4 The Unified Patent Court: help or
hindrance?
Overview
57. The consensus among patent professionals
was that unified patent protection within Europe is desirable
in theory.[12] This is
because having one action and one decision to replace litigation
in several countries has obvious benefits, such as consistency
and reduced costs.[13]
58. However, the theme of the evidence which
the Committee received was that the current draft of the agreement
to establish the UPC is likely to worsen the status quo;[14]
a view not confined to the UK.[15]
At the root of this are concerns about the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice of the European Union, increased forum shopping
as a consequence of bifurcation being permitted in the UPC, increased
litigation costs, the quality of judges, and the effect on SMEs
(Small and Medium Enterprises), on the European Patent Convention,
on the UK's position as a hub for international patent litigation,
and on the UK's Patent County Court.
59. The evidence also demonstrated concern about
process. The drafting of the agreement was widely criticised for
being both rushed and opaque.
60. Only one submission of evidence favouring
parts of the current draft agreement was received,[16]
other than from the Government. A request to the Government to
point the Committee to evidence in favour of the UPC was unanswered.[17]
61. If the UPC goes ahead as in the current draft,
the UK faces a difficult decision about whether or not to join
in. Opting out risks marginalisation; opting in risks commitment
to a damaging scheme. When asked, however, expert witnesses expressed
a preference in favour of the UK joining the UPC, even in these
circumstances, in the absence of an alternative[18]¯to
be left out would be the worse option for UK business. However,
this was said in the hope that London would be secured as the
location for the Central Division, which would mitigate some of
the ill effects of the UPC whilst reaping the economic rewards
of hosting a large European institution.[19]
62. Overall, there is mystification as to why
the EU is pressing ahead in the face of such opposition. One theory,
offered by Timothy Roberts and supported by the other expert witnesses,
was as follows:
The only theory I can suggest to you is that
the EU needs a victory and this can be presented as a victory.
This is something they have been trying to do for 40 years.
They have almost got agreement on something. It is a very desirable
objective and it is being presented, outside the UK, as a victory,
as something that the EU can do. There is a need, as The Daily
Beast requested, "Please cable victories". That
is the motivation behind this.[20]
63. The Government agreed that there had been
attempts to rush the negotiation of the agreement.[21]
However, it emphasised that in its view the UPC is not a done
deal; "negotiations are ongoing and the Government will continue
to work hard to ensure that the interests of UK industry are protected
before we sign any final agreement".[22]
Jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice
64. Articles 6 to 8 of the proposed EU unitary
patent Regulation contain provisions on direct and indirect infringement
of patent rights. This means that EU law will govern this aspect
of substantive patent law. Baroness Wilcox conceded that there
was no published body of expert opinion supporting the inclusion
of Articles 6 to 8 in the unitary patent Regulation. However,
two arguments were put forward by the Government. Firstly, that
"the effect of the acte clair doctrine [...] would
potentially reduce the number of references to the ECJ".[23]
As Nicholas Fernandes explained, "the doctrine of acte
clair is a principle that, where provision is clear, it does
not need to be interpreted; therefore, no reference is required".[24]
He went on to say that "patent law [...] has been largely
untouched by European legislation, so the opportunities for reference
are less."[25]
65. One member of the patent professions, Professor
Dr Winfried Tilmann, agreed. He thought that the previous decisions
of patent courts would mean that "it will not be necessary
to start all over again in submitting all these questions to the
ECJ, because of the acte clair doctrine".[26]
66. However, Henry Carr QC said of this argument
that it "misunderstands the criteria for references to the
CJEU":
A reference must be made unless the interpretation
is acte clair. Acte clair only applies where a judge is
sure, not just how he/she would interpret the provision, but also
how it would be interpreted by all other Member States. This has
led to a large number of references in relation to the Trade Marks
Directive, and published expert opinion, including that of Sir
Robin Jacob, emphasises that this will be the case with Arts.
6-8.[27]
67. The second argument put forward by the Government
in favour of Articles 6 to 8 was that "the infringement set
out the very core of an IP right, and therefore it is crucial
that these provisions appear in the EU legislation establishing
the unitary patent". [28]
68. By contrast, the vast majority of experts
forecast unnecessary harm if references were able to be made to
the Court of Justice.[29]
There were two main concerns: delay and judges' lack of expertise.
69. Henry Carr QC described the difficulties
which currently result from delay:
I have appeared in several cases in the European
Court of Justice, largely because of the trademark system, which
is already subject to the European Court of Justice. We have
a trademark regulation, a trademark directive, so questions of
interpretation are referred to the European Court of Justice.
Let us say you are involved in a trademark case and a question
of interpretation arises; unless the UK Court is absolutely certain
what the answer is—not just here, but in all Member States—it
has to refer it. So your case then stops and it takes about two
years to get an answer from the ECJ and, of course, during that
time there are additional costs because the parties have to prepare
written observations, governments intervene, you go to a hearing
in the ECJ and you eventually get an answer. It then comes back
to the UK Court, who then tries to interpret the answer. There
has not just been extra delay and extra cost but in trademarks
it has been really difficult to interpret the answer. Then there
is a great debate about who has won and then you have to continue
with the case. It has not proved a system that intellectual property
lawyers throughout the world wish to expand and the problem with
the existing proposal is that it expands it into patents as well.[30]
70. CIPA also foresaw particular difficulties
for SMEs:
Such legal uncertainty can lead to more litigation
between parties trying to clarify their respective legal position.
It can also prevent parties from entering a market in which they
would be free otherwise to compete but for the uncertainty of
the legal position and the threat of litigation. Both outcomes
increase costs and can damage innovation and the functioning of
the market, especially for SMEs.[31]
71. Regarding judges' expertise, one member of
the patent professions, Professor Dr Winfried Tilmann, had no
concerns: "the ECJ has been very active in the field of trademark
law [...] generally speaking [...] practice is impressively good".[32]
72. However, many others had concerns about the
judges' lack of experience in patent law. Henry Carr QC emphasised
the problem, that "the quality of justice administered by
any court is dependent on the expertise of its judges".[33]
Therefore, the consequence of Articles 6 to 8 would be low quality
decisions at the highest instance.
