF air transport aircraft providing extensive
logistic support to the deployed bases in Italy, Sicily and the
Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.[115]
AIR CAPABILITIES
102. The role of the Royal Air Force in operations
in Libya began on 24 February 2011, when the Royal Navy and the
Royal Air Force started evacuating UK nationals from Libya.[116]
In the space of a few days, the UK was able to evacuate over 800
UK nationals and over 1,000 nationals from over 50 countries.[117]
The UK Armed Forces used helicopters, Hercules aircraft and HMS
Cumberland in this evacuation.
103. The RAF used various capabilities as part of
operations in Libya; the main role of the Tornado was attack and
of the Typhoon air combat and attack. Army Air Corps Apache helicopters
were also used in the attack role. Other air capabilities included
reconnaissance, refuelling and logistical support aircraft. We
asked Air Chief Marshal, Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air
Staff, about the success of air operations, who said:
First of all, the performance of Tornado has
yet again proven it a bedrock of multi-role capability, having
precision weapons, first-class reconnaissance capability and first-class
targeting capability. As in Afghanistan and as before, it has
demonstrated that the Tornado is an excellent platform for what
we do and has proved to be very effective.
Typhoon, on its first outing in an operation
as opposed to its defensive counter-air role in the UK and the
Falklands, proved again to be very reliable4,500 flying
hours with no engine changes.[118]
It is an amazingly reliable piece of kit. Within a matter of days,
we were able to bring forward its existing air-to-ground capability
on top of its air-to-air capability and to deliver very effective
and very poignantly laser-guided bombs, and eventually to make
sure that it could conduct that role simultaneously with its air
defence role. Therefore, it could provide the requirement to enforce
the no-fly zone and target precisely and accurately targets on
the ground.
All of those have proved extremely reliable and
effective.[119]
104. Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, UK Military
Representative to NATO, commented on the role of attack helicopters
during the mission:
We actually saw a very capable air capability
deployed from a maritime asset in the form of attack helicoptersat
peak there were fivebeing operated from HMS Ocean. They
played a very pivotal role in delivering capability at a particular
point in the campaign, where there were significant movements
of pro-Gaddafi forces up and down lines of communication. So,
arguably, this was an area of UK involvement in the campaign in
Libya where you saw jointery at its best.[120]
105. On 21 December, Peter Luff MP, Minister for
Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, wrote to us that "Typhoon,
in its first multi-role mission in providing both air and ground
attack, has demonstrated exceptional levels of survivability and,
in its ground attack role, a targeting capacity with minimal collateral
damage, proving it is truly a formidable aircraft".[121]
106. We commend all air units on their role in
the operation, both in a combat role and in the Non-combatant
Evacuation Operations for UK and other civilians by Hercules prior
to the commencement of combat operations. We note the Chief of
the Air Staff's view that both Tornado and Typhoon had operated
well. We particularly note that in its first operational role
Typhoon performed very reliably. We also note that the Joint Helicopter
Command was able to deploy successfully Apache helicopters to
the Mediterranean Sea as well as maintain numbers in Afghanistan.
