2 Considering consumption-based emissions
6. The Committee received evidence that DECC's
position of relying solely on one method of calculating emissionsthe
territorial approachhad severe shortcomings in terms of
UK energy and climate change policy. WWF-UK's Head of Climate
Change, Dr Keith Allott, argued that consideration of consumption-based
emissions alongside the established territorial approach "gives
additional insights, guards against perverse consequences, and
can help to improve policy formulation".[10]
Academics from the universities of Leeds, Manchester and York
all agreed that there was a case for publishing consumption and
territorial emissions together.[11]
7. This view was shared amongst representatives
of energy-intensive industries and businesses. The Director of
UK Steel, Ian Rodgers, told us that "[the territorial approach
alone] gives a false view of the UK's total contribution to climate
change". [12] Jeremy
NicholsonDirector of the Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG),
Fergus McReynoldsSenior Climate and Policy Adviser at EEF
(the manufacturers' organisation), and Dr Richard Leese of the
Minerals Products Association all agreed that relying solely on
territorial emissions provided an "incomplete picture".[13]
The EIUG's Jeremy Nicholson added that this picture was "an
inaccurate one, which is unhelpful for policy makers and indeed
for the industry".[14]
8. The Carbon Trust had undertaken detailed analysis
of the UK's consumption-based greenhouse gas emissions. Their
Associate Director, Eric Lounsbury, explained to the Committee
the problem with DECC's reliance on territorial emissions as an
indicator of the success of the UK's climate policies:
If we have tackled one half of the problem, which
is producing the stuff that we produce here more carbon-efficiently,
that is a huge part of the battle, but we should not forget about
the other piece of it [that we are also consuming more goods and
services causing emission outside the UK].[15]
9. The UK's consumption-based emissions are published
by Defra, and take into account the emissions embedded in the
UK's imports and exports.[16]
Defra's Parliamentary Under-Secretary of StateLord Taylor
of Holbeach CBEtold us that, "Taken together, territorial
and consumption emissions provide a more complete picture of the
carbon emissions associated with the activities of UK citizens
and businesses." [17]
Emissions trends
10. Analysis by the Sustainable Consumption Institute
has shown that UK greenhouse gas emissions measured on a consumption
basis are consistently higher than those on a territorial basis,
and the gap is widening as shown in Figure 1.[18]
This research was funded by Defra, and is being continued on at
Leeds University for years 2009-2014. The UK Energy Research Centre
(UKERC) stated that while territorial-based emissions showed a
19% reduction between 1990 and 2008, consumption based emissions
showed a 20% increase.[19]
11. Analysis by the Carbon Trust has shown that
in 2004 the UK's consumption emissions were 34% greater than the
"usually reported" territorial emissions, as shown in
Figure 2.[20] Given this
disparity, WWF-UK thought that it was not "credible for the
UK to claim progress towards a sustainable, green economy"
unless the impacts of both UK territorial and consumption emissions
were addressed together.[21]
Figure 1Comparison
of UK consumption-based GHG emissions with territorial emissions[22]

Source: UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC)
12. Oxford University's Professor of Energy Policy,
Dieter Helm, and others examined the UK's climate record up to
2007, in the report, "Too Good to be true?".[23]
They determined that one of the main reasons for the UK's territorial
emissions falling was the "dash-for-gas" since 1990.[24]
Helm's report noted that these emissions savings were "real"
in that they were a genuine GHG reduction caused by the displacement
of coal-fired electricity generation by gas.[25]
WWF-UK's Dr Keith Allot agreed that the UK's move from coal to
increasing amounts of power generated by gas had played a part
in driving down the UK's territorial emissions, but noted that
this transition "was not really driven by climate change
policy".[26]
Figure 2the impact of a consumption-based
view on emissions by country.[27]

Source: The Carbon Trust
13. The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) observed
that the difference in the UK between the rate at which consumption-based
emissions rose and the rate at which territorial emissions fell
was the largest amongst the top ten emitters in the worlda
23% difference in 2008 compared to 1990, compared to only 8% for
the US (see Figure 3).[28]
Figure 3 shows that consumption emissions in the USA and UK since
1990 have grown faster than their territorial emissions have fallen.
