Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
235-316)
Mr Henry Bellingham MP, Mr Chris Holtby and Captain
David Reindorp RN
6 July 2011
Chair: I welcome members of the public
to this third evidence session of the Committee's inquiry into
piracy off the coast of Somalia. We are having a hard look at
this topic and today our key witness, eagerly awaited, is Henry
Bellingham, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs who is responsible for this area of policy.
He is accompanied by Captain David Reindorp, the Head of Defence
Crisis Management at the Ministry of Defence, who appeared before
uswas it last week or the week before?
Captain Reindorp: Last week.
Q235 Chair: I also welcome Chris
Holtby, the Deputy Head of the Security Policy Department at the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Minister, given that hardly any of our ships
have been snatched down there, why do we have such a high profile
in this area?
Mr Bellingham: First, Chair, may
I make a very short statement, by way of introduction?
Chair: Of course.
Mr Bellingham: I thank the Committee
for giving me the opportunity to give this update. I read the
earlier evidence with great interest. Partly to answer your question,
we are a great maritime nation; the impact of Somali piracy is
costing world trade between $7 billion and $10 billion a year,
so it obviously poses a threat to our interests; and it threatens
the lives of United Kingdom seafarers. It also perpetuates instability
in Somalia and threatens the economies and well-being of other
states in the region. We are therefore playing a leading role,
which I shall probably have a chance to explain in a moment.
Your Committee heard the week before last from
Major General Buster Howes about the excellent work that the European
Union is doing in leading the international response and the key
roles of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. I understand that
you visited Atalanta at the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood,
and I am sure that you will agree with me that the capability
is very impressive. It is also a very good example of co-ordination
between different groups: there is no shared command, but they
are working incredibly well together.
I think that progress has been madethere
has not been a hijack for the past eight months in the Gulf, in
spite of the 20,000-odd vessels that navigate through itbut,
of course, there is displacement into the wider ocean, and that
is why we are not complacent. The UK is taking a very active
role. We are very active on the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia. We chair the Committee on Operational Military
Co-ordination and the Regional Capability Development Committee.
We are very active on the International Contact Group on Somalia
and have also helped to promote debates at the United Nations
on the issue of Somalia and piracy.
On the legal aspects, there are obviously significant
legal challenges on piracy, particularly relating to prosecution,
and I have been particularly active in pursuing that with some
of the regional states. The first problem we had with various
countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles was that
international piracy on the high seas was not an offence under
their law, so they had to change their law to make it an offence
under their jurisdiction. That was the first important move,
but the second move is that most of those countries do not have
an offence of going equipped or going with intent, so we are working
with them to try to change that. Of course, if they do not have
an offence in their own legal system of going equipped or with
intent, unless an act of piracy has been actually carried out,
they will not accept the pirates for trial and possibly detention
if successfully prosecuted. We work alongside those partners.
I can understand the frustration of catch and release occurring,
but it is worth saying that more than 1,000 pirates are now in
custody around the world, so there is no impunity.
Obviously, the shipping industry has a key role
to play. You heard from General Howes the week before last when
he pointed out that scarcely any successful hijacks have been
carried out of vessels that were following best management practice.
Lastlyperhaps I should have said this
at the beginningwe are dealing with the symptoms. The
only way to sort out piracy is on land. A fractured, chaotic
state such as Somaliaa failed state with no governance
and with institutions that have no legitimacywill not be
able to control the problem. It is probably instructive to look
at what is happening in West Africa, where there have been piracy
problems but where functioning states have been able to get a
grip of them.
Finally, since I became a Minister I have set
up a cross-Whitehall ministerial working group on piracy. We have
an ongoing dialogue with the EU and our development partners,
and we are working closely with industry and other key parties.
That is a snapshot, Chair. I hope it provides a useful platform
for further discussions.
Q236 Chair: So the answer to the
question I leapt in with is that we are there because we are a
major maritime nation?
Mr Bellingham: We are there because
we are a major maritime nation, yes, but we are also playing a
critical role in the peace process in Somalia. I mentioned the
International Contact Group and the debates that we have helped
to launch in the UN. Obviously, the curse of piracy is one of
the drivers of the instability and problems in Somalia, so the
two work hand in hand. I believe that the key thing is to go back
to the cause of the problem, which is on land.
Q237 Chair: There are not one
but three command structures, all with a slightly different take
on the subject. Do you think it would be more efficient to have
a unified command structure and why are we a member of all three?
Mr Bellingham: I have had a chance
to look at this in quite a lot of detail, and I agree with Buster
Howes. If we were starting from scratch, we would probably have
different arrangements in place. On the other hand, we have to
bear in mind that although we have Atalanta, the Combined Maritime
Force and NATO, a number of countries are outside those structures
and are inside on only an ad hoc basis.
What is impressive is the shared awareness and
deconfliction mechanism, based in Bahrain. When I was at Permanent
Joint HQ at Northwood visiting Atalanta, a number of senior naval
officers said to me that that was an absolute exemplar of maritime
security and co-operation. In spite of the fragmented arrangements
that you rightly allude to, the level of co-operation is first
class. If we start trying to change those structures in any fundamental
way now, that would not necessarily be the right thing to do.
We would have to carry our European and NATO counterparts with
us. What we have in place we have got working very well, and I
think we can get it working even better.
Q238 Chair: We had a good visit
to Northwood the other day with EUNAVFOR, so your comments resonate
with us.
We have the SDR and no one can deny that there
is going to be a reduction in hardware for the armed forces. How
sustainable is it to go on supplying into the future the level
of commitment that we have supplied? Can we keep up the tempo,
or will we have to slow up a bit?
Mr Bellingham: The Navy has a
number of standing tasks. The protection of the UK in home waters,
the protection of the deterrent, and the two standing Atlantic
patrol tasks: North, which is the Caribbean and counter-narcotics;
and South, which is the Falklands and West Africa. Then there
are the contingent tasks that are carried out on an enduring basis.
There are two vessels in the Gulf, and two supporting the operations
in Libya. There are 19 vessels to go round. As far as Somalia
is concerned, counter-piracy is not one of the standing tasks,
but that is something that the MOD and the NAC will keep under
constant review.
I stress that the role the UK is taking is not
only a matter of the vessels that we have deployed, but the leadership
role that we are supplying, the lead that we have provided on
strategy and the thinking behind a number of the different strands.
At the same time, we are saying to many of our partners in the
EU and NATO that we have commitments elsewhere that they do not
haveLibya is the obvious example, but there is also the
Gulfand we want them to pull their weight in terms of deployment.
Q239 Chair: Do you think we will
keep up the flow of ships that we have had in the past?
Mr Bellingham: The FCO will be
doing all we possibly can to make sure that that is the message
going from our part of the Government to the MOD. Obviously, we
provide the headquarters for Atalanta. You heard Buster Howes
say the week before last that he would be very surprised indeed
if that function did not continue. In spite of what has happened
in terms of the downsizing, we will still have one of the most
formidable navies in the worldprobably the third most competent,
efficient and professional navy in the world. That is why the
issue of Somalia and piracy is going before the NSC; it is exactly
the sort of thing that it will look at.
Q240 Chair: That sounds like a
probably rather than a definitely.
We have received reports that there has been
a shortage of RFAs and problems with refuelling the ships there.
Can you cast any light on that?
Mr Bellingham: I was not aware
that there had been a problem. I was aware of some of the excellent
work done by RFAs, which in many ways are a suitable platform
because they have the helicopter capability, as do frigates and
destroyers as well, of course. Buster Howes pointed out that the
helicopter is certainly a force multiplier. I will refer to Captain
David Reindorp on the specific question about refuelling.
Captain Reindorp: To put it in
perspective, sir, there is always a shortage of RFAs. It does
not matter where you are, in which part of the ocean, doing what
particular task, there is always a shortage of ships to refuel
from. To the best of my knowledge, though, I do not think that
Atalanta or NATO has suffered from an inability to refuel.
Q241 Chair: There was a suggestion
that it was limiting the time on patrol.
Captain Reindorp: It may do, but
an RFA will simply provide fuel and occasionally a small proportion
of food or other logistics. At some stage, each ship on patrol
will need to return to harbour. If there has been any reduction
of time on task, it will be relatively short.
Q242 Mr Watts: Minister, we heard
from previous witnesses that the downsizing of the Navy would
have an impact on the operation, yet you seem to indicate that
you are fairly confident that that would not be the case. Previous
witnesses said that we would be more reliant on our partners to
provide the vessels that we need to do the job. Which is it, and
why are you so confident that other nations will provide the facilities
we need if we downsize?
Mr Bellingham: I am confident
we are going to be able to keep up the pressure on those other
nations. I did not say that I was confident that they would necessarily
come up with the goods and step up to the plate, but that is an
ongoing narrative that we are going to have to have with them.