73. Liz Coleman, on behalf of the Government,
agreed that the Court of Justice has "no specialist experience".[34]
Indeed, this was echoed by every other witness who gave evidence
on this topic.[35]
74. In particular, the undesirability of including
Articles 6 to 8 in the unitary patent Regulation was repeated
at a meeting of the Intellectual Property Judges Association on
28-29 October 2011. Twenty-seven judges were present, 24 of which
were from the EU. They unanimously resolved that:
They were against the proposed inclusion of Arts.6-8
of the current draft Regulation into the final Regulation and
that if they were included the new system would fail to achieve
the object of a better system of patent litigation in Europe.[36]
75. Strongest of all was the statement made by
Professor Sir Robin Jacob:
"There is no time for anything other than
plain speaking. I am fortunate enough to have had wide experience,
as barrister, judge and now academic, with the patent system from
all angles. I have many contacts amongst users and lawyers.
I know of no one in favour of involvement of the CJEU in patent
litigation. On the contrary all users, lawyers and judges are
unanimously against it."[37]
76. Neil Feinson referred to the Government's
"desire for [Articles 6 to 8] to be removed from there to
limit the opportunity for cases to go on reference to the ECJ",[38]
as did Baroness Wilcox.[39]
Nevertheless, Baroness Wilcox was clear that "among our negotiating
partners and within the EU institutions there has been insufficient
support to change the text by deleting these articles from the
regulation."[40]
If they were not removed, she explained "we are told by our
witnesses that they still think we should go forward".[41]
The numbers of concerns expressed by the patent profession suggest
that this instruction is a last resort.
CONCLUSIONS
77. With the exception of Professor Tilmann,[42]
the patent professionals who submitted evidence were opposed to
the Court of Justice being given jurisdiction over this, or any,
aspect of substantive patent law. This was because:
- Articles 118 TFEU does not
require the Court of Justice to have jurisdiction over Articles
6 to 8 of the proposed Regulation: Article 3(2) is sufficient
to establish an intellectual property right proving uniform protection;
- it is just as important to unitary effect that
provisions concerning scope of protection and validity are uniform
as that provisions concerning infringement are uniform; yet Articles
6 to 8 do not contain provisions on scope of protection or validity;
- this is likely to lead to the development of
EU jurisprudence in one area of substantive patent law, causing
unhelpful and unnecessary asymmetry;
- the Court of Justice does not have the necessary
expertise in patent litigation;
- the preliminary reference procedure before the
Court of Justice is too slow: in patent litigation, which concerns
claims of continuing economic harm, commercial necessity and fairness
require a court to come to a final decision as soon as possible;
- the preliminary reference procedure will add
considerable or prohibitive costs for litigants;
- which would defeat the whole purpose of having
a specialist patent court;
- there are likely to be many references to the
Court of Justice arising from its jurisdiction over Articles 6
to 8.
78. Set against these are the arguments made
by the Government, the Commission, and Professor Tilmann, namely
that:
- Articles 6 to 8 are necessary
to establish the intellectual property rights contained in Article
118 TFEU (a point made by all three);
- in addition, EU intellectual property rights
are to be superimposed on national rights rather than derived
from harmonizing national laws (the Commission);
- it is inevitable that the Court of Justice should
have ultimate jurisdiction over Articles 6 to 8, as they are provisions
of secondary EU law (all three);
- however, references to the Court of Justice will
be rare because of the doctrine of acte clair (the Government,
Professor Tilmann).
79. It is plain, in our view, that the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice over Articles 6 to 8 leads to anomalous
consequences-on
what grounds can the infringement of a patent ever be considered
more important than its validity as a matter of EU law?-and
highly undesirable consequences-decisions
by non-specialist judges, added delay and costs. To say that the
doctrine of acte clair will limit the number of references
made to the Court of Justice appears to be wishful thinking rather
than evidence-based: the case law of the Court in relation to
trade marks, design and copyright is a case in point.
80. We agree with those who
so strongly oppose the inclusion of Articles 6 to 8 in the unified
patent Regulation. There is, however, in our opinion an inevitability
to their inclusion. Whilst the arguments of Professors Kraßer
and Jacob strike us as right as a matter of patent law, the counter-arguments
of the Commission on what is required to implement Article 118
TFEU seem to reflect the firm views of the EU institutions, including
the Court of Justice, as a matter of EU law. This calls into question
whether incorporating a unitary patent regime within the EU will
ever be practicable.
Separation of infringement and
validity—bifurcation
81. Henry Carr QC explained the meaning of bifurcation
in his written evidence:
In an action for infringement of a patent, the
validity of a patent may be challenged, for example on the basis
that it lacks novelty or contains no inventive step. Invalidity
is a defence to an action for infringement.
In the UK, validity and infringement are normally
tried together. However, in Germany, they are separated, with
the question of infringement being decided first. This is known
as "bifurcation".[43]
82. The current draft UPC agreement gives discretion
to divisions of the UPC as to whether or not to separate trials
of infringement and validity (i.e. whether or not to bifurcate).
83. If a case is bifurcated, the local and regional
divisions will deal with infringement cases and the Central Division
will deal with validity.[44]
The Central Division will use the language of the patent (English,
French or German), whereas regional and local divisions will use
the local language.[45]
Dr Gassauer-Fleissner did "not see any reason why it should
not work, because in particular Germany has a long tradition in
excellent patent litigation. It is one of the leading countries
in this respect."[46]
84. However, no UK-based experts favoured bifurcation
and most voiced their opposition.[47]
The three main concerns raised were forum shopping, the effects
on SMEs and fairness.
85. Liz Coleman stated that "bifurcation
is only an option for a panel, so we do not expect
it to happen in every case".[48]
However Henry Carr QC stated in his oral evidence that:
[I]f Germany generally bifurcates and the UK
doesn't, then as a patentee—patent holder—you will
start your case in Germany because, if you think it through, you
want to win and you have got more chance of winning and getting
your injunction if validity is not being considered.[49]
86. Therefore the impression was that, if bifurcation
is permitted, patentees are likely to choose courts that bifurcate
because this gives them a better chance of winning. This was described
as forum shopping: choosing a particular court because the desired
result is more likely there. Therefore, bifurcation would be commonly
chosen by patentees.
87. Henry Carr QC thought there would be further
detriment to SMEs:
[T]he practical problems of bifurcation for a
company are—say that you are a small company; you trade
on the internet. You can be sued anywhere and an injunction will
apply across the whole of Europe. You are sued in wherever—Greece,
an injunction is granted on the basis that you fall within the
claims of the patent and three and a half years later the Central
Division says, "Oh, by the way, that patent was invalid",
at which point you are out of business. It is a real, practical
problem.[50]
88. CIPA viewed the practice as unfair:
[I]t is quite unfair to the party accused of
infringement. If the patent is invalid, it cannot be infringed.
