4 Somalia: a solution on land
The origins of piracy: breakdown
in Somalia
121. Following the fall of General Mohamed Siad
Barre's dictatorial regime in 1991, Somalia has been in a state
of almost perpetual conflict. It now suffers from multiple and
diverse challenges, including a government that has been unable
to project its power beyond parts of the capital Mogadishu; ongoing
conflict between the government and the Islamist terrorist group
al-Shabab which controls much of the southern region; a famine
that has put 4 million people in crisis, with 750,000 people reported
to be at risk of death in the next four months;[224]
and the displacement of around 2 million of its population of
only 9 million, making it the third largest refugee-producing
country in the world after Afghanistan and Iraq.[225]
The combination of these problems and the resulting humanitarian
catastrophe has led to Somalia being considered the most failed
of the world's failed states.[226]
122. Somalia is divided into three main regions,
with stark differences between them in terms of governance and
conflict:
- Somaliland: A former British
protectorate, Somaliland is a relatively well-governed and peaceful
region in the north of Somalia. It has an established democratic
government which has upheld the rule of law and is seeking independence
from the rest of Somalia.
- Puntland: A semi-autonomous region on the horn
of east Africa, Puntland has its own government that is seeking
a federal role in the Somali state. It suffers from extreme poverty
and some conflict. Much Somali piracy operates from Puntland and
the area south of it toward Galmudug.
- South central Somalia: Containing the capital,
Mogadishu, until recently much of south central Somalia was held
by the main terrorist group, al-Shabab. The region is mired in
conflict between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (supported
by up to 12,000 African Union troops)[227]
and al-Shabab. A recent incursion by Kenyan troops across Somalia's
southern border to pursue suspected perpetrators of recent kidnappings
in Kenya has further heightened the state of conflict.
123. Many submissions to our inquiry, including
the Government's, noted that piracy at sea is a symptom of the
breakdown of state authority in Somalia and the inability of its
government to establish law and order within its borders or off
its coast. The long-term solution to piracy therefore lies on
land. As Major General Howes said of the naval operations:
We are treating the symptom only. We are containing
a problem that emanates directly as a consequence of instability
in Somalia, so the only way this is going to be resolved is over
a long period of time with a comprehensive approach that reduces
the insecurity in that country.[228]
International response to the
crisis
124. The international community has a history
of difficult and controversial engagement with Somalia. In 1994,
US-led UN troops in Somalia were withdrawn following a notorious
battle in Mogadishu in which left 18 US soldiers dead and between
350 and 1,000 Somali gunmen and civilians believed killed.[229]
An intervention of Ethiopian troops in 2006 on the invitation
of the Transitional Federal Government to oust Islamist opposition
forces was also controversial, and the troops withdrew as part
of the 2008 Djibouti agreement. Nevertheless, the humanitarian
catastrophe and the two security threats of terrorism and piracy
have served recently to re-focus international attention onto
Somalia again. States and organisations in the region, as well
as the United Nations and the European Union, have registered
a new sense of urgency in responding to the crisis.
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
125. Numerous attempts have been made to establish
a political agreement to bring about an end to the conflicts in
Somalia, and this remains a key priority at the UN, which has
established a UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), headed
by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Augustine
Mahiga, and a UN Contact Group on Somalia. The UN-backed Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) is the result of a peace process that
began in Kenya in 2001, following a dozen failed initiatives.
The TFG is recognised internationally and aspires to govern the
entire Somali territory but it has little control beyond parts
of the capital, and continues to be troubled by infighting and
allegations of corruption. Earlier in 2011, elections that had
been planned under the 2008 Djibouti Peace Process were delayed until
2012, a deadline which some observers still consider unrealistic.[230]
126. It is not clear how much legitimacy the
Transitional Federal Government has in the eyes of Somalis. One
recent media report stated that "The transitional government
is seen by many Somalis as simply another militia, and a foreign-backed
one at that".[231]
Sally Healy, a specialist on Somalia at Chatham House, told us
that the TFG is "only a government in name".[232]
Nevertheless, the TFG is still supported by most of the international
community, including the UK. The FCO Minister Henry Bellingham
took a much more positive view of the TFG, stating that "we
are confident that the TFG will now start reaching out to the
different constituent parts of Somalia and actually start making
a difference, giving the people of Somalia some hope for the future".[233]
127. In addition to supporting the TFG, international
engagement has broadened to include the governments of the Somaliland
and Puntland regions, which have had some success in establishing
institutions and a degree of order. Somaliland, in particular,
is seen as a successful and stable example. Although it has not
been recognised as an independent state, it has strived to act
as a good international partner.[234]
SECURITY
128. There is ongoing conflict within Somalia
between the main opposition force, the Islamist al-Shabab, and
the Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabab controls large
portions of south central Somalia and, until recently, parts of
Mogadishu. The TFG is backed up by around 9,000 African Union
troops (AMISOM). 2011 has seen a number of gains by AMISOM, including
a major breakthrough in August when al-Shabab withdrew from Mogadishu.
An incursion in October by Kenyan troops has claimed some success
as well, and appears to be threatening al-Shabab's stronghold
in the port of Kismayo. However, it is not clear that the intervention
has been welcomed by the TFG, and some observers fear that Kenya
will be embroiled in the conflict for a long time.[235]
Even where it has ceded territory, al-Shabab remains a major ongoing
threat to stability, as demonstrated by a recent suicide bombing
in a TFG compound in Mogadishu that killed 72 people.
129. States in the regionparticularly
Uganda, Burundi and Kenyahave taken the lead in responding
militarily to establish security in Somalia. The UN has called
for others to support AMISOM through contributions. The EU, for
example, has so far provided AMISOM with contributions worth over
258 million through its African Peace Facility. The UK also
supports the work of AMISOM and will support AMISOM with approximately
£27.3 million over this financial year".[236]
The EU also has a small military mission in Uganda to contribute
to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM).[237]
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION AND HUMANITARIAN
AID
130. The EU is the largest overall donor to Somalia.
The EU has committed 215.4
million for development aid for the period 2008 to 2013, which
is complemented by funding sourced through various thematic programmes.[238]
According to EUNAVFOR, EU
assistance to Somalia since 2003 has included:
Development aid from the European Commission (EDF)
- 409,472,071 million of
development aid from 2003
- 215.8 million for 2008-2013 (EDF, Somalia
Special Support Programmeinitial envelope)
- 175 million for 2012-2013 (EDF, Ad-hoc
Review)
Ongoing development assistance in focal sectors
- 52 million Governance
& Security
- 36 million Education
- 48 million Economic Growth
Humanitarian aid from the European Commission for
Somalia (ECHO)
- 43.8 million for 2008,
45 million in 2009 and 35 million for 2010 (possibly
30 million in 2011)
- 198 million since 2005 for Somalia[239]
131. In addition to ongoing humanitarian assistance,
a famine in the Horn of Africa has heightened Somalia's need for
international humanitarian aid in 2011. The United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported
on 15 November 2011 that funding for the 2011 Consolidated Appeal
Process for Somalia had reached US$800 million, out of the $1
billion requirement.[240]
UNOCHA also noted that the UK's 2011 contribution to the Somalia
appeal had risen by over $55 million compared to that of 2010,
making it one of the biggest contributers to the fund.[241]
However, ongoing conflict and a ban on some UN agencies by al-Shabab
had made it difficult to ensure the delivery of aid to all areas
in Somalia. On 13 December 2011, UNOCHA stated that the crisis
in the Horn of Africa remains the largest humanitarian crisis
in the world, and launched its Consolidated Appeal Process for
2012, seeking a record $1.5 billion for Somalia.[242]
132. The ongoing problems in Somalia are of such
scale that no single state can hope to have a meaningful impact
alone. The UK should be very
wary of international claims to deliver a solution on land in
Somalia. International capacity to rebuild a Somali state is extremely
limited. We conclude that the UK should continue to act through
the United Nations and European Union programmes to pursue peace
and stability in Somalia. We urge the Government to push for a
concerted international effort to capitalise on the African Union
Mission in Somalia's (AMISOM) recent military gains against al-Shabab
by supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in its
efforts to extend its control, build the rule of law combat corruption
and encourage development.
COUNTER-PIRACY PROJECTS
133. In addition to the stabilisation work above,
the UN runs a number of counter-piracy projects in Somalia, largely
focused on the more stable areas in Somaliland and Puntland. These
include improving prison conditions and welfare, providing capacity-building
and training programmes to prison staff, building courtroom facilities,
and contributing to the building of prisons. In addition, the
UNODC has a Somalia-wide law reform project, which covers the
incorporation of piracy provisions into Somali law and the brokering
of post trial transfer agreements, as well as the training of
judges.[243]
UK response
134. The UK Government regards Somalia as a key
priority.[244] The
Prime Minister recently stated that Somalia "directly threatens
British interests",[245]
and Henry Bellingham, FCO Minister, told us that the Government's
Somalia strategy "recognises that what happens in Somalia
matters to the UK. In addition to counter-terrorism, we have a
range of interests in the country, including piracy/maritime security
threats".[246]
The Minister also informed us that Somalia continued to present
"one of the most significant terrorist threats to the UK".
The Foreign Secretary announced in 2010 that the FCO intends to
open an Embassy in Somalia as soon as conditions allow.
135. The UK is a member of the UN Contact Group
on Somalia and has instigated a number of UN debates on Somalia
and piracy. It has hosted visits from Ministers from the TFG,
Somaliland and Puntland governments. In March 2011, DfID announced
that it was substantially increasing aid to Somalia to an average
of £63 million per year until 2015 as part of a shake-up
of development spending.[247]
Due to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and enhanced
need, DfID spending on Somalia is expected to increase to at least
£84.5 million for this financial year.[248]
According to a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Committee,
the FCO provided over £6 million of support in the last financial
year to continue building counter-piracy capacity in the region.
According to the Foreign Secretary, the funding represented a
total of 12 separate piracy-related projects recently taken forward
in Kenya, the Seychelles and in Somalia itself, including support
for courts, prisons, police and coastguards.[249]
The UK has dedicated over £3 million to UNODC counter piracy
projects in Somalia itself. [250]
CRITICISM OF THE APPROACH IN SOMALIA
136. A number of submissions criticised the failure
of the international community to engage with Somali society to
provide a sense of legitimacy and local ownership of the political
settlements and development projects. Both Saferworld, an NGO
that works with Somali civil society organizations, and World
G18 Somalia, a UK-based diaspora group, noted the lack of trust
between the local Somali communities and the international community.
According to Saferworld, the lack of structured and substantive
consultation with Somali civil society has created a 'trust deficit'
between local, national and international actors. Furthermore,
Saferworld argued that this "impacts negatively on the effectiveness
of aid programmes, undermines Somali civil society, and contributes
to a sense of alienation among Somali communities from the decision-making
processes that affect their lives". Saferworld and World
G18 Somalia also criticised the UK's approach in channeling its
funding through international NGOs, seeing this as a "lack
of meaningful engagement" with Somalis and the Somali diaspora.[251]
In December 2011, the Government stated that both the FCO and
the Department for International Development would be willing
to consider applications from UK diaspora organisations representing
any region of Somalia, and that the FCO has already made grants
to some Somali diaspora organisations.[252]
137. This engagement is particularly important
with regard to countering piracy. Sally Healy told us that:
Somalis tend not to have a very benign view of outside
interventions in their country, and I think that anti-piracy activities
need to recognise that that is likely to be the case. It is important
that any anti-piracy activities give some indication that we actually
care about Somalia and its people, and the protection issues that
are at stake, rather than simply being concerned with shipping
interests, although obviously we should be driven by UK interests.[253]
From the limited information available, it appears
that there exists an ambiguous and shifting relationship between
Somali pirates and the local communities, local and national politicians,
and al-Shabab. For leaders in Puntland and south central Somalia,
piracy is a concern, but it is not a priority, and their limited
resources are better spent on creating and maintaining stability.[254]
There are mixed reports of the relationship between al-Shabab
and pirates. While there are some reports that al-Shabab has been
co-operating to some extent with pirate groups, Sally Healy told
us:
The al-Shabab group, which controls a lot of the
southern areas and at least the port of Kismayo appears up to
now to be against pirates and piracy. The group itself has a very
different agenda, and it seems to regard the buccaneering and
this manner of raising money as an improper activity that goes
against the moralistic and strict version of Islam that it follows.[255]
138. There are also mixed reports of the views
of local communities in Somalia about the piracy that operates
from their coastline. There are those who are supportive of the
pirates, seeing piracy as just a way of earning a living. Some
are "very alive to the big pirate economy that has developed,
and [..] quite cynical about it, and feel that their own contribution
to it is just one of many that are kind of cashing in on a bit
of a bonanza".[256]
However, there are also reports of clans moving against pirate
groups in their area, because of the negative economic impacts:
although some gains from piracy trickle down and support a 'pirate
economy', ransoms also cause house price booms and inflation.
139. There was some disagreement among our witnesses
about what measures should be taken to improve the situation in
Somalia, and to counter piracy off its coast. World G18 Somalia
and Saferworld both mentioned the need to provide employment and
development alternatives to piracy, and Sally Healy agreed, noting
that the fishing industry had "huge potential" to offer
alternative employment. However, Dr Alec D Coutroubis and George
Kiourktsoglou were more sceptical, arguing that there was limited
opportunity to develop sources of legitimate income, and that
"even if there were, the income (per capita) generated by
these alternative professional activities would pale compared
to the cash generated via piracy ransom payments", and that
the solution to piracy lies in a more comprehensive "nation
(re)building process".[257]
140. We note that engagement on the ground in
Somalia is difficult at present due to the security situation
there, which impedes both the commissioning and monitoring of
projects. However, the FCO announced in October 2011 that the
Government would commit £2 million to "community engagement
and economic development projects" in coastal regions, spreading
messages on the dangers of piracy and providing "small scale
but high impact programmes to offer real alternatives to piracy".
In addition, Henry Bellingham announced he had held preliminary
discussions to engage industry partners in "innovative community
engagement schemes".[258]
141. We recommend that the Government
develop its engagement with civil society organisations in Somalia
to strengthen local responsibility and involvement in international
efforts to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. We recommend
that in its response to this report, the Government provide more
details of the community engagement projects which it announced
in October 2011.
224 In September 2011, it was reported that 750,000
were at risk, see "Somalia famine: UN warns of 750,000 deaths",
BBC News Online, 5 September 2011. In November, the prediction
was reduced to 250,000 see "Somali famine zones downgraded
by UN", BBC News Online, 18 November 2011. For more
information see: UN Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit,
fsnau.org. Back
225
Q 195 and "UNHCR issues warning over treatment of Somali
refugees", United Nations Refugee Agency, unhcr.org Back
226
For four years in a row, Somalia has topped the Foreign Policy
Magazine's Failed States Index. See foreignpolicy.com. Back
227
African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. On 30 September 2011
the UN Security Council extended AMISOM's mandate to October 2012
and urged states to increase its numbers to the authorised strength
of 12,000. SC/10399 Back
228
Q 92 Back
229
See "1993: US forces killed in Somali gun battle", BBC
News Online, 4 October 2003, bbc.co.uk. Back
230
Under the Kampala peace accord, agreed in June 2011, elections
of the president and speaker were postponed for a year from August
2011. Back
231
"Don't aim too high", The Economist, 15
October 2011, economist.com Back
232
Q 196 Back
233
Q 313 Back
234
Q 196 Back
235
See, for instance, "France to support Kenya's incursion into
Somalia", BBC News Online, 25 October 2011, bbc.co.uk. Back
236
International Development Committee, Working Effectively in Fragile
and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda, Ev 75-76 Back
237
Agreed on 25 January 2010, and launched in May 2010. Back
238
European Union External Action Service, 'EU ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA',
April 2011, EU Somalia/12 Back
239
EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, 'Media Information', 21 November
2011, eunavfor.eu Back
240
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
'Somalia: Famine & Drought, Situation Report No. 24', 29 November
2011. The report notes that the Somalia Consolidated Appeal 2011
is one of the most comprehensively funded humanitarian
appeals. Back
241
UNOCHA, 'Humanitarian Funding Analysis for Somalia: Drought and
Famine Scale-Up' August 2011 Back
242
Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
ReliefCoordinator, Valerie Amos, Press Briefing, 14 December 2011 Back
243
Ev 69 Back
244
Henry Bellingham, statement at the United Nations Security Council
Somalia Open Debate, 11 March 2011 Back
245
Prime Minister David Cameron, Lord Mayor's banquet speech, 14
November 2011 Back
246
Ev 71 Back
247
DfID Bilateral Aid Review Results: Country Summaries Back
248
HC Deb, 3 November 2011, Cols 790-91W Back
249
Foreign Affairs Committee, Developments in UK Foreign Policy,
oral evidence from the Foreign Secretary on 16 March 2011, HC(2010-12)
881-i Back
250
Ev 69. See written evidence for further details and a breakdown
of donations. Back
251
Ev 116, paras 11 and 14 and Ev 125, paras 3 (f) and 5 Back
252
HL Deb, 9 December 2011, col WA204 Back
253
Q 195 Back
254
Q 196 Back
255
Q 196 Back
256
Q 210 Back
257
Ev 123, paras 5.4 and 5.5 Back
258
Henry Bellingham MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, speech
to the Chamber of Shipping, 12 Oct 2011 Back
|