This is because the UK and USA, and by 2006 Canada, were increasingly
consuming more emissions embedded in imports than they were reducing
their territorial emissions. Meanwhile, China and India were increasingly
exporting more of their emissions to be consumed in other countries.
Figure 3Growth difference between consumption-based
and territorial-based CO2 emissions from 1990 for China, India,
and industrial nationals in the top ten emitters.[29]

Source: UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC)
14. When we raised this with Ministers, the DECC
Minister Greg Barker told us, "If we were to see a divergence
[between territorial and consumption emissions] obviously we want
to take that into account" [30]
15. There is a clear divergence
between the UK's territorial emissions and its consumption-based
emissions. Furthermore, the rate at which the UK's territorial
emissions have fallen has been outpaced by the growth in its consumption-emissions.
We are concerned that the UK could be meeting its domestic carbon
budgets at the expense of the global carbon budget.
Carbon Leakage
16. As the UK's industrial emissions fell, the
growth in the UK's consumption emissions indicated either that
industry (and therefore the associated emissions) was leaving
the UK, or that the UK was consuming more and more (or a combination
of the two). The term carbon leakage is used to refer to the relocation
of an industry to avoid the costs of cutting greenhouse gas emissions
that have been imposed in a particular region (for example, the
EU-Emissions Trading System). In the new region, the industry
continues to emit greenhouse gases without any penalty, and exports
their products back into the original region to be "consumed".
Carbon is said to be "embedded" in these products. Carbon
leakage can also refer to the associated "investment leakage",
where companies do not invest in a country in the first place
owing to the carbon costs that are imposed.
17. Ultimately, carbon leakage leads to an increase
in the amount of greenhouse gases that are emitted to the atmosphere,
despite efforts to reduce them. UKERC defined two distinct categories
of carbon leakage: weak and strong:
- strong carbon leakage refers to an increase in
global emissions owing specifically to climate policies; while
- weak carbon leakage refers to an increase in
global emissions owing to increased consumption, rather than any
specific government policy.[31]
18. However, there can be many reasons why a
business may choose to relocate to another country, or invest
money in one region over another. The Aldersgate Group (a coalition
of environment agencies, NGOs, think tanks and industry) noted
that "there is no evidence of industry relocating from the
UK solely as a result of climate change policy", in other
words, no evidence of what UKERC described as "strong carbon
leakage".[32] The
Public Interest Research Centre's Guy Shrubsole told us that the
disparity between UK consumption and territorial emissions "is
almost entirely down, so far, to weak carbon leakagethat
is increasing consumption". [33]
19. The Aldersgate Group explained that, while
carbon costs could be significant for a limited number of industries,
"often they are exaggerated and the potential economic benefits
[of reducing emissions] ignored".32 UKERC argued that the
current carbon price is too low to be a factor in a company's
decision on where it manufactures its goods.[34]WWF-UK
believed claims that business is being driven overseas by carbon
regulation (including by the EU-ETS) had been shown to be "greatly
exaggerated or even groundless" although it was sometimes
cited by industry as the reason for their relocation.[35]
For example, Rio Tinto blamed the closure of their Alcan aluminium
smelter in Northumberland on "energy costs [that] are increasing
significantly, due largely to emerging [climate] legislation".[36]
In contrast, WWF-UK believed that the "dynamics of globalisation"
were the main driver of where companies located their manufacturing
facilities, rather than "environmental, climate or social
policies implemented in the UK".[37]
20. Professor Dieter Helm explained that the
"de-industrialisation" (a move away from manufacturing
industries) that the UK has experienced since 1990which
would have contributed to a fall in territorial emissions"may
have not delivered a real saving at the global level" as
it led to increased emissions from countries with greater greenhouse
gas intensities in their manufacturing sectors.[38]
The University of Leeds' Professor Barrett argued that greater
emphasis on a system of consumption-based accounting could have
the positive effect of highlighting the efficiency of UK industry
in terms of lower emissions intensity.[39]
21. The Director of UK Steel, Ian Rodgers, explained
that the drive to decarbonise the power-generating sector had
led to higher electricity prices in Europe.[40]
However, Mr Rodgers added that the steel sector had "free
[emissions] allowances under the EU-ETS. So it would be implausible
to argue that current policies [
] resulted in [strong] carbon
leakage".[41] The
Minerals Products Association's Dr Richard Lease added that the
UK's climate policy was not the main concern when a company made
investment decisions, but it was "certainly an influencing
factor".[42] The
Energy Intensive Users' Group's Director, Jeremy Nicholson, believed
the UK's climate policies placed a large cumulative burden on
energy intensive industries, but noted that, "If the rest
of the world will sign up to this [emissions reduction] agenda
there would be no competitiveness issue arising from this".[43]
22. We conclude that the fall
in the UK's territorial emissions was not entirely or even mostly
a consequence of the Government's climate policy. Rather, it was
mainly a result of the switch from coal to gas-fired electricity
generation that began in the early 1990s, and the shift in manufacturing
industries away from the UK in response to the pressures of globalised
markets. At the same time, the emissions embedded in the UK's
imported goods have increased. To complement the UK's existing
territorial carbon budgets, we recommend that DECC explore the
options for setting emissions targets on a consumption-basis at
the national level, and to set out the steps it will take to do
this when responding to the Committee's report.