The infringement trial (in Germany) is faster than the validity
trial. Infringement may be found (and the "infringer"
required to cease operations and pay damages) well before the
patent is proved to be invalid in the validity trial. An even
stronger objection is that the patentee can put a different case
in the two trials [...] Trying validity and infringement together
is intrinsically fairer because the patentee must then argue only
for one consistent meaning.[51]
89. However, Liz Coleman, on behalf of the Government,
stated that:
One of the ways that we hope to mitigate [...]
would be to address the timing issue, so that the two arms of
the case should come together in timing; you should not be able
to have a decision on infringement without the decision on validity
being speeded up so that the two come together. We are hoping
that can be addressed through the rules of procedure.[52]
90. Neil Feinson went on to say that "before
we sign on the dotted line, we need to know what the rules of
procedure are going to be, because they are so important".[53]
Baroness Wilcox, however, was clear that "we are negotiating
at the moment [...] There is no line in the sand".
91. Henry Carr QC was concerned that "the
agreement will be forced through before procedural rules have
been agreed".[54]
CIPA were also concerned that "the danger from bifurcation
is grossly underestimated".[55]
FORUM SHOPPING
92. Witnesses pointed out that forum shopping
could arise from reasons other than bifurcation. Dr Gassauer-Fleissner,
for example, said:
I think the choice of the Court to go to will
not, in my view, depend on the bifurcation issue. It may depend
on the question of whether I want to go to an experienced division
or not. I see this as different from the bifurcation issue.[56]
93. The benefits of forum shopping were outlined
by Vicki Salmon:
My personal view is that forum shopping is a
good thing at some levels, as it produces competition between
Courts. One of the things that we have had in this country has
been competition between the High Court and the Patents County
Court, which has led to each of them improving their procedures.[57]
94. This was echoed by Liz Coleman[58]
and Baroness Wilcox: "Genuine competition on a fair basis
can lead to efficiency and improvements".[59]
95. However, Henry Carr QC drew a distinction
between choosing the most qualified court and choosing a court
where one is more likely to get the result one wants:
[U]nder this proposal you say, "Okay, I
can choose where I am going to sue. I am not going to sue in
the UK or perhaps Holland, where I am going to get a judge who
really knows." I do not want to be too offensive about a
country: "I am going to sue in Bulgaria this time".
That is real forum shopping and I get my injunction for everywhere.[60]
96. Baroness Wilcox agreed that she "would
be concerned about users shopping around for the right decision".[61]
97. However, she stated that "the whole
idea of us wanting to get the court right is that, wherever, therefore,
the court is sitting in any of those countries, they will be playing
by the same rules. This is the whole idea".[62]
When asked to respond to concerns that courts across Europe do
not operate according to the same standards, Baroness Wilcox replied:
"Yes I would agree, of course, that the systems are all different.
I would agree with all of this, but here is an opportunity for
us to see if we can improve things for ourselves within the European
Community".[63]
98. Despite Baroness Wilcox's optimism, the sense
was that forum-shopping would be difficult to avoid as it is already
happening in practice. As Dr Gassauer-Fleissner said:
I think this may definitely lead to forum shopping
for obvious reasons [...] There are many scenarios typical for
each case and depending on the situation you find yourself in
you may want to go to a Court that is perhaps more friendly to
infringers or that is more friendly to invalidate patents. This
is what is happening now even within countries like Germany.[64]
99. He also acknowledged that deciding the best
country in which to bring a claim would then become one of the
first issues to consider when advising a patentee.[65]
100. CIPA anticipated particular problems for
SMEs if forum-shopping becomes common:
This will be particularly inconvenient for small
companies from other countries, who will have extra expense in
dealing with overseas proceedings not in their own language. They
may be able to get the suit transferred from the local German
division of the European Patents Court to the Central Court, so
that infringement and validity can be tried together—but
arranging the transfer will itself cause added trouble and expense.
A cheaper alternative may be to concede the case unargued. This
is a discouraging outlook for small companies.[66]
CONCLUSIONS
101. The proposed UPC has discretion to bifurcate
in any particular case, with a requirement that the Central Division
will hear infringement and validity arguments at the same time.
But there is no guidance as to how that discretion should be exercised.
UK patent professionals are particularly concerned about this.
They say that patentees will be advised to file their infringement
suits in the local division of the UPC in Germany wherever possible,
for the obvious reason that defendants will not be able to raise
the validity of the patent as a defence. If the German local division
finds in favour of the patentee, the judgment will be valid throughout
the EU (a national court's decision is limited to national jurisdictions).
This means an increase in forum-shopping and that Germany is likely
further to dominate the market in patent litigation.
102. It will also be particularly inconvenient
for small companies, which will have extra expense in dealing
with overseas proceedings not in their own language. They may
be able to get the suit transferred from the local German division
of the UPC to the Central Division, so that infringement and validity
can be considered together, but arranging the transfer will itself
cause added trouble and expense.
103. We recognise that a patent
court which represents the traditions of 25 EU Member States,
including Germany and Austria, will have to allow for bifurcation,
but the probable consequences of this appear to us to be so grave,
for the UK in particular, as to question the validity of a unified
patent court in the EU in the first place.
Absence of suitable judges
104. Baroness Wilcox expressed confidence in
finding suitable judges:
Besides our own expert judges, there are already
150 patent judges in the German federal court, and states where
there is little patent experience are keen to develop that expertise.
All the participating Member States are committed to beginning
training judges as soon as the court Agreement is signed. This
would ensure that enough suitably qualified and experienced judges
would be able to start work as soon as the new system comes in
to force.[67]
105. She also anticipated sufficient time to
train judges because:
The Unified [Patent] Court should not lead to
an increase in patent cases in Europe. [...] It will be the reverse,
in fact, as multiple litigation is replaced by a single European
act. A proportion of the existing expert patent judges in the
major jurisdictions will therefore become available for work for
the Unified Court as the caseload of the Court grows. It will
not reach capacity for some years, and training for additional
judges is already planned to start as soon as the court is agreed.[68]
106. However, the feeling among the patent profession
was that the draft agreement was unrealistic. Henry Carr QC:
Article 10(1) of the draft agreement requires
that judges of the Unified Patent Court shall "ensure the
highest standards of competence and proven experience in the field
of patent litigation". Pursuant to Article 6, each panel
must have a multinational composition. The Commission estimates
that by 2022, when the transitional period ends, 101 full time
and 45 part time judges will be required.
