Conclusions and recommendations
Impact of piracy off the coast of Somali
1. Piracy
off the coast of Somalia has escalated over the last four years
and is a major concern for the UK. The threat is not primarily
to UK ships as very few have been captured. Rather, the threat
is to the UK's economy and security. Piracy affects the UK's banking,
insurance and shipping industries, and threatens the large volume
of goods which are transported to the UK by sea. In light of these
concerns, and as a state whose strengths and vulnerabilities are
distinctly maritime, the UK should play a leading role in the
international response to piracy. (Paragraph 20)
Response from industry: self defence
2. We
commend the maritime industry's work on Best Management Practices
and note their success in reducing ships' vulnerability to attack.
(Paragraph 24)
3. We conclude that
the Government should engage with the shipping industry to explore
options for the industry to pay for vessel protection detachments
of British naval or military personnel on board commercial shipping.
(Paragraph 25)
Private armed security guards
4. We
recommend that the Government provide in its response to this
report any assessment it has made of the likelihood of smaller
vessels transiting the area, and to comment upon fears that pirates
will increasingly focus attacks on smaller and less well-defended
vessels and vessels carrying inflammable materials. (Paragraph
28)
5. We conclude that
for too long the Government failed to respond to the urgent need
for armed protection. However, we welcome the Prime Minister's
recent announcement that the Government's position would be reversed
and that private armed guards will be permitted on UK-flagged
vessels. We agree that the evidence in support of using private
armed security guards is compelling and, within legal limits and
according to guidance, shipowners should be allowed to protect
their ships and crew by employing private armed security guards
if they wish to do so. (Paragraph 31)
6. The Government
should in its response to this report assess the risk that private
armed security guards, and possibly the masters of ships on which
they operate, might face extradition to another state following
an incident involving the use of weapons, particularly where that
state may not be able to assure a fair trial. The Government should
set out the steps it intends to take to minimise this risk. (Paragraph
36)
7. We conclude that
the guidance on the use of force, particularly lethal force, is
very limited and there is little to help a master make a judgement
on where force can be used. The Government must provide clearer
direction on what is permissible and what is not. Guidance over
the use of potentially lethal force should not be left to private
companies to agree upon. We recommend that the change of policy
be accompanied by clear, detailed and unambiguous guidance on
the legal use of force for private armed guards defending a vessel
under attack. This guidance should be consistent with the rules
that would govern the use of force by members of the UK armed
forces in similar circumstances, and should include:
- the circumstances in which private armed security
guards faced with a clear threat of violence may respond with
force, including lethal force, where proportionate and necessary,
and
- examples of a "graduated response"
to an attack, including confirmation that nothing in UK law or
the CPS guidance requires a victim of pirate attack to await an
aggressor's first blow before acting in self-defence.
We recommend that the Government take this forward
as a matter of urgency, as we understand that private armed guards
are already being deployed on some UK-flagged vessels. (Paragraph
37)
8. We recommend that
the Government work with the naval operations to issue clear guidance
for private armed guards on what to do in the event of a naval
intervention, and to provide the Committee with a copy of this
guidance in its response to this report. (Paragraph 38)
9. We conclude that
it is vital to ensure that armed guards are properly trained and
deployed in sufficient numbers. We urge the Government in its
response to this report quickly to bring forward proposals for
a national regulatory structure (whether governmental or industry
based self-regulation) that would provide a measure of quality
assurance. (Paragraph 40)
10. We conclude that
the Government should take a more proactive approach to facilitate
an effective and safe legal regime for the carriage and use of
weapons for the purposes of deterring piracy. We recommend that
the Government actively engage with port and coastal states surrounding
Somalia to establish an agreement on the carriage and transfer
of weapons by private armed guards so that they can be securely
removed from vessels once they have exited the high risk area.
