Piracy off the coast of Somalia - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers 235-316)

Mr Henry Bellingham MP, Mr Chris Holtby and Captain David Reindorp RN

6 July 2011

  Chair: I welcome members of the public to this third evidence session of the Committee's inquiry into piracy off the coast of Somalia. We are having a hard look at this topic and today our key witness, eagerly awaited, is Henry Bellingham, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs who is responsible for this area of policy. He is accompanied by Captain David Reindorp, the Head of Defence Crisis Management at the Ministry of Defence, who appeared before us—was it last week or the week before?

  Captain Reindorp: Last week.

  Q235 Chair: I also welcome Chris Holtby, the Deputy Head of the Security Policy Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

  Minister, given that hardly any of our ships have been snatched down there, why do we have such a high profile in this area?

  Mr Bellingham: First, Chair, may I make a very short statement, by way of introduction?

  Chair: Of course.

  Mr Bellingham: I thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to give this update. I read the earlier evidence with great interest. Partly to answer your question, we are a great maritime nation; the impact of Somali piracy is costing world trade between $7 billion and $10 billion a year, so it obviously poses a threat to our interests; and it threatens the lives of United Kingdom seafarers. It also perpetuates instability in Somalia and threatens the economies and well-being of other states in the region. We are therefore playing a leading role, which I shall probably have a chance to explain in a moment.

  Your Committee heard the week before last from Major General Buster Howes about the excellent work that the European Union is doing in leading the international response and the key roles of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. I understand that you visited Atalanta at the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood, and I am sure that you will agree with me that the capability is very impressive. It is also a very good example of co-ordination between different groups: there is no shared command, but they are working incredibly well together.

  I think that progress has been made—there has not been a hijack for the past eight months in the Gulf, in spite of the 20,000-odd vessels that navigate through it—but, of course, there is displacement into the wider ocean, and that is why we are not complacent. The UK is taking a very active role. We are very active on the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. We chair the Committee on Operational Military Co-ordination and the Regional Capability Development Committee. We are very active on the International Contact Group on Somalia and have also helped to promote debates at the United Nations on the issue of Somalia and piracy.

  On the legal aspects, there are obviously significant legal challenges on piracy, particularly relating to prosecution, and I have been particularly active in pursuing that with some of the regional states. The first problem we had with various countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles was that international piracy on the high seas was not an offence under their law, so they had to change their law to make it an offence under their jurisdiction. That was the first important move, but the second move is that most of those countries do not have an offence of going equipped or going with intent, so we are working with them to try to change that. Of course, if they do not have an offence in their own legal system of going equipped or with intent, unless an act of piracy has been actually carried out, they will not accept the pirates for trial and possibly detention if successfully prosecuted. We work alongside those partners. I can understand the frustration of catch and release occurring, but it is worth saying that more than 1,000 pirates are now in custody around the world, so there is no impunity.

  Obviously, the shipping industry has a key role to play. You heard from General Howes the week before last when he pointed out that scarcely any successful hijacks have been carried out of vessels that were following best management practice.

  Lastly—perhaps I should have said this at the beginning—we are dealing with the symptoms. The only way to sort out piracy is on land. A fractured, chaotic state such as Somalia—a failed state with no governance and with institutions that have no legitimacy—will not be able to control the problem. It is probably instructive to look at what is happening in West Africa, where there have been piracy problems but where functioning states have been able to get a grip of them.

  Finally, since I became a Minister I have set up a cross-Whitehall ministerial working group on piracy. We have an ongoing dialogue with the EU and our development partners, and we are working closely with industry and other key parties. That is a snapshot, Chair. I hope it provides a useful platform for further discussions.

  Q236 Chair: So the answer to the question I leapt in with is that we are there because we are a major maritime nation?

  Mr Bellingham: We are there because we are a major maritime nation, yes, but we are also playing a critical role in the peace process in Somalia. I mentioned the International Contact Group and the debates that we have helped to launch in the UN. Obviously, the curse of piracy is one of the drivers of the instability and problems in Somalia, so the two work hand in hand. I believe that the key thing is to go back to the cause of the problem, which is on land.

  Q237 Chair: There are not one but three command structures, all with a slightly different take on the subject. Do you think it would be more efficient to have a unified command structure and why are we a member of all three?

  Mr Bellingham: I have had a chance to look at this in quite a lot of detail, and I agree with Buster Howes. If we were starting from scratch, we would probably have different arrangements in place. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that although we have Atalanta, the Combined Maritime Force and NATO, a number of countries are outside those structures and are inside on only an ad hoc basis.

  What is impressive is the shared awareness and deconfliction mechanism, based in Bahrain. When I was at Permanent Joint HQ at Northwood visiting Atalanta, a number of senior naval officers said to me that that was an absolute exemplar of maritime security and co-operation. In spite of the fragmented arrangements that you rightly allude to, the level of co-operation is first class. If we start trying to change those structures in any fundamental way now, that would not necessarily be the right thing to do. We would have to carry our European and NATO counterparts with us. What we have in place we have got working very well, and I think we can get it working even better.

  Q238 Chair: We had a good visit to Northwood the other day with EUNAVFOR, so your comments resonate with us.

  We have the SDR and no one can deny that there is going to be a reduction in hardware for the armed forces. How sustainable is it to go on supplying into the future the level of commitment that we have supplied? Can we keep up the tempo, or will we have to slow up a bit?

  Mr Bellingham: The Navy has a number of standing tasks. The protection of the UK in home waters, the protection of the deterrent, and the two standing Atlantic patrol tasks: North, which is the Caribbean and counter-narcotics; and South, which is the Falklands and West Africa. Then there are the contingent tasks that are carried out on an enduring basis. There are two vessels in the Gulf, and two supporting the operations in Libya. There are 19 vessels to go round. As far as Somalia is concerned, counter-piracy is not one of the standing tasks, but that is something that the MOD and the NAC will keep under constant review.

  I stress that the role the UK is taking is not only a matter of the vessels that we have deployed, but the leadership role that we are supplying, the lead that we have provided on strategy and the thinking behind a number of the different strands. At the same time, we are saying to many of our partners in the EU and NATO that we have commitments elsewhere that they do not have—Libya is the obvious example, but there is also the Gulf—and we want them to pull their weight in terms of deployment.

  Q239 Chair: Do you think we will keep up the flow of ships that we have had in the past?

  Mr Bellingham: The FCO will be doing all we possibly can to make sure that that is the message going from our part of the Government to the MOD. Obviously, we provide the headquarters for Atalanta. You heard Buster Howes say the week before last that he would be very surprised indeed if that function did not continue. In spite of what has happened in terms of the downsizing, we will still have one of the most formidable navies in the world—probably the third most competent, efficient and professional navy in the world. That is why the issue of Somalia and piracy is going before the NSC; it is exactly the sort of thing that it will look at.

  Q240 Chair: That sounds like a probably rather than a definitely.

  We have received reports that there has been a shortage of RFAs and problems with refuelling the ships there. Can you cast any light on that?

  Mr Bellingham: I was not aware that there had been a problem. I was aware of some of the excellent work done by RFAs, which in many ways are a suitable platform because they have the helicopter capability, as do frigates and destroyers as well, of course. Buster Howes pointed out that the helicopter is certainly a force multiplier. I will refer to Captain David Reindorp on the specific question about refuelling.

  Captain Reindorp: To put it in perspective, sir, there is always a shortage of RFAs. It does not matter where you are, in which part of the ocean, doing what particular task, there is always a shortage of ships to refuel from. To the best of my knowledge, though, I do not think that Atalanta or NATO has suffered from an inability to refuel.

  Q241 Chair: There was a suggestion that it was limiting the time on patrol.

  Captain Reindorp: It may do, but an RFA will simply provide fuel and occasionally a small proportion of food or other logistics. At some stage, each ship on patrol will need to return to harbour. If there has been any reduction of time on task, it will be relatively short.

  Q242 Mr Watts: Minister, we heard from previous witnesses that the downsizing of the Navy would have an impact on the operation, yet you seem to indicate that you are fairly confident that that would not be the case. Previous witnesses said that we would be more reliant on our partners to provide the vessels that we need to do the job. Which is it, and why are you so confident that other nations will provide the facilities we need if we downsize?

  Mr Bellingham: I am confident we are going to be able to keep up the pressure on those other nations. I did not say that I was confident that they would necessarily come up with the goods and step up to the plate, but that is an ongoing narrative that we are going to have to have with them.