Patent expertise varies greatly between Member
States. In some countries, such as the UK, Germany and the Netherlands,
there are many patent cases. In others, such as the Eastern European
countries, there are very few.
Therefore the requirement for multinational panels
of judges possessing the highest standards of competence in patent
litigation is a pipe dream. The quality of justice administered
by any court is dependent on the expertise of its judges. It will
be impossible to train such a large number of judges, who do not
have the relevant experience, to an acceptable standard.[69]
107. When asked about the likelihood of finding
suitably qualified judges for the UPC divisions, Dr Gassauer-Fleissner
agreed; "This indeed will be a problem because it is true
that the number of patent infringement cases is very different
in the various countries".[70]
108. There were two consequences that alarmed
the witnesses. The first was uncertainty about funding, as Henry
Carr QC described:
[W]ho is going to fund it all? Who is going
to fund, for example, the training of these vast numbers of judges,
all of whom are supposed to be patent experts, from Member States
that have no patent expertise and have hardly ever heard a patent
case?[71]
109. The second, as Vicki Salmon explained, was
the resulting difficulties in administering justice within the
UPC framework:
[I]f you have an incredibly valuable pharmaceutical
patent you are quite worried about a non-expert judge deciding
to revoke that in a territory that is not very familiar with patents,
and your protection across the whole of Europe has gone until
you can get it put back through the appeal process.[72]
110. The SME Innovation Alliance felt that there
was already an absence of suitable judges:
A patent [...] must be written so that it can
be understood by a "person of ordinary skill in the art"
(POSITA) [...] a patent is going to be incomprehensible to someone
who is not a POSITA. This latter category includes judges. [...]
Binding decisions on infringement should be made by a panel of
appointed experts in the field of technology in question.
In order to obtain grant, patents have been examined
and approved by technically qualified patent examiners (who represent
the authority's official POSITA).
If all of a granted patent is open to challenge
then patent examiners are redundant. If their work is unsatisfactory,
then address that. Instead SMEs have to assume responsibility
and pay with their business when opponents challenge a granted
patent—the cost of a challenge usually being sufficient
to sink the SME or, at minimum, its patent.
Most challenges attempt to ascribe different
meanings to words in the patent that the patent examiner had to
have used e.g. "prior art", deficient specification.
Patent examiners do not appear in court, which seems an obvious
failing as it is their decisions that are challenged, thus making
this system open to a great deal of abuse. Anything relevant will,
of course, have already been examined by the patent examiner in
order to allow grant or reject the patent application so such
challenges should not be allowed.[73]
CONCLUSIONS
111. It is important to keep in mind what is
required of a good patent judge, described by the Intellectual
Property Lawyers' Association as follows:
Patent law comprises a series of concepts which
are unfamiliar to most lawyers (and judges) who have not made
a special study. Furthermore, decisions in patent cases require
the application of the law to scientific facts in areas of technology
with which the judges are unfamiliar. A good patent judge accordingly
requires knowledge of patent law and experience of its application,
together with a willingness to engage with and understand unfamiliar
technologies. Judges who do not have these characteristics will
find it difficult to give decisions which are fair and which will
be respected by the litigants.[74]
112. Patent expertise varies greatly between
Member States. In some countries, such as the UK, Germany and
the Netherlands, there are many patent cases. In others, such
as the Eastern European countries, there are very few.
113. There is an irony to the fact that the ultimate
jurisdiction for infringement of the unitary patent will lie with
a non-specialist court, as EPLAW points out:
A fundamental objective of the project is to
avoid decisions by inexperienced judges, particularly in courts
of first instance, by centralizing patent cases before specialized
courts and judges. The proposal as it stands aggravates the deficiency
of the current system by turning the situation upside down since
the CJEU, as a court of appeal for infringement of unitary patents,
will be far from specialized. In any event, much effort is intended
to be made to secure experience in the local divisions and in
creating a central division and a court of appeal which are structured
and designed specifically to meet the particular challenges of
patent law. However, on questions of infringement of the unitary
patent under articles 6 - 8 the final say will now lie with the
CJEU which completely lacks all the characteristics and features
commonly accepted as requirements for a court that can render
quality decisions and which will not be restructured to meet those
characteristics and features. Further, the judges there will not
have to go through the selection and training process that will
be required for judges at the specialized patent courts.[75]
114. The requirement for multinational
panels of judges possessing the highest standards of competence
in patent litigation is unrealistic. The quality of justice administered
by any court is dependent on the expertise of its judges. Several
of the witnesses, such as Henry Carr QC, conclude that it will
be impossible to train such a large number of judges, who do not
have the relevant experience, to an acceptable standard. We have
little reason to prefer the assurances of the Government to the
contrary over the experienced views of patent lawyers.
Costs of litigation and effect
on SMEs
115. Baroness Wilcox acknowledged that she "cannot
give a definitive view of the costs and benefits, at least in
monetary terms, as fees for the patent and the court are still
to be decided."
116. This was of concern to the patent profession.[76]
As Dr Gassauer-Fleissner said:
Nobody knows what this is going to cost. On
the one hand, currently, at least in my country, even the Government
does not know what it would cost because there are still disputes
about where the local divisions would be and whether each country
will have a local division. Secondly, nobody knows what the court
fee will be. Nobody knows what costs can be reimbursed or asked
to be reimbursed by the successful party.[77]
117. As a result, although witnesses approved
of the Minister's intention to reduce costs,[78]
doubts remained over whether the proposed UPC was realistic. CIPA
was sceptical:
We have seen no reliable estimates for renewal
fees or of litigation. Nevertheless it is claimed that the new
system will be considerably cheaper, to the particular advantage
of smaller companies (SMEs). However, this claim is based on doubtful
assumptions.[79]
118. Indeed, the patent profession was overwhelmingly
of the opinion that the current draft of the UPC Agreement would
increase litigation costs. The first concern was the overall costs
of the UPC in comparison to the UK's current court system. As
Dr Gassauer-Fleissner explained:
[T]he cost of patent litigation is very different
in the various countries and the Member States of the European
Union. I would go as far as saying there is a ratio of one to
10 from the cheapest country to the most expensive country. From
most of the civil law countries' points of view the new system
would mean a significant increase in costs.[80]
119. Henry Carr QC agreed that the UPC structure
would be more expensive for the UK:
The current proposal is to have a Central Division,
the location of which is yet to be determined, as well as Local
Divisions in different Member States. A Regional Division may
also be set up for two or more States upon their request. Each
panel of each Division will have three judges.
