5 Long term contracts|
86. In the current market, generation that is capital-intensive
with low running costs (such as low-carbon technologies like wind)
is exposed to the volatility of a wholesale market in which prices
are set by the marginal cost of gas and coal generation. The EMR
Consultation Document set out several options for low-carbon generation
revenue support: feed-in tariffs (FITs), supplier obligations
and regulated asset bases.
The proposals favoured a FIT with contract for difference (CfD).
Under the Government's proposals, CfD would be chosen for all
low-carbon technologies. This section examines the choice of CfDs
and whether it is the most appropriate option for all kinds of
87. Feed-in tariffs are long-term contracts between
Government and (in this case) a low-carbon generator, giving a
guaranteed tariff or price for a defined period. In some cases
this contract also gives a guaranteed buyer for the electricity.
There is already a FIT for small renewables generation, which
began in April 2010 under powers introduced in the Energy Act
2008. This applies to generation under 5MW. The EMR Consultation
proposes a FIT for large scale low-carbon generation. Long-term
contracts are an effective way to offer attractive returns and
reduce the risk of investment in low-carbon generation, which
should deliver the massive amounts of capital required.
88. There are three main forms of FIT as proposed
in the EMR consultation:
a) Premium FIT: would pay a fixed premium on
top of the variable wholesale electricity price. Generators therefore
receive a "bonus" in addition to their revenues from
selling electricity in the wholesale market. This type of FIT
is used in Spain;
b) Fixed FIT: would pay a fixed payment which
generators receive instead of revenues from selling electricity
in the market. This is the model of FIT used in Germany for onshore
wind, offshore wind, PV, biomass, hydro, landfill gas, sewage
gas and geothermal; and
c) FIT with a Contract for Difference (CfD):
is a long term contract with the agreed "strike" price
set at a fixed level, where payments are made to "top up"
the difference between the average market price and the agreed
price. The FIT payment would be made in addition to the generator's
revenues from selling electricity in the market. According to
DECC, the CfD could work both ways, so that generators would be
obliged to return money if electricity prices are higher than
the agreed tariff.
This model of FIT is used in the Netherlands for renewables (the
"sliding premium") and in Denmark for offshore wind.
89. A FIT with CfD is intended to maintain the efficiencies
of the price signal as generators will have an incentive to sell
their output whenever the market price is above the variable cost
of their plant, as they will keep any upsidein other words,
clever and efficient generation strategies will still allow companies
to make profits, maintaining the incentive for efficient generation.
A one-sided CfD would allow the holder to receive the shortfall
between the market and strike price, but would not be liable to
pay back any upside profit from selling at a higher market price.
90. FIT with CfD is the Government's preferred option,
but the Government felt that it was necessary to consult on an
alternative model. It considered a premium feed-in tariff as a
credible alternative that could enable the electricity sector
to meet the Government's decarbonisation and security of supply
91. Since 2008, the Netherlands has used a FIT very
similar to a FIT with CfD to incentivise renewable technologies
(the "sliding premium"). Generators have to sell their
electricity (either into the wholesale market or in bilateral
contracts) and then an energy agency pays them a top-up payment
(differentiated by technology) up to the tariff level. The tariff
is decided by the Government. Contracts are signed by the energy
agency for 15 years. The reference price is the average annual
spot market price. The top-up is paid out monthly to facilitate
cash flow for smaller generators. It is in effect a one-way CfD
in that if the electricity price goes above the tariff then the
generator keeps all the upside.
92. In Denmark a FIT for offshore wind has been in
operation since 2005, which is also very similar to a CfD model.
For major offshore wind farms the required support is set by means
of a tender procedure. The Danish Energy Authority has run four
auctions for three offshore wind sites (one was re-tendered).
The principal criterion determining allocation was the amount
of the feed-in price per kWh of electricity produced that applicants
requested in order to carry out the project.
93. In general, most witnesses to this inquiry were
supportive of CfDs, including the Big Six. The exception among
the Big Six was SSE. Ian Marchant (SSE) thought "that is
the wrong way to go, because we need a vibrant, liquid energy
market and CfDs go to the heart of that". Instead, he argued
for a premium FIT which, he believed, "is easier to doit
is less intrusive on the market and easier to remove when the
technology of CCS, nuclear and offshore wind can compete against
a carbon energy and capacity price".
