HC 1552 Developing Threats to Electronic Infrastructure

EIS 006

Written evidence from HM Government

This paper sets out the Government evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee inquiry on Developing Threats to Electronic Infrastructure. It has been prepared by the Ministry of Defence in consultation with officials from other Government Departments and the National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies).

Summary

The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effect of a nuclear weapon detonated at ground level would be limited but one detonated at high altitude would generate a widespread effect. A limited number of States are considered to be capable of detonating a nuclear device at high altitude.

Non-nuclear EMP devices have a much more localised effect, and we continue to track the threat posed by such devices whether employed by state or non-states.

Space weather has the potential to generate EMP like effects. The UK has access to space weather data through close military and civilian links with the US allowing warnings to be issued of extreme events.

Space Weather and EMP have the potential to impact a range of civil infrastructure including: power networks; satellite services; aviation; digital control systems; and, wireless and mobile communications.

A three pronged approach is taken to mitigate the effects of EMP: prior warning is given, either through forecasting or the collection of intelligence, which enables appropriate action to take place, for example switching off vulnerable satellite systems; infrastructure is hardened where appropriate, this is especially the case for critical military infrastructure; and we prepare for these events although the Government’s approach to civil resilience management is to plan for the consequences of potential civil emergencies no matter what the cause. Contingencies are in place to react to large scale loss of electronic infrastructure with the restoration of the National Grid being a priority.

The UK has significant research resources available. The civil sector focuses on the effects of space weather whereas the military sector covers both space weather and its possible EMP effects.

Written Evidence

Q1. The extent of any threat posed to UK electronic infrastructure by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) events caused by space weather events, nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude or other EMP weapons.

1.1 The Government considers risks to national security, such as an EMP event, on the basis of the likelihood of the event as well as its potential impact. This is to ensure that investment in security and resilience remains proportionate to the risk. Risks of civil emergencies, [1] both malicious and non-malicious, affecting the UK mainland over the next five years are assessed in an annual classified National Risk Assessment (NRA), while areas of global risks to UK national security are weighed over a five and 20 year horizon in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), first published in 2010 under the Government’s National Security Strategy (NSS). [2]

1.2 The impact of EMP events caused by nuclear devices would be very severe but the likelihood is currently considered to be low. Non-nuclear EMP devices exist and the risks are being kept under review but are not currently considered to be sufficient to warrant recognition as a national security risk. Severe space weather, which might cause geomagnetic storms impacting the Earth’s magnetosphere, has been the subject of extensive research over the past year. The likelihood of a severe space weather event is assessed to be moderate to high over the next five years, with the potential to cause damage to electrically conducting systems such as power grids, pipelines, and signalling circuits.

Q2. The likelihood that a viable EMP weapon can or will be used by either state or non-state actors.

2.1 A nuclear weapon (whether state or a terrorist improvised device) activated at ground level would cause a direct EMP but its range of effect would be of limited extent, and arguably less significant than the blast, thermal radiation, and fallout from any such device.

2.2 To generate more widespread damage from EMP, a nuclear warhead would have to be detonated at high altitude to generate the EMP from the interaction between the radiation from the weapon and the outer layers of the atmosphere. This could only be achieved by launching a device by missile to an altitude of several tens of kilometres. A limited number of States possess this capability.

2.3 The use of such a nuclear device against the UK would be considered to be a nuclear attack and an act of aggression. The EMP would also be likely to cause damage to a number of other nations beyond the target country, leading to the possibility of a collective response.

2.4 No non-State actors can currently produce an improvised nuclear device and none are likely to be able to make a sufficiently robust warhead for missile delivery in the foreseeable future.

2.5 State development of non-nuclear EMP devices would require advanced engineering, although cruder devices with limited ranges of effects may be achievable by non-States. There is evidence of the proliferation of such technology, which may lead to its acquisition by countries and/or non-state actors of concern to the UK in future years.

Q3. The extent to which space weather is forecasted and the effectiveness of early warning systems that may be in place.