This complex structure is likely to be far more
costly and burdensome for SMEs than the existing system in the
UK.[81]
120. Baroness Wilcox stated that "at the
forefront of our mind is growth for our country and for our people
in our country to have the very best way of proceeding in the
world, particularly within the European Community [sic]".[82]
121. The patent profession's second concern was
that costs would increase for SMEs. Again, there were concerns
that predicted cost savings were unrealistic.
122. In support of the savings to SMEs, Baroness
Wilcox focussed on the relative costs of securing patents in 25
Member States, "we need SMEs in particular to be able to
obtain a single patent covering 25 countries at an affordable
cost. That is the whole idea."[83]
However, CIPA thought that very few SMEs actually require protection
in all 25 States and so cost savings would not be as great. In
support, they quoted statistics estimating that 2% of patents
are annually validated in all 27 EU Member States whereas 40%
are validated in only the five largest EU markets.[84]
CIPA predicted that, as a result, the UPC's lack of flexibility
would be detrimental for SMEs:
If the patentee needs to economise, with a selection
of countries he can abandon the less vital rights, and keep the
others: with the unitary patent, the only choice is to pay in
full or lose all rights.[85]
123. Dr Gassauer-Fleissner summed up the harm
he envisaged for SMEs:
Creating an invention has two sides. One is
getting the patent and the other is enforcing the patent. You
are applying for a patent to get the patent and to enforce it
and if enforcement is getting too expensive, in particular for
SMEs, your patent has less value because many of those will not
be able to afford it.[86]
124. Henry Carr QC set out the expectations if
the current draft UPC Agreement proceeds and causes increased
costs:
There is a real fear in some quarters that some
SMEs will fold because they are unable to get themselves properly
represented in a distant European division and/or, if subject
to a Europe-wide injunction from a remote court in a bifurcated
system on their main product line, will simply not have the funds
(without a product to sell) to enable them to establish that the
patent is in fact invalid within a reasonable time. That would
amount to a denial of justice. I am not persuaded that this concern
has been taken on board.
These concerns are not just shared by the professions
and the judiciary. They have also been expressed by industry.
For example, on 16 December 2011 the CBI and IP Federation wrote
to Baroness Wilcox describing the current proposals as "deeply
flawed" and that they would, if accepted create a patent
system worse than at present. The letter was endorsed, inter
alia, by the Bioindustry Association. There is anecdotal
evidence that substantial research-based undertakings are so concerned
that they have started to file national instead of European
patents, in an attempt to avoid the system altogether.[87]
125. These concerns were echoed emphatically
by the SME Innovation Alliance. They noted that the negotiations
were making "a huge assumption which is that patent disputes
should be tried in a court"[88]
and asked "why other, far more accurate and reliable approaches
such as technical binding arbitration are not being considered
given this important opportunity".[89]
126. They also felt that costs for SMEs were
prohibitive:
All these processes rack up enormous costs, and
we do not refer here to only legal costs and fees but those borne
by the SME itself. It has to pay for its management and staff
to travel, stay in accommodation and be diverted away from their
business [...] [N]o SME can actually commence a case because of
the high barrier of these different costs.[90]
127. The SME Innovation Alliance harboured grave
concerns for the future of UK businesses, because "no serious
growth can result from such a system in which only corporate patents
can be enforced".
VALIDITY OF THE EU IMPACT ASSESSMENT
128. Vicki Salmon of CIPA expressed concerns
about the EU's impact assessment being "out of date"
because:
[U]p until the bringing in of the enhanced cooperation,
the EU was going to be heavily involved in the Court and was therefore
going to provide a lot of funding from central resources for the
divisions of the Court and for the training of the judges. With
the change of that, following the enhanced cooperation, the EU
funding was then not going to be available anymore.[91]
129. Liz Coleman, on behalf of the Government,
did not think that the subsequent lack of EU funding would present
a problem:
In the Government, we have always taken the view
that the court should be self-funding from user fees, so we thought
it was a perfectly acceptable way forward to go with Member States'
funding rather than it coming from the EU budget, which we contribute
to anyway. The funding mechanism, then, as far as the UK is concerned,
does not make a lot of difference in terms of how the money actually
gets there.[92]
130. Henry Carr QC stated that the EU's impact
assessment was, "extremely poor and extremely uncertain because
they are based on all sorts of assumptions about how many cases
are going to happen".[93]
131. In addition, he thought it was "unclear
whether any impact assessment has been done by the EU authorities
of the effect of requiring the CJEU to determine questions of
infringement when it cannot determine questions of validity".[94]
132. Overall, the patent professions seemed to
reach a consensus, voiced by Vicki Salmon, that "we need
a new assessment as to what the costs would be, what the court
fees are going to be and how that is going to be funded".[95]
CONCLUSIONS
133. This complex structure of the UPC is likely
to be far more costly and burdensome for SMEs than the existing
system in the UK. A UK SME engaged in cross-border trade may
also be required to defend itself against a pan-European injunction
for patent infringement in the language of the local division
chosen by the patentee.
134. How the UPC will be funded is highly speculative.
There are no reliable estimates for litigation costs, but it is
clear that a panel of three judges will cost more than a single
judge. CIPA comments:
We have seen no reliable estimates for renewal
fees or of litigation. Nevertheless it is claimed that the new
system will be considerably cheaper, to the particular advantage
of smaller companies (SMEs). However, this claim is based on
doubtful assumptions. Comparisons are made between the costs
of obtaining protection by 25 separate national patents via the
EPO route with the cost of a unitary patent. This shows the unitary
patent to considerable advantage—it could be much cheaper.
But whether an SME necessarily needs protection in 25 EU countries
is not considered. No inventions are ever protected in all countries
where patents can be obtained. The cost of rights obtained is
roughly proportional to the number of countries in which patents
are sought. The additional value of extra rights falls rapidly.