I am confident, Mr Watts, that the MOD regards
Somali piracy and the work off the Horn of Africa and deep into
the ocean as a key priority. It is not a standing task, as you
know, which means that it is one of those functions and responsibilities
that has to take second priority after the key standing task,
but given what is at stake for the UK, I have every confidence
that the UK will be able to keep up its leadership role and the
naval platforms in the area. For example, although our ship that
is currently tasked to Atalanta will shortly be coming out of
theatre, we will still have a vessel within the NATO force, and
I would be very surprised indeed if we did not at all times have
a vessel as part of one of the forces providing counter-piracy
work.
Q243 Mr Watts: You say you are
confident, but there will be fewer vessels and we have not so
far secured any further assets from our partners. If it is a key
task, are we not putting the carthorse before the cart in the
sense that we should say either, "We want to do this,"
or, "We don't want to do it."? Should we not find the
resources or make sure that resources are in place before we continue
down a road that we may not have the resources to deliver?
Mr Bellingham: I have every confidence
that the work that is being carried out in the counter-piracy
operations will continue apace. As I said, the UK will continue
to have a very important role. We are going to go on providing
the leadership in key areas; a huge amount of the strategy work
is being done by the UK; and I can assure you that I, the Foreign
Secretary and the Defence Ministers spare no effort in putting
pressure on our European counterparts and our NATO allies who
may not have the other commitments that we have at the moment.
Of course, those other commitments are contingent commitments
being carried out on an enduring basis, as the Navy puts it, but
I hope they will not continue for ever.
Q244 Mr Watts: I think, from your
answer, that there is no guarantee that those resources will be
in place at this stage.
Mr Bellingham: I do not think
that any government can give an absolute cast-iron guarantee on
particular assets that will be used, but we can give a guarantee
that we will continue to provide the leadership. I would be very
surprised indeed if that leadership role, the work that we have
done so far and the success that we have had would not be continued
without a Royal Navy vessel being part of those operations.
Chris Holtby: May I add something
to what the Minister said? We recognise in the work we do in the
Contact Group that continued force flow is an issue, but as the
Minister said, we have been encouraging our partners to do more.
Already in the last year or so, we have had new contributors coming
forward, such as Thailand, Indonesia and South Africa, so there
is a broadening of the coalition. They all come together through
the SHADE mechanism that the Minister has already mentioned. In
fact, it is a cohesive international effortsome burden
sharing if you like.
Q245 Andrew Rosindell: Minister, it
is a pleasure to see you this afternoon. Government briefings
often state that pirates have to be caught red-handed before they
can be prosecuted, and that is often used as the reason why so
few get prosecuted. In international law, though, prosecution
is permitted when people are intending to commit piracy. Are you
satisfied that the UK is fully using international law and the
rules of engagement to deal with this situation?
Mr Bellingham: Thank you for that
question, Mr Rosindell. There are four key points that I would
like to make in that. First, UN Security Council Resolutions 1851
and 1950 are based on UNCLOS, as you rightly point out. What those
resolutions and that part of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea looks at is pirate activity on the high seasactivity
on the high seas for pirate ends. It has not been designated as
an armed conflict.
There is not an issue around the actual rules
of engagement as such. The issue, of course, is what happens when
the pirates are apprehendedcaught. If the pirates have
committed a pirate offence and it is in the UK's interests to
prosecute them, then we will do so. I made that absolutely crystal
clear. I have recently written to the Secretary of State for Justice
about this very point.
As far as the regional players are concerned,
as I said in my opening statement, we have had quite a long slog
with countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles and Mauritius.
They have now, in many cases, stepped up to the plate, particularly
Seychelles and Mauritius, but first we had to persuade them to
change their lawpreviously, piracy was an offence under
their penal code only if it took place in their territorial waters.
That was the first step. Now, piracy does not have to take place
against a Kenyan vessel for it to be triable in Kenya, because
it is now an offence under Kenyan law. We now need to see their
law changed to match our law where going equipped with intent
is an indictable offence.
Q246 Andrew Rosindell: Are we
being robust enough in dealing with this serious problem on the
high seas, particularly in the Indian Ocean? Do you know of any
EU or NATO commanders who have asked us to be more robust in how
we are handling this? Are there lessons to be learned from the
way in which Russia, China and India deal with this situation?
Mr Bellingham: There are a couple
of points. First, the UK has not designated this an armed conflict.
The current rules of engagement allow sufficient force to be used
in self defence. In other words if a naval vessel is fired on
it can fire back. It can use proportionate force. What the Navy
does not do, because this is not an armed conflict, is take pre-emptive
action if it sees a skiff with pirates on it. That is not something
that we would do because it is not envisaged under the UN security
council resolutions or under this part of UNCLOS. Captain Reindorp
said in his evidence that he knows that at any one time, as part
of the counter-piracy operations, there will be x-hundred Royal
Navy personnel on our vessels who are frustrated. The last thing
that they want to do is to put in a lot of effort and to use their
intelligence and professionalism to apprehend pirates. If no actual
piracy act is being committed, gathering the evidence can be challenging,
especially when they chuck the weapons overboard and claim to
be fishermen.
You have to remember, Mr Rosindell, that to
make a prosecution stack up, you need sufficient evidence. The
captain of a vessel has to be prepared to give evidence and you
have to have crew members. Unless there is sufficient evidence,
is it in the UK's interests to bring pirates back here to prosecute?
I suggest it is not. But what we are very keen to do is to get
these other countries to change their law so that when we transship
pirates to Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles or Mauritius, there is
a good chance of a successful prosecution. But the key thing also
is to build the judicial and custodial capacity in those countries.
If we build that capacity by helping them, they will be much more
inclined to assist. The channels have to be gone throughit
has to be done very quicklybefore we get a positive decision
from the Kenyan or Tanzanian authorities saying, "Yes, we
will take this particular batch of pirates."
Q247 Andrew Rosindell: Finally,
Minister, I have two pointsthe first leading on from the
point you just made. Of course, we have our own territory in
that region of the worldBritish Indian Ocean Territory.
Is there no way we could make use of that territory as a base
for tackling piracy in the Indian Ocean? Possibly, we could have
prosecutions ourselves, bearing in mind that we have Crown territory
in that region. That is the first point. Secondly, is there any
scope at all for military action against pirates on land? Have
you encountered that as a possibility?
Mr Bellingham: First, as far as
Diego Garcia is concerned, you are absolutely right. British Indian
Ocean Territory is a UK Overseas Territory, which is leased to
the Americans. Royal Navy vessels obviously go there from time
to time. I am quite sure that if they had to go there as part
of these operations, to reprovision or refuel, they would do exactly
that. We have a very good relationship with the Americans. They
are our close allies, of course. On the point about building a
court there, I would certainly be prepared to have a look at that,
but I think what is more important is to use our moneythe
DFID moneythat goes in through UNODC to build court capacity
in the region. When this problem is eventually sorted out, they
will then have a legacy of good courts and better prisonsbetter
facilities all round.
You asked about taking action against pirates
on land. Security Council Resolutions 1851 and 1950 authorise
operations throughout Somali territory. It is important to bear
in mind that they authorise action against pirates, not against
terrorists. There would have to be agreement among our partners
and changes to the operating plans, and a number of considerations
would have to be looked at before that was entered into.
Captain Reindorp: May I add one
point to that? I have not been to Diego Garcia, but I understand
that you cannot get a ship alongside. There is a long runway,
but very little else. I also understand that the chief prosecutor
is a naval officer who is sent out there on a three-year posting.
It is really very basic. To build some sort of infrastructurea
courthouse, jail or whateverwould be quite a large undertaking.
Q248 Andrew Rosindell: If we are
spending that money in other countries, why not our own territories?
Captain Reindorp: It is almost
certainly not practical is my answer to that. To go back to your
previous question, you introduced the word "robustness".
Three phrases are often conflated when talking about pirates:
"more robust", "rules of engagement" and "international
law". All three are different; all three have different
meanings. From our perspective, the rules of engagement are perfectly
adequate for the job that we have. They are based on domestic
and international law. If you wanted to be more robust and if
you wanted to change ROE, you have to change domestic and international
law. At the moment, our law is firm on the level of force that
can be used in a constabulary operation, which limits you to self-defence.
Anything else moves away from that and would be quite a large
undertaking.
Mr Bellingham: And you would have
to have a designation of armed conflict for that to happen, or,
as the captain says, a change in the law. But I think it is fair
to say that we keep all this under review. This is a situation
that we take incredibly seriously. You heard from Captain Reindorp
last week about the operating plan. I said in a parliamentary
answer about a month ago that there was a change in the EU Atalanta
operating plan to look at enhanced boarding capability. For operational
reasons, we cannot go into detail here, but that is an example
of how the threat is changing the whole time. The pirates have
raised their game through the use of motherships, and our response
has to change accordingly.
Q249 Chair: May I take you back
to an answer you gave to Mr Rosindell, in which I think you confirmed
that an intent to commit an act of piracy was an indictable offence.
Is that right?
Mr Bellingham: Under UK law, going
equipped or with intent is an indictable offence, but it is not
an offence in other countries. I think only four countries in
fact have a law that enables you to prosecute for intent or going
equippedI think India is one of them, isn't it, Chris?
Chris Holtby: Seychelles.