(Paragraph 43)
Naval response: policing the Indian Ocean
11. We
conclude that a unified command structure, while it may be the
ideal, is of a lower priority than securing the widest possible
international participation in counter-piracy operations in the
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, and the maximum number of assets
patrolling the waters. The Government should be rigorous, however,
in eliminating any duplication between operations. (Paragraph
47)
12. We conclude that
naval forces have so far been unable to make the oceans safe from
Somali piracy. Recognising that a substantial increase in conventional
naval and air assets is unlikely, we urge the Government to think
of novel ways of detecting skiffs and thus improving response
times to incidents in Indian Ocean, by exploring technologies
such as micro satellite surveillance and/or lighter than air persistent
wide area surveillance, such as that being developed by US forces
for Afghanistan. (Paragraph 52)
13. We conclude that
the cautious approach to military operations when hostages are
involved is appropriate and agree that protecting the safety of
hostages is paramount. However, if the use of violence against
hostages continues to increase this may change the balance of
risk in favour of military intervention in the future. (Paragraph
54)
14. Implementation
of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is not a matter
for us, but we urge the Government to continue to provide at least
one vessel to counter piracy operations at all times, and to host
the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) and NATO HQs
at Northwood for the life of those operations. We recommend that
in its response to this report the Government comment upon concerns
expressed by the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
that the provision of military forces is likely to fall short.
(Paragraph 57)
15. We recommend that
the Foreign Office provide in its response to this report an update
on the Italian prosecution against the pirates captured by UK
forces following their successful boarding of the hijacked ship
the Monte Cristo. (Paragraph 62)
16. We conclude that
simply returning suspected pirates to their boats or to land,
while it may temporarily disrupt their activities, provides little
long term deterrence and has demonstrably failed to prevent an
annual increases in both the number of pirates going to sea and
in the number of attacks. We urge the Government to keep naval
forces' Rules of Engagement under regular review to ensure that
they can respond flexibly to changes in the pirates' tactics.
(Paragraph 63)
International co-ordination
17. We
conclude that the profile of international efforts needs to be
raised further. We welcome the Prime Minister's announcement that
the UK will host an international conference and recommend that
in its response to this report, the Government provide further
information on the conference, including details of who will be
invited and what it expects to achieve. (Paragraph 69)
The UK's comprehensive response: cross-departmental
co-ordination
18. We
conclude that the Government's comprehensive approach to tackling
the problem of Somali piracy aimed at solutions on land and at
sea is the correct one. However, we recommend that the FCO provide
in its response to this report a statement clarifying which department
is responsible for each aspect of the Government's response to
Somali piracy, and which department has the overall lead on the
UK's response to piracy off the coast of Somalia. (Paragraph 73)
Bringing pirates to justice
19. We
conclude that gathering evidence to secure a successful prosecution
for piracy is challenging. However, not all claims made by the
Government about the difficulty in securing evidence were wholly
convincing: when pirates are observed in boats with guns, ladders
and even hostages, it beggars belief that they cannot be prosecuted,
assuming that states have the necessary laws in place and the
will to do so. We urge the Government to pursue alternative means
of securing suitable evidence (such as photos or video recordings
of pirates with equipment, and supplying witness testimony by
videolink). We urge the Government to engage with regional states
to agree consistent and attainable rules on evidence required
for a piracy prosecution. (Paragraph 81)
20. We recommend that
the Government take steps to ensure that all aspects of international
piracy are adequately covered by UK law. (Paragraph 84)
21. We conclude that
the Government was right to oppose the establishment of an extra-territorial
Somali court as proposed in the Jack Lang report to try Somali
pirates in a third country. We recommend that the Government set
out in its response to this report its views on the more recent
proposals for specialised anti-piracy courts established within
regional states under ordinary national law. (Paragraph 92)
22. We recommend that
the FCO take more concerted action to re-establish the transfer
arrangement with Kenya, and should be prepared to exert more pressure
on other states in the region to accept piracy suspects for prosecution.