ISTAR CAPABILITIES
107. Early in the mission, the MoD announced an
extension in the service of the Nimrod R1 signals intelligence
aircraft which had been due to be decommissioned in 2011.[122]
ISTAR capability was key to the success of the operation as it
provided effective targeting and helped minimise the risk of civilian
casualties. Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, told
us that the protection of civilians was at the forefront of British
and NATO planning and that rates of civilian casualties at the
hands of NATO were very much lower than in any comparable action.[123]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air Staff,
said that many potential targets were rejected because of the
risk of civilian casualties.[124]
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff,
said that intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets
were essential in the prevention of casualties.[125]
Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, UK Military Representative
to NATO, also stressed the importance of intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance:
It [Sentinel] played a key and pivotal role in
the operation. There is no question about that. This is a highly
capable ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance]
platform that is able to detect movement on the ground with extraordinary
high fidelity and provide that information in real time. Discussion
with the air commander would indicate that he relied extremely
heavily on its capability and on similar capabilities provided
by other platforms. So, without that capability I do not think
that we would have seen the rapid success that has been achieved.[126]
108. There was a heavy reliance on US Forces for
ISTAR capabilities (see paragraph 88). As described above, Sentinel
played a central part in Operation ELLAMY but is due to be decommissioned
once its role in Afghanistan ends.[127]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton told us of its fundamental
role:
It [Sentinel] was fundamental. We were able to
link up and securely pass information from the Sentinel aircraft
providing the ground-mapping capability through the AWACS in E3
aeroplanes, through secure satellite comms, through data links
to the Typhoon and from Typhoon to Tornado and onwards. All that
was done. Without that combat ISTAR [...] the ability to do something
about what you find on the ground at the same timethis
would undoubtedly have been a more complex operation. The technical
capability is there, and it has proven itself to be combat-ready
and combat-capable.[128]
109. We asked Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton
if he would be sorry to see Sentinel go. He said:
The requirement for Sentinel is in the SDSR paper,
which talked about the fact that when it was no longer required
for Afghanistan, we would look to take it out of service. Of course,
in the interim, its quality and its performance in Afghanistan
and in Libya have demonstrated what a fundamental part of the
ISR and the whole combat ISTAR piece it is. I feel that as ever,
we will have the opportunity in the next SDSR to look at whether
[...] that is one of the capabilities that we will want to look
at again, to see whether it was the right decision to say that
when it is no longer required for Afghanistan, it will go. I am
sure that is what we will do.[129]
110. ISTAR capabilities are vital to the ability
of UK Armed Forces to undertake operations such as those in Libya.
We note that it was necessary as part of the mission to extend
the service life of the Nimrod R1 signals intelligence aircraft.
We expect the MoD to give a higher priority to the development
of such capabilities in advance of the next SDSR. In response
to this report we also expect the MoD to clarify the position
on the future of Sentinel and whether consideration is being given
to its retention and what impact retention would have on other
budget areas.
MARITIME CAPABILITIES
111. We asked about the impact of capabilities being
withdrawn from standing tasks to operate in Libya on the Royal
Navy's ability to perform these standing tasks and to be ready
for other tasks which may arise. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, First
Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, told us:
[...] Before Libya, we had already recognised
stretch in our ability to satisfy our commitment to have a warship
in the Caribbean during the hurricane season. We were covering
that with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, which is entirely acceptable
to do that job, although it did not absolutely satisfy it. During
the Libya operation, to satisfy the standing overseas commitments,
there was a need to extend some operational tasking programmes.
We had to extend time on task for some units and manage our way
through the period of the Libya crisis.[130]
112. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope further explained:
The contingent capability in the maritime sphere
is the Response Force Task Group [...]. That was planned as a
standard training requirement that would go into the Mediterranean
and some of the units would transit to the Middle East in the
early part of this year. We deployed that group early as a consequence
of the growing crisis in Libya. In terms of its use, we worked
it up in the Mediterranean and had it standing by for contingent
option capabilityin Libya or as required.
When the situation on the ground in Libya sorted
itself it meant that we could make some judgmentswe sent
the remainder of that group into the Middle East for a period
of time before returning it to the United Kingdom. HMS Ocean,
for example, was deployed with it, expecting to be away for seven
weeks; she is still on operations as contingent requirement in
the Indian ocean. So our contingent requirement was available
to be used for the crisis of the time. Some of it was used; some
of it went on to be contingent in the Middle East.[131]
113. The Royal Navy contribution stressed the value
of building flexibility into maritime thinking and capability:
HMS Cumberland [Type 22 Frigate] made a key contribution to the
safe evacuation of UK and entitled personnel from Benghazi; HMS
Brocklesby [mine counter measures ship] was equally important
to the underwater operations and to the mine countermeasures effort;
the successful deployment of Army Attack Helicopters to HMS Ocean
for the first time in live operations gave a very useful option
to the Operational Commander and also proved to be an effective
area of liaison with French forces; whilst the value of TLAM [Tomahawk
Land Attack Missile] fired from submarines, and the 4.5inch gun
and air and maritime surveillance and co-ordination from HMS Liverpool
were again proven.
114. We commend the actions of the Royal Navy
in the operation particularly in respect of the evacuation of
civilians from Benghazi, the enforcement of the arms embargo and
the early deployment of the first Response Force Task Group. However
we note that important tasks, such as the Fleet Ready Escort and
counter drugs operations, were not able to be carried out due
to meeting the Libya commitment. Given the continued high levels
of standing maritime commitments it is likely that this type of
risk taking will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the
SDSR are implemented. This will be a significant challenge for
the Royal Navy and the MoD who should outline their plans to meet
this challenge in response to our Report.
AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND HARRIER FORCE
115. The Government claimed that the success of the
Libya operation indicated that the policy and decisions of the
SDSR were justified, including those on enduring a capability
gap on carrier strike and the decommissioning of the Harrier Force.
During our inquiry, we discussed whether the UK would have deployed
an Aircraft Carrier and Harrier Force if it had been available
as part of the operation. This was an area of contention between
witnesses during our inquiry. Other nations did deploy ships capable
of carrying aircraft (US, Italy and France). The UK also deployed
HMS Ocean to carry helicopters. The First Sea Lord agreed that
a Carrier with Harriers would have been deployed if available
but also said:
Using Libya as an example of the need, or not,
for aircraft carriers can lead you to some false assumptions.
If we had had a carrier with Harrier capability, as we used to,
I suspect we would have used it as another option, and it might
have been reactively tasked in some circumstances. But, let us
be absolutely clear, it could not have provided the effect of
Tornado with Brimstone and Storm Shadow. At that stage, Harrier
was not capable of embarking those weapons. We would have had
to have used the same effort to achieve the same effect. Of course,
we had the advantage of local air basing rights and overflight
rights, so we could position strike capability from Italy to be
embarked into Libya. It workedand it worked splendidly.[132]
Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, added:
If we had instead deleted Tornado at the end
of 2010, the first challenge for the residual Harrier force would
have been to re-engage in Afghanistan. That being so, it would
have been highly unlikely that it would have been available for
the action in Libya. Even if it had, it would not have had the
same fire power, as the First Sea Lord has observed.[133]
116. In our SDSR report we noted the decommissioning
of the Harrier Force. Whilst none of our witnesses told us that
the Libya operation could not have succeeded without a fixed wing
aircraft carrier, we note that three ships capable of carrying
aircraft were deployed in theatre as well as the helicopter carrier
HMS Ocean. We also note that the First Sea Lord told us that if
a carrier with Harrier Force capability had been available it
would probably have been used. In response to our Report the Government
should indicate if the operation could have been carried out more
effectively and efficiently with an aircraft carrier. We repeat
our support for proceeding with both Queen Elizabeth class carriers
to ensure one is always available for operations.
MUNITIONS
117. On the attack capabilities which performed well,
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air Staff,
told us:
As far as we are concerned, the principal four
weapons systems that were used all performed to an extremely high
level of satisfaction in terms of their capabilities, and well
above the predicted level percentage-wise, with very few exceptions.
For instance, to talk about Brimstone in particular, 98.3% to
98.7% of the missiles fired went exactly as per the textbook and
did exactly what we expected, so the quality of that was extremely
high. The same is true, in ratio terms, of all the precision weapons
that we droppedand bear in mind that that is exactly what
we require.[134]
118. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, First Sea Lord and
Chief of Naval Staff, told us about the maritime attack capabilities
that had performed well:
As far as maritime fires are concerned, the early
requirement to use Tomahawk to suppress enemy air defence was
proven yet again. Once you have suppressed the air defences, you
can project power more comfortably from the air. Naval fires simply
using the 4.5 gun, which some people have suggested was not appropriate
in this modern era, was proven again in terms of the ability to
put fire on the ground where necessary with some considerable
precision. We had to work up our standard procedures to be able
to do that, to ensure the required precision that was again necessary
to guarantee the safety of life.
Not quite a naval fire, but a very important
part of the ability to sustain some of the operations was the
mine countermeasures vessel capability, which ensured that, when
they placed mines, we were able to disable those mines to allow,
ultimately, the passage of vessels in and out of Misrata. [...][135]
119. There has been speculation that UK Forces nearly
ran out of ammunition, for example, the newer version of the Brimstone
missile during the operation, or that there was a stockpile of
missiles in Afghanistan awaiting servicing. On 23 September 2011,
the Royal United Services Institute raised concerns about supply
problems for UK Armed Forces of some types of ammunition during
the operation, particularly, Brimstone Missiles. It said:
Did UK forces nearly run out of ammunition in
the Libya operation? It is a claim which has been much discussed
in relation to the Brimstone missile. A new variation on this
anti-armour missile is the Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone (DMSB) which
makes it a laser-guided weapon with a small but very potent charge.