Mr Bellingham: And the Seychelles
have now changed their law. So what we want is for countries like
Kenya, Tanzania and Mauritius to change their laws as well.
Captain Reindorp: If I may, to
add a little context to this discussion of "intent to commit",
we have to be able to differentiate four Somali gentlemen in a
small boat with AK47s, which they will usually say that they carry
for self-protection from pirates, from pirates, who may well also
look like four Somali gentlemen in the same boat, with exactly
the same weapons.
Q250 Chair: That is a good point.
So how do you make that judgement?
Captain Reindorp: That is where
you get stories about having to catch them red-handed. Because
in order to build sufficient evidence, it almost comes down to
that.
Q251 Chair: But if you saw a skiff
with four pirates with arms on board approaching a merchant vessel,
at what point do you decide that that is an intent to carry out
an act of piracy?
Captain Reindorp: I suppose in
that instance, it's when they start to brandish their weapons
and if indeed they start to fire them, but again, in that part
of the world merchant ships frequently go past small Somali vessels
with AK47s in them. It is a judgment call.
Chair: I'd say firing them was more than
intent, actually.
Q252 Mr Roy: Could you clarify
that point, Captain and Minister? In articles 101 and 103 of UNCLOS,
it states quite clearly that if it is known that a ship is, "intended
by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose
of committing" a pirate act, then that should therefore be
enough. It is important to know that the article 101 definition
of piracy also includes as piracy, "any act of voluntary
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft".
Crucially, that means that a pirate ship is defined as being a
ship that those in control intend to use to commit the act. That
is not really what you just said, because you said that you have
to prove otherwise and that is not the case. Can you just clarify
that, what articles 101 to 103 say?
Mr Bellingham: I can certainly
clarify that, Mr Roy. What is in these articles has to then be
transferred into the national law of the country in question.
You have this body of articles, and we have moved it into our
law, and we are trying to persuade regional countries to do exactly
the same.
Q253 Mr Roy: Sorry, are you saying
that our national law is different from articles 101 to 103 of
the United Nations?
Mr Bellingham: No, our law mirrors
this. But the law of various countries like Kenya, and until recently
the Seychelles, did not incorporate this particular principle.
Q254 Mr Roy: But you will agree,
then, that the effect of this article is that a ship does not
need to have already committed an act of piracy to be a pirate
ship?
Mr Bellingham: Under the UN article,
that is absolutely right. This means we have an incredibly strong
case when we go to countries like Kenyaand the Seychelles
have taken a position on thisand other countries, and we
say they have to ask them to change their law. There is a very
powerful reason for them doing so, because it would be in line
with the article. I don't know if you would like to add anything
to that, Chris?
Chris Holtby: First, it has to
be prosecuted under national law. But it still remains a case
of evidence in each individual case. So you would have to prove
in the national courts that that ship was equipped specifically
for piracy.
Q255 Chair: Let us go back to
our skiff with four men and AK47s, and probe the question of intent.
If they had a boarding ladder and a grappling hook with them,
would that show intent? Would that define them as pirates, rather
than innocent fishermen carrying guns to protect themselves?
Captain Reindorp: It probably
would not define them as piratesthere could still be innocent
explanationsbut I agree you would be moving further away
from the presumption of innocence. The level of proof actually
required is set by the prosecutors and the lawyers that you are
dealing with.
Chris Holtby: May I move into
a slightly different paradigm? If there were infinite prison capacity
in the region, we would be able to find states in the region that
would be willing to prosecute every case of intent. The fundamental
capacity concern in the region is that there is not enough prison
space to hold all the pirates. That is why these states are primarily
focusing on cases in which pirate attacks have taken place.
Chair: That is very helpful. It is an
area we are planning to come to, but you have nicely set the tone.
Q256 Mr Baron: I think we all
accept that pirates nowadays do not go running around the ocean
with a skull and crossbones. Does that not raise the importance
of having maritime private security companies on vessels? The
figures suggest that most are British anyway. I know the FCO is
conducting a review, but the fact that to our knowledge no vessel
with guards on board has been successfully hijacked suggests it
is a policy we should adopt.
Mr Bellingham: I agree with you
wholeheartedly. The shipping industry's thinking on that has been
moving quite slowly, but it has gathered pace. In reply to Question
90, Buster Howes said that a year or so ago he had been quite
frustrated with the shipping industry's attitude, but he thinks
that everything has now moved on quite significantly.
I agree that there isn't a single recorded incident
of a vessel with private military armed security on board that
has been successfully pirated. I am working with the Shipping
Minister, Mike Penning, who is the Department for Transport lead
on this issue, because the Department's guidelines currently strongly
discourage the use of armed security on vessels. We want the Department
to change those guidelines to, at the very best, neutral.
There are implications for using prohibited
firearms on UK vessels, which is why I have also written to the
Home Secretary on the changes that would have to be made to the
firearms legislation. It can either be done through primary legislation
or through secondary legislation, through which the Home Secretary
could issue a permit to companies registered with the trade association
that provides the oversight and regulation for that industry.
Q257 Mr Baron: To be clear, the
Government support this idea and it is a question of how we get
from here to there?
Mr Bellingham: The Government
recognise that armed private security companies are a fact of
life. Some 25% of ships in the region have them on board. Many
shipping lines have been pressing us very hard on that issue.
Nautilus International, the trade union, has been particularly
vocal. Our view is that the UK Government should not encourage
such measures, but we should also not discourage them; we should
be neutral. It should be a decision for the shipping industry
on a case-by-case basis.
Q258 Mr Baron: It was reported
in the press that the Committee was going to be given a copy of
the Government's review of this issue for UK-flagged ships. We
have not received anything. When will the review be available,
and, if we go down the route at which you are hinting, will changes
to legislation be required?
Mr Bellingham: The Department
for Transport, which is the lead Department, will come up with
some proposals alongside the review. The Department will announce
that the consultation has taken place across the industry. Obviously,
it will explain what the different trade associationsthe
Chamber of Shipping and other organisations such as the IMOare
saying. It will also announce its proposals, having discussed
with the Home Office how we can achieve them. Do you know the
timing of the review, Chris?
Chris Holtby: Discussions are
ongoing between the DFT and the Home Office, which are the primary
Departments involved. In May, the Maritime Safety Committee of
the IMO issued a framework for international legislation or guidelines
on this area. It is important that we do not act alone and that
we go in step with our international partners, particularly as
many UK companies use flags of other nations. We have that international
framework now, and we are looking at how it can be reflected in
national law. There is no set timeline, but, given the legal risks
if arms are used on board vessels, both Departments realise the
urgency of this issue.
Q259 Mr Baron: Very briefly, before
I go on to the vessel protection detachments, can I press you
on that slightly? These maritime private security firms work on
ships flagged to other nations. Are you going to be drawing lessons
from that experience when you look at this in undertaking your
review?
Mr Bellingham: Yes, very much
so. The starting premise is that these armed private security
company detachments have been extremely successful. There are
issues around best practice, having enough personnel on board
and making sure that this is not a reason for neglecting best
management practice and using the convoy system. A fear has been
expressed in some quarters that if this becomes the norm, some
of the other good practices that are now embedded would be neglected
in the interests of trying to get vessels through these waters
more quickly. I would certainly say that we can learn quite a
lot from the countries that allow this to happen at the moment.
Q260 Mr Baron: Moving on to vessel
protection detachments, we know that other countries such as France
make use of them. Many would argue that it is safer and more effective
to draw upon the family of the armed services to provide some
sort of protectionthat might be from the Marines or detachments
of the Armyon vessels. What is your take on that? Is the
budget so tight that that option is not on the table, given that
most would agree that they would prefer it to security companies?
Mr Bellingham: France and Spain
use VPDs on a regular basis, as do other countriesI understand
that Israel, for example, does so on a regular basisand
we have done it before. We have done it in different strategic
areas. It is all a question of availability of resources. At the
moment, our armed forces are very heavily committed. If a stage
was reached when our armed forces were less committed, I am sure
that the MOD would look at a request for providing VPDs, which
are military detachments. If the opportunity arose, it would be
a welcome step forward, but I do not believe it is practical at
the moment.
Q261 Mr Baron: It is down to a
lack of resourcesthat is what it comes down to.
Mr Bellingham: It is not so much
a lack of resources; it is down to the lack of availability of
the relevant troops. I don't know whether you want to add anything,
Captain.
Captain Reindorp: Again, if I
can add a bit of context, allowing for a certain number of UK
ships going through that area at any one time, we would have to
find roughly 500 Royal Marinesthey would have to be marinised
troops; they cannot just be Army infanteers, unless of course
they are given adequate trainingto do that. That does not
take into account the 500 that we would be preparing to take over
from them, and the 500 that would be recovering from having been
there, and it does not take into account the extra training that
would be required. That is a considerable burden and at the moment
if you wish to do that, they would have to stop doing something
else.