94. Statoil favoured a premium FIT "as this
has most in common with the existing model, retains the exposure
for generators to the electricity market and is the easiest to
It went on to point out that different kinds of investors prefer
different kinds of risk profile and recommended that "investors
were given the choice between models (Premium Feed-inTariff or
Contract for Difference)".
Designing a UK FIT
95. One major difficulty with long-term contracts
is that there is no clear reference price against which the Government
should set the level of the subsidy. The size of the subsidy,
however, is vital to the success of the scheme: too low and not
enough low-carbon investment would be forthcoming; too high and
there would be substantial costs for consumers, because the extra
rents enjoyed by low-carbon generation would be passed on to electricity
96. According to DECC's Impact Assessment costs to
consumers would be dependent on the efficiency of the Government's
incentive setting. It found that a £5/MWh error in the level
of the subsidy could result in £4bn additional costs for
consumers by 2030.
97. The Government would benefit from a clear reference
price in the electricity wholesale market in setting the subsidy
level, but the lack of a clear reference price is a consequence
of the illiquid wholesale market.
International Power believed that a liquid market "will in
any case be needed to ensure a robust reference price for the
CfD FITs mechanism being proposed".
Andrew Wright (Ofgem) argued that a CfD arrangement relied crucially
on having a reliable reference price.
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF FEED-IN TARIFFS
FOR DIFFERENT LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES
98. It is possible to set the level of a Feed-in
Tariff differently for different kinds of low-carbon technology
in order to take into account different stages of development,
costs and financing challenges.
99. EDF energy suggested that "a single flat
payment is unlikely to provide sufficient returns to deliver all
of these technologies and that some renewable technologies in
particular will require higher payments until they become mature".
Dr David Kennedy (Committee on Climate Change) argued that "there
has to be some kind of banding mechanism, effectively".
The Renewable Energy Association pointed out the different requirements
of technologies at different stages of development, observing
that "the needs of established technologies are very different
from emerging technologies. The mechanism would need to
span innovative marine renewables, where devices are still being
] to mature renewables such as onshore wind".
100. We heard two main alternatives for setting the
subsidy level for FITs. The first option was for the level to
be set by Government. The second option was to use an auction
methodology. An auction would have the benefit of minimising costs
for consumers through competition and "market discipline",
allowing the market to discover the most efficient mixture of
low-carbon and renewable technologies.
101. Currently, support for low-carbon generation
is through the Renewables Obligation (RO), which obliges electricity
suppliers to source an increasing proportion of electricity from
renewable sources. The RO is structured in "bands",
with different levels of support for different technologies. These
levels have been set by government in consultation with companies.
Since April 2009, different technologies have been placed in bands
which are rewarded with different numbers of RO Certificates (ROCs)
per MWh according to their estimated electricity generating costs.
DECC employed consultants to advise on banding levels initially,
and the Department is now considering resetting the level of ROC
support every four years.
102. The Renewable Energy Association warned that
a government-set approach would expose developers to uncertainty
about how long support would last at a certain level.
Professor Helm pointed to the degree to which political lobbying
could influence this process and Good Energy argued that such
approaches suffer from a lack of transparency and "a lack
of understanding about the level of support given by the taxpayer",
which in turn "leads to debate about whether this support
103. Alternatively, a reverse-price auction or tendering
process could be used to set the levels of FIT support. In this
process, individual developers would bid against one another to
provide a certain volume of electricity at a certain level of
support, with contracts awarded to those that bid for the lowest
tariff. In theory, the use an auction mechanism delivers the lowest
cost electricity to the grid.
104. Some witnesses believed that auctioning removed
the risk of leaving too much to the judgement of the Government.
Professor Helm spoke of the dangers of an "interventionist"
way of setting subsidies, saying that it would mean "a glorified
banded ROC system" in which "the Government will pick
Such a system could be "wide open and vulnerable to picking
winners, picking technologies, political lobbying, rent capture,
] the climate change pork barrel".
We share this view and believe that it should not be Government
which has to predict the best mix of low-carbon generation technologies.
105. Eventually, it may be possible to create a long-term
signal through contracts that is technology neutral. Ideally,
EMR would create a level playing field for all kinds of low-carbon
generation, with the market taking the lead in the exact mix of
projects. Sara Vaughan (E.ON) explained that in a market-led situation,
as an investor, "we may be bringing forward an offshore wind
project; we may be bringing forward a biomass project; or we may
be bringing forward a nuclear project; and they will all be looking
at the same market regime. So the state is not making that decision".