An SME with a significant invention will rarely be well advised
to file in all countries of the European Union. It is often a
better use of limited funds to file only in a few of the larger
countries of the EU, those in which competition is likely to be
most important.[96]
135. Despite Baroness Wilcox's
insistence that "there is a very strong commitment from all
those involved in negotiations that the patent and court system
should be affordable for SMEs"[97]
and "you can be sure that the one thing the Department for
Business is not going to be doing is wanting to make small and
medium-sized businesses disadvantaged",[98]
the patent professions remain unconvinced. As CIPA stated, "the
statement is strong on hopes and weak on certainties [...] there
are too many opportunities for things to go wrong".[99]
We share the concerns expressed by the professions that the UPC
will be prohibitively expensive, and also take the view that the
EU impact assessment needs to be urgently revisited.
Exclusivity and transitional
provisions
136. The current draft UPC Agreement gives the
UPC exclusive jurisdiction for all infringement and validity litigation
concerning both unitary patents and national patents granted by
the EPO (European Patent Office). A seven-year transition period
is envisaged, during which patents granted by the EPO will not
have to be litigated in the UPC.
137. Regarding the transition period, the Minister
has stated that "a review will be carried out five years
after the entry into force of the Agreement, with the possibility
of prolonging the period by up to another seven years".[100]
Liz Coleman described this as "already getting quite long".[101]
However, EPLAW did not consider this to be long enough:
Disputes about patent infringement very often
arise towards the end of the 20 year patent protection period.
Accordingly, it will only be possible to evaluate the viability
of any new system, and its acceptance by new users, after more
than seven years.[102]
138. CIPA felt that a review was not sufficient:
"If the system proves not to work, we have no redress. A
"review" alone is not enough (reviews rarely changed
things much). Instead, the review should provide member countries
the opportunity to change or leave the system".[103]
139. Regarding exclusive jurisdiction, Henry
Carr QC's inclination was that patentees would try and avoid the
UPC.[104] CIPA also
advised that, "Such uncertainty as to the quality of the
court and system may well mean that many companies will choose
to pursue litigation through the national route for many patents
in order to avoid the new court".
140. In his oral evidence, Timothy Roberts stated
that; "the European Patent Office, the new system introduced
in 1978, has really been a remarkable success"[105].
The resulting worry expressed by CIPA in written evidence was
that "if the new system doesn't work, it could be severely
damaged, because in order to avoid that system, inventors will
have to bypass the EPO".[106]
141. Henry Carr QC also thought that a problem,
even if inventors choose to opt out of the UPC, is that "they
have no choice when they are defendants".[107]
142. With reference to SMEs, Timothy Roberts
was troubled by the effect of exclusivity on the means of enforcing
patents:
We now have the Patents County Court, in which
costs are capped and damages are limited to £500,000, and
you have a special procedure. We have a new judge who simplifies
the procedure and speeds it up. [...] Now, under the proposed
new system, the exclusive right of the new Court will apply not
merely to unitary patents but also to the European patents, which
everybody here takes more or less as a routine. [...] so the
exclusivity right of the new Court will remove from SMEs the opportunity
to enforce their European patents quickly and economically.[108]
143. Therefore, CIPA recommended that "we
need to know the track record of the European Patents Court over
at least a decade before any such exclusivity starts, and then
the compulsion should only relate to applications filed after
the end of that transition period and not to all then pending
applications and granted patents."[109]
144. Vicki Salmon thought the UPC should firstly,
"show that it is a success and then people will not want
to use the national systems".[110]
145. By contrast, Liz Coleman explained that
"exclusive jurisdiction is something that the court will
need, because otherwise we will end up with conflicting decisions
between the Unified Patent Court and the national court in relation
to, certainly, the bundle patent in due course".[111]
146. When asked why the UPC was being given exclusive
jurisdiction regardless of the expected problems, Vicki Salmon
said "There seems to be a move, particularly from within
the Commission, that the aim is to have a unitary Court and therefore
everything should go to it and if it is in competition with other
Courts it would not get any business."[112]
Timothy Roberts also suggested that "they would not make
it compulsory unless it was necessary to make it compulsory".[113]
CONCLUSIONS
147. The overall sense of the witnesses' evidence
was that the UPC was being given a monopoly.
148. The draft agreement gives the UPC exclusive
jurisdiction for all infringement and validity litigation both
on unitary patents and on national patents granted by the EPO.
The transitional period of seven years after which European patents
fall under the jurisdiction of the UPC is, in our view, too short.
The fact that a review will be carried out to see whether a further
seven-year transitional period is required is not a guarantee
that the transitional period will be extended. The evidence we
received stated that disputes about patent infringement very often
arise towards the end of the 20-year protection period. Seven
years is therefore a short period within which to assess the viability
of the UPC.
149. In our view, the exclusivity of the UPC
will be a problem if the UPC, as predicted, turns out to be disadvantageous
to patentees and so is avoided by them. This is because it will
stop patentees from using European Patents under the EPO, which
after seven years fall under the jurisdiction of the UPC. According
to CIPA, the EPO is considered to have been a success:
The EPO has been a remarkable success, without
coercion. As an optional new system, competing with national
patents, it has won the trust of users (who retain the opportunity
to file for patents nationally). It is now a cornerstone of the
European patent regime. But if the new Court system doesn't work,
it could be severely damaged, because in order to avoid that system,
inventors will have to bypass the EPO.
The uncertainties are numerous. No one knows
yet how the European Patents Court will function or what it will
cost. Whilst it is expected to be cheaper than litigating the
same patent in three or four different EU member states, it is
unlikely to be cheaper than litigation in one member state only.
Will cases take longer than they do at present? We don't yet
know the Court rules, which will be a key determinant of quality.
Such uncertainty as to the quality of the court and system may
well mean that many companies will choose to pursue litigation
through the national route for many patents in order to avoid
the new court.[114]
150. The UK Patents County Court (PCC) has procedures
and a costs regime specifically designed for SMEs and is currently
working well. After the transitional period, the current proposal
gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Unified Patents Court, even
in respect of existing European Patents, and so will exclude the
PCC.
151. Some experts therefore recommend that the
system of European patents should be allowed to continue in parallel
with the UPC, whose jurisdiction would become non-exclusive.[115]
152. We conclude that the UPC
should not be given a monopoly over both unitary and European
patents until its capabilities have been proved.
Location of the Central Division
153. In addition to the UK's bid to host the
Central Division, Baroness Wilcox informed the Committee that
"Germany, France and the Netherlands have also made similar
bids".[116] She
told us that "Securing the Central Division for London is
still an important priority for the United Kingdom",[117]
however she warned the Committee that "negotiations are still
ongoing";[118]
the situation remains unresolved.