Chris Holtby: Again, this is an
issue that the Contact Group has taken on as being a means of
increasing capability and sharing the burden. There are countries
that are now prepared and offering to provide VPDs to supplement
what the warships are doing. In particular, we are looking at
the challenge of trying to provide the majority of escorts of
the World Food Programme and AMISOM forces by using VPDs, rather
than having a dedicated warship always alongside those vessels,
bearing in mind the individual risk assessments in each case.
The African Union, the United Nations and the World Food Programme
are working with us on that, and there are countries that are
interested in doing that.
Q262 Mike Gapes: Let me take you
back to the question of the private armed security people on ships.
We currently have a voluntary self-regulation code for the private
security companies, which was introduced by the previous Government
and is carried on now. Would a wide extension of the use of private
security companies on British flagged vessels, as might happen
as a result of the change, require a reconsideration of that code
or potentially even moving towards a legislative code?
Mr Bellingham: Thank you for that
question, Mr Gapes. This is one of the areas that I lead on in
the Foreign Office, and quite a lot of work was done on setting
up the Geneva code for private military security companies. The
result of that was our decision not to follow the route of the
previous Government and have statutory regulation, but to go down
the route of having regulation within the sector itself. Aerospace
Defence and SecurityADSis the regulatory body for
private military security companies. It would cover security companies
providing security at sea as well. There is also the Security
Association for the Maritime Industry, which will not be an oversight
regulatory body like ADS, but will nevertheless insist on best
practice.
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the
UK Government are one of the biggest procurers of the services
of private military security companies. It is in our interests
to demand high standards and to insist that the Geneva code is
being followed. The Geneva code lays down very tight requirements
for training, conduct, financial oversight, corporate governance,
transparency and everything else. Chris has just told me that
we are looking at similar steps to those in the Geneva codeto
extend it further into the maritime area.
Q263 Mike Gapes: Would that be
legislative steps?
Mr Bellingham: It would not be
legislative; it would be on the same voluntary basis as the Geneva
code. As I say, I don't think that the UK Government have bought
in any services from the maritime military security companies
yet, but we are a big buyer of services from the private military
security companies. As a purchaser of services, we can demand
the highest possible standards.
Chris Holtby: In the preparation
of the Geneva documentthe Montreux documentit was
quite clear that the maritime sector was much more complex legally
than the land sector. In the land sector, you have one set of
laws in your country, but in the maritime sector you have various
different jurisdictions and everything else. That is why, at that
time, a decision was taken to exclude the maritime sector.
There are companies operating in the maritime
sector that have signed up to the code and therefore regard themselves
as bound by its conditions. The Minister has referred to the work
that we are doing to try and find a solution that will govern
the whole sector, which could be to extend the conditions of the
code of conduct to the whole sector. But there are various permutations,
and the work of the International Maritime Organisation in this
area should be taken into account too.
Q264 Mr Roy: Can I bring us to
the subject of prosecutions, or the lack of them, as seems to
be the case? At present, nine out of 10 suspected Somali pirates
captured by the Royal Navy are released. Last year, in one month
alone, there were reports of three cases in which Royal Navy vessels
encountered motherships with both suspect pirates and hostages
aboard. The Navy liberated the hostages but released the pirates.
Why?
Mr Bellingham: I mooted this earlier:
to mount a successful prosecution, for a start, you must have
sufficient evidence; you must also have sufficient capacity in
terms of detention facilities, trial facilities and prison facilities
in the region. It is easy to point to the number of catch and
releases, but I would also point to the fact that 1,000 pirates
are in detention at the moment.
It is also worth bearing in mind that most of
the so-called catch and releases have been the result of disruption
activities with naval vessels going in quite a lot closer to the
shore and intercepting skiffs. Of the cases of actual attacks
on vessels and attempted acts of piracy that resulted in capture
by the Navy, very few have resulted in catch and release, because
if an attack has been made on a vessel, you have the evidence.
I am incredibly keen to help build capacity
in the region and I have been putting a lot of effort into that.
We must obviously have buy-in from the front-line countriesSeychelles,
Mauritius, Tanzania and, particularly, Kenya; we also want to
get Mozambique and South Africa on board. Furthermore, one should
bear in mind that Mombasa is the main port for five landlocked
countries and Dar es Salaam is the port of access for eight such
countries. Many countries in Africa have strong, growing economies
that will be frightened if the piracy menace is not controlled.
We want to get buy-in from some of those countries as well. The
reluctance of Kenya, which signed the MOU and then pulled out
of it, was simply the result of its concern that it would basically
be shouldering the whole burden. The key thing is to get that
capacity.
Q265 Mr Roy: That does not answer
the question, Minister. The question was: why, in one month alone
last year, did the Royal Navy capture three ships with their hostages
still on board and release the pirates without taking any action?
Why is it still the case that nine out of 10 of those people who
are held by the Royal Navy are then released?
Mr Bellingham: Some of those disruptions
have been close into shore, where there would not have been enough
evidence. The ones that you allude to are cases where hostages
have been released after a successful pirate attack that the Navy
has prevented from going any further. There has to be evidence.
Q266 Mr Roy: The pirates were
released, not just the hostages.
Mr Bellingham: I entirely appreciate
that, but there has to be sufficient evidence.
Q267 Mr Roy: Is there not enough
evidence when you have a boat full of hostages, with people holding
them hostage? Is that not enough evidence to say that those are
the bad guys and they deserve to be prosecuted?
Mr Bellingham: There are two points,
Mr Roy. I sympathise deeplyI would like to see every single
pirate prosecutedbut, first, if the UK was going to take
those pirates back to the UK, we would have to be satisfied that
there was going to be enough evidence for a successful prosecution,
and that means people giving evidence. It means the captain of
the ship that was pirated giving evidence, and probably independent
witnesses giving evidence as well. They have to be prepared to
do that.
The same applies to taking pirates to a country
such as Kenya, Tanzania or wherever it might be. As you know,
the first person in this very important decision-making chain
would be the commander of the vessel; he would then talk to probably
the lawyer in the Atalanta force; it would then be referred through
to the MOD, in the case of the UK, and they would have to take
a decision on whether it was in the UK's interest to prosecute.
They would also have to work with the authorities in, say, Kenya
to ask the Kenyans to take a batch of pirates. If the Kenyans
say no, they will not take them, and there is nowhere else they
can be taken, and if we decide there is not enough evidence to
take them to the UK, they are unfortunatelyI find this
as frustrating as you doreleased.
Q268 Mr Roy: I get your point
about making sure that you have some type of evidence before you
bring them back to the UK, but if I asked you how many of those
people have been brought back to the UKfive, 10 or zerowhat
would the answer be? Because I know what the answer is.
Mr Bellingham: We have not taken
any pirates back to the UK yet.
Q269 Mr Roy: None so far. Why
then is it that countries such as the United States, France and
Germany have brought pirates back to their own country to put
them on trial? That is good enough for the Americans, the French
and the Germans, but not good enough for the British. Why?
Mr Bellingham: In each of those
cases, as I understand it, French, American or German citizens
were harmed. There was overwhelming evidence of a crime having
been committed against nationals of those countries. If that happened
in the case of the UK, I think it would be inconceivable that
they would not be brought back here to be prosecuted.
Q270 Mr Roy: Minister, is not
the reason for the concern of the British Government that, once
here, the pirates will claim asylum?
Mr Bellingham: That is not the
reason why we do not bring pirates back here. We have a criminal
justice system that is fair, but you have to remember, Mr Roy,
that under our system the defendant is innocent till proven guilty,
and many QCs on large amounts of legal aid money will be being
paid to defend those peoplequite rightly so, because they
have legal rights. It has to be in the UK's interests and there
has to be enough evidence to make that prosecution in the public
interest.
Q271 Mr Roy: But no one has been
brought back here. Yes, they are innocent till proved guilty,
but we have not even got to that point, because no one at all
has been brought back to this country, where they are innocent
till proved guilty. That is the truthno one.
Mr Bellingham: Mercifully and
thankfullylargely because of the professionalism of our
Navya UK citizen has not yet been harmed by pirates.
Q272 Mr Roy: Is that the criterion
then: that you would bring pirates back only if one of our UK
nationals has been injured?
Mr Bellingham: If a UK national
was injured, that would be indicative of pretty overwhelming evidence
that it is in the public interest to prosecute. If you have a
case of a ship being pirated and the hostages released, and there
is evidence of piracyobviously, by definitionbut
you have to ask the question: how will that stand up in court.
Are there witnesses? If we simply bring pirates back to this
country and prosecute them without witnesses, I suggest to you
that those pirates would not be convicted.
Q273 Mr Roy: If Brits are kidnapped
and then released, after the Royal Navy has captured the ship,
you are saying that, because they have not been harmed, you will
not bring the prosecution to the United Kingdom.
Mr Bellingham: We look at every
single case on its merits. The final point I wish to make is
that it is in the interests of trying to solve this problem, of
sending a very strong signal to the pirates and the communities
that are supporting them that they are prosecuted in the region
and detained in the region. It is the same argument that I have
applied to the Court Service in this country. If someone commits
a serious crime and they are tried near their own community, it
will have a bigger deterrent effect and it is going to send a
much stronger signal than if they are triedin this casemany
thousands of miles away.