106. However, we believe that auctions could be problematic
for some of the key technologies in the short term. There may
be few bidders willing to risk participating without a clear reference
price. Several witnesses expressed concern that auctions would
not provide the long-term price signals required for investments.
Simon Skillings told us that "the cost characteristics, the
timetable and the investment risks are all so different. I cannot
imagine what a technology-neutral auction would look like. It
is bound to favour one or the other".
The Renewable Energy Association warned that the Government must
not repeat mistakes made in the auction process for the Non-Fossil
Fuel Obligation (NFFO),
where "winners curse" meant that many of the contracts
awarded were not delivered.
The Association of Electricity Producers warned that "the
vagaries of a tender process do not necessarily ensure the required
outcomes are achieved. The government will need to be mindful
of the potential burdens that participating in an auction/tender
could present to generators, in particular smaller renewables
In particular, the high capital costs associated with some low-carbon
generation such as nuclear and CCS could pose a problem because
to "get a project to the point where you might enter it into
an auction, you are talking about investing several hundreds of
millions of pounds", which would pose a considerable risk
if developers were then unsuccessful in the auction and could
lead to an "empty room" with no willing bidders.
107. For these reasons, the Secretary of State appeared
to rule out the option of auctioning contracts in the short term.
108. The Committee recognises that different levels
of Feed-in Tariff ("banding") are required to support
technologies at different levels of maturity and with different
financing needs. In the short term, levels should based on technological
and economic considerations. This process must be transparent
and levels must be set for a defined period, with clear triggers
that would activate a review if levels need to be reassessed.
109. In its White Paper, the Government should
acknowledge the problems of relying on auctions to set Feed-in
Tariffs for most technologies in the short term, but it should
set out conditions under which it would shift to an auction-based
process in the future.
Different kinds of Feed-in Tariff
for different low-carbon technologies
110. As well as requiring different levels
of support through banding of Feed-in Tariffs, we heard that different
kinds of long-term contract may be appropriate for different
kinds of low-carbon technology. This section presents the evidence
that we heard suggesting that the CfD approach may not be the
most appropriate kind of FIT for all low-carbon generation alike.
111. In general, witnesses were supportive of FITs.
However, not everyone agreed with the Government that a FIT with
CfD was the most appropriate type of FIT for every kind of low-carbon
technology. Supporters of a CfD model included EDF, Intergen,
Scottish Power, Alstom, E.ON, Drax and the Welsh Power Group.
The reasons for support included:
- A CfD will retain exposure
to price fluctuations through participation in the wholesale market
(this would not be the case with a fixed FIT).
- It would avoid windfall profits and ensure that
excess revenue due to high market prices is returned to end customers.
- It was perceived to offer best value for money.
112. Those who preferred a Premium FIT (PFIT) included:
RES, Centrica, SSE, Statoil and International Power.
The main reason given for this preference was that a PFIT was
felt to be the option that was closest in nature to the existing
Renewables Obligation (RO). This means that only modest market
reforms would be required to transfer from an RO to PFIT, making
it the easiest to implement.
Ian Marchant (SSE) saw a pPFIT as easier to do: "it is less
intrusive on the market and easier to remove when the technology
of CCS, nuclear and offshore wind can compete against a carbon
energy and capacity price".
113. Chris Hunt (Riverstone) highlighted difficulties
with a PFIT. If fossil fuel prices were to rise significantly,
a PFIT would result in a windfall profit to low-carbon generators.
In his view, this made a PFIT a less attractive option.
114. There was also some support for the fixed FIT
proposal. Friends of the Earth argued that the consultation document
"may offer too negative opinion of the merits of a fixed
Energy supported either a PFIT or a fixed FIT:
DONG Energy has considerable experience of working
with the feed-in tariff mechanism in a wide range of other markets,
including Denmark, and believes that it can be implemented successfully
in the UK. It is essential however that any such mechanism should
be simple and straightforward and designed to ensure effective
capital funding for projects. A Premium or a Fixed feed-in tariff
would achieve these aims.
115. Different kinds of generation have different
financing and operational requirements and low-carbon generation
must not be viewed as a homogenous category. Simon Skillings (E3G)
told the Committee that "the CFD instrument [the Government]
describe is clearly not appropriate for all the technologies [...]
the technologies are all very different".