  I am confident, Mr Watts, that the MOD regards Somali piracy and the work off the Horn of Africa and deep into the ocean as a key priority. It is not a standing task, as you know, which means that it is one of those functions and responsibilities that has to take second priority after the key standing task, but given what is at stake for the UK, I have every confidence that the UK will be able to keep up its leadership role and the naval platforms in the area. For example, although our ship that is currently tasked to Atalanta will shortly be coming out of theatre, we will still have a vessel within the NATO force, and I would be very surprised indeed if we did not at all times have a vessel as part of one of the forces providing counter-piracy work.

  Q243 Mr Watts: You say you are confident, but there will be fewer vessels and we have not so far secured any further assets from our partners. If it is a key task, are we not putting the carthorse before the cart in the sense that we should say either, "We want to do this," or, "We don't want to do it."? Should we not find the resources or make sure that resources are in place before we continue down a road that we may not have the resources to deliver?

  Mr Bellingham: I have every confidence that the work that is being carried out in the counter-piracy operations will continue apace. As I said, the UK will continue to have a very important role. We are going to go on providing the leadership in key areas; a huge amount of the strategy work is being done by the UK; and I can assure you that I, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Ministers spare no effort in putting pressure on our European counterparts and our NATO allies who may not have the other commitments that we have at the moment. Of course, those other commitments are contingent commitments being carried out on an enduring basis, as the Navy puts it, but I hope they will not continue for ever.

  Q244 Mr Watts: I think, from your answer, that there is no guarantee that those resources will be in place at this stage.

  Mr Bellingham: I do not think that any government can give an absolute cast-iron guarantee on particular assets that will be used, but we can give a guarantee that we will continue to provide the leadership. I would be very surprised indeed if that leadership role, the work that we have done so far and the success that we have had would not be continued without a Royal Navy vessel being part of those operations.

  Chris Holtby: May I add something to what the Minister said? We recognise in the work we do in the Contact Group that continued force flow is an issue, but as the Minister said, we have been encouraging our partners to do more. Already in the last year or so, we have had new contributors coming forward, such as Thailand, Indonesia and South Africa, so there is a broadening of the coalition. They all come together through the SHADE mechanism that the Minister has already mentioned. In fact, it is a cohesive international effort—some burden sharing if you like.

   Q245 Andrew Rosindell: Minister, it is a pleasure to see you this afternoon. Government briefings often state that pirates have to be caught red-handed before they can be prosecuted, and that is often used as the reason why so few get prosecuted. In international law, though, prosecution is permitted when people are intending to commit piracy. Are you satisfied that the UK is fully using international law and the rules of engagement to deal with this situation?

  Mr Bellingham: Thank you for that question, Mr Rosindell. There are four key points that I would like to make in that. First, UN Security Council Resolutions 1851 and 1950 are based on UNCLOS, as you rightly point out. What those resolutions and that part of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea looks at is pirate activity on the high seas—activity on the high seas for pirate ends. It has not been designated as an armed conflict.

  There is not an issue around the actual rules of engagement as such. The issue, of course, is what happens when the pirates are apprehended—caught. If the pirates have committed a pirate offence and it is in the UK's interests to prosecute them, then we will do so. I made that absolutely crystal clear. I have recently written to the Secretary of State for Justice about this very point.

  As far as the regional players are concerned, as I said in my opening statement, we have had quite a long slog with countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles and Mauritius. They have now, in many cases, stepped up to the plate, particularly Seychelles and Mauritius, but first we had to persuade them to change their law—previously, piracy was an offence under their penal code only if it took place in their territorial waters. That was the first step. Now, piracy does not have to take place against a Kenyan vessel for it to be triable in Kenya, because it is now an offence under Kenyan law. We now need to see their law changed to match our law where going equipped with intent is an indictable offence.

  Q246 Andrew Rosindell: Are we being robust enough in dealing with this serious problem on the high seas, particularly in the Indian Ocean? Do you know of any EU or NATO commanders who have asked us to be more robust in how we are handling this? Are there lessons to be learned from the way in which Russia, China and India deal with this situation?  

  Mr Bellingham: There are a couple of points. First, the UK has not designated this an armed conflict. The current rules of engagement allow sufficient force to be used in self defence. In other words if a naval vessel is fired on it can fire back. It can use proportionate force. What the Navy does not do, because this is not an armed conflict, is take pre-emptive action if it sees a skiff with pirates on it. That is not something that we would do because it is not envisaged under the UN security council resolutions or under this part of UNCLOS. Captain Reindorp said in his evidence that he knows that at any one time, as part of the counter-piracy operations, there will be x-hundred Royal Navy personnel on our vessels who are frustrated. The last thing that they want to do is to put in a lot of effort and to use their intelligence and professionalism to apprehend pirates. If no actual piracy act is being committed, gathering the evidence can be challenging, especially when they chuck the weapons overboard and claim to be fishermen.

  You have to remember, Mr Rosindell, that to make a prosecution stack up, you need sufficient evidence. The captain of a vessel has to be prepared to give evidence and you have to have crew members. Unless there is sufficient evidence, is it in the UK's interests to bring pirates back here to prosecute? I suggest it is not. But what we are very keen to do is to get these other countries to change their law so that when we transship pirates to Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles or Mauritius, there is a good chance of a successful prosecution. But the key thing also is to build the judicial and custodial capacity in those countries. If we build that capacity by helping them, they will be much more inclined to assist. The channels have to be gone through—it has to be done very quickly—before we get a positive decision from the Kenyan or Tanzanian authorities saying, "Yes, we will take this particular batch of pirates."

  Q247 Andrew Rosindell: Finally, Minister, I have two points—the first leading on from the point you just made. Of course, we have our own territory in that region of the world—British Indian Ocean Territory. Is there no way we could make use of that territory as a base for tackling piracy in the Indian Ocean? Possibly, we could have prosecutions ourselves, bearing in mind that we have Crown territory in that region. That is the first point. Secondly, is there any scope at all for military action against pirates on land? Have you encountered that as a possibility?

  Mr Bellingham: First, as far as Diego Garcia is concerned, you are absolutely right. British Indian Ocean Territory is a UK Overseas Territory, which is leased to the Americans. Royal Navy vessels obviously go there from time to time. I am quite sure that if they had to go there as part of these operations, to reprovision or refuel, they would do exactly that. We have a very good relationship with the Americans. They are our close allies, of course. On the point about building a court there, I would certainly be prepared to have a look at that, but I think what is more important is to use our money—the DFID money—that goes in through UNODC to build court capacity in the region. When this problem is eventually sorted out, they will then have a legacy of good courts and better prisons—better facilities all round.

  You asked about taking action against pirates on land. Security Council Resolutions 1851 and 1950 authorise operations throughout Somali territory. It is important to bear in mind that they authorise action against pirates, not against terrorists. There would have to be agreement among our partners and changes to the operating plans, and a number of considerations would have to be looked at before that was entered into.

  Captain Reindorp: May I add one point to that? I have not been to Diego Garcia, but I understand that you cannot get a ship alongside. There is a long runway, but very little else. I also understand that the chief prosecutor is a naval officer who is sent out there on a three-year posting. It is really very basic. To build some sort of infrastructure—a courthouse, jail or whatever—would be quite a large undertaking.

  Q248 Andrew Rosindell: If we are spending that money in other countries, why not our own territories?

  Captain Reindorp: It is almost certainly not practical is my answer to that. To go back to your previous question, you introduced the word "robustness". Three phrases are often conflated when talking about pirates: "more robust", "rules of engagement" and "international law". All three are different; all three have different meanings. From our perspective, the rules of engagement are perfectly adequate for the job that we have. They are based on domestic and international law. If you wanted to be more robust and if you wanted to change ROE, you have to change domestic and international law. At the moment, our law is firm on the level of force that can be used in a constabulary operation, which limits you to self-defence. Anything else moves away from that and would be quite a large undertaking.

  Mr Bellingham: And you would have to have a designation of armed conflict for that to happen, or, as the captain says, a change in the law. But I think it is fair to say that we keep all this under review. This is a situation that we take incredibly seriously. You heard from Captain Reindorp last week about the operating plan. I said in a parliamentary answer about a month ago that there was a change in the EU Atalanta operating plan to look at enhanced boarding capability. For operational reasons, we cannot go into detail here, but that is an example of how the threat is changing the whole time. The pirates have raised their game through the use of motherships, and our response has to change accordingly.

  Q249 Chair: May I take you back to an answer you gave to Mr Rosindell, in which I think you confirmed that an intent to commit an act of piracy was an indictable offence. Is that right?

  Mr Bellingham: Under UK law, going equipped or with intent is an indictable offence, but it is not an offence in other countries. I think only four countries in fact have a law that enables you to prosecute for intent or going equipped—I think India is one of them, isn't it, Chris?

  Chris Holtby: Seychelles.

  Mr Bellingham: And the Seychelles have now changed their law. So what we want is for countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Mauritius to change their laws as well.