3.1 The US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Space Weather Prediction Centre (SWPC) is the global centre for space weather services into the civilian community and is the dominant source of data and predictions for the UK. The US Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA), provides prediction services to UK military operations. UK infrastructure operators receive warnings via subscription services with NOAA or AFWA.

3.2 The Meteorological Office is currently developing a space weather prediction capability in partnership with NOAA and a number of UK organisations including British Geological Survey (BGS). Future space weather collaboration is also under discussion between the Met Office and AFWA. The European Space Agency (ESA) Space Situational Awareness (SSA) programme is defining ESA’s requirements for space weather services. The global space weather community is dependent on a small number of solar environment observation satellites, many of which were launched for scientific purposes and not for operational observation to support prediction.

3.3 The MoD UK Space Operations Co-ordination Centre (SpOCC), based at RAF High Wycombe, receives 12-hourly updates from the US Joint Space Operations Centre of any solar activity expected within the next 72 hours. The SpOCC also receives automated alerts from the AFWA. These alerts provide details of any space weather phenomena observed in the previous 24 hour period and any solar activity expected in the next 24 hours. Where the level of solar activity is expected to impact on military operations, warnings are sent to the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood and the Global Operations and Security Control Centre at Corsham. AFWA space weather products are also embedded within routine outputs from the Joint Operational Meteorology and Oceanography Centre at Northwood.

Q4. The potential impact of such events for both civilian and military infrastructure.

4.1 Space weather comprises a range of solar phenomena including solar flares, solar radiation storms, and coronal mass ejections (CME), which are likely to impact upon a wide range of systems including:

a. Power networks: Severe geomagnetic storms caused by fast-moving CME, can generate large geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) through long, electrically conducting systems such as power grids, pipelines and signalling circuits. High levels of GIC can permanently damage transmission, distribution, and generation assets in electricity networks potentially leading to power failure.

b. Satellite Services: Severe space weather can interrupt satellite services including Global Navigation Satellite Systems, communications, and Earth observation and imaging systems by damaging the space-based hardware, distorting the satellite signal, or increasing the errors in ground-based receivers.

c. Aviation: Airlines rely on High Frequency (HF) radio and satellites to maintain communications both of which can be disrupted by space weather. Cosmic rays and energetic particles from solar radiation storms can adversely affect microelectronic components in aircraft. The elevated levels of radiation exposure at flight altitude can be of concern for airline passengers and flight crews.

d. Digital control systems : High levels of neutron flux produced by the atmosphere by solar radiation storms can greatly enhance error rates in these components.

e. Wireless and mobile communications : The Sun can produce strong bursts of radio noise over a wide range of frequencies that can interfere with wireless systems including mobile phone telecommunication and the internet.

4.2 The Ministry of Defence relies on space based assets to provide:

a. Satellite Communications (SATCOM). SATCOM and data networks enable the command and control of deployed forces and the timely exploitation and dissemination of intelligence data.

b. Positioning Navigation and Timing (PNT). Precise PNT solutions derived from the US Global Positioning System (GPS) enable the orchestration of complex military operations while reducing the risk of collateral damage and fratricide.

c. Earth Observation (EO). Earth observation capabilities (most of which are derived from allies and commercial providers) provide the necessary strategic indicators and warnings, and intelligence to support operational and tactical planning.

4.3 Defence procurement standards direct that military equipment must have an appropriate hardening against nuclear weapon effects including EMP. This hardening provides a level of protection against space weather effects.

a. SATCOM All beyond-line-of-sight communications for the MoD are provided through a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) with Paradigm Secure Communications Ltd.  Under the terms of the PFI, the military is afforded access to assured and protected communications; these are derived principally from the Skynet 5 satellite constellation (and its ground infrastructure), which is hardened to withstand a reasonable worst case space weather event and a high altitude nuclear explosion (HANE).  The PFI also accounts for the provision of commercial SATCOM for military purposes.  While commercial satellites are designed to withstand routine space weather effects, they would be more susceptible to severe space weather than their military-grade equivalents, and their ground stations would be less resilient to artificially-generated EMP effects and GIC caused by space weather.