116. In particular, the CFD may not be the right
instrument to support wind generation. The best prices for electricity
will often be when the wind is not blowing because at these
times supply will be less and other resources will need to be
found to meet demand. Electricity from an unreliable source will
be worth less than electricity from sources whose output is more
dependable. Wind generators are therefore likely to receive less
than the average price in the electricity wholesale market. Wind
generators would have only limited ability to vary their output
to benefit from the sort of "market discipline" that
the Government wishes to encourage. Renewable Energy Systems told
us, for example, that CfD "does not benefit wind generators
as they would remain exposed to short term price risk. Wind generators
are likely to realise substantially less than the contract 'strike
price', yet this lower level of realisable revenues would be largely
RES argued that a premium FIT would be better for wind generators.
117. Juliet Davenport, CEO of Good Energy, also told
us that the CfD approach is unlikely to be suitable for small-scale
generation. She said that a CfD "will be very hard for small
generators to manage, and potentially the administration costs
will be significant".
Good Energy recommended that an expansion of the current FIT system
would be a better solution for some generators.
118. Statoil believed that "the single auction
approach overlooks the fundamentally different financing, operational
and investment characteristics of different technologies".
to Green Alliance, many investors may want mechanisms that reduce
their exposure to electricity price risk and are simpler to understand,
for example a standard FIT rather than a premium FIT.
This would mean paying a standard price for electricity from certain
technologies, rather than add the tariff as a premium onto a variable
119. The CfD approach may also present difficulties
for generation with carbon capture and storage (CCS). CCS presents
the opportunity to keep the price and flexibility benefits of
fossil fuel generation with lower carbon emissions, but the technology
is currently untested and expensive and is likely to require substantial
support. CCS presents different contractual challenges from other
low-carbon generation because it is flexible and also has very
high variable costs. A contract would need to provide for flexible
120. Electricity storage should also benefit from
a different kind of FIT. Swanburton, a specialist storage consultancy,
told us that "The use of feed-in-tariffs is often seen as
an inhibitor to storage, as the renewable producer claims an income
from selling into the network, and leaves the problem of management
of any surplus electricity to the system operator or central buying
A long-term contract may need to recognise the amount of energy
fed into the store, rather than the output because electricity
can be lost in the process. Alternatively, a FIT could remunerate
output at a different rate, providing an incentive for the storage
operator to increase efficiency.
121. The main argument for the Contract for Difference
is the Government's desire to achieve the investment certainty
offered by fixed prices while maintaining the efficiency of a
competitive market. However, this approach is not appropriate
for all kinds of low-carbon generation. Different kinds of low-carbon
generation are at very different stages of technological maturity,
with very different operational and financing requirements. Feed-In
Tariffs should recognise the unique characteristics of different
low-carbon technologies. Proper discussion of these possibilities
is a serious omission from the consultation.
122. The Government must recognise more clearly
the different financing requirements of low-carbon technologies
and investigate the possibility of different kinds of long-term
contract for different kinds of low-carbon technology. The Government
should consider Contract for Difference for nuclear, but it should
recognise that some technologies such as wind generation cannot
easily respond to market signals under a Contract for Difference
and may be exposed to lower than average prices. We also believe
that Carbon Capture and Storage and electricity storage should
benefit from Feed-in Tariff support, but that a Contract for Difference
may not be the best model. These technologies are likely to require
bespoke contracts. The White Paper should offer a flexible solution
to meet these different objectives.
FEED-IN TARIFFS AND NEW NUCLEAR
123. One of the main beneficiaries of the CFD approach
is likely to be the nuclear industry. In our inquiry on National
Policy Statements, we heard that the Government had identified
sites suitable for up to 16GW of new nuclear generation by 2025,
with the first new capacity coming online in 2018.
We recognised that building significant new nuclear in that timescale
would be extremely challenging and would require substantial support
from the Government.
124. The Coalition Agreement expressed support for
new nuclear power generation "provided that they are subject
to the normal planning process for major projects (under a new
National Planning Statement), and also provided that they receive
no public subsidy".
The Minister of State told us that the industry was keen to invest
in new plant.
125. The Secretary of State argued that a subsidy
for nuclear generation would be "something which is specific
to the industry". 