  Captain Reindorp: If I may, to add a little context to this discussion of "intent to commit", we have to be able to differentiate four Somali gentlemen in a small boat with AK47s, which they will usually say that they carry for self-protection from pirates, from pirates, who may well also look like four Somali gentlemen in the same boat, with exactly the same weapons.

  Q250 Chair: That is a good point. So how do you make that judgement?

  Captain Reindorp: That is where you get stories about having to catch them red-handed. Because in order to build sufficient evidence, it almost comes down to that.

  Q251 Chair: But if you saw a skiff with four pirates with arms on board approaching a merchant vessel, at what point do you decide that that is an intent to carry out an act of piracy?

  Captain Reindorp: I suppose in that instance, it's when they start to brandish their weapons and if indeed they start to fire them, but again, in that part of the world merchant ships frequently go past small Somali vessels with AK47s in them. It is a judgment call.

  Chair: I'd say firing them was more than intent, actually.

  Q252 Mr Roy: Could you clarify that point, Captain and Minister? In articles 101 and 103 of UNCLOS, it states quite clearly that if it is known that a ship is, "intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing" a pirate act, then that should therefore be enough. It is important to know that the article 101 definition of piracy also includes as piracy, "any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft". Crucially, that means that a pirate ship is defined as being a ship that those in control intend to use to commit the act. That is not really what you just said, because you said that you have to prove otherwise and that is not the case. Can you just clarify that, what articles 101 to 103 say?

  Mr Bellingham: I can certainly clarify that, Mr Roy. What is in these articles has to then be transferred into the national law of the country in question. You have this body of articles, and we have moved it into our law, and we are trying to persuade regional countries to do exactly the same.

  Q253 Mr Roy: Sorry, are you saying that our national law is different from articles 101 to 103 of the United Nations?

  Mr Bellingham: No, our law mirrors this. But the law of various countries like Kenya, and until recently the Seychelles, did not incorporate this particular principle.

  Q254 Mr Roy: But you will agree, then, that the effect of this article is that a ship does not need to have already committed an act of piracy to be a pirate ship?

  Mr Bellingham: Under the UN article, that is absolutely right. This means we have an incredibly strong case when we go to countries like Kenya—and the Seychelles have taken a position on this—and other countries, and we say they have to ask them to change their law. There is a very powerful reason for them doing so, because it would be in line with the article. I don't know if you would like to add anything to that, Chris?

  Chris Holtby: First, it has to be prosecuted under national law. But it still remains a case of evidence in each individual case. So you would have to prove in the national courts that that ship was equipped specifically for piracy.

  Q255 Chair: Let us go back to our skiff with four men and AK47s, and probe the question of intent. If they had a boarding ladder and a grappling hook with them, would that show intent? Would that define them as pirates, rather than innocent fishermen carrying guns to protect themselves?

  Captain Reindorp: It probably would not define them as pirates—there could still be innocent explanations—but I agree you would be moving further away from the presumption of innocence. The level of proof actually required is set by the prosecutors and the lawyers that you are dealing with.

  Chris Holtby: May I move into a slightly different paradigm? If there were infinite prison capacity in the region, we would be able to find states in the region that would be willing to prosecute every case of intent. The fundamental capacity concern in the region is that there is not enough prison space to hold all the pirates. That is why these states are primarily focusing on cases in which pirate attacks have taken place.

  Chair: That is very helpful. It is an area we are planning to come to, but you have nicely set the tone.

  Q256 Mr Baron: I think we all accept that pirates nowadays do not go running around the ocean with a skull and crossbones. Does that not raise the importance of having maritime private security companies on vessels? The figures suggest that most are British anyway. I know the FCO is conducting a review, but the fact that to our knowledge no vessel with guards on board has been successfully hijacked suggests it is a policy we should adopt.

  Mr Bellingham: I agree with you wholeheartedly. The shipping industry's thinking on that has been moving quite slowly, but it has gathered pace. In reply to Question 90, Buster Howes said that a year or so ago he had been quite frustrated with the shipping industry's attitude, but he thinks that everything has now moved on quite significantly.

  I agree that there isn't a single recorded incident of a vessel with private military armed security on board that has been successfully pirated. I am working with the Shipping Minister, Mike Penning, who is the Department for Transport lead on this issue, because the Department's guidelines currently strongly discourage the use of armed security on vessels. We want the Department to change those guidelines to, at the very best, neutral.

  There are implications for using prohibited firearms on UK vessels, which is why I have also written to the Home Secretary on the changes that would have to be made to the firearms legislation. It can either be done through primary legislation or through secondary legislation, through which the Home Secretary could issue a permit to companies registered with the trade association that provides the oversight and regulation for that industry.

  Q257 Mr Baron: To be clear, the Government support this idea and it is a question of how we get from here to there?

  Mr Bellingham: The Government recognise that armed private security companies are a fact of life. Some 25% of ships in the region have them on board. Many shipping lines have been pressing us very hard on that issue. Nautilus International, the trade union, has been particularly vocal. Our view is that the UK Government should not encourage such measures, but we should also not discourage them; we should be neutral. It should be a decision for the shipping industry on a case-by-case basis.

  Q258 Mr Baron: It was reported in the press that the Committee was going to be given a copy of the Government's review of this issue for UK-flagged ships. We have not received anything. When will the review be available, and, if we go down the route at which you are hinting, will changes to legislation be required?

  Mr Bellingham: The Department for Transport, which is the lead Department, will come up with some proposals alongside the review. The Department will announce that the consultation has taken place across the industry. Obviously, it will explain what the different trade associations—the Chamber of Shipping and other organisations such as the IMO—are saying. It will also announce its proposals, having discussed with the Home Office how we can achieve them. Do you know the timing of the review, Chris?

  Chris Holtby: Discussions are ongoing between the DFT and the Home Office, which are the primary Departments involved. In May, the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO issued a framework for international legislation or guidelines on this area. It is important that we do not act alone and that we go in step with our international partners, particularly as many UK companies use flags of other nations. We have that international framework now, and we are looking at how it can be reflected in national law. There is no set timeline, but, given the legal risks if arms are used on board vessels, both Departments realise the urgency of this issue.

  Q259 Mr Baron: Very briefly, before I go on to the vessel protection detachments, can I press you on that slightly? These maritime private security firms work on ships flagged to other nations. Are you going to be drawing lessons from that experience when you look at this in undertaking your review?

  Mr Bellingham: Yes, very much so. The starting premise is that these armed private security company detachments have been extremely successful. There are issues around best practice, having enough personnel on board and making sure that this is not a reason for neglecting best management practice and using the convoy system. A fear has been expressed in some quarters that if this becomes the norm, some of the other good practices that are now embedded would be neglected in the interests of trying to get vessels through these waters more quickly. I would certainly say that we can learn quite a lot from the countries that allow this to happen at the moment.

  Q260 Mr Baron: Moving on to vessel protection detachments, we know that other countries such as France make use of them. Many would argue that it is safer and more effective to draw upon the family of the armed services to provide some sort of protection—that might be from the Marines or detachments of the Army—on vessels. What is your take on that? Is the budget so tight that that option is not on the table, given that most would agree that they would prefer it to security companies?

  Mr Bellingham: France and Spain use VPDs on a regular basis, as do other countries—I understand that Israel, for example, does so on a regular basis—and we have done it before. We have done it in different strategic areas. It is all a question of availability of resources. At the moment, our armed forces are very heavily committed. If a stage was reached when our armed forces were less committed, I am sure that the MOD would look at a request for providing VPDs, which are military detachments. If the opportunity arose, it would be a welcome step forward, but I do not believe it is practical at the moment.

  Q261 Mr Baron: It is down to a lack of resources—that is what it comes down to.

  Mr Bellingham: It is not so much a lack of resources; it is down to the lack of availability of the relevant troops. I don't know whether you want to add anything, Captain.

  Captain Reindorp: Again, if I can add a bit of context, allowing for a certain number of UK ships going through that area at any one time, we would have to find roughly 500 Royal Marines—they would have to be marinised troops; they cannot just be Army infanteers, unless of course they are given adequate training—to do that. That does not take into account the 500 that we would be preparing to take over from them, and the 500 that would be recovering from having been there, and it does not take into account the extra training that would be required. That is a considerable burden and at the moment if you wish to do that, they would have to stop doing something else.

  Chris Holtby: Again, this is an issue that the Contact Group has taken on as being a means of increasing capability and sharing the burden. There are countries that are now prepared and offering to provide VPDs to supplement what the warships are doing. In particular, we are looking at the challenge of trying to provide the majority of escorts of the World Food Programme and AMISOM forces by using VPDs, rather than having a dedicated warship always alongside those vessels, bearing in mind the individual risk assessments in each case. The African Union, the United Nations and the World Food Programme are working with us on that, and there are countries that are interested in doing that.