But the military only had so many of these upgraded DMSBs, with
a stockpile in Afghanistan of Brimstone that had not been used
and were due for re-servicing. The supplier, MBDA, was able to
increase production of the seeker heads; and other weapons were
fired wherever possible. Supply then caught up with demand. But
the stock of usable DMSBs was reported to have fallen to single
figures at one stage. There is no question of the UK running out
of munitions for this operation. Nevertheless, it ran very short
of the new variant of the weapon which most suited the chosen
tactics.[136]
120. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton told us:
In the whole area of weapons stockpiling, in
the old days, [...] we would end up buying a whole stock of weapons;
at the time, you needed to do that, because the production line
was going to run from now to then, and stop. In today's world,
what we do differently is that we make sure we have access to
enough stock to meet what we think are the planning requirements
in the early stages, and then we maintain a relationship with
industry such that we can reorder weapons as required, when their
usage starts to go up. We actually have that as part of our formal
strategy and policy, and contracts are in place to do it.
That is exactly what we did here. As we started
to use the weapons up, new weapons or converted weapons were tasked
to industry to be produced and developed, and they were; they
were delivered, and therefore the stockpiles were kept at a level
commensurate with our operational requirements. Yes, inevitably,
decisions are made on a daily, or shall I say a weekly, basis
about whether we send weapons stock to this or that place, depending
on where we are operating, to make sure that we keep the balance
right and the required stocks in place.[137]
121. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton further
told us that the UK ordered more Brimstones when they realised
they were likely to use more.[138]
Part of the order included converting some of the standard missiles
into "dual mode seeker" Brimstones.[139]
Mr Harvey told us:
Munitions stockpile levels are classified, so
I am not going to get drawn into that. We were able to sustain
the effort throughout; we did not have any serious worries. [...]
It [the system] operated satisfactorily throughout, without undermining
what we could do in Libya or Afghanistan.[140]
122. Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, UK Military
Representative to NATO, re-iterated that, as we discuss in the
section on NATO, nations involved in the Alliance shared assets:
[...] this was an alliance operation, in which
essentially the sum of the parts come together to deliver the
required military effect. Therefore, any limitations suffered
by an individual nation are made up for by what other members
of the alliance contribute to the campaign. It was pretty widely
reported that a lot of the key enablers were provided by the United
States and, indeed, the debate has subsequently been opened as
to whether European nations need to do more to fill the capability
gap in terms of being able to have some of those key enablers
for themselves. However, during this campaign, we did not suffer
for lack of any particular capability. Indeed, alliance members
and in particular the United States bent over backwards to make
sure that we were always provided with the minimum capability
required to be able to prosecute the mission as successfully as
we did.[141]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton told us that
he was not aware of the UK having any discussions with allies
concerning any shortfalls in assets or munitions.[142]
123. We asked Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope if there
was any removal of capability from some of the UK ships. He told
us that there were no armaments used in the Libya campaign about
which the UK had any concern in terms of shortage of stocks.[143]
He further told us:
In deploying ships, we equip them for the mission
which they are tasked for. That might be constrained with regard
to the equipment placed on the ship. There are areas of risk in
the positioning of ships that require us to put more equipment
on board them, for instance, operations in the Arabian Gulf, where
the threat levels are higher, than if we are going to operate
them in the North Atlantic. Some of the vessels used for Libyan
operations were not fitted with what one might call the area-specific
kit, nor was it required.[144]
124. During our inquiry, we also explored the selection
of munitions for individual missions in Libya and the high proportion
of precision weapons used by UK Forces which are more expensive
compared to the other options or tactics that might have been
used.[145] According
to a written Parliamentary Answer on 14 September, up to 1 September
2011 "76% of weapons employed were precision guided"
which included Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone, Enhanced Paveway II,
Paveway IV, Storm Shadow missiles and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles.[146]
We put it to witnesses that other coalition members had used cheaper
weapons without inflicting collateral damage or civilian casualties,
as a consequence of using those weapons. Air Chief Marshal Sir
Stephen Dalton, replied:
The other issue would be that, for instance,
no other country had Brimstone and its dual-mode capability. The
consequence of that is that those aircraft were doing very specific
missions. In essence, therefore, what they achieved was unique
in the overall scheme. So trying to make any comparison of that
against what others were targeting [...] would be rather false
unless you use something very simplistic, which is not valid,
such as the cost per hour, because the effectiveness is what we
are trying to achieve. [...]