154. All of the patent professions based in the
UK agreed and wanted the UK to host the Central Division.[119]
They were motivated by the UK's expertise in patent litigation,
the absence of other EU institutions in the UK and the economic
benefits.
155. The City of London Corporation stated that
"it is important that the Central Division is located in
a city with global commercial reach."[120]
It went on to cite evidence that, in 2009, "net exports of
legal services from the U.K. amounted to some £2.5 billion"
and, in 2010, "in a survey of global corporations, 30% expressed
a preference for London as the seat of international arbitration;
its closest competitors were Geneva, on 9%, and Paris, on 7%".[121]
156. It also pointed out that:
English is, increasingly, the international language
of choice in commercial and scientific fields, as is pertinently
demonstrated by the fact that some 55-60% of patent specifications
filed at the E.P.O. are written in English (compared to approximately
30-35% in German and 10-15% in French).[122]
157. Timothy Roberts agreed that it "makes
sense to litigate them in the language that they were granted
in, in the country whose native language that is."[123]
158. The City of London Corporation also noted
that:
[O]ther countries already host European intellectual
property institutions: for instance, the E.P.O. in Munich, the
Plant Variety Office in Angers, and the Office for Harmonisation
in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) in Alicante.
On this point and more broadly, it might be argued that the U.K.
has a comparative dearth of significant European institutions,
given its size and importance.[124]
159. Henry Carr QC highlighted the economic benefits:
Although estimates vary, the current annual spend
by industry (much of it from overseas) on patent litigation and
associated advisory services in the UK is about £700 million.
If the Central Division is located outside the UK and, if, as
a result, most litigation is conducted elsewhere, this is projected
to decline significantly. By contrast, the volume of patent cases
heard in the UK (and consequent annual spend) may increase considerably,
if the Central Division is located here. This seems conservative,
as all validity challenges and all declarations of non-infringement
will be heard by the Central Division.
The Central Division will create a significant
number of highly skilled jobs. By way of comparison, the European
Patent Office is located in Munich and employs at least 7000 people
(the briefing note suggests a higher figure). Four times as many
German nationals are employed at the EPO than UK nationals. Whilst
the Central Division will not require as many staff, it is likely
to be a major European institution, with consequent indirect enhancement
of its location. As previously noted, if the Central Division
goes to Germany, the bulk of the patent system, from grant to
enforcement would be there.[125]
160. When asked if there were circumstances in
which the UK would compromise on the location of the Central Division,
Baroness Wilcox said, "yes".[126]
She also explained another option:
[T]here was a suggestion that the Central Court
might not necessarily be led by a national judge from the country
it was going to be located in; it might be led by someone from
another country. We would like to think that, if we did not get
the location, we might be able to lead on that.[127]
161. Henry Carr QC also suggested an alternative:
It is not clear that there has to be only one
seat of the Central Division. One option would be for the Central
Division itself to have separate "seats" of which one
would be the UK. From a UK perspective, this would be better than
nothing. Alternatives such as these have not been considered.[128]
162. However, he emphasised that the UK has a
great deal at stake and the Central Division offers a saving grace:
If the Central Division is not in London, the
current proposal will bring no benefit to the UK and considerable
disadvantage to the UK economy overall.[129]
I do not believe that Europe as a whole is likely
to benefit from the current proposal [...] However, the country
where the Central Division is located is likely to benefit disproportionately[...][130]
Assuming it continues, whoever gets the Central
Division will be able to mitigate [...] definitely, the most serious
effects.[131]
CONCLUSIONS
163. The location of the Central
Division will be crucial, as it will inevitably have significant
influence on the practice and procedures of the Court, as well
as bring significant economic advantages to the host city. Bringing
the Central Division to London (already a centre of international
arbitration) would both build the credibility of the Court and
bring economic benefits to London. If the Central Division is
located outside the UK, there will be far less requirement for
the high level of patent expertise that currently exists in this
country.
164. It appeared from the Minister's
evidence that this was, however, an issue on which the UK might
compromise.[132]
This would be unacceptable. As one of our witnesses noted "Whoever
gets the Central Division will be able to mitigate or to put its
own national stamp—because it is the most important place—on
how this Court works. For example, there will be decisions the
Central Division makes that affect everywhere. You will be able
to mitigate, definitely, the most serious effects."[133]
Supplementary protection certificates
165. Baroness Wilcox stated that:
There is currently a lack of clarity around how
the current system of SPCs will apply to the unitary patent and
the pharmaceutical industry is quite rightly concerned. We need
the Commission to bring forward legislation to extend the availability
of SPCs to the new unitary patent, and the Commission has signalled
its willingness to do so.[134]
166. This issue concerned both CIPA and EPLAW.[135]
CIPA set out their worries in their written evidence:
Supplementary Protection Certificates ("SPCs")
are a form of patent term extension which can be obtained for
certain pharmaceutical and agrochemical products. The extension
compensates for the time taken to obtain by regulatory approval.
These rights mean a great deal to drug developers.
[...] SPCs are granted by national patent offices
on national patents [...]
This regime will not extend to the new EU patent.
A new regime is required. This is not simply a case of needing
to adapt the current regulation to cover the EU patent as well
as the national patents, an authority which will grant and administer
the SPCs must also be established.[136]
167. CIPA then went on to describe the uncertainties
as to how and on what basis SPCs will be granted with unitary
effect, and how they may be enforced or their validity challenged
in the proposed unified system.
CONCLUSIONS
168. On this issue, both the
patent professions and the Government seem to agree that certain
provisions are urgently required.
Procedural rules
169. Baroness Wilcox stated that: "We have
been clear during the recent negotiations about our wish to see
and consider a draft set of rules before signing the court Agreement".[137]
However, she recognised that, although there has been "work
on the rules of procedure by the group of experts that has started
up again. That is about as far as we have got so far".[138]
170. Witnesses expressed concerns about inadequate
consideration of the procedural rules.[139]
Henry Carr QC explained:
A current (un-agreed) draft of the rules is immensely
complex, containing over 200 provisions. Yet none of the existing
documents even address fundamental questions, such as third party
liability for patent infringement (accessory liability), legal
professional privilege etc. Principles will have to be developed
from scratch through case law of the new Court, a process which
will be unpredictable and expensive.[140]
171. Dr Gassauer-Fleissner was sceptical about
the influence the patent professions would have; "I am not
aware that any comments of EPLAW made any impact on this. Also
my understanding is that there was not much discussion about the
rules of procedure anyway."[141]
172. The Vice-Chairman of the Intellectual Property
Bar Association, Daniel Alexander, is expected to suggest amendments
to the rules of procedure.[142]
Despite this, Henry Carr QC went on to express concern that: "the
agreement will be forced through before procedural rules have
been agreed[143]".