  Q262 Mike Gapes: Let me take you back to the question of the private armed security people on ships. We currently have a voluntary self-regulation code for the private security companies, which was introduced by the previous Government and is carried on now. Would a wide extension of the use of private security companies on British flagged vessels, as might happen as a result of the change, require a reconsideration of that code or potentially even moving towards a legislative code?

  Mr Bellingham: Thank you for that question, Mr Gapes. This is one of the areas that I lead on in the Foreign Office, and quite a lot of work was done on setting up the Geneva code for private military security companies. The result of that was our decision not to follow the route of the previous Government and have statutory regulation, but to go down the route of having regulation within the sector itself. Aerospace Defence and Security—ADS—is the regulatory body for private military security companies. It would cover security companies providing security at sea as well. There is also the Security Association for the Maritime Industry, which will not be an oversight regulatory body like ADS, but will nevertheless insist on best practice.

  Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the UK Government are one of the biggest procurers of the services of private military security companies. It is in our interests to demand high standards and to insist that the Geneva code is being followed. The Geneva code lays down very tight requirements for training, conduct, financial oversight, corporate governance, transparency and everything else. Chris has just told me that we are looking at similar steps to those in the Geneva code—to extend it further into the maritime area.

  Q263 Mike Gapes: Would that be legislative steps?

  Mr Bellingham: It would not be legislative; it would be on the same voluntary basis as the Geneva code. As I say, I don't think that the UK Government have bought in any services from the maritime military security companies yet, but we are a big buyer of services from the private military security companies. As a purchaser of services, we can demand the highest possible standards.

  Chris Holtby: In the preparation of the Geneva document—the Montreux document—it was quite clear that the maritime sector was much more complex legally than the land sector. In the land sector, you have one set of laws in your country, but in the maritime sector you have various different jurisdictions and everything else. That is why, at that time, a decision was taken to exclude the maritime sector.

  There are companies operating in the maritime sector that have signed up to the code and therefore regard themselves as bound by its conditions. The Minister has referred to the work that we are doing to try and find a solution that will govern the whole sector, which could be to extend the conditions of the code of conduct to the whole sector. But there are various permutations, and the work of the International Maritime Organisation in this area should be taken into account too.

  Q264 Mr Roy: Can I bring us to the subject of prosecutions, or the lack of them, as seems to be the case? At present, nine out of 10 suspected Somali pirates captured by the Royal Navy are released. Last year, in one month alone, there were reports of three cases in which Royal Navy vessels encountered motherships with both suspect pirates and hostages aboard. The Navy liberated the hostages but released the pirates. Why?

  Mr Bellingham: I mooted this earlier: to mount a successful prosecution, for a start, you must have sufficient evidence; you must also have sufficient capacity in terms of detention facilities, trial facilities and prison facilities in the region. It is easy to point to the number of catch and releases, but I would also point to the fact that 1,000 pirates are in detention at the moment.

  It is also worth bearing in mind that most of the so-called catch and releases have been the result of disruption activities with naval vessels going in quite a lot closer to the shore and intercepting skiffs. Of the cases of actual attacks on vessels and attempted acts of piracy that resulted in capture by the Navy, very few have resulted in catch and release, because if an attack has been made on a vessel, you have the evidence.

  I am incredibly keen to help build capacity in the region and I have been putting a lot of effort into that. We must obviously have buy-in from the front-line countries—Seychelles, Mauritius, Tanzania and, particularly, Kenya; we also want to get Mozambique and South Africa on board. Furthermore, one should bear in mind that Mombasa is the main port for five landlocked countries and Dar es Salaam is the port of access for eight such countries. Many countries in Africa have strong, growing economies that will be frightened if the piracy menace is not controlled. We want to get buy-in from some of those countries as well. The reluctance of Kenya, which signed the MOU and then pulled out of it, was simply the result of its concern that it would basically be shouldering the whole burden. The key thing is to get that capacity.

  Q265 Mr Roy: That does not answer the question, Minister. The question was: why, in one month alone last year, did the Royal Navy capture three ships with their hostages still on board and release the pirates without taking any action? Why is it still the case that nine out of 10 of those people who are held by the Royal Navy are then released?

  Mr Bellingham: Some of those disruptions have been close into shore, where there would not have been enough evidence. The ones that you allude to are cases where hostages have been released after a successful pirate attack that the Navy has prevented from going any further. There has to be evidence.

  Q266 Mr Roy: The pirates were released, not just the hostages.

  Mr Bellingham: I entirely appreciate that, but there has to be sufficient evidence.

  Q267 Mr Roy: Is there not enough evidence when you have a boat full of hostages, with people holding them hostage? Is that not enough evidence to say that those are the bad guys and they deserve to be prosecuted?

  Mr Bellingham: There are two points, Mr Roy. I sympathise deeply—I would like to see every single pirate prosecuted—but, first, if the UK was going to take those pirates back to the UK, we would have to be satisfied that there was going to be enough evidence for a successful prosecution, and that means people giving evidence. It means the captain of the ship that was pirated giving evidence, and probably independent witnesses giving evidence as well. They have to be prepared to do that.

  The same applies to taking pirates to a country such as Kenya, Tanzania or wherever it might be. As you know, the first person in this very important decision-making chain would be the commander of the vessel; he would then talk to probably the lawyer in the Atalanta force; it would then be referred through to the MOD, in the case of the UK, and they would have to take a decision on whether it was in the UK's interest to prosecute. They would also have to work with the authorities in, say, Kenya to ask the Kenyans to take a batch of pirates. If the Kenyans say no, they will not take them, and there is nowhere else they can be taken, and if we decide there is not enough evidence to take them to the UK, they are unfortunately—I find this as frustrating as you do—released.

  Q268 Mr Roy: I get your point about making sure that you have some type of evidence before you bring them back to the UK, but if I asked you how many of those people have been brought back to the UK—five, 10 or zero—what would the answer be? Because I know what the answer is.

  Mr Bellingham: We have not taken any pirates back to the UK yet.

  Q269 Mr Roy: None so far. Why then is it that countries such as the United States, France and Germany have brought pirates back to their own country to put them on trial? That is good enough for the Americans, the French and the Germans, but not good enough for the British. Why?

  Mr Bellingham: In each of those cases, as I understand it, French, American or German citizens were harmed. There was overwhelming evidence of a crime having been committed against nationals of those countries. If that happened in the case of the UK, I think it would be inconceivable that they would not be brought back here to be prosecuted.

  Q270 Mr Roy: Minister, is not the reason for the concern of the British Government that, once here, the pirates will claim asylum?

  Mr Bellingham: That is not the reason why we do not bring pirates back here. We have a criminal justice system that is fair, but you have to remember, Mr Roy, that under our system the defendant is innocent till proven guilty, and many QCs on large amounts of legal aid money will be being paid to defend those people—quite rightly so, because they have legal rights. It has to be in the UK's interests and there has to be enough evidence to make that prosecution in the public interest.

  Q271 Mr Roy: But no one has been brought back here. Yes, they are innocent till proved guilty, but we have not even got to that point, because no one at all has been brought back to this country, where they are innocent till proved guilty. That is the truth—no one.

  Mr Bellingham: Mercifully and thankfully—largely because of the professionalism of our Navy—a UK citizen has not yet been harmed by pirates.

  Q272 Mr Roy: Is that the criterion then: that you would bring pirates back only if one of our UK nationals has been injured?

  Mr Bellingham: If a UK national was injured, that would be indicative of pretty overwhelming evidence that it is in the public interest to prosecute. If you have a case of a ship being pirated and the hostages released, and there is evidence of piracy—obviously, by definition—but you have to ask the question: how will that stand up in court. Are there witnesses? If we simply bring pirates back to this country and prosecute them without witnesses, I suggest to you that those pirates would not be convicted.

  Q273 Mr Roy: If Brits are kidnapped and then released, after the Royal Navy has captured the ship, you are saying that, because they have not been harmed, you will not bring the prosecution to the United Kingdom.

  Mr Bellingham: We look at every single case on its merits. The final point I wish to make is that it is in the interests of trying to solve this problem, of sending a very strong signal to the pirates and the communities that are supporting them that they are prosecuted in the region and detained in the region. It is the same argument that I have applied to the Court Service in this country. If someone commits a serious crime and they are tried near their own community, it will have a bigger deterrent effect and it is going to send a much stronger signal than if they are tried—in this case—many thousands of miles away.

