House of Commons - UK-Turkey relations and Turkey's regional role

UK-Turkey relations and Turkey's regional role - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

4 Turkey as a foreign policy partner

Turkey's international position and policy

91. The Government wants to strengthen the UK's relations with Turkey in large part because it sees the country as a foreign policy partner. The Foreign Secretary announced in his first major speech in office that the Government would "make a particular diplomatic effort to work with Turkey".[200] The FCO identified Turkey as having assets and characteristics potentially useful in a partner for the UK: membership of international organisations including NATO, the G20, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe; a "strong network of relationships and influence in regions where UK interests are significant", including North Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Western Balkans; and a status as a Muslim democracy.[201] Sir David Logan argued that Turkey was especially well-placed as a potential partner for the UK in its region, since its "geographical location, [...] historical (Ottoman) links and [...] shared (Muslim) religion are assets not otherwise available to the UK among our NATO allies and EU partners".[202] Mr Park highlighted Turkey's influence in the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (formerly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference),[203] and several witnesses said that Ankara had developed a close relationship with the Arab