We recommend that the Government provide to the Committee in its
response to this report a list of current transfer agreements
and those under negotiation, and with an update on its efforts
to re-establish the Kenyan Memorandum of Understanding. (Paragraph
99)
23. We recommend that
the FCO include in its future agreements with Kenya and other
states a right to monitor the status of detainees it transfers
from its control to those states to prosecute for piracy. (Paragraph
101)
24. We recommend that
in its response to this report the Government provide the Committee
with an explanation of why jurisdictional issues were seen as
an obstacle to the UK prosecuting pirates for their role in the
Chandlers' case. (Paragraph 106)
25. We conclude that
prosecuting pirates in local courts should remain the preferred
option. However, we also conclude that there is no legal reason
for the UK not to assert jurisdiction and try pirates in our national
courts, and we urge the Government to consider this as an option
if no other country will take suspected pirates captured by UK
ships. (Paragraph 107)
26. We conclude that
pre- and post-sentencing transfer agreements are a pragmatic approach
but there are too few of them. We recommend that the Government
pursue more vigorously its efforts to increase prison capacity
in the region and in Somalia itself. We also recommend that the
Government investigate whether it would be feasible to transfer
pirates from the UK back to Somalia to serve their sentences after
prosecution in the UK. (Paragraph 110)
Ransoms
27. We
conclude that the fact that ransom payments in 2011 have already
totalled $135m, another all-time record, should be a matter of
deep concern to the British Government and to the entire international
maritime community. We conclude that the Government should not
pay or assist in the payment of ransoms but nor should it make
it more difficult for companies to secure the safe release of
their crew by criminalising the payment of ransoms. (Paragraph
115)
Financial tracking
28. We
conclude that the Government has been disappointingly slow to
take action on financial flows relating to ransom payments, particularly
given the information available from British companies involved.
(Paragraph 118)
29. The Serious Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA) should make it a priority to address rumours
of ransom money making its way into the UK's financial system.
(Paragraph 118)
30. We conclude that
the Government's laudable principle not to become involved in
ransom payments should not extend to the point of failing to collect,
analyse, and act upon information concerning ransom payments made
by British companies or private individuals. We recommend that
the Government establish a mechanism through which intelligence
and information about ransom payments and pirate groups and negotiations
can be communicated to the Government by those involved. (Paragraph
119)
31. We recommend that
the FCO publish details on the new maritime intelligence and information
co-ordination centre, including its mandate, funding, and when
it is expected to begin operations. (Paragraph 120)
International response to the crisis in Somalia
32. The
UK should be very wary of international claims to deliver a solution
on land in Somalia. International capacity to rebuild a Somali
state is extremely limited. We conclude that the UK should continue
to act through the United Nations and European Union programmes
to pursue peace and stability in Somalia. We urge the Government
to push for a concerted international effort to capitalise on
the African Union Mission in Somalia's (AMISOM) recent military
gains against al-Shabab by supporting the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) in its efforts to extend its control, build the
rule of law combat corruption and encourage development. (Paragraph
132)
UK response
33. We
recommend that the Government develop its engagement with civil
society organisations in Somalia to strengthen local responsibility
and involvement in international efforts to counter piracy off
the coast of Somalia. We recommend that in its response to this
report, the Government provide more details of the community engagement
projects which it announced in October 2011. (Paragraph 141)
FCO support for victims and families
34. We
recommend that the Government review the medium in which information
on piracy such as travel warnings is released, in order to ensure
that it is accessible to different users, including yachtsmen.
We further recommend that the Government intensifies its efforts
to draw to the attention of seafarers the information that is
available on the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
and NATO websites about specific sea areas at risk of pirate attack.
(Paragraph 146)
35. We recommend that
the Government review its handling of the Chandlers' case to ascertain
whether improvements could be made for the future, and we request
that the Government present its conclusions in its response to
this report. (Paragraph 149)
36. We are disappointed
that Paul and Rachel Chandler did not feel that their family was
adequately supported during their ordeal. We recommend that the
FCO review its communication and other procedures to provide support
to family members of British hostages abroad, and provide its
conclusions to the Committee in response to this report. (Paragraph
150)
Conclusion
37. We
conclude that for too long there has been a noticeable gap between
the Government's rhetoric and its action. Despite nine UN Security
Council resolutions and three multinational naval operations,
the counter-piracy policy has had limited impact. The number of
attacks, the costs to the industry and the price of the ransoms
have all increased significantly since 2007. (Paragraph 154)
38. We conclude that
decisive action is now required on a number of fronts to contain
the problem in the short to medium term, so that long term solutions
can be found. We recommend that the FCO gives high priority to
the international conference on piracy to be hosted by the UK
in February 2012 and provides the Committee with a full and detailed
account of decisions taken and UK and international actions that
arise from it. (Paragraph 155)
| 