  Captain Reindorp: If I may, I wish to give a little context that may help to understand the situation. This is a very emotive issue. It is particularly emotive for all the servicemen and women who are out there at the moment risking their lives to do this. They find it very frustrating, quite frankly, to be blamed for something that is not within anybody's gift to solve. If I add a little bit of context, that may help to understand why they are frustrated and why this image has built up.

  You need a defined and acceptable—acceptable to the UK—legal finish to any seized pirate. We have certain standards that we must abide by—nothing to do with the military, they are the laws of the land that we are subject to and signed up to. Part of that legal finish is sufficient evidence, and the other part is a willing and suitable prosecutor and potential jailer. Finding those is not always easy. It is not always easy for a variety of reasons. We have discussed previously the discrimination between an innocent Somali fisherman who may or may not happen to have an AK47. Possessing an AK47 on the high seas is not illegal.

  We have had many occasions when, even when we have seized pirates and have released the hostages, those hostages are not willing to testify. They do not want to come back to the UK, or do not want to go to Kenya, or do not want to go anywhere to testify against the pirates. We have no ability to compel them to do so. Even if they did, we would almost certainly have to release them back to, for instance, Yemen for a while, before they went wherever they had to go to appear as witnesses. If you release someone into Yemen, the chances of getting them back again are almost negligible. Nor is there always a clear distinction between hostages and pirates. There have been occasions when we take a boat and the first thing that the pirates do is pretend that they are hostages. Actually, it is really quite difficult to differentiate between the two.

  The final point I will leave you with is one of simple calculus: whilst all this is going on, a ship is not performing its primary role which is deterring pirates, so you have to decide whether you are going to chase an ever-decreasing possibility of a successful prosecution or go back and deter pirates.

  Q274 Mr Roy: If you free nine out of 10 of those you arrest, does that not indeed frustrate the people in your service?

  Captain Reindorp: Absolutely, but the answer is as the Minister has said: we need more legal courses.

  Q275 Mr Roy: Minister, is deterrence prioritised over prosecution? Has the decision been made that the type of equipment required to prosecute is not worth it? If not, what criteria can inform the decision to prosecute?

  Mr Bellingham: Are you talking about prosecuting in the UK?

  Q276 Mr Roy: Anywhere.

  Mr Bellingham: What happens obviously is that the initial assessment is made by the commander of the vessel, who will then feed it through the chain. The first key ingredient is whether there is enough evidence. Secondly, where can the pirates be taken to? I am doing outreach with the regional countries. For example, I shall be spending at least two hours tomorrow with Raila Odinga, the Kenyan Prime Minister, and shall be doing all I possibly can to persuade him to reactivate the MOU. I am going to do that because I shall be able to tell him that more countries in the region are providing key capacity. If the decision through the chain that I have described is a) there is enough evidence and b) there is somewhere to take the pirates to, hopefully we will be able to find a solution to the problem to which you have alluded and on which you rightly have challenged us, and that we all feel needs to be sorted out.

  I will just add one other thing: a lot of work has been done in the Caribbean with drug suspects, and the Navy—the standing North Atlantic patrol—often intercepts vessels carrying drugs. There has not yet been a case of any of those drug runners being brought back to the UK, because we invariably take a decision to have them dealt with in the region. There is regional capacity to do that in the Caribbean, and we want to have the same capacity to deal with the pirates in this region.

  Q277 Mr Roy: Lastly on that subject, why has the UK Minister not supported a proposal by UN Special Adviser Jack Lang for an extraterritorial Somali court, and would you support calls for an international court?

  Mr Bellingham: I had two meetings with Jack Lang, who is a very eminent former Cabinet Minister. His report contains a lot of really good recommendations, and we certainly agree with what he has to say about building capacity in the region—prison capacity. I also went to have a look at the court in Arusha, which is currently the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. First of all, the court needs a lot of money spending on it. The costs of bringing the court up to standard and using it on an ongoing basis would be huge: we reckon that about $100 million a year would be needed.

  Q278 Chair: For what period?

  Mr Bellingham: Well, if the court was opened next year, say, there would be initial costs, but going forward the figure would be certainly not far short of that. The panoply of legal infrastructure currently at Arusha—detention facilities, translation facilities, defence lawyers and so on—is a big operation. There are two key points. First, this money would be much better spent in the region; within the region we could get a huge amount of value for one tenth of that sum. Secondly, it is illegal under the Somali constitution to have courts to try Somalis outside Somalia.

  I also had a long conversation about this with Mohamed Omaar, who is the TFG Foreign Minister. He made it very clear to me that this was an absolute red line as far as the TFG were concerned. It does not mean that we do not need to look at the suggestion very carefully, because Jack Lang's report has a lot to recommend it. That particular suggestion was discussed by the UN Security Council on 21 June and you are probably aware that only Russia and France supported using Arusha, so the Security Council has reached its decision. That does not mean that we cannot come back to it at some stage in the future, but I think all those possible pitfalls would still apply.

  Q279 Chair: The advice we have had, incidentally, is that the UNODC valuation advised Mr Lang that it would cost $25 million over three years, rather than $100 million.

  Mr Bellingham: Can you explain why my figures were way above that, Chris?

  Chris Holtby: When Jack Lang went on his initial mission to the region, he came up with a few models. One of the models was costed at $25 million. The cost of running the Arusha tribunal last year was $121 million. Because the current tribunal and the structures there cannot cope with large-scale piracy trials as well, we are looking at creating something analogous to it, so the costs could be of a broadly similar order. The costs of the Lockerbie court, which is the only other delocalised court we have dealt with so far, were about £150 million. That was dealing with one individual, rather than large-scale processing.

  Q280 Chair: How do these figures compare with the ransoms being paid?

  Mr Bellingham: The amount paid in ransom so far—I think you have probably seen the figures—is estimated at $275,000, but $1 million has been paid so far. I would suggest that the figure is probably underestimated, but we could safely say that in the region of $300 million has been paid over in ransom so far.

  Q281 Chair: Makes a court look rather cheap, doesn't it?

  Mr Bellingham: I would still come back to the point that we have the Somali Government constitution to get round, and there is also the fact that the money that we have put into countries such as the Seychelles and Kenya, and the work we put into court and detention facilities in Somaliland and Puntland, has been in the order of small numbers of millions, but that money has gone a long, long way. My suggestion would be that what we want to try and do is to build a legacy in the surrounding countries, so that once this problem has been sorted out, they will have better detention facilities, better court facilities and better prison facilities.

  Chris Holtby: One of the things that Jack Lang said very clearly was, "Even if we create an international court, we would still need more prisons in the region. Please, get on and build them." Creating the tribunal would not address that problem.

  Q282 Chair: We have the full spec of what he called for, and we are well aware of it.

  Chris Holtby: For prisons, that is correct, but not for the court.

  Q283 Mr Baron: To make it absolutely clear, as a Committee we are not impugning the reputation or the actions of the armed forces. Having served myself, I can understand their frustration. In turn, though, you have to understand our frustration and explain why the prosecution rate for piracy seems to be so low and why other countries seem to succeed in prosecuting whereas we cannot. You seemed to suggest earlier that it is a question of evidence, yet we have had a situation in which hostages and pirates are caught on the same boat, which in most courts of law would go a long to satisfy the evidence requirement. It is looking more and more as though it is not a question of evidence, but just that there is no legal end game when it comes to prosecution. Is that more the issue than the question of evidence? That is certainly what you seem to be suggesting.

  Mr Bellingham: I come back to my earlier point. The majority of cases of catch and release have taken place close to the coast, where navies have gone in to disrupt the passage of skiffs, the smaller vessels. Very often evidence has been chucked away, and although people have been apprehended, a decision has been taken that, although they may have been going equipped and with intent, it would be completely impractical to take them into custody on the vessel and transfer them for prosecution. In cases where there is significant evidence, a decision has to be made on whether the evidence will stand up in court.

  I come back to the point about witnesses. I have heard from the Chamber of Shipping and the IMO that to get a successful prosecution you need crew members who have been hostages to give evidence.

  Q284 Mr Baron: France, Germany and other countries seem to do it. Why are we alone in being apparently incapable of taking such opportunities?

  Mr Bellingham: In all those cases, citizens of those countries had been harmed, and in some cases killed. In those cases the countries in question took a view that it would be completely in the public interest to bring the defendants back to France, Holland or America to launch an action against them. Those defendants are currently in custody awaiting trial—I think one trial has started, but it is going to be a long, drawn-out process. Those countries decided that there is sufficient evidence and sufficient witnesses to go down that particular route. We have not, and, mercifully, we have not yet had a British citizen harmed or, worse still, killed.

  Chris Holtby: The UK has delivered successful evidence prosecution cases to Kenya, which has prosecuted pirates, so we are delivering on those lines.