[...] if you wanted to know what the cost-effectiveness
of doing that was, you would very quickly get to a point where,
in some cases, there was only one that could do it.[147]
He added:
[...] you take the assets that were contributed
by other nations and you then match the capabilities and weapons
that those assets have to the targets that you have to go against.
For instance, if we had tried to throw a squadron's worth of F16s'
capabilities with 500 lb bombs against some of the targets that
you send a Tornado with Storm Shadow in, you could have sent another
three squadrons and you would not have achieved anything because
it is the combination of the aircraft and the weapon that achieves
the effect you want on the ground. So that is why it is not simple
to do a quick, straightforward cost-effectiveness comparison between
one aircraft and its capabilities and another and its capabilities
in this sort of mission.[148]
125. We note the high reliability and accuracy
of the principal air munitions employed, but we also note reports
regarding shortages of munitions, such as the new variant Brimstone
missile, during the operation. UK Armed Forces require large enough
stocks of 'Warlike Materiel' which can be quickly replenished
when used. This requires larger stocks of those items which are
more difficult to procure or slower to produce. In response to
this report the Government should outline the contingency measures
that are in place and whether it has any plans to review them.
We accept that that it was necessary for UK Armed Forces to use
costly precision guided weapons on some missions in order to minimise
or avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. In response
to our Report, we request a detailed explanation on how decisions
on which munitions to deploy are made, and at what command level,
and whether cost is one of the factors considered.
Impact on other operations and
standing tasks
126. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force had to
divert assets from other tasks and prioritise how to deploy them
to undertake this operation. We were concerned that operations
in Libya might have had an impact on operations in Afghanistan
and standing tasks elsewhere in the world. We received the following
responses to our questions:
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton:
The overall position is that we were able to maintain all our
commitmentsfor instance, UK air defence, air defence of
the Falklands and our commitment to Afghanistanwhile conducting
the operation in Libya. We did necessarily prioritise where assets
went on a daily basis. In some cases they were sent further east
and in some cases they were kept in the Mediterranean. These are
assets that are, by nature, designed to be able to flexed from
one theatre to another when they are needed for the priority that
they are doing. Therefore in terms of the overall ability to conduct
what we are tasked to conduct as a standing set of tasks, we were
able to do that without impact on the operational capability,
and where we needed to move assets around we did so. Another example
would be that we sometimes took TriStars off mounting air logistics
deployments to make them into tankers to support the Tornadoes
that were flying out of the UK. We backfilled that, if necessary,
by using other assets. If we did not need to and we could delay
the missions for the air logistic support, that is what we did.
We prioritised the tasks at the time, depending on what they were.
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope: [...]
we satisfied all of our standing overseas commitments throughout
this period, with the exception of that single one in the Caribbean,
which we covered through other assets. We managed our way through
maintaining coverage in those areas through extended deployment
for some ships and by stretching the length of string that some
of them were on from various focal points in the South Atlantic,
where they were in the South Atlantic. [...] at the early outset
of the operation, when we were still under Op Deferencethe
recovery of personnel from Libya itselfwe took one unit
that was en route to the Falklands and put it into the Mediterranean
to provide support for a short period of time. [...] we had Cumberland
coming back from the Indian Ocean, which we used to provide the
necessary recovery of personnel from Benghazi. We managed it for
the period of the operation through flexing and stretching some
of the deployment baselines.[149]
127. Although the UK was able to satisfy both
operations in Libya and the Military Standing Tasks and other
operational commitments, Operation ELLAMY was conducted prior
to the implementation of many of the Strategic Defence and Security
Review decisions on capability reductions. We believe the Government
will face significantly greater challenges should an operation
of similar size be necessary in the future and it will need to
be prepared for some difficult decisions on prioritisation. We
consider that Operation ELLAMY raises important questions as to
the extent of the United Kingdom's national contingent capability.
We urge the Government to review the United Kingdom's capacity
to respond to concurrent threats. This work should be conducted
as a matter of urgency before the next Strategic Defence and Security
Review.