Compensation for energy intensive
companies
23. In his November 2011 Autumn Statement, the
Chancellor announced measures intended to "reduce the impact
of policy on the costs of electricity for the most electricity-intensive
industries".[44]
The Treasury's aim was to minimise the "carbon leakage
which might happen if investment relocated abroad".44 Beginning
in 2013, the Government plans to introduce compensation measures
for electricity-intensive industries that will be worth around
£250 million over the Spending Review period 2011-12 to 2014-15.
This was despite the fact that we had been told earlier that day
that it would be "implausible" to argue that the UK's
policies had resulted in carbon leakage.[45]
24. WWF-UK's Dr Keith Allot told us that if companies
were receiving compensation for the impacts of the UK's climate
policies:
[...] there should be something in returnsome
clear commitmentsfrom the sectors benefiting [...] in terms
of increased environmental benefits from energy efficiency improvement
[
] Otherwise, we are in danger of giving something for nothing
for generalised industry lobbying. [
] The reason why Europe
is struggling to show the [climate] leadership that we need [
]
is substantially because of lobbying by the heavy manufacturing
industry.[46]
25. We asked the Minister whether the companies
benefiting from this compensation would be obliged to make commitments
to increased energy efficiency, to which he responded "I
expect so".[47]
26. We received no evidence
that electricity-intensive industry investment decisions were
being driven by the Government's climate policy, and therefore
no evidence that the compensation for electricity-intensive industries
announced by the Chancellor in his 2011 Autumn Statement is necessary.
If electricity-intensive industries are to be "compensated"
for increases in the cost of electricitywhich are being
driven primarily by volatility in the fossil fuel market, not
climate policywe recommend that the Government requires
the beneficiaries to make clear commitments to increased energy
efficiency. In its response to our Report, the Government must
set out clearly what these commitments will be.
10 Q 74 Back
11
Q 3 Back
12
Q35 Back
13
Q 36 Back
14
Q 36 Back
15
Q 76 Back
16
Ev 46 Back
17
Q 127 Back
18
Ev 81 Back
19
Ev w30 Back
20
Ev 70 Back
21
Ev 63 Back
22
Ev w30 Back
23
Helm, D.R, et al.,Too Good To be True? The UK's Climate Change
Record, December 2007 Back
24
The dash-for-gas refers to the significant shift away from coal
by the newly privatised electricity companies in the UK towards
lower-carbon gas-fired electricity generation during the 1990s Back
25
Helm, D.R, et al.,Too Good To be True? The UK's Climate Change
Record, December 2007, p 11 Back
26
Q 90 Back
27
Ev 70 Back
28
Ev w30 Back
29
Ev w30 Back
30
Q 185 Back
31
Ev w30 Back
32
Ev 95 Back
33
Q 91 Back
34
Ev w30 Back
35
Ev 63 Back
36
"Energy costs blamed as Rio axes smelter", Financial
Times, 16 November 2011 Back
37
Ev 63 Back
38
Helm, D.R, et al.,Too Good To be True? The UK's Climate Change
Record, December 2007, p 11 Back
39
Q 23 Back
40
Q 36 Back
41
Q 37 Back
42
Q 37 Back
43
Q 40 Back
44
HMT, Autumn Statement 2011, Cm 8231, November 2011, p 36 Back
45
Q 36 Back
46
Qq 92-93 Back
47
Q 138 Back
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