  Mr Bellingham: And we will do much more of that as we build capacity in the region.

  Q285 Mr Watts: Isn't the whole policy in a mess? Let me give an example. It seems to me that, ideally, you would like to resolve the matter on land, as you have said, but that is not going to happen in the foreseeable future. We see from the figures that arresting pirates and bringing them to trial is not successful. The only thing that seems to be successful is having armed guards on ships. We can see that the pirates do not target ships from India, Russia and China; they leave those ships alone and concentrate on those that have no armed guards. Wouldn't it be better to stand down the Navy, stop doing all the other things, and just put some armed guards on all of our ships?

  Mr Bellingham: I do not think that we can go down any one route. Just putting armed guards on vessels and standing down the Navy would not be in the UK's interest. The Navy, as we know, is an incredibly professional service. We need a multi-pronged approach, and a wider Somalia policy is essential. I am a "glass half full" person when it comes to my assessment of Somalia. AMISOM is making very good progress and will soon have control over the whole of Mogadishu. We are working in Somaliland, which is a quasi-independent province within Somalia. Through our aid programme, we are helping to build capacity and governance there, and they have eradicated piracy completely.

  Puntland is an area where we do not have so much influence, but a lot of aid work is going on. When we had the Puntland Minister at a Wilton Park conference earlier in the year, he said that there were a number of communities in Puntland where the former fishing villages had been host to pirate activities, but the Government now had control of those villages. If you have a state that is no longer fractured and that can provide governance and control, you solve the piracy problem. In the meantime, you have to deal with the symptoms at sea, and it is a multifaceted approach.

  I think that international navies have a vital role to play. If they were not there, the costs to world shipping would be even greater. Military security companies on board have a role to play, and that is why we are going to change our advice—hopefully—once a review has been completed. Looking at operating plans in terms of the motherships is also important. It is a fluid situation, Mr Watts, and one that is changing the whole time.

  The one thing we must keep stressing is that, as far as piracy is concerned, a lot depends on the willpower and determination of the shipping industry to keep up the pressure. It has to drive the highest possible standards—the best management practice and convoy system. Bear in mind also that 40 flag countries are not part of the Maritime Co-ordination Framework, so that is roughly 10% of all vessels in the region, as General Howes told you. If we can get perhaps half of them to come into the co-ordination framework, that would help. So, this is multifaceted. I do not think that we should give up. The UK has huge interests at stake here, and we must do everything that we possibly can to keep up the pressure and go on providing that lead.

  Q286 Mr Watts: Let us go back to the low rate of prosecutions. We have heard that as soon as these pirates are arrested, there is a race against the clock. Are we doing all we can to put in place relationships with other states and procedures to make sure that they are dealt with as quickly as possible? What are the human rights issues, for example in relation to Kenya? When suspects are transferred to Kenya, are there human rights considerations that we need to take on board? Is that part of the reason for some of the delay?

  Mr Bellingham: The front-line countries are consistently improving their performance. The setback, unfortunately, was when Kenya signed the MOU and then pulled out. I am hoping that my discussions tomorrow with the Kenyan Prime Minister will help to move that forward. As I said earlier, Kenya was worried that it was going to be shouldering an unfair burden. However, I think that all the countries in the region realise that this is a threat to their future, and I would be very disappointed if I was not able to report to this Committee in six months that we had seen really serious progress in the post-trial transfer agreements. Getting the law changed in the Seychelles was very important, as was getting the transfer of those who had been convicted to prisons in the region, particularly in Somalia and Puntland.

  You asked about human rights. If the Royal Navy is operating anywhere in the world, you would expect it to respect the highest standards. This is not an armed conflict; this is a constabulary or gendarmerie-type operation. Therefore, the Royal Navy will look at these issues. Once a prisoner has been transferred to Kenya or Tanzania—we are doing this for UNODC—we make sure that the detention and court facilities, and the judicial system that is in place around this area of law, are, if not up to western standards, of a much higher standard than in the region generally.

  Q287 Mr Watts: Do we visit them?

  Mr Bellingham: Yes, we certainly do. I have not visited them, and I do not know whether Chris has, but we have diplomats who have visited the facilities in Kenya and all these countries.

  Q288 Mr Watts: And do they visit the suspects—the people we have handed over—as well?

  Mr Bellingham: They certainly will have observed trials taking place and they will have seen the facilities in the prisons.

  Chris Holtby: The UN Office on Drugs and Crime sponsors a programme to visit all prisoners and keep an eye on their welfare.

  Q289 Mr Watts: Finally, Minister, can you just run through the states with which we have managed to negotiate transfer for prosecution agreements? Which ones are we currently negotiating with?

  Mr Bellingham: The situation is that the Seychelles are in front of the pack, because they have changed their law so that going equipped or going with intent is an offence under their law. They were taking prisoners at an earlier stage. Mauritius has signed an MOU. Tanzania, we are working on. When I was in Tanzania recently, I had a fruitful discussion with the Foreign Minister and the President about this issue. They said that they realised the threat to their shipping and economy, and that they were behind the curve. They wanted to get an MOU in place as soon as possible. We have spoken to the South Africans and we will speak to the Mozambique Government. I will not restrict this to the maritime countries. As I mentioned, there are many landlocked African countries that have extremely strong economies.

  Although Kenya signed the MOU, I stress that it is still dealing with pirates on a case-by-case basis. We want a standardised situation for when the commander of a vessel intercepts pirates, if he thinks there is enough evidence and that is confirmed by the chain of command, as I have mentioned. We need an efficient, fit-for-purpose system within the region. That could well be something like a software programme that shows at any one time what capacity is available and which country is next in line to take prisoners. We are trying to organise it on a professional, efficient basis. I would hope that within six months we will have seen an important step forward. I do not want to look at this too optimistically, but the discussions I have had with those countries indicate to me that they realise that this evil menace on the high seas is a threat to their economies, and they want to do something about it.

  Q290 Mike Gapes: May I take you on to the question of the payment of ransoms? It is difficult to predict exactly how much has been paid or will be paid. I have seen figures of more than $200 million. Clearly the amount paid in some cases is considerable—in some cases $5 million plus. I understand that it is not illegal, under international law, to pay ransoms, although some countries have made it illegal. It is not illegal under UK law to pay ransoms, but our Government discourage their payment. Will you clarify why that is the case, given that it is not illegal and that large numbers of shipping companies and others are prepared to pay—and wish to pay—ransoms, rather than lose the vessel or crew?

  Mr Bellingham: There are two key areas here. The first is the actual payment of the ransom. You are right to point out that it is not illegal to pay a ransom under UK law, although it might be in some circumstances, such as if there was evidence that the payment would trigger another crime. Generally speaking, a ransom payment in this country is not illegal, but we strongly discourage it because, as we all know, paying ransoms simply encourages further acts of piracy or hostage taking—whatever it might be. We are firm on that.

  Paragraph 14 of the evidence that was given to you by the British Chamber of Shipping states that it was concerned by "US legislative actions to curtail piracy by means of an Executive Order signed by US President… which has the potential to block payments to certain individuals on the grounds that they may be contributing to the conflict in Somalia; the order included the names of a few known pirates." That was following on from a UN Security Council resolution. Some countries have implemented the resolution. As you will see, the International Chamber of Shipping, the Lloyds Market Association and other bodies remain "very concerned that any attempt to prohibit the payment of ransoms would further endanger the seafarers held captive".

  We need to think outside the box. One of the things that we could do would be to make more effort to look at those flows of money after the payment of ransom. Learning more about the financial flows and taking action to disrupt them are going to be very important. We are gathering plenty of evidence and we want to use it to ensure that some of the kingpin pirates are brought to justice. Two of them have been convicted and imprisoned already, and there is another who has been extradited. I think that the shipping industry has a very important role to play in helping to gather the evidence.

   In this area, there are other EU partners who have a lot of expertise and knowledge, which they have used in campaigns against Mafia gangs, for example, or criminal gangs. We want to try and get them to play a part in this agenda as well so that we can build up that expertise.

  Q291 Mike Gapes: What I take from what you are saying is that you think that we should do more to discourage the payment of ransoms and to get our European partners and others also to discourage the payment of ransoms. However, there is clearly a view coming from organisations that represent seafarers and also from many of the companies involved that they would be very concerned about that approach because of the consequences it might have for them—with people or crews taken hostage, or the shipping.

  Mr Bellingham: You are absolutely right. This is paragraph 14 of the evidence that was given by the Chamber of Shipping, which you have a copy of.

  Q292 Mike Gapes: What is the Government's position? I am trying to pin this down exactly. There is clearly a conflict here. If a vessel is taken with British hostages and we are not prepared—perhaps because of consequences for their lives—to use a full military assault to try to rescue them, and if no efforts are made to pay a ransom, how long do you think it will be before those hostages are released?