Captain Reindorp: If I may, I
wish to give a little context that may help to understand the
situation. This is a very emotive issue. It is particularly
emotive for all the servicemen and women who are out there at
the moment risking their lives to do this. They find it very
frustrating, quite frankly, to be blamed for something that is
not within anybody's gift to solve. If I add a little bit of
context, that may help to understand why they are frustrated and
why this image has built up.
You need a defined and acceptableacceptable
to the UKlegal finish to any seized pirate. We have certain
standards that we must abide bynothing to do with the military,
they are the laws of the land that we are subject to and signed
up to. Part of that legal finish is sufficient evidence, and
the other part is a willing and suitable prosecutor and potential
jailer. Finding those is not always easy. It is not always easy
for a variety of reasons. We have discussed previously the discrimination
between an innocent Somali fisherman who may or may not happen
to have an AK47. Possessing an AK47 on the high seas is not illegal.
We have had many occasions when, even when we
have seized pirates and have released the hostages, those hostages
are not willing to testify. They do not want to come back to
the UK, or do not want to go to Kenya, or do not want to go anywhere
to testify against the pirates. We have no ability to compel
them to do so. Even if they did, we would almost certainly have
to release them back to, for instance, Yemen for a while, before
they went wherever they had to go to appear as witnesses. If
you release someone into Yemen, the chances of getting them back
again are almost negligible. Nor is there always a clear distinction
between hostages and pirates. There have been occasions when
we take a boat and the first thing that the pirates do is pretend
that they are hostages. Actually, it is really quite difficult
to differentiate between the two.
The final point I will leave you with is one
of simple calculus: whilst all this is going on, a ship is not
performing its primary role which is deterring pirates, so you
have to decide whether you are going to chase an ever-decreasing
possibility of a successful prosecution or go back and deter pirates.
Q274 Mr Roy: If you free nine
out of 10 of those you arrest, does that not indeed frustrate
the people in your service?
Captain Reindorp: Absolutely,
but the answer is as the Minister has said: we need more legal
courses.
Q275 Mr Roy: Minister, is deterrence
prioritised over prosecution? Has the decision been made that
the type of equipment required to prosecute is not worth it?
If not, what criteria can inform the decision to prosecute?
Mr Bellingham: Are you talking
about prosecuting in the UK?
Q276 Mr Roy: Anywhere.
Mr Bellingham: What happens obviously
is that the initial assessment is made by the commander of the
vessel, who will then feed it through the chain. The first key
ingredient is whether there is enough evidence. Secondly, where
can the pirates be taken to? I am doing outreach with the regional
countries. For example, I shall be spending at least two hours
tomorrow with Raila Odinga, the Kenyan Prime Minister, and shall
be doing all I possibly can to persuade him to reactivate the
MOU. I am going to do that because I shall be able to tell him
that more countries in the region are providing key capacity.
If the decision through the chain that I have described is a)
there is enough evidence and b) there is somewhere to take the
pirates to, hopefully we will be able to find a solution to the
problem to which you have alluded and on which you rightly have
challenged us, and that we all feel needs to be sorted out.
I will just add one other thing: a lot of work
has been done in the Caribbean with drug suspects, and the Navythe
standing North Atlantic patroloften intercepts vessels
carrying drugs. There has not yet been a case of any of those
drug runners being brought back to the UK, because we invariably
take a decision to have them dealt with in the region. There is
regional capacity to do that in the Caribbean, and we want to
have the same capacity to deal with the pirates in this region.
Q277 Mr Roy: Lastly on that subject,
why has the UK Minister not supported a proposal by UN Special
Adviser Jack Lang for an extraterritorial Somali court, and would
you support calls for an international court?
Mr Bellingham: I had two meetings
with Jack Lang, who is a very eminent former Cabinet Minister.
His report contains a lot of really good recommendations, and
we certainly agree with what he has to say about building capacity
in the regionprison capacity. I also went to have a look
at the court in Arusha, which is currently the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. First of all, the court needs a lot of money
spending on it. The costs of bringing the court up to standard
and using it on an ongoing basis would be huge: we reckon that
about $100 million a year would be needed.
Q278 Chair: For what period?
Mr Bellingham: Well, if the court
was opened next year, say, there would be initial costs, but going
forward the figure would be certainly not far short of that. The
panoply of legal infrastructure currently at Arushadetention
facilities, translation facilities, defence lawyers and so onis
a big operation. There are two key points. First, this money would
be much better spent in the region; within the region we could
get a huge amount of value for one tenth of that sum. Secondly,
it is illegal under the Somali constitution to have courts to
try Somalis outside Somalia.
I also had a long conversation about this with
Mohamed Omaar, who is the TFG Foreign Minister. He made it very
clear to me that this was an absolute red line as far as the TFG
were concerned. It does not mean that we do not need to look at
the suggestion very carefully, because Jack Lang's report has
a lot to recommend it. That particular suggestion was discussed
by the UN Security Council on 21 June and you are probably aware
that only Russia and France supported using Arusha, so the Security
Council has reached its decision. That does not mean that we cannot
come back to it at some stage in the future, but I think all those
possible pitfalls would still apply.
Q279 Chair: The advice we have
had, incidentally, is that the UNODC valuation advised Mr Lang
that it would cost $25 million over three years, rather than $100
million.
Mr Bellingham: Can you explain
why my figures were way above that, Chris?
Chris Holtby: When Jack Lang went
on his initial mission to the region, he came up with a few models.
One of the models was costed at $25 million. The cost of running
the Arusha tribunal last year was $121 million. Because the current
tribunal and the structures there cannot cope with large-scale
piracy trials as well, we are looking at creating something analogous
to it, so the costs could be of a broadly similar order. The costs
of the Lockerbie court, which is the only other delocalised court
we have dealt with so far, were about £150 million. That
was dealing with one individual, rather than large-scale processing.
Q280 Chair: How do these figures
compare with the ransoms being paid?
Mr Bellingham: The amount paid
in ransom so farI think you have probably seen the figuresis
estimated at $275,000, but $1 million has been paid so far. I
would suggest that the figure is probably underestimated, but
we could safely say that in the region of $300 million has been
paid over in ransom so far.
Q281 Chair: Makes a court look
rather cheap, doesn't it?
Mr Bellingham: I would still come
back to the point that we have the Somali Government constitution
to get round, and there is also the fact that the money that we
have put into countries such as the Seychelles and Kenya, and
the work we put into court and detention facilities in Somaliland
and Puntland, has been in the order of small numbers of millions,
but that money has gone a long, long way. My suggestion would
be that what we want to try and do is to build a legacy in the
surrounding countries, so that once this problem has been sorted
out, they will have better detention facilities, better court
facilities and better prison facilities.
Chris Holtby: One of the things
that Jack Lang said very clearly was, "Even if we create
an international court, we would still need more prisons in the
region. Please, get on and build them." Creating the tribunal
would not address that problem.
Q282 Chair: We have the full spec
of what he called for, and we are well aware of it.
Chris Holtby: For prisons, that
is correct, but not for the court.
Q283 Mr Baron: To make it absolutely
clear, as a Committee we are not impugning the reputation or the
actions of the armed forces. Having served myself, I can understand
their frustration. In turn, though, you have to understand our
frustration and explain why the prosecution rate for piracy seems
to be so low and why other countries seem to succeed in prosecuting
whereas we cannot. You seemed to suggest earlier that it is a
question of evidence, yet we have had a situation in which hostages
and pirates are caught on the same boat, which in most courts
of law would go a long to satisfy the evidence requirement. It
is looking more and more as though it is not a question of evidence,
but just that there is no legal end game when it comes to prosecution.
Is that more the issue than the question of evidence? That is
certainly what you seem to be suggesting.
Mr Bellingham: I come back to
my earlier point. The majority of cases of catch and release have
taken place close to the coast, where navies have gone in to disrupt
the passage of skiffs, the smaller vessels. Very often evidence
has been chucked away, and although people have been apprehended,
a decision has been taken that, although they may have been going
equipped and with intent, it would be completely impractical to
take them into custody on the vessel and transfer them for prosecution.
In cases where there is significant evidence, a decision has to
be made on whether the evidence will stand up in court.
I come back to the point about witnesses. I
have heard from the Chamber of Shipping and the IMO that to get
a successful prosecution you need crew members who have been hostages
to give evidence.
Q284 Mr Baron: France, Germany
and other countries seem to do it. Why are we alone in being apparently
incapable of taking such opportunities?
Mr Bellingham: In all those cases,
citizens of those countries had been harmed, and in some cases
killed. In those cases the countries in question took a view that
it would be completely in the public interest to bring the defendants
back to France, Holland or America to launch an action against
them. Those defendants are currently in custody awaiting trialI
think one trial has started, but it is going to be a long, drawn-out
process. Those countries decided that there is sufficient evidence
and sufficient witnesses to go down that particular route. We
have not, and, mercifully, we have not yet had a British citizen
harmed or, worse still, killed.