Anglo-French co-operation
128. The mission in Libya was the first new operation
undertaken since the signing of the Anglo-French Treaty on bilateral
defence cooperation in November 2010. We asked Nick Harvey MP,
Minister for the Armed Forces, for his assessment of the effectiveness
of the cooperation in the Libyan operation:
I think it has undoubtedly been a significant
success. Of course, in the early days we had to get used to each
other's modus operandi. We had some initial difficulties in basic
communications, but those were overcome. As time went on, it went
from strength to strength. We are pleased to have demonstrated
the ability of the UK and France to act together in a leading
role in the way that we have, which is encouraging for the future.
NATO allies and the US will have been encouraged by that, too.
On the back of the treaties that we signed with France last year,
this was a very significant achievement in improving our interoperability
and working relations with France.[150]
129. We welcome the successful interoperability
of Anglo-French Forces during the operation, particularly in respect
of maritime-based attack helicopter operations. We note the Minister's
comments that there were some problems in the early stages of
the operation and request an account of what these were and how
resolved. We will continue our scrutiny of the Anglo-French Defence
Treaties.
Cost of Operations
130. In a written statement on 23 June 2011, Rt Hon
Liam Fox MP, then Secretary of State for Defence stated that the
costs of Operation ELLAMY for the six months from mid-March to
mid-September were estimated to be £120 million with the
additional cost of replenishing munitions of £140 million.
The additional costs incurred by the Ministry of Defence on Operation
ELLAMY would be borne by the Reserve, and would be in addition
to the core Defence budget.[151]
In a further written statement on 12 October, the figure for the
whole operation, from mid-March to mid-December, was revised to
£160 million with the cost of replenishing munitions remaining
at £140 million. [152]
131. Following the evidence session with Nick Harvey
MP, Minister for the Armed Forces on 26 October, we asked the
MoD for additional information on the methodology used for calculating
the additional cost of the operation and the cost of replenishing
munitions. We received the following response:
Our estimates for the cost of operations in Libya
are on the basis of the 'net additional cost of operations' (NACMO).
It includes only additional costs incurred by the MOD as a result
of the operation, and excludes costs which would be incurred anyway.
Top Level Budget Holders (TLBs) are tasked to
provide the MOD centre with an estimate, based on policy agreed
with the Treasury, on what spending should come from the core
budget, and what is NACMO. For example, included in NACMO would
be: costs of additional fuel and munitions consumption; extra
maintenance requirements; spares; an assessment of capital depreciation;
the deployment and recovery of equipment and personnel from theatre;
accommodation; operational allowances; and theatre-specific training.
Excluded from NACMO would be: base salaries of service personnel
and civilians involved; a base level of equipment usage, such
as occurs during standard training; and most significantly the
procurement costs of equipment which will stay with the MOD after
the operation.
With regard to munitions, HM Treasury have agreed
to provide the cost of replenishing munitions from the Reserve,
and will assess any future claims on a case-by-case basis. Final
costs for munitions will be contingent on future decisions regarding
required stocks and estimates for the market price of munitions.
Not all costs are reclaimed in yearwe often replenish munitions
stockpiles over a number of years.[153]
We also asked for the figures on how much was spent
on oil, fuel and munitions during the operation:
Fully audited figures will be produced as part
of the annual accounts.
On current estimates we expect the net additional
cost of the operation to include around £25 million on oil
and fuel.
In October, the previous Defence Secretary provided
an estimate for the additional cost of munitions of £140
million; this was based on the continuation of Operation Unified
Protector until mid-December. We are now working on a new estimate
based on the completion of operations in October, which I will
announce in December.[154]
132. On 8 December, following the completion of operations,
the Secretary of State for Defence estimated that the net additional
cost of Operation ELLAMY would be £212 million. This estimate
was made up of £145 million of operating costs, plus a further
£67 million on the cost of replenishing. He also stated that
"the fully audited cost of Operation ELLAMY will be published
in the Ministry of Defence's annual report and accounts".[155]
133. However some commentators have suggested that
the cost was much higher. In an article in the Guardian on 25
September, Francis Tusa stated that the cost could be between
£850 million and £1.75 billion (see box below for further
details).[156]
Extract from Guardian Article (25 September 2011)
Francis Tusa's key figures were quoted as:
- "Officially", as of late August, the UK's operation has cost some £230-260-million for the 25 weeks since March 19. The new calculations put the cost of UK operations at well over £600-million, and arguably into the £1.25 billion-plus range. This has to come out of existing MoD reserves
- A breakdown of the costs of mounting an air operation: £35,000 per Tornado GR4 mission, £45,000 per Typhoon Eurofighter active mission
- Bombs and missiles are more expensive: £183,000 for a Brimstone missile, £50,000 per Paveway guided bomb
- A long-range extra mission including cruise missiles cost £11m
- Use of the Italian base at Gioia del Colle has cost the UK at least £10m
- Up until the end of May, Tusa estimated missions had cost around £512m
- Since then, the estimates are of another £377mtaking to it to a max figure of £950m, for air and sea operations alone.