b. PNT  Ionospheric disturbances caused by space weather are the single largest contributor to single-frequency GPS errors. However, military receivers use two frequency bands and enhanced signal processing techniques, which make them less susceptible to signal errors caused by EMP effects in the ionosphere. 

c. EO It is possible that a severe space weather event or HANE could degrade the ability of these satellites to collect and disseminate data in a timely manner. 

d. Military Ground Infrastructure Much of the military ground infrastructure in the UK is connected to the National Grid, the Public Switching Telephone Network, and other utilities, which may be susceptible to artificially generated EMP or GIC caused by space weather. Critical military infrastructure is designed to operate independently of nationally-provided utilities, with many facilities having back-up power generators and bulk fuel reserves. 

4.4 The consequences of an attack by non-nuclear EMP can be temporary or permanent. The effect can be achieved either by the generated electromagnetic energy directly coupling to the victim communication wires, links and/or sensors, or coupling indirectly via metallic structures, cables, or network architectures. Equipment hardened to withstand nuclear generated EMP, may be susceptible to aspects of non-nuclear EMP. Commercial-Off-The-Shelf electronics are known to be vulnerable to non-nuclear and radio-frequency electromagnetic pulse attack.

4.5 The success of a non-nuclear EMP attack is, however, dependent on the level of access to and knowledge of the target as acquired by the attacker. Fixed targets such as land based devices, units, and centres that use IT, electronic and/or computer control systems are considered to be more vulnerable to an attack than moving targets such as air systems.

Q5. Ways of mitigating electromagnetic pulse events, either targeted or naturally occurring.

5.1 DECC and National Grid have been working closely over the past year to gain a better understanding of the potential impacts of a severe space weather event on electricity assets and networks. Scientific advice suggests that most of the risk from severe space weather arises from short lived extreme events that are not well correlated with longer term trends in solar activity. Historical records suggest that the so-called "Carrington event" of 1859 is a reasonable worst case scenario. Evidence indicates this event was about ten times more intense [3] than the most severe recent event that occurred in 1989 and led to a major power system disturbance in Quebec, Canada.

5.2 The main risk the Sun poses to electricity networks is CME. The components of the British electricity system most at risk are the high-voltage transformers that are used to enable power to move from one network voltage to another (e.g. from the 400kV grid network to a 132kV distribution network). Transformers at the edges of a large network and those on ground/rock with high electrical resistance are particularly susceptible. Transformers connected to transmission networks (including those connecting power stations) are at greater risk than those on distribution networks because the networks couple to the ground over greater distances and provide a lower resistance to the GIC. If damaged, the transformers connected to the transmission system would either need to be replaced or returned to the factory for repair. National Grid has around 800 high-voltage transformers installed and holds a number of strategic spares to cover for individual faults.

5.3 There is substantial redundancy within the design of the grid allowing demand to be met in full unless there are multiple transformers out of service in a particular locality. Failure of substantial number of transformers would complicate the restart of the grid. As the normal demand for very large transformers is small (they have a life of around 50-60 years) such an event could cause substantial delay in restoring full connectivity due to the time taken to manufacture replacement transformers. There has yet to be a recorded case in which damage has been sufficient to cause such a delay in service restoration.

5.4 To date, the most severe damage on National Grid’s network was in 1989 when two transformers had to be returned to the manufacturer with damage that was believed to have been caused by the same space weather event that affected the Hydro-Quebec electricity network. Although two transformers were damaged, the redundancy within the design of the system enabled demand to be met in full. Since that time National Grid have taken actions to mitigate the risk to their network against a storm of similar intensity: altering the specification of their transformers, monitoring warnings of potential problems, and developing operational strategies.