  Mr Bellingham: First, if hostages are actually taken—this is a Foreign Office lead—it would be a matter for special forces involvement. In certain circumstances, a hostage release operation would be mounted. In the case of the Chandlers, as is well known from media coverage, that was looked at, but when it was considered by people who have far more experience of this than me, it was decided that there would be too great a risk to the hostages. The Chandlers then got taken into captivity and a ransom was eventually paid. We discouraged the payment of a ransom. The problem, basically, is that if we adopted that UN Security Council resolution into our own law, it would prevent the payment of those ransoms if they were going to go to well known pirates. That would mean that the only way around it would be to use the payment under duress clause. It might be quite difficult to do that under our law because we have an independent prosecution authority.

  Q293 Mike Gapes: I am still unclear. The thrust of what you are saying is that we do not pay ransoms and we do not encourage the payment of ransoms.

  Mr Bellingham: Correct.

  Q294 Mike Gapes: Yet, there are circumstances—you mentioned the Chandlers; there are others—where individuals would potentially be detained for a very, very long time, and if no ransom had been paid and there were no other circumstances for their liberation, presumably they would continue to be detained potentially for years, certainly many months. Other governments seem to have a slightly different approach to this. I am trying to clarify: is it a nod-and-wink policy that officially we do not do it but if somebody does it, we will live with the consequences, or is it a real effort to say, "Absolutely, under no circumstances should anybody pay any ransom"?

  Mr Bellingham: No, because paying ransoms is not against our law. That is the point. We would have to change our law. The reason why the industry was very concerned about the UN Security Council resolution on the payment of ransoms that might get to known pirates, is that it would mean that we would make changes to our legal system. What they were particularly concerned about was that countries that have incorporated this into their law have a defence of duress.

  Now, other countries have a different prosecution system from ours. Basically, in America there is Executive control over prosecution policy; we have an independent set of prosecution authorities in this country. The industry is very concerned that if the legal situation were changed, prosecutions could well occur when the payment was made to save lives.

  We are into a very difficult area, but can I assure you that we have to weigh up two things. We have to weigh up all the policy and the efforts to counter piracy, to look at the risk-reward ratio. At the moment, the balance of the equation is in favour of reward, not risk. If we increased the level of risk to the pirates, we might disincentivise piracy. This is one ingredient, and I can assure you that we will keep it under review, but it will mean fairly fundamental changes.

  Q295 Mike Gapes: But we have been told of a specific case in which the ransom was waiting on the runway ready to be sent off, but the people who were sending it wanted political cover, which the FCO refused to give. Therefore the whole deal fell through and those people were detained. Several months later, the payment was made and the people were released. There is a level of ambiguity here, isn't there?

  Mr Bellingham: I do not agree there is ambiguity. Unless we change our law to make the payment of ransoms illegal, our policy of discouraging it will continue. I will give you a good example of what happened the other day, which has been widely covered in the press. People who were carrying a ransom arrived at Mogadishu airport with, I think, US$2.5 million. They were apprehended by the TFG and were up in the court the following day, where they were convicted and given lengthy prison sentences.

  We dealt with that as a consular case. We did not say that the TFG were wrong to prosecute those people for paying a ransom, which is against their law. In that case, there has been a presidential pardon—the men have been released, but the money has been confiscated by the TFG, and I understand the assets as well, such as vehicles and aircraft.

  Q296 Mike Gapes: A final question: can I take it from your answer that we are not going to outlaw the payment of ransoms in all circumstances?

  Mr Bellingham: We keep this under review. Some countries have adopted the Security Council resolution, but we have not done so yet. It would require a change in our law. We keep it under review. As I say, we have to weigh up the peculiar circumstances of our legal system. But if we adopted the resolution, those paying a ransom to save people's lives might end up being prosecuted, which might not be in the public interest.

  Q297 Chair: Does the UK track ransom payments?

  Mr Bellingham: We are trying to understand much more about the financial flows and therefore disrupt them. Yes, we are strongly supporting two major organisations—Interpol and the UNODC—that are doing exactly that, for which they have a number of new policies and protocols in place. It is slow work, but so far, two key Somali kingpins have been convicted and are serving custodial sentences. Another kingpin financier is awaiting extradition from Dubai to Belgium. The work is ongoing.

  We have very advanced money-laundering laws in the UK, as well as all the training that goes with that. We put money into UNODC—as a big contributor to the UN, we do that anyway—but DFID have put some extra money in to work with the regional countries to implement new money-laundering laws in, say, Kenya, as well as training. There is no point in having the laws—

  Q298 Chair: Can we concentrate on the UK?

  Mr Bellingham:—if you haven't got regional financial investigators. We are certainly doing all we can in the UK.

  Q299 Chair: So the answer is yes—you do track money through these organisations.

  Mr Bellingham: It is fair to say that we were possibly slow to look at this area as a priority. But in the early days of payment of ransoms we were talking about a few million US dollars; we are now talking about a total amount of about $300 million. Serious sums of money are washing around different world financial centres and systems. Understanding where that money goes, disrupting it and going after the kingpins is incredibly important. We have had some success, but there is much more to do.

  Q300 Chair: Is SOCA involved when ransom money is paid?

  Mr Bellingham: SOCA certainly are involved, yes. We have a strong SOCA presence in Nairobi, and there is liaison between SOCA—

  Q301 Chair: Is SOCA involved when ransom payments go through the UK?

  Mr Bellingham: SOCA certainly are involved in trying to track payments.

  Q302 Chair: Are they involved when ransom money goes through the UK?

  Mr Bellingham: If there was evidence of ransom money; there would need to be evidence. Of course it's very difficult when money is paid over in cash to unknown individuals, who then launder it through property, through assets in the region. Does some of the money end up in London? We do not have evidence that money has ended up in London, but we are doing our best to make sure that we understand much more about these flows, so that if money does end up here, we are able to get at the guys who are the recipients.

  Q303 Chair: So you don't know if SOCA is involved?

  Mr Bellingham: SOCA are treating this as a priority, but they don't yet have evidence that could lead to a prosecution.

  Chris Holtby: SOCA clear all payments that could be regarded as suspicious, as part of their normal work, across all financial transactions. That is a routine matter for SOCA.

  Q304 Chair: Isn't that inconsistent with the policy of discouraging payment?

  Chris Holtby: No.

  Q305 Chair: Why not?

  Chris Holtby: They are not asked to take a judgment on whether or not it is a matter of policy. They are asked whether or not it is legal.

  Q306 Chair: But if you have a Government Department that is sanctioning payments, yet it is the policy of the Government to discourage payments, I would say that was inconsistent.

  Mr Bellingham: They are not exactly sanctioning those payments, because if they had evidence that those payments resulted from a ransom situation, they would be able to take action.

  Q307 Chair: Don't you think it makes you look a bit weak? There you are saying, "We don't approve of this payment," but none the less, you are thoroughly aware that it is happening.

  Mr Bellingham: We are aware that payments are made. We do not have evidence of money finding its way through the financial service institutions in the City. We don't have evidence that there is money ending up in London. If there was evidence of this, then we would be able to go after the guys. That is why we are making this a bigger priority, putting more money into Interpol, into UNODC, understanding more about how these financial flows are structured. DFID are looking at a project to embed some experts into this who have serious knowledge. We can't tell you anything about that at the moment, because it is still ongoing, but there may be an announcement coming up at some stage in the near future from DFID on that.

  Q308 Chair: Are you aware of the details of how the Chandlers were freed?

  Mr Bellingham: I am not personally aware of that.

  Q309 Chair: Is anyone in the Foreign Office aware of it?

  Mr Bellingham: Do you want to comment on that, Chris?

  Chris Holtby: The Chandler family have kept in regular contact with consular officers in the Foreign Office, but we were not in any way engaged in any of the ransom negotiations or payments.

  Q310 Chair: Is anyone at the Foreign Office aware of the details?

  Chris Holtby: In so far as the Chandlers have wanted to share it with consular officials, then they know, but payment of ransom is not a matter for Government.

  Q311 Chair: Is it classified?

  Chris Holtby: I don't think it would be a classified issue, but—

  Q312 Chair: I am just wondering if there is anything you could share with us.

  Mr Bellingham: We could certainly look at that. If there is information that is available and is not classified, we could come back to you on that. We could let you know.

  Chair: We now move on to Somaliland. We have just 15 minutes left.

  Q313 Mike Gapes: You have already referred to Somaliland's—in your words—quasi-independence. Given that it is quasi-independent, how do we engage with Somaliland and with Puntland on these issues, given that the Transitional Federal Government is so weak that it doesn't control large parts of Somalia? Related to that, is it not time we were more positive towards the fact that we have a democratic Government in Somaliland? It has good governance and is about the only part of Somalia which is functioning.