This concern was shared by CIPA, following the former Polish Presidency's
announcement that the UPC Agreement was being delayed only by
disagreements regarding the location of the Central Division.[144]
173. Overall, those witnesses who commented on
procedural rules felt strongly that they ought to be approved
before the UPC is agreed.[145]
CONCLUSIONS
174. We think that it is premature
to conclude the negotiations on the UPC agreement.
The reasons for this are well set out in the written submission
from EPLAW:
It is premature to conclude any agreement on
the new system. Important open issues include (1) the fees payable
by the users of the new system (this again is vital for SMEs),
(2) the allocation of costs and revenues to the participating
states (which will play a role in some states´ decision on
whether or not to create a local division of the court which in
turn again is of importance for SMEs), (3) the draft procedural
rules, which presently contain more than 400 provisions, will
require an enormous effort to find compromises between the participating
states on fundamental aspects of civil procedure law to ensure
a harmonized, expeditious and appropriate procedure for all type
of cases, and, not least, (4) the amount of recoverable costs
that a successful litigant may claim. Those issues must not be
left for later discussion but should be addressed before any agreement
to implement the proposed system is concluded.[146]
175. We note the emphasis placed by the Government
on the negotiation of the Rules of Procedure as curing the defects
in the UPC agreement, for example in relation to contemporaneous
hearings for infringement and validity actions in relation to
the same patent.[147]
We asked
to be kept informed of significant developments in the negotiations
on the Rules of Procedure, and of how consultations with stakeholders
have influenced the Government's position in those negotiations.
12 Henry Carr QC (Ev 36); CBI (Ev w1); CIPA (Ev 39);
IP Federation (Ev w2); IPLA (Ev w3) [Note: references to 'Ev
wXX' are references to written evidence published in the volume
of additional written evidence published on the Committee's website] Back
13
IPLA (Ev w3) Back
14
Ev 29; Ev 37; Ev w1; Ev 39; Ev w2; Ev w4; Ev w5; Ev w12; Ev 53
Back
15
Ev 29; Ev 53 Back
16
Ev w7 Back
17
Q 1 Back
18
Q 33; Ev w3 Back
19
Qq 33, 35 Back
20
Q 22 Back
21
Q 76 Back
22
Ev 48 Back
23
Q 131 Back
24
Q 131 Back
25
Q 134 Back
26
Ev w7 Back
27
Ev 46 Back
28
Ev 48 Back
29
Q 2; Q 45; Ev 36; Ev w3 Back
30
Q 12 Back
31
Ev 39 Back
32
Ev w7 Back
33
Ev 36 Back
34
Q 101 Back
35
EPLAW (Q 45); CIPA (Ev 39); IPLAW (Ev w3); Henry Carr QC (Ev 51);
Back
36
IPJA; Ev 36 Back
37
Ev 36 Back
38
Q 81 Back
39
Q 107 Back
40
Ev 36; Ev 48 Back
41
Q 107 Back
42
Ev w7 Back
43
Ev 36 Back
44
Q 139 Back
45
Q 140 Back
46
Q 60 Back
47
Henry Carr QC (Q 24); CIPA (Ev 39); IPLA (Ev w3); AIPPI (Ev w5) Back
48
Q 142 Back
49
Q 24 Back
50
Q 24 Back
51
Ev 39 Back
52
Q 142 Back
53
Q 93 Back
54
Ev 36 Back
55
Ev 45 Back
56
Q 61 Back
57
Q 32 Back
58
Q 103 Back
59
Q 110 Back
60
Q 32 Back
61
Q 111 Back
62
Q 122 Back
63
Q 123 Back
64
Q 71 Back
65
Q 72 Back
66
Ev 39 Back
67
Ev 48 Back
68
Q 153 Back
69
Ev 36 Back
70
Q 67 Back
71
Q 23 Back
72
Q 25 Back
73
Ev w12 Back
74
Ev w3 Back
75
Ev 29 Back
76
CBI (Ev w1); CIPA (Ev 39); IPLA (Ev w3) Back
77
Q 50 Back
78
Ev 48 Back
79
Ev 39 Back
80
Q 64 Back
81
Ev 36 Back
82
Q 84 Back
83
Q 78 Back
84
Ev 39 Back
85
Ev 39 Back
86
Q 51 Back
87
Ev 51 Back
88
Ev w12 Back
89
Ev w12 Back
90
Ev w12 Back
91
Q 7 Back
92
Q 77 Back
93
Q 7 Back
94
Ev 51 Back
95
Q 7 Back
96
Ev 39 Back
97
Q 90 Back
98
Q 85 Back
99
Ev 45 (CIPA) Back
100
Ev 48 Back
101
Q 155 Back
102
Ev 29 Back
103
Ev 45 (CIPA) Back
104
Q 31 Back
105
Q 31 Back
106
Ev 39 Back
107
Q 31 Back
108
Q 26 Back
109
Ev 39 Back
110
Q 31 Back
111
Q 151 Back
112
Q 31 Back
113
Q 31 Back
114
Ev 39 Back
115
Ev 29; Ev 39 Back
116
Ev 48 Back
117
Ev 48 Back
118
Ev 48 Back
119
Ev 48 Back
120
Ev w11 Back
121
Ev w11 Back
122
Ev w11 Back
123
Q 33 Back
124
Ev w11 Back
125
Ev 51 Back
126
Q 157 Back
127
Q 156 Back
128
Ev 51 Back
129
Ev 51 Back
130
Ev 51 Back
131
Q 33 Back
132
Q 156 Back
133
Q 33 Back
134
Ev 48 Back
135
EPLAW (Ev 29); CIPA (Ev 39) Back
136
Ev 39 Back
137
Ev 48 Back
138
Q 126 Back
139
EPLAW (Q 41); Henry Carr QC (Ev 36); Q 1; Q 3 Back
140
Ev 36 Back
141
Q 41 Back
142
Q 5 Back
143
Ev 36 Back
144
Ev 39 Back
145
CBI (Ev w1); IPLA (Ev w3); Henry Carr QC (Q 4) Back
146
Ev 29 Back
147
Q 142 Back
|