Chris Holtby: The UK has delivered
successful evidence prosecution cases to Kenya, which has prosecuted
pirates, so we are delivering on those lines.
Mr Bellingham: And we will do
much more of that as we build capacity in the region.
Q285 Mr Watts: Isn't the whole
policy in a mess? Let me give an example. It seems to me that,
ideally, you would like to resolve the matter on land, as you
have said, but that is not going to happen in the foreseeable
future. We see from the figures that arresting pirates and bringing
them to trial is not successful. The only thing that seems to
be successful is having armed guards on ships. We can see that
the pirates do not target ships from India, Russia and China;
they leave those ships alone and concentrate on those that have
no armed guards. Wouldn't it be better to stand down the Navy,
stop doing all the other things, and just put some armed guards
on all of our ships?
Mr Bellingham: I do not think
that we can go down any one route. Just putting armed guards on
vessels and standing down the Navy would not be in the UK's interest.
The Navy, as we know, is an incredibly professional service. We
need a multi-pronged approach, and a wider Somalia policy is essential.
I am a "glass half full" person when it comes to my
assessment of Somalia. AMISOM is making very good progress and
will soon have control over the whole of Mogadishu. We are working
in Somaliland, which is a quasi-independent province within Somalia.
Through our aid programme, we are helping to build capacity and
governance there, and they have eradicated piracy completely.
Puntland is an area where we do not have so
much influence, but a lot of aid work is going on. When we had
the Puntland Minister at a Wilton Park conference earlier in the
year, he said that there were a number of communities in Puntland
where the former fishing villages had been host to pirate activities,
but the Government now had control of those villages. If you have
a state that is no longer fractured and that can provide governance
and control, you solve the piracy problem. In the meantime, you
have to deal with the symptoms at sea, and it is a multifaceted
approach.
I think that international navies have a vital
role to play. If they were not there, the costs to world shipping
would be even greater. Military security companies on board have
a role to play, and that is why we are going to change our advicehopefullyonce
a review has been completed. Looking at operating plans in terms
of the motherships is also important. It is a fluid situation,
Mr Watts, and one that is changing the whole time.
The one thing we must keep stressing is that,
as far as piracy is concerned, a lot depends on the willpower
and determination of the shipping industry to keep up the pressure.
It has to drive the highest possible standardsthe best
management practice and convoy system. Bear in mind also that
40 flag countries are not part of the Maritime Co-ordination Framework,
so that is roughly 10% of all vessels in the region, as General
Howes told you. If we can get perhaps half of them to come into
the co-ordination framework, that would help. So, this is multifaceted.
I do not think that we should give up. The UK has huge interests
at stake here, and we must do everything that we possibly can
to keep up the pressure and go on providing that lead.
Q286 Mr Watts: Let us go back
to the low rate of prosecutions. We have heard that as soon as
these pirates are arrested, there is a race against the clock.
Are we doing all we can to put in place relationships with other
states and procedures to make sure that they are dealt with as
quickly as possible? What are the human rights issues, for example
in relation to Kenya? When suspects are transferred to Kenya,
are there human rights considerations that we need to take on
board? Is that part of the reason for some of the delay?
Mr Bellingham: The front-line
countries are consistently improving their performance. The setback,
unfortunately, was when Kenya signed the MOU and then pulled out.
I am hoping that my discussions tomorrow with the Kenyan Prime
Minister will help to move that forward. As I said earlier, Kenya
was worried that it was going to be shouldering an unfair burden.
However, I think that all the countries in the region realise
that this is a threat to their future, and I would be very disappointed
if I was not able to report to this Committee in six months that
we had seen really serious progress in the post-trial transfer
agreements. Getting the law changed in the Seychelles was very
important, as was getting the transfer of those who had been convicted
to prisons in the region, particularly in Somalia and Puntland.
You asked about human rights. If the Royal Navy
is operating anywhere in the world, you would expect it to respect
the highest standards. This is not an armed conflict; this is
a constabulary or gendarmerie-type operation. Therefore, the Royal
Navy will look at these issues. Once a prisoner has been transferred
to Kenya or Tanzaniawe are doing this for UNODCwe
make sure that the detention and court facilities, and the judicial
system that is in place around this area of law, are, if not up
to western standards, of a much higher standard than in the region
generally.
Q287 Mr Watts: Do we visit them?
Mr Bellingham: Yes, we certainly
do. I have not visited them, and I do not know whether Chris has,
but we have diplomats who have visited the facilities in Kenya
and all these countries.
Q288 Mr Watts: And do they visit
the suspectsthe people we have handed overas well?
Mr Bellingham: They certainly
will have observed trials taking place and they will have seen
the facilities in the prisons.
Chris Holtby: The UN Office on
Drugs and Crime sponsors a programme to visit all prisoners and
keep an eye on their welfare.
Q289 Mr Watts: Finally, Minister,
can you just run through the states with which we have managed
to negotiate transfer for prosecution agreements? Which ones are
we currently negotiating with?
Mr Bellingham: The situation is
that the Seychelles are in front of the pack, because they have
changed their law so that going equipped or going with intent
is an offence under their law. They were taking prisoners at an
earlier stage. Mauritius has signed an MOU. Tanzania, we are working
on. When I was in Tanzania recently, I had a fruitful discussion
with the Foreign Minister and the President about this issue.
They said that they realised the threat to their shipping and
economy, and that they were behind the curve. They wanted to get
an MOU in place as soon as possible. We have spoken to the South
Africans and we will speak to the Mozambique Government. I will
not restrict this to the maritime countries. As I mentioned, there
are many landlocked African countries that have extremely strong
economies.
Although Kenya signed the MOU, I stress that
it is still dealing with pirates on a case-by-case basis. We want
a standardised situation for when the commander of a vessel intercepts
pirates, if he thinks there is enough evidence and that is confirmed
by the chain of command, as I have mentioned. We need an efficient,
fit-for-purpose system within the region. That could well be something
like a software programme that shows at any one time what capacity
is available and which country is next in line to take prisoners.
We are trying to organise it on a professional, efficient basis.
I would hope that within six months we will have seen an important
step forward. I do not want to look at this too optimistically,
but the discussions I have had with those countries indicate to
me that they realise that this evil menace on the high seas is
a threat to their economies, and they want to do something about
it.
Q290 Mike Gapes: May I take you
on to the question of the payment of ransoms? It is difficult
to predict exactly how much has been paid or will be paid. I have
seen figures of more than $200 million. Clearly the amount paid
in some cases is considerablein some cases $5 million plus.
I understand that it is not illegal, under international law,
to pay ransoms, although some countries have made it illegal.
It is not illegal under UK law to pay ransoms, but our Government
discourage their payment. Will you clarify why that is the case,
given that it is not illegal and that large numbers of shipping
companies and others are prepared to payand wish to payransoms,
rather than lose the vessel or crew?
Mr Bellingham: There are two key
areas here. The first is the actual payment of the ransom. You
are right to point out that it is not illegal to pay a ransom
under UK law, although it might be in some circumstances, such
as if there was evidence that the payment would trigger another
crime. Generally speaking, a ransom payment in this country is
not illegal, but we strongly discourage it because, as we all
know, paying ransoms simply encourages further acts of piracy
or hostage takingwhatever it might be. We are firm on that.
Paragraph 14 of the evidence that was given
to you by the British Chamber of Shipping states that it was concerned
by "US legislative actions to curtail piracy by means of
an Executive Order signed by US President
which has the
potential to block payments to certain individuals on the grounds
that they may be contributing to the conflict in Somalia; the
order included the names of a few known pirates." That was
following on from a UN Security Council resolution. Some countries
have implemented the resolution. As you will see, the International
Chamber of Shipping, the Lloyds Market Association and other bodies
remain "very concerned that any attempt to prohibit the payment
of ransoms would further endanger the seafarers held captive".
We need to think outside the box. One of the
things that we could do would be to make more effort to look at
those flows of money after the payment of ransom. Learning more
about the financial flows and taking action to disrupt them are
going to be very important. We are gathering plenty of evidence
and we want to use it to ensure that some of the kingpin pirates
are brought to justice. Two of them have been convicted and imprisoned
already, and there is another who has been extradited. I think
that the shipping industry has a very important role to play in
helping to gather the evidence.
In this area, there are other EU partners who
have a lot of expertise and knowledge, which they have used in
campaigns against Mafia gangs, for example, or criminal gangs.
We want to try and get them to play a part in this agenda as well
so that we can build up that expertise.
Q291 Mike Gapes: What I take from
what you are saying is that you think that we should do more to
discourage the payment of ransoms and to get our European partners
and others also to discourage the payment of ransoms. However,
there is clearly a view coming from organisations that represent
seafarers and also from many of the companies involved that they
would be very concerned about that approach because of the consequences
it might have for themwith people or crews taken hostage,
or the shipping.
Mr Bellingham: You are absolutely
right. This is paragraph 14 of the evidence that was given by
the Chamber of Shipping, which you have a copy of.