5.5 National Grid has instituted a GIC warning system with Metatech and EPRI. Scottish Power have commissioned an independent warning and monitoring system with BGS. These processes enabled warnings to be issued for at least five events including the major ‘Halloween’ storm in October 2003 that caused some issues in South Africa. This storm was detected in the UK but did not have any detrimental effects. The monitoring part of the current system, which records GICs flowing in selected transformer neutrals, has been integrated into the Smart Asset Management monitoring system and US Solar Shield system. A visual warning and modelling system is currently being developed with BGS with a full GB transmission model.

5.6 On 20 September 2010 the Electric Infrastructure Security Summit (EISS) at Westminster Hall was attended by HMG Officials. This was the first in a series of summits intended to promote cooperation on assessing the risks of space weather and taking appropriate action. National Grid agreed to investigate the implications of various scenarios on the British transmission system and have reported their initial findings to the Energy Emergencies Executive Committee (E3C), where government and industry work together to mitigate threats to gas and electricity supplies. E3C have been tasked with conducting further work across the electricity sector to fully understand the risks posed by severe space weather to generators and distribution network operators. An initial report is expected in early 2012.

5.7 The second EISS in April 2011 in Washington had wider industry attendance and particularly highlighted the severe effect on the US of a Carrington type event as well as EMP. Further work following the Washington Summit has determined which transmission networks or regions are particularly susceptible to geomagnetic disturbance. Increased risk is experienced in highly loaded systems with long high voltage lines over highly resistive geology and old design five limb or single phase transformers. Historically the GB transmission system has had a relatively low failure rate of less than 0.3% per year from 1952 to 2004 (five solar cycles) and random failure modes.


5.8 National Grid continues to review its approach to space weather compared to the US, European, and other transmission systems. The National Grid has six monitoring sites that, along with two on the US National Grid, will provide key inputs to the Electric Power Research Institute SUNBURST collaborative project (which the National Grid has been a member of since 2000), which in turn supports NASA’s Solar Shield project. Other collaboration is taking place with the University of Manchester for transformer modelling, the University of Lancaster for space environment modelling, as well as BGS, Rutherford Appleton Laboratories, the EURISGIC project, DECC, E3C, and the Cabinet Office. NERC in the US has been particularly useful as its operational mitigation procedures are similar to National Grid.

5.9 Mitigation arrangements are in place to reduce the threat to military infrastructure. These have been detailed in response to Q4, together with the supporting space weather forecasting arrangements detailed in response to Q3.

Q6. The resources available in respect of research and development in the field.

6.1 The UK has significant civil sector expertise in space weather spread over Research Council institutes, universities, industry, and the Met Office. This includes:

a. provision of targeted space weather services for users in the public and private sectors;

b. development and operation of instruments that are the UK contribution to the global space weather monitoring;

c. key roles in European programmes and proposals to improve space weather forecasting (e.g. improved modelling of threats to spacecraft and power grids; improved international coordination and integration of space weather data resources and measurements); and

d. collaboration with US space weather forecasters in the provision of services, the development of advanced modelling and better methods for the detection and tracking of space weather threats.

6.2 A UK-US workshop in October 2010 explored the development of a roadmap for research collaboration to address key gaps in the science needed to deliver accurate space weather forecasts.

6.3 The MoD has expertise on space weather and EMP effects within its Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) that is complemented by industry expertise gained through practical hardening and assessments of electronic systems.

Q7. Contingencies in place to react to a large scale loss of UK electronic infrastructure, and the role of the military in such an event.

7.1 Successful management of a major electricity supply emergency requires effective communication and cooperation between industry and government. The wider consequences of an incident could be mitigated by the choices that industry is able to make, and some of the practical aspects of managing an incident could be assisted by the activities of government. The National Emergency Plan for Downstream Gas and Electricity (NEP-DG&E) sets out a framework for industry and government to work together to manage a major supply emergency.