He observed that:
Obviously, nuclear will benefit from the general
framework which we have brought forward to encourage low carbon
electricity generation. That will be the carbon price floor. That
will be the EU emissions trading scheme. Anything else which is
of a general nature designed to encourage low carbon generation
will be available to nuclear.
126. Redpoint's analysis suggested that new nuclear
stations could be competitive without subsidy under Baseline assumptions
if future carbon prices rise to the levels assumed by Government.
However, they recognised that "the key issue is investors'
lack of confidence" that those prices will be reached. EMR
therefore rightly proposes to include nuclear in the system of
Feed-in Tariffs with Contracts for Difference.
127. WWF were "strongly of the view that a new
Feed-in Tariff scheme should not apply to new nuclear power stations
(which would appear to breach the pledge in the Coalition Agreement
not to provide any public subsidy to new nuclear power stations)".
Greenpeace pointed out that nuclear is a mature technology not
a developing one. They argued that "there is no case for
support in making it market ready".
Friends of the Earth agreed that "These incentives are only
appropriate to help newer technologies compete with existing players
in a system which currently heavily favours older technologies".
128. E3G thought "A UK floor price for carbon
is simply a new subsidy for existing nuclear power. It would be
an expensive addition to taxpayer or bill-payer costs and deliver
no new energy output".
In addition, nuclear generators already in operation could receive
windfall profits from the increased prices.
129. We recognise that the views of the Big Six on
the use of FIT with CFD for all low-carbon generation vary according
to their generation fleet and plans for development; in general,
those companies with substantial amounts of nuclear in their portfolios
favoured the combination of a FIT with CFD and carbon price support.
Those with a greater component of renewables or fossil fuel generation
and without a lot of nuclear did not favour the package. Ian Marchant,
CEO of SSE, believed that the package had been designed around
the requirements for new nuclear and warned that:
[...] part of the issue with EMR is that, although
we talk about high-level objectives of security of supply in energy,
it has actually been designed to get nuclear built. If you design
any energy system around nuclearanywhere in the world apart
from in Franceit is a recipe for disaster, because nuclear
is such a different technology. Don't get me wrong: I am not saying
that nuclear should not be built, but if you design your market
structures with that objective in mind, you get an awful lot of
unintended consequences on capacity, other investment and prices.
We should be much more honest. If subsidies are needed to get
the first few nuclear plants built, let's be clear and let's make
that happenlike we're doing with renewables and carbon
capturerather than designing a created market just to get
something to happen.
130. Renewable Energy Systems argued that the package
was very beneficial for new nuclear build, but that it was unsuitable
for encouraging renewable generation.
131. In September 2010, the Secretary of State told
the Committee that "the economics of nuclear are actually
very similar to the economics of renewables. The cost is effectively
all upfront and the marginal cost is virtually zero".
While we see the economic resemblance, we are not convinced
that the finance and support requirements are the same
for all forms of low-carbon generation. There are also important
differences in that nuclear power is predictable and its fuel
use is controllable and therefore might be considered more reliable
and preferable for consumers, while neither is the case for wind,
132. If it is the Government's policy objective
to develop large amounts of new nuclear generation, then it is
almost certain that it will require policy or financial support
that will amount to forms of subsidy. While a Contract for Difference
Feed-in Tariff may be the best option for nuclear generation,
it may not be the best for all low-carbon generation. The Government
must not go down the route of Contracts for Difference for all
low-carbon generation just because it does not feel able to differentiate
between nuclear energy and other low-carbon technologies. The
White Paper should address the advantages, risks and challenges
of promoting new nuclear generation head-on and honestly; it should
not distort the market merely to save political face about the
precise meaning of the Coalition Agreement for Government.
How will contracts be designed?
133. It is not clear from the EMR consultation whether
the Government intends to be the counterparty to contracts, or
whether it would delegate this function to Ofgem or to a completely
new institution. Ian Marchant of SSE said that he was concerned
"about putting the state in as the buyer [
] Let us
be clearthe CfD is a contract with the state, or the state
will create an energy agency".
Professor Helm argued the case for an expert institution:
In this architecture, you can call it what you like,
but it is a job for something like an agency, which is given a
very clear remit by DECC as to what the targets are that it has
to achieve, and a legal framework to the reformsI suspect
that that will be one of the many annual Energy Acts that we will
have going forward. It needs that framework and it needs a skilled
set of people who will not be rotated around. This needs expertise
and we have none of that within our existing framework.