Q292 Mike Gapes: What is the Government's
position? I am trying to pin this down exactly. There is clearly
a conflict here. If a vessel is taken with British hostages and
we are not preparedperhaps because of consequences for
their livesto use a full military assault to try to rescue
them, and if no efforts are made to pay a ransom, how long do
you think it will be before those hostages are released?
Mr Bellingham: First, if hostages
are actually takenthis is a Foreign Office leadit
would be a matter for special forces involvement. In certain circumstances,
a hostage release operation would be mounted. In the case of the
Chandlers, as is well known from media coverage, that was looked
at, but when it was considered by people who have far more experience
of this than me, it was decided that there would be too great
a risk to the hostages. The Chandlers then got taken into captivity
and a ransom was eventually paid. We discouraged the payment of
a ransom. The problem, basically, is that if we adopted that UN
Security Council resolution into our own law, it would prevent
the payment of those ransoms if they were going to go to well
known pirates. That would mean that the only way around it would
be to use the payment under duress clause. It might be quite difficult
to do that under our law because we have an independent prosecution
authority.
Q293 Mike Gapes: I am still unclear.
The thrust of what you are saying is that we do not pay ransoms
and we do not encourage the payment of ransoms.
Mr Bellingham: Correct.
Q294 Mike Gapes: Yet, there are
circumstancesyou mentioned the Chandlers; there are otherswhere
individuals would potentially be detained for a very, very long
time, and if no ransom had been paid and there were no other circumstances
for their liberation, presumably they would continue to be detained
potentially for years, certainly many months. Other governments
seem to have a slightly different approach to this. I am trying
to clarify: is it a nod-and-wink policy that officially we do
not do it but if somebody does it, we will live with the consequences,
or is it a real effort to say, "Absolutely, under no circumstances
should anybody pay any ransom"?
Mr Bellingham: No, because paying
ransoms is not against our law. That is the point. We would have
to change our law. The reason why the industry was very concerned
about the UN Security Council resolution on the payment of ransoms
that might get to known pirates, is that it would mean that we
would make changes to our legal system. What they were particularly
concerned about was that countries that have incorporated this
into their law have a defence of duress.
Now, other countries have a different prosecution
system from ours. Basically, in America there is Executive control
over prosecution policy; we have an independent set of prosecution
authorities in this country. The industry is very concerned that
if the legal situation were changed, prosecutions could well occur
when the payment was made to save lives.
We are into a very difficult area, but can I
assure you that we have to weigh up two things. We have to weigh
up all the policy and the efforts to counter piracy, to look at
the risk-reward ratio. At the moment, the balance of the equation
is in favour of reward, not risk. If we increased the level of
risk to the pirates, we might disincentivise piracy. This is one
ingredient, and I can assure you that we will keep it under review,
but it will mean fairly fundamental changes.
Q295 Mike Gapes: But we have been
told of a specific case in which the ransom was waiting on the
runway ready to be sent off, but the people who were sending it
wanted political cover, which the FCO refused to give. Therefore
the whole deal fell through and those people were detained. Several
months later, the payment was made and the people were released.
There is a level of ambiguity here, isn't there?
Mr Bellingham: I do not agree
there is ambiguity. Unless we change our law to make the payment
of ransoms illegal, our policy of discouraging it will continue.
I will give you a good example of what happened the other day,
which has been widely covered in the press. People who were carrying
a ransom arrived at Mogadishu airport with, I think, US$2.5 million.
They were apprehended by the TFG and were up in the court the
following day, where they were convicted and given lengthy prison
sentences.
We dealt with that as a consular case. We did
not say that the TFG were wrong to prosecute those people for
paying a ransom, which is against their law. In that case, there
has been a presidential pardonthe men have been released,
but the money has been confiscated by the TFG, and I understand
the assets as well, such as vehicles and aircraft.
Q296 Mike Gapes: A final question:
can I take it from your answer that we are not going to outlaw
the payment of ransoms in all circumstances?
Mr Bellingham: We keep this under
review. Some countries have adopted the Security Council resolution,
but we have not done so yet. It would require a change in our
law. We keep it under review. As I say, we have to weigh up the
peculiar circumstances of our legal system. But if we adopted
the resolution, those paying a ransom to save people's lives might
end up being prosecuted, which might not be in the public interest.
Q297 Chair: Does the UK track
ransom payments?
Mr Bellingham: We are trying to
understand much more about the financial flows and therefore disrupt
them. Yes, we are strongly supporting two major organisationsInterpol
and the UNODCthat are doing exactly that, for which they
have a number of new policies and protocols in place. It is slow
work, but so far, two key Somali kingpins have been convicted
and are serving custodial sentences. Another kingpin financier
is awaiting extradition from Dubai to Belgium. The work is ongoing.
We have very advanced money-laundering laws
in the UK, as well as all the training that goes with that. We
put money into UNODCas a big contributor to the UN, we
do that anywaybut DFID have put some extra money in to
work with the regional countries to implement new money-laundering
laws in, say, Kenya, as well as training. There is no point in
having the laws
Q298 Chair: Can we concentrate
on the UK?
Mr Bellingham:if you haven't
got regional financial investigators. We are certainly doing all
we can in the UK.
Q299 Chair: So the answer is yesyou
do track money through these organisations.
Mr Bellingham: It is fair to say
that we were possibly slow to look at this area as a priority.
But in the early days of payment of ransoms we were talking about
a few million US dollars; we are now talking about a total amount
of about $300 million. Serious sums of money are washing around
different world financial centres and systems. Understanding where
that money goes, disrupting it and going after the kingpins is
incredibly important. We have had some success, but there is much
more to do.
Q300 Chair: Is SOCA involved when
ransom money is paid?
Mr Bellingham: SOCA certainly
are involved, yes. We have a strong SOCA presence in Nairobi,
and there is liaison between SOCA
Q301 Chair: Is SOCA involved when
ransom payments go through the UK?
Mr Bellingham: SOCA certainly
are involved in trying to track payments.
Q302 Chair: Are they involved
when ransom money goes through the UK?
Mr Bellingham: If there was evidence
of ransom money; there would need to be evidence. Of course it's
very difficult when money is paid over in cash to unknown individuals,
who then launder it through property, through assets in the region.
Does some of the money end up in London? We do not have evidence
that money has ended up in London, but we are doing our best to
make sure that we understand much more about these flows, so that
if money does end up here, we are able to get at the guys who
are the recipients.
Q303 Chair: So you don't know
if SOCA is involved?
Mr Bellingham: SOCA are treating
this as a priority, but they don't yet have evidence that could
lead to a prosecution.
Chris Holtby: SOCA clear all payments
that could be regarded as suspicious, as part of their normal
work, across all financial transactions. That is a routine matter
for SOCA.
Q304 Chair: Isn't that inconsistent
with the policy of discouraging payment?
Chris Holtby: No.
Q305 Chair: Why not?
Chris Holtby: They are not asked
to take a judgment on whether or not it is a matter of policy.
They are asked whether or not it is legal.
Q306 Chair: But if you have a
Government Department that is sanctioning payments, yet it is
the policy of the Government to discourage payments, I would say
that was inconsistent.
Mr Bellingham: They are not exactly
sanctioning those payments, because if they had evidence that
those payments resulted from a ransom situation, they would be
able to take action.
Q307 Chair: Don't you think it
makes you look a bit weak? There you are saying, "We don't
approve of this payment," but none the less, you are thoroughly
aware that it is happening.
Mr Bellingham: We are aware that
payments are made. We do not have evidence of money finding its
way through the financial service institutions in the City. We
don't have evidence that there is money ending up in London. If
there was evidence of this, then we would be able to go after
the guys. That is why we are making this a bigger priority, putting
more money into Interpol, into UNODC, understanding more about
how these financial flows are structured. DFID are looking at
a project to embed some experts into this who have serious knowledge.
We can't tell you anything about that at the moment, because it
is still ongoing, but there may be an announcement coming up at
some stage in the near future from DFID on that.
Q308 Chair: Are you aware of the
details of how the Chandlers were freed?
Mr Bellingham: I am not personally
aware of that.
Q309 Chair: Is anyone in the Foreign
Office aware of it?
Mr Bellingham: Do you want to
comment on that, Chris?
Chris Holtby: The Chandler family
have kept in regular contact with consular officers in the Foreign
Office, but we were not in any way engaged in any of the ransom
negotiations or payments.
Q310 Chair: Is anyone at the Foreign
Office aware of the details?
Chris Holtby: In so far as the
Chandlers have wanted to share it with consular officials, then
they know, but payment of ransom is not a matter for Government.
Q311 Chair: Is it classified?
Chris Holtby: I don't think it
would be a classified issue, but
Q312 Chair: I am just wondering
if there is anything you could share with us.
Mr Bellingham: We could certainly
look at that. If there is information that is available and is
not classified, we could come back to you on that. We could let
you know.
Chair: We now move on to Somaliland.
We have just 15 minutes left.
Q313 Mike Gapes: You have already
referred to Somaliland'sin your wordsquasi-independence.