  Mr Bellingham: I can certainly understand the enthusiasm that a lot of people have for recognising Somaliland as an independent country. What I said was, that it is a quasi-independent country. It has home rule. It is autonomous, but any recognition of Somaliland as an independent country is a matter for the people of Somaliland. It is also a matter which the AU would have to lead on. It would be wrong for the UK to get involved or pre-empt this. It would also undermine our wider Somali strategy because our strategy is not just about engagement with the TFG. It is a much wider strategy, which is why are taking a lead in the International Contact Group on Somalia. It is why we have the cross-departmental working group on Somalia, which obviously includes piracy. We are looking at how we can add value to different parts of Somalia.

  Somaliland is somewhere where we have a good relationship. There is a large diaspora in this country. They had presidential elections early this year, which went very smoothly and there was a transfer of power. Somaliland is a place where we are putting in quite a lot of aid. For example, part of the money we put into UNODC focused on improving prison conditions, staff housing and training programmes for prison staff in Somaliland. It supported also the completion of the prison in Hargeisa. We gave a substantial amount of money for that. The fact that Somaliland does not host any pirate activity is an indication of that.

  I would like to see Somaliland as the exemplar for the rest of Somalia. We would like to see Puntland coming the same way, and I think there is a good chance that the positive progress in Puntland will lead to further significant steps forward. The TFG have extended their transition for another year, and we are confident that the TFG will now start reaching out to the different constituent parts of Somalia and actually start making a difference, giving the people of Somalia some hope for the future. What the people of Somalia, particularly in South and Central, must have is some confidence in the legitimacy of the Government and some incentive to move away from the enticements of al-Shabab. In fact, the Captain has just told me that Royal Fleet Auxiliary Cardigan Bay is currently operating off the coast of Somaliland with the Somaliland coastguard. That leads on to the other point: building some regional capacity not just in terms of prisons in Somaliland, but coastguard capacity.

  I come back to the point I made earlier, which Mr Stewart so eloquently put when talking about fractured failed states. If you have a fractured failed state, you will have problems like piracy.

  Q314 Rory Stewart: Minister, thank you for your endurance of our marathon session. Just to follow up, it does seem as though the fundamental problem is that Somalia is in a mess. It was in a mess before the Government collapsed in the early '90s. It is in even more of a mess now. Perhaps some wise policy needs to start from humility. We need to acknowledge that there is a limited amount that the United Kingdom can really do to resolve such situations. It is very tempting to say, "Well, we are doing this splendid DFID project," or "We are building some prisons," or "We are encouraging people to talk to each other," but if you were to step back, detach and look at the past 20 or 30 years, maybe we need to begin by acknowledging that there may be things that we cannot do.

  Mr Bellingham: I do not think that we can win this from a military point of view. The lessons are that the Somalis do not take at all well to outside foreign intervention. We have to work with the grain of what the Somali people aspire to, and I think that they aspire to having control of their own lives. The reason why so much of South and Central is under the control of al-Shabab is because they have filled a void and they provide order. Where there is order, business can operate.

  One of the things that struck me about Somalia—and I have not been there yet—is that, in South and Central, even in the areas where al-Shabab is holding forward, business continues for SMEs, enterprise is going on, and we are getting aid in there through local organisations. At the moment, there is the big problem of refugees moving to Kenya, and there are big problems over the drought, but it is interesting to reflect that, when the Islamic courts were in charge of Somalia, there was no piracy problem because they told the communities that going down the piracy route was against the Koran, that it was completely evil and wrong and that, if they did it, they would suffer the most appalling consequences under the sharia law system that they had in place.

  Somali people respect authority; they greatly resent a lack of legitimacy, which is why we have to work with the TFG. They are not the only game in town, which is why our wider Somali policy envisages a whole-Somali approach. I am a glass half full person on Somalia—there is a very good chance that the TFG will be able to provide services throughout Mogadishu in the near future. AMISOM has done an absolutely fantastic job. The TFG forces coming into theatre, trained by the EU training mission, have performed incredibly well.

  What was interesting at the recent AU summit, which I attended last week, was that, although Libya and Sudan dominated, there was still a lot of focus on Somalia. There is a real determination within the regional community, particularly IGAD, to play an important role. Along with President Museveni, it was absolutely pivotal in brokering the Kampala accord, which is leading to the political bureau being set up. There will be a Mogadishu summit that Special Representative Mahiga will preside over next week.

  We are not just working along; we are working with European partners and particularly with regional partners, who understand how, if the problem is not solved—with Sudan going, I hope, in the right direction and some of the other disasters in Africa, like Côte d'Ivoire, being sorted out—we will have this appalling, ongoing failed-state situation on the Horn of Africa, causing a huge amount of economic damage to the whole region, to say nothing of the refugees and the human suffering.

  Q315 Rory Stewart: Finally, a plea for the idea that the international community, in dealing with the issues, may not be able to solve the problems, but should at least not make the situation worse. Obviously, as you have explained, you have a difficult problem with al-Shabab. On the one hand, there is horrible human rights abuse and links to radical Islam and, on the other hand, a certain amount of support, legitimacy and attempts to control piracy. The international community has got itself into a situation where it is in some ways paralysing the situation and continuing the conflict. It is doing it by pumping money into one side in the conflict, which is not necessarily the cleanest, most uncorrupt and most credible part of the Somali situation. It is in many ways getting in the way of any kind of political settlements or negotiations that might take place. Do you think we could see a situation in which the international community begins to extract itself, rather than digging itself ever deeper with the risk that it makes the situation worse—not better—by doing so?

  Mr Bellingham: I am more positive and optimistic than you, Mr Stewart. I think that the Kampala accord presents a way forward in the short term. The political bureau that is going to sit in Mogadishu will be made up of a number of international partners. The key role of the political bureau is to make sure that the milestones that are now in place for the TFG to achieve are met—that the conditions are put in place, that their feet are held to the fire and that they actually deliver services. One of the key aspects of that is getting them to reach out to the more moderate clans to make their Government more inclusive, because until they do that and give the people of Somalia some hope that they can offer a federal Government within a loose federal system, there is no way forward.

  I would be optimistic that the much more subtle, multifaceted international approach will pay dividends, whereas in the past the approach was much more blunt, as you are aware. That is perhaps what you fear will happen again in the future. Our approach is much more nuanced and carefully thought out. It is a question of bringing in regional partners and of looking at where we can add value in the parts of Somalia that are going well, but it is also about being under no illusions as to the power of al-Shabab. On the other hand, there are communities where an alternative is now in place to al-Shabab, and they see that—not al-Shabab—as their future.

  Q316 Rory Stewart: How is that different from people who, for example, say in Afghanistan all the same things about the Karzai Government? They say that we need to hold their feet to the fire, make them meet the milestones, reach out to the moderate tribes and bring in the regional partners. Why should it be any more successful in Somalia than it has been in other parts of the world? What is the cause for optimism?

  Mr Bellingham: There is a narrative that you can repeat in the context of both countries. There are two reasons why I am optimistic. I suppose you could say the same about Afghanistan, but the Somali people have been through so much. The appalling plight of refugees and the problems with drought have been conflict multipliers. There are so many reasons for listening to the diaspora, who are optimistic. Those guys are making serious money in the UK and remitting it back to Somalia.

  On the point of cleaning up the TFG. There was a lot of infighting, and the rows between Sheikh Sharif, the Speaker and the Prime Minister were hugely distracting. Many members of the TFG were more interested in drawing their salary than trying to make a difference. There is now a new Prime Minister, there is a political bureau overseeing the TFG's work, and the Foreign Minister, who you may have met, has a positive vision for the country. We now have a Government who are working together and delivering.

  Finally, the brave troops of AMISOM are making progress on the ground. If, when the troops free up an area, the TFG can move in, open a medical centre, get a school going and allow markets to start flourishing again, people will say that there is an alternative way forward. Although the Somalis are from many different clans, they are basically a people who have an entrepreneurial drive. The vast majority—outside of Somaliland, where I agree there is an aspiration for independence—are incredibly wedded to the idea of a loose federal country, of one Somalia.

  Chair: Thank you, Minister. As you are aware, in the main Chamber after the debate on phone hacking there is a debate on the Select Committee reports on Afghanistan, so some of us had better slip away and put a few notes together for that.

  Thank you very much indeed for coming along. There may be one or two loose ends, in which case we will drop you a line, if you wouldn't mind dealing with them. Your efforts are much appreciated, as are those of Mr Holtby and Captain Reindorp.



 
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