7.2 Should a severe space weather event cause sufficient damage to the British electricity system that a prolonged electricity shortage is experienced in a specific region, or, exceptionally, the whole country, electricity rationing may be necessary until such time as repairs are completed or sufficient mobile generation installed. The NEP-DG&E provides an option to implement electricity rationing through existing arrangements contained within the Electricity Supply Emergency Code. This aims to ensure the fair distribution of available electricity regionally/nationally to all consumers whilst protecting supplies to those who require priority treatment, using a process known as "Rota Disconnections". Electricity distribution network operators maintain lists of priority customers within their networks and in emergencies, as Category 2 Responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, are experienced at working closely with Local Responders to ensure that vulnerable customers are cared for.

7.3 In the unlikely event that a severe space weather event causes a total or partial shutdown of the British transmission system, National Grid as the System Operator, would declare a Black Start. This is the industry procedure to recover from a total or partial shutdown of the transmission system which has caused an extensive loss of supply, and entails isolated power stations being started individually and gradually being reconnected to each other to form an interconnected system again. National Grid run a regular inspection and testing regime of all Black Start stations to ensure that the capability to start-up independently is robust.

7.4 Telecommunications and electrical power generation and distribution infrastructures are mutually dependent. Public, fixed line, telecommunications infrastructures in the UK have arrangements in place that enable them to continue to function for up to five days in the event of the loss of grid-distributed electricity. Telecommunications infrastructures are owned and operated by private sector organisations who are best placed to respond to and recover from a major telecommunications incident.

7.5 Government has worked closely with the owners and operators of telecomms infrastructures through the Electronic Communications Resilience and Response Group to facilitate restoration of services in the event of a major incident affecting networks. The procedures that are in place are subjected to an extensive annual test conducted over several days. This is augmented with more frequent tests of the mustering arrangements for participants.

7.6 Core telecommunications networks are highly resilient when viewed against the planning assumptions from the National Risk Assessment. While the resilience of core networks is largely the concern of the Network Service Provider, since there is a significant incentive to efficiently route traffic, the resilience of access to these networks is largely a concern for the customer. Customers for telecommunications services can undertake a range of measure to enhance resilience.

7.7 The High Integrity Telecommunications System provides a strategic communications network linking Central Government to Strategic Co-ordination Centres, from where the response to civil emergencies are co-ordinated. The network achieves an exceptionally high level of resilience through the use of both military hardened satellite capabilities and terrestrial links.

7.8 Industry has an established procedure in place (the National Emergency Alert for Telecoms) for dealing with emergencies. In both real and exercise scenarios, this procedure has proved to be a highly effective process for ensuring resilience.

7.9 In the case of a national EMP event Defence does not expect to play a significant role in the primary response, [1] for example, restoring the National Grid. Under the provision of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities, MoD may, however, have capacity to augment any civil response, if capabilities are overwhelmed by the scale of the emergency. Defence personnel are likely to be available in the UK, and if requested should be able to provide general duties support to the emergency services and others dealing with the knock-on effects of an EMP event. Such support can be requested by any government department at the strategic level and at the local level this is facilitated through a nationwide network of Joint Regional Liaison Officers who work with local resilience fora and others to enable access to military aid.

Q8. The broader security of UK electronic and space infrastructure, particularly satellites and satellite navigation systems and the risk posed by space debris.

8.1 The Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 committed the Government to develop a National Space Security Policy, which would coherently address all aspects, both military and civil, of the UK’s dependence on space; assure access to space; help mitigate risks to critical national infrastructure; focus future investment and research on national priorities, opportunities, and sovereign capability requirements; and encourage co-operation with UK industry and with international partners. We expect this policy to be published in 2012.

October 2011


[1] Emergency is defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as an event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK , an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK , or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK . It must also be a threat or hazard of sufficient scale and nature that it is likely to seriously obstruct a Category 1 responder in the performance of its functions, or require the Category 1 responder to exercise its function and undertake a special mobilisation.

[2] Cabinet Office, A S trong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy , Cm 7953, October 2010

[3] Although this depends on what effect is being measured.

[1] D efence may have a small number of specialists who can be deployed.

Prepared 14th November 2011