Given that it is quasi-independent, how do we engage with Somaliland
and with Puntland on these issues, given that the Transitional
Federal Government is so weak that it doesn't control large parts
of Somalia? Related to that, is it not time we were more positive
towards the fact that we have a democratic Government in Somaliland?
It has good governance and is about the only part of Somalia which
is functioning.
Mr Bellingham: I can certainly
understand the enthusiasm that a lot of people have for recognising
Somaliland as an independent country. What I said was, that it
is a quasi-independent country. It has home rule. It is autonomous,
but any recognition of Somaliland as an independent country is
a matter for the people of Somaliland. It is also a matter which
the AU would have to lead on. It would be wrong for the UK to
get involved or pre-empt this. It would also undermine our wider
Somali strategy because our strategy is not just about engagement
with the TFG. It is a much wider strategy, which is why are taking
a lead in the International Contact Group on Somalia. It is why
we have the cross-departmental working group on Somalia, which
obviously includes piracy. We are looking at how we can add value
to different parts of Somalia.
Somaliland is somewhere where we have a good
relationship. There is a large diaspora in this country. They
had presidential elections early this year, which went very smoothly
and there was a transfer of power. Somaliland is a place where
we are putting in quite a lot of aid. For example, part of the
money we put into UNODC focused on improving prison conditions,
staff housing and training programmes for prison staff in Somaliland.
It supported also the completion of the prison in Hargeisa.
We gave a substantial amount of money for that. The fact that
Somaliland does not host any pirate activity is an indication
of that.
I would like to see Somaliland as the exemplar
for the rest of Somalia. We would like to see Puntland coming
the same way, and I think there is a good chance that the positive
progress in Puntland will lead to further significant steps forward.
The TFG have extended their transition for another year, and
we are confident that the TFG will now start reaching out to the
different constituent parts of Somalia and actually start making
a difference, giving the people of Somalia some hope for the future.
What the people of Somalia, particularly in South and Central,
must have is some confidence in the legitimacy of the Government
and some incentive to move away from the enticements of al-Shabab.
In fact, the Captain has just told me that Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Cardigan Bay is currently operating off the coast of Somaliland
with the Somaliland coastguard. That leads on to the other point:
building some regional capacity not just in terms of prisons in
Somaliland, but coastguard capacity.
I come back to the point I made earlier, which
Mr Stewart so eloquently put when talking about fractured failed
states. If you have a fractured failed state, you will have problems
like piracy.
Q314 Rory Stewart: Minister, thank
you for your endurance of our marathon session. Just to follow
up, it does seem as though the fundamental problem is that Somalia
is in a mess. It was in a mess before the Government collapsed
in the early '90s. It is in even more of a mess now. Perhaps
some wise policy needs to start from humility. We need to acknowledge
that there is a limited amount that the United Kingdom can really
do to resolve such situations. It is very tempting to say, "Well,
we are doing this splendid DFID project," or "We are
building some prisons," or "We are encouraging people
to talk to each other," but if you were to step back, detach
and look at the past 20 or 30 years, maybe we need to begin by
acknowledging that there may be things that we cannot do.
Mr Bellingham: I do not think
that we can win this from a military point of view. The lessons
are that the Somalis do not take at all well to outside foreign
intervention. We have to work with the grain of what the Somali
people aspire to, and I think that they aspire to having control
of their own lives. The reason why so much of South and Central
is under the control of al-Shabab is because they have filled
a void and they provide order. Where there is order, business
can operate.
One of the things that struck me about Somaliaand
I have not been there yetis that, in South and Central,
even in the areas where al-Shabab is holding forward, business
continues for SMEs, enterprise is going on, and we are getting
aid in there through local organisations. At the moment, there
is the big problem of refugees moving to Kenya, and there are
big problems over the drought, but it is interesting to reflect
that, when the Islamic courts were in charge of Somalia, there
was no piracy problem because they told the communities that going
down the piracy route was against the Koran, that it was completely
evil and wrong and that, if they did it, they would suffer the
most appalling consequences under the sharia law system that they
had in place.
Somali people respect authority; they greatly
resent a lack of legitimacy, which is why we have to work with
the TFG. They are not the only game in town, which is why our
wider Somali policy envisages a whole-Somali approach. I am a
glass half full person on Somaliathere is a very good chance
that the TFG will be able to provide services throughout Mogadishu
in the near future. AMISOM has done an absolutely fantastic job.
The TFG forces coming into theatre, trained by the EU training
mission, have performed incredibly well.
What was interesting at the recent AU summit,
which I attended last week, was that, although Libya and Sudan
dominated, there was still a lot of focus on Somalia. There is
a real determination within the regional community, particularly
IGAD, to play an important role. Along with President Museveni,
it was absolutely pivotal in brokering the Kampala accord, which
is leading to the political bureau being set up. There will be
a Mogadishu summit that Special Representative Mahiga will preside
over next week.
We are not just working along; we are working
with European partners and particularly with regional partners,
who understand how, if the problem is not solvedwith Sudan
going, I hope, in the right direction and some of the other disasters
in Africa, like Côte d'Ivoire, being sorted outwe
will have this appalling, ongoing failed-state situation on the
Horn of Africa, causing a huge amount of economic damage to the
whole region, to say nothing of the refugees and the human suffering.
Q315 Rory Stewart: Finally, a
plea for the idea that the international community, in dealing
with the issues, may not be able to solve the problems, but should
at least not make the situation worse. Obviously, as you have
explained, you have a difficult problem with al-Shabab. On the
one hand, there is horrible human rights abuse and links to radical
Islam and, on the other hand, a certain amount of support, legitimacy
and attempts to control piracy. The international community has
got itself into a situation where it is in some ways paralysing
the situation and continuing the conflict. It is doing it by pumping
money into one side in the conflict, which is not necessarily
the cleanest, most uncorrupt and most credible part of the Somali
situation. It is in many ways getting in the way of any kind of
political settlements or negotiations that might take place. Do
you think we could see a situation in which the international
community begins to extract itself, rather than digging itself
ever deeper with the risk that it makes the situation worsenot
betterby doing so?
Mr Bellingham: I am more positive
and optimistic than you, Mr Stewart. I think that the Kampala
accord presents a way forward in the short term. The political
bureau that is going to sit in Mogadishu will be made up of a
number of international partners. The key role of the political
bureau is to make sure that the milestones that are now in place
for the TFG to achieve are metthat the conditions are put
in place, that their feet are held to the fire and that they actually
deliver services. One of the key aspects of that is getting them
to reach out to the more moderate clans to make their Government
more inclusive, because until they do that and give the people
of Somalia some hope that they can offer a federal Government
within a loose federal system, there is no way forward.
I would be optimistic that the much more subtle,
multifaceted international approach will pay dividends, whereas
in the past the approach was much more blunt, as you are aware.
That is perhaps what you fear will happen again in the future.
Our approach is much more nuanced and carefully thought out. It
is a question of bringing in regional partners and of looking
at where we can add value in the parts of Somalia that are going
well, but it is also about being under no illusions as to the
power of al-Shabab. On the other hand, there are communities where
an alternative is now in place to al-Shabab, and they see thatnot
al-Shababas their future.
Q316 Rory Stewart: How is that
different from people who, for example, say in Afghanistan all
the same things about the Karzai Government? They say that we
need to hold their feet to the fire, make them meet the milestones,
reach out to the moderate tribes and bring in the regional partners.
Why should it be any more successful in Somalia than it has been
in other parts of the world? What is the cause for optimism?
Mr Bellingham: There is a narrative
that you can repeat in the context of both countries. There are
two reasons why I am optimistic. I suppose you could say the same
about Afghanistan, but the Somali people have been through so
much. The appalling plight of refugees and the problems with drought
have been conflict multipliers. There are so many reasons for
listening to the diaspora, who are optimistic. Those guys are
making serious money in the UK and remitting it back to Somalia.
On the point of cleaning up the TFG. There was
a lot of infighting, and the rows between Sheikh Sharif, the Speaker
and the Prime Minister were hugely distracting. Many members of
the TFG were more interested in drawing their salary than trying
to make a difference. There is now a new Prime Minister, there
is a political bureau overseeing the TFG's work, and the Foreign
Minister, who you may have met, has a positive vision for the
country. We now have a Government who are working together and
delivering.
Finally, the brave troops of AMISOM are making
progress on the ground. If, when the troops free up an area, the
TFG can move in, open a medical centre, get a school going and
allow markets to start flourishing again, people will say that
there is an alternative way forward. Although the Somalis are
from many different clans, they are basically a people who have
an entrepreneurial drive. The vast majorityoutside of Somaliland,
where I agree there is an aspiration for independenceare
incredibly wedded to the idea of a loose federal country, of one
Somalia.
Chair: Thank you, Minister. As you are
aware, in the main Chamber after the debate on phone hacking there
is a debate on the Select Committee reports on Afghanistan, so
some of us had better slip away and put a few notes together for
that.
Thank you very much indeed for coming along.
There may be one or two loose ends, in which case we will drop
you a line, if you wouldn't mind dealing with them. Your efforts
are much appreciated, as are those of Mr Holtby and Captain Reindorp.
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