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134. We asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed
Forces, for his assessment of Mr Tusa's costings:
You referred to an article, which I think was
in The Guardian. I have explained that we compute costs
on the basis of net additional costs, and the journalist's calculations
in The Guardian story appear to be his cockshy at
estimating the entire cost, regardless of whether some of that
was cost that the Department would already have been incurring.
Governments never estimate the cost of an operation on that basis,
and such calculations are almost impossible to verify because
there is not really a methodology for doing so. I am sorry to
say that I do not recognise his figures or the logic that he has
deployed to arrive at them.[157]
135. We note that in December 2011 the Government
stated the estimate for the whole operation was £212 million,
made up of £145 million of operating costs, plus a further
£67 million on the cost of replenishing munitions used in
Libya. We also note that the Secretary of State for Defence announced
that fully audited figures would be produced as part of the annual
accounts. We expect the details included in the accounts to be
as complete as possible and should include a detailed explanation
of the component parts of the additional costs, including those
of replenishing munitions. In response to our Report the MoD should
indicate the timetable for them being reimbursed the additional
costs by HM Treasury. In light of the fact that other commentators
have estimated the cost of operations to be much higher than the
MoD estimate, we expect the MoD and HM Treasury to provide us
with a detailed and transparent explanation of the methodology
used when calculating its figures. We remain concerned that the
MoD does not understand the full costs of operations in Libya.
106 Q 76 Back
107
Q 77 Back
108
Q 208 Back
109
HC Deb, 14 November 2011, col 517W Back
110
Ministry of Defence Press Release, Hammond -Proud of Armed
Forces' role in Libya, 21 October 2011 Back
111
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5909, Military
Operations in Libya, October 2011, p 24 Back
112
HC Deb, 1 December 2011, cols 1059-60W Back
113
MoD press release, RFA Fort Rosalie finishes her Libya mission,
3 October 2011 Back
114
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5909, Military
Operations in Libya, October 2011, p 24 Back
115
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5909, Military
Operations in Libya, October 2011, pp 24-25 Back
116
Ev 53 Back
117
HM Government, Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser's Review
of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned, December 2011.
Available at: www.number10.gov.uk/news/report-on-libya/ Back
118
Note by witness following evidence session: this figure should
read 3,035 flying hours Back
119
Q 272 Back
120
Q 175 Back
121
Ev 59 Back
122
HC Deb, 30 March 2011, col 392W Back
123
Q 241 Back
124
Q 241 Back
125
Q 241 Back
126
Q 178 Back
127
Q 275 Back
128
Q 274 Back
129
Q 275 Back
130
Q 205 Back
131
Q 206 Back
132
Q 279 Back
133
Q 279 Back
134
Q 267 Back
135
Q 269 Back
136
Royal United Services Institute Interim Campaign Report, Accidental
Heroes, Britain, France and the Libya Operation, September
2011, p 6 Back
137
Q 255 Back
138
Qq 255-256 Back
139
Qq 255-256 Back
140
Q 260 Back
141
Q 159 Back
142
Q 261 Back
143
Q 264 Back
144
Q 265 Back
145
For details of costs of precision weapons see HC Deb, 18 October
2011, col 875W and HC Deb, 17 May 2011, cols 111-2W. Back
146
HC Deb, 14 September 2011, cols 1206-7W Back
147
Qq 292-293 Back
148
Q 294 Back
149
Q 253 Back
150
Q 270 Back
151
HC Deb, 23 June 2011, col 24WS Back
152
HC Deb, 12 December 2011, col 30WS Back
153
Ev 56-57 Back
154
Ev 57 Back
155
HC Deb, 8 December 2011, col 41WS Back
156
See also Ev 57-59 Back
157
Q 289 Back
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