134. The Secretary of State recognised that various
options are available. He told us that "One option is clearly
to go for a completely new institution, another would be to look
at existing institutions to try and fulfil that role". He
stressed that when new investors look at the contracts on offer
it would be important that "they know that they have a counterparty
that is utterly creditworthy and will respect the legal contract
that they have signed."
135. The White Paper should identify which institution
will be given power to create appropriate contracts and set this
up as quickly as possible. If this role is not taken on by Ofgem,
a shadow body should be set up in advance of legislation. Government
should concentrate on the powers of this institution rather than
the detail of the contracts and clarify its role, objectives,
composition and funding as soon as possible. The agency must be
totally independent and not susceptible to political influence.
96 DECC, Electricity Market Reform Consultation
Document, Cm 7983, December 2010, p 32 Back
DECC, Electricity Market Reform Consultation Document,
Cm 7983, December 2010, p 48 Back
DECC, Electricity Market Reform Consultation Document,
Cm 7983, December 2010, p 118 Back
Q 171 Back
Ev 137 (Statoil) Back
Ev 137 (Statoil) Back
DECC, Electricity Market Reform-options for ensuring electricity
security of supply and promoting investment in low-carbon generation,
Impact Assessment, p 5 Back
Ev w10 (CHPA), section 4; Ev 191 (EDF Energy); Q 171 [Mr de Rivaz] Back
Ev 153 (International Power), section 23 Back
Q 33 Back
Ev w10 (CHPA), section 16 Back
Ev 191 (EDF Energy), section 12 Back
Q 331 Back
Ev w17 (REA), section 3.13 Back
Q 23 [Mr Buchanan]; Q 68 [Professor Helm] Back
Ev w17 (REA), section 3.1 Back
Ev w17 (REA), section 3.8 Back
Ev 130 (Good Energy) Back
Ev 137 (Statoil) Back
Q 98 Back
The NFFO was the main support policy for the deployment of renewable
electricity generation between 1990 and 1998 and worked with competitive
Ev w17 (REA), Ev w19 (ESB International) Back
Ev w23 (AEP), section 9 Back
Q 179 [Ms Vaughan, Mr Sambhi, Mr Campbell, Mr Spence]; Q 224 [Ms
Q 394 Back
Ev 191 (EDF Energy), Ev w32 (InterGen UK), Ev 197 (ScottishPower),
Ev 202 (Alstom), Ev 143 (E.ON UK), Ev 147 (Drax Power), Ev w26
(Welsh Power Group) Back
Ev w32 (InterGen UK) Back
Ev 147 (Drax Power) Back
Ev w26 (Welsh Power Group) Back
EV W35 (RES), Ev 211 (Centrica), Ev 214 (SSE), Ev 137 (Statoil)
, Q 141 [Dr Riley] Back
Ev 211 (Centrica), Ev 137 (Statoil), Q 139 [Dr Edge], Q 141 [Dr
Q 171 Back
Q 184, Q 185 [Mr Hunt] Back
Ev 203 (Friends of the Earth) Back
Ev 158 (DONG Energy) Back
Q 98 Back
Ev w35 (RES), section 5b Back
Ev w35 (RES), section 6 Back
Q 118 Back
Ev 130 (Good Energy) Back
Ev 137 (Statoil) Back
Rachel Cary, The case for reform and the challenges ahead,
"Towards a brighter future", Green Alliance, November
2010, p 8 Back
Ev w4 (Swanbarton), section 21 Back
Ev w4 (Swanbarton) Back
Taken from the DECC website - information on the energy mix (nuclear)
The Coalition, Our programme for Government, May 2010,
p 16 Back
HC Deb, 1 December 2010, col 900 and Q 73; HC 648-i, Q 71 Back
HC 474-i, Wednesday 15 September 2010, Q 69 Back
HC 474-i, Wednesday 15 September 2010, Q 75 Back
Redpoint, Electricity Market Reform: Analysis of policy options,
December 2010, p 5 Back
Ev 162 (WWF-UK) Back
Ev 195 (Greenpeace) Back
Ev 203 (Friends of the Earth) Back
Ev 151 (E3G), para 4 Back
Q 174 Back
Ev w35 (RES), annex Back
Oral evidence taken before the Energy and Climate Change Committee
on 15 September 2010, HC 474-I, Q 30 Back
Q 175 Back
Q 84 Back
Q 402 Back