6 Conclusion
151. Since the end of the Second World War, vessels
transiting the Indian Ocean have been relatively safe from attack.
It is wholly unacceptable that a comparatively small number
of criminal groups engaged in piracy have rendered the Indian
Ocean a 'no go' area for smaller vessels such as yachts, and one
in which larger shipping needs to hire private armed guards to
guarantee safe passage.
152. This year has seen a reduction in the number
of successful attacks, and the surge in piracy attacks that was
expected in autumn 2011 does not appear to have materialised.
It remains to be seen whether this is indicative of an improving
trend as a result of better defence and naval action, or whether
it is merely a lull while pirates adapt to a changing situation.
The fact that the number of attacks, hostages, and ships held,
as well as the overall ransom figures, have all reached record
highs at times this year should serve as a caution against any
complacency in the UK's counter-piracy response.
153. A combination of unarmed ships, owners that
are willing to pay millions in ransom to have their ships returned,
too few naval forces to respond, and relative impunity in Somalia
for their crimes, has created a compelling business model for
Somali pirates that offers enormous financial incentives and few
real disincentives. It is commendable that the Government has
proceeded through international co-operation, particularly in
the swift establishment in 2008 of the Internationally Recommended
Transit Corridor which has effectively secured shipping in the
Gulf of Aden. It does not appear, however, that subsequent international
efforts have been as decisive, timely or effective in curbing
Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, Somali pirates have
proven nimble and adaptable to change. As a consequence, piracy
off the coast of Somalia has proliferated and grown into a thriving
business.
154. We conclude that for too
long there has been a noticeable gap between the Government's
rhetoric and its action. Despite nine UN Security Council resolutions
and three multinational naval operations, the counter-piracy policy
has had limited impact. The number of attacks, the costs to the
industry and the price of the ransoms have all increased significantly
since 2007. The threat
is not primarily against British merchant ships, very few of which
have been successfully attacked, nor is it one of terrorism. It
is rather that Somali piracy threatens the UK's economy through
the banking, insurance and shipping industries, and the British
and foreign flagged ships we depend upon for trade. Despite this,
piracy is not a priority task for Royal Navy forces and the UK
has at times barely dedicated even one ship to counter-piracy
activities. The naval operations have been further limited by
the failure to prosecute detained suspects and rules of engagement
that required strengthening earlier this year.
155. Looking forward, proposals focusing on pursuing
financial transactions related to piracy have potential, and pursuing
stability on land in Somalia is theoretically the solution, although
UK and international leverage there is limited. Private armed
guards seem to be the best way quickly to improve the situation,
but the Government was slow to permit armed guards on UK shipping
and its guidance lacks critical detail. We
conclude that decisive action is now required on a number of fronts
to contain the problem in the short to medium term, so that long
term solutions can be found. We recommend that the FCO gives high
priority to the international conference on piracy to be hosted
by the UK in February 2012 and provides the Committee with a full
and detailed account of decisions taken and UK and international
actions that arise from it.
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