5 Climate Change Negotiations
68. In their 2011 inquiry into Carbon Budgets,
the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee asked the Secretary
of State for DECC about the general case for a consumption-based
emissions approach, and was told:
The reality is that if you were to tell most members
of the United Nations that their territorial sovereignty would
henceforth be suspended because we intended to take account of
our imported embedded emissions, I think there would be an absolute
firefight. The reality is that the territorial principle is very
well established. We are responsible for our own territory, and
while that remains the case, that is the bit that we can take
responsibility for.[128]
69. The Environmental Audit Committee did not
share the Secretary of State's reluctance to take consumption-based
emissions into account when making policy, arguing rather that
it would "facilitate a more rigorous approach to controlling
our contribution to climate change".128 We have explored
whether an increased acknowledgement of the UK's consumption emissionsand
hence a more complete acknowledgement of the UK's impact on the
global climatecould facilitate negotiations on a global,
legally binding agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
We acknowledge DECC's point about a potential "firefight"
at the United Nations climate negotiations, but we are not suggesting
changes to the territorial accounting mechanisms that underpin
the negotiations.
70. The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) observed
that the UK is especially vulnerable to international criticism
at the moment because "the leakage of its emissions is larger
than that of all other industrial nations".[129]
It wasin partBritain's leadership on the issue of
climate change in the early 1990s that eventually led to the signing
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Perhaps in the 2010s an admission
of responsibility by the UK for the impacts of its consumption
could lead the way for other net importers of emissions to do
the same, and allow some of the barriers to a climate change agreement
to be surmounted.
71. Reflecting the argument it made to the Environmental
Audit Committee, DECC stated that the territorial approach to
emissions reporting is used because countries have a much greater
ability to "influence [manufacturing] activities in their
own territory" than to influence "emissions from goods
which are consumed in their country but [manufactured] overseas".[130]
WWF-UK agreed with DECC, and acknowledged that the territorial-based
approach to emissions accounting had considerable merit in that
the "levers that address these emissions are clearly within
the direct control and mandate of UK policy makers".[131]
WWF-UK thought the UK should not promote a shift to an international
policy framework based on consumption emissions, as it would have
"very little support internationally and threaten the emergence
of a new binding global deal".[132]
72. We heard evidence that the UK could have
some influence beyond the emissions that it has territorial sovereignty
over. UKERC believed that that the "key issue" with
regards to reducing emissions globally was the UK's ability to
reduce overseas emissions, and that the UK should recognise the
influence it has over emissions embodied in the goods it imports.[133]
Policy Exchange observed that "the scale and rapid growth
of carbon embedded in trade makes negotiation of an international
agreement difficult and complex, including making it hard to specify
realistic and fair targets for rapidly growing developing countries".[134]
The Sustainable Consumption Institute thought that an increased
emphasis on consumption-based emissionsin parallel to the
territorial approachwould "increase the share of global
emissions over which the UK has influence, and therefore broaden
its reach".[135]
By acknowledging that the UK has partial responsibility for emissions
produced in another country, the UK could have more leverage in
negotiations aimed at reducing those emissions. Professor Barrett
from the University of Leeds told us that, while it may be argued
that the UK does not have responsibility for the emissions produced
in the manufacture of goods abroad which it then consumes, "we
do have some influence over those emissions".[136]
73. In the paper "Growth in emission
transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008",
Glen Peters, from the Norwegian Center for International Climate
and Environmental Research in Oslo, and others argued that the
consumption approach could inform negotiations on what international
agreement takes shape after Kyoto's first commitment period expires.[137]
The Kyoto Protocol as it stands was designed at a time when international
flows of carbon were much smaller: emissions embedded in trade
grew from 4.3 GtCO2 in 1990 to 7.8 GtCO2
in 2008.[138] This
rise in the carbon emissions embedded in international trade flows
shows the increased importance of a consumption-based approach
to assessing the emissions a country is responsible for.
74. Professor Barrett told us that, at this point
in the climate change negotiations, he would not argue for shifting
the targets from away from the agreed territorial basis, but an
increased acknowledgement of the UK's consumption emissions could:
[
] add further integrity to climate change
debates; it helps give insights into responsibility [
] it
is about additional information to give us greater insight to
widen our policy scope, not to try and totally redesign the whole
international negotiations [
] I think we are at a situation
where we need to overcome the barriers [to a global agreement],
and so therefore new information to me can only be useful to do
that.[139]
75. The University of Manchester's Dr Alice Bows
added, "there will always be some emissions that we cannot
necessarily have influence over and so it would be very tricky
to set a target on [a consumption] basis".[140]
On the other hand, Elena Dawkins of the University of York argued
that "other countries might resist territorial emissions
targets because they would impinge on their development goals.
So maybe they will be more willing to accept that consumption
approach".[141]
76. The UK has been a leader
on climate policy for many years. If the UK wishes to lead on
low-carbon growthand encourage emissions reductions in
countries that manufacture and export goods to the UKwe
recommend that the Government acknowledges the growth in the UK's
consumption-based emissions. The Committee is not proposing that
a legally binding agreement on emissions reductions should be
based on consumption rather than territorial emissions. However,
we do recommend that the Government acknowledge that the UK's
consumption is driving up territorial emissions in other countries.
This admission could increase the UK's leverage over those emissions.
DECC should not dismiss out of hand the potential leverage of
a more holistic assessment of the UK's emissions, and an acknowledgement
that the UK's consumption drives up territorial emissions elsewhere.
Developing countries
77. DECC were concerned that developing countries
would be concerned that an emphasis on consumption-based accounting
could lead to protectionist anti-trade policies. The Minister
told us that he thought there was a danger "that it could
be misinterpreted [
] as a way of imposing tariff barriers
and a new form of carbon duties on developing countries".[142]
However, DECC also stated, "it could also be argued that
developing countries should not be entirely responsible for emissions
associated with goods and services that are mainly consumed in
the developed world".[143]
78. Sustainability consultants Best Foot Forward
noted that territorial emissions accounting typically led to a
situation "where developed countries outsource their industries
to developing countries and the latter have to bear costs of reducing
GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions".[144]
Dr. Glen Peters' study estimated the consumption-based carbon
dioxide emissions for 113 world regions.[145]
A key finding was that although many developed countries (including
the UK) stabilised their territorial emissions, there was often
an associated increase in emissions in developing countries through
manufacturing the imported goods and services.[146]
79. We put it to the Minister that it was very
likely that developing economies would like to have an acknowledgment
at the negotiating table of how low their consumption-based emission
were on a per capita basis compared to ours, and he acknowledged
that this would be "very helpful".[147]
80. We accept that territorial
emissions should remain the basis for international climate negotiations.
However, the UK Government's emphasis on territorial emissions
means that the responsibility for reducing emissions embedded
in the products that we import lies with theoften, developingcountries
where the goods are manufactured. We accept there is a risk that
some exporters could have concerns that an increased emphasis
on consumption-based emissions by the UK could be a precursor
to anti-trade policies that penalised high-carbon products. On
balance, however, we conclude that the potential benefits of an
increased emphasis on consumption based emissions outweigh this
risk. We recommend that the Government acknowledges the extent
of our responsibility for these emissions in developing countries,
in order to encourage a more equitable approach to reducing emissions
globally.
Border tariff adjustments
81. It has been suggested that the emissions
embodied in imported goods could be accounted for in a form of
carbon taxation, called a "border tariff adjustment",
as a product passes through a border. UKERC noted that there were
well-documented examples of taxation on consumption (consumption
in general, not emissions), such as VAT.[148]
As an example, UKERC explained that there had been resistance
by the Unites States for the initial proposal for VAT, on the
grounds that "a tax on [its] exports presented a trade barrier".[149]
However, academic evidence has suggested that a "move from
an origin to a destination basis for tax would have the effect
of changing [the] price [...] and consequently offered no competitive
advantage to Europe".[150]
This argumentthat consumption taxes do not act as a trade
barriercould then be extended to a border tariff adjustment,
or tax, on the carbon content of products as they pass into a
country.
82. EEF, the manufacturer's association noted
that the UK has no powers to apply taxes at borders relating to
a product's carbon content, as this is an EU prerogative.[151]
Ian Rodgers, the Director of UK Steel, argued that, in the absence
of a multilateral agreement where all the participants agree to
suspend their rights in the World Trade Organisation, "border
tax adjustments could lead to some serious trade disputes".[152]
However, the University of Leeds' Professor Barrett made us aware
of "Recent academic analysis or analysis by lawyers, [that]
would suggest that it is possible to introduce border carbon agreements
[
] there are environmental clauses [under WTO rules] where
such a tax could potentially be bought into play".[153]
Dr Richard Leese of the Minerals Products Association added that
"consumption-based accounting would give you the information
to judge whether border adjustment is possible. The possibility
of border adjustment mechanisms then gives you the leverage to
use in an international agreement".[154]
Guy Shrubsole of the Public Interest Research Centre suggested
to us, "the potential for integrating environmental standards
into bilateral trade deals [
] should be looked at in much
more detail".[155]
83. We recognise that the introduction
of border tariff adjustments, to account for the carbon embedded
in a product as it crosses into a country, is unlikely to be welcomed
by exporting countries, particular those whose economies are developing.
We recommend that the Government examine the challenges and opportunities
that border tariff adjustments present when considering ways to
limit consumption emissions and mitigate leakage risks. The Committee
on Climate Change has declared its willingness and availability
to undertake an investigation into consumption-based emissions,
including an exploration of border tariff adjustments.
128 Environmental Audit Committee, Carbon Budgets,
September 2011, HC 1080 p 17 Back
129
Ev w30 Back
130
Ev 46 Back
131
Ev 63 Back
132
Ev 63 Back
133
Ev w30 Back
134
Policy Exchange, Carbon Omissions-Consumption-based accounting
for international carbon emissions, October 2011, p 2 Back
135
Ev 81 Back
136
Q 9 Back
137
Author Affiliations: Center for International Climate and Environmental
Research-Oslo, N-0318 Oslo, Norway; Department for Sustainable
Engineering and the Department for the Economics of Climate Change,
Technical University Berlin, Germany; Science and Technology Policy
Institute, Washington, DC, USA; Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA; and Potsdam Institute
for Climate Impact Research, Germany. Back
138
Peters, G. et al., 'Growth in emission transfers via international
trade from 1990 to 2008', Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, vol. 108 no. 21, p 8903, March 2011 Back
139
Qq 9, 19 Back
140
Q 24 Back
141
Q 9 Back
142
Q 187 Back
143
Ev 46 Back
144
Ev w42 Back
145
Peters, G. et al., 'Growth in emission transfers via international
trade from 1990 to 2008', Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, vol. 108 no. 21, p 8903-8908, March 2011 Back
146
Ev w30 Back
147
Q 188 Back
148
Ev w30 Back
149
Ev w30 Back
150
Ev w30 Back
151
Ev 67 Back
152
Q 54 Back
153
Qq 23, 28 Back
154
Q 55 Back
155
Q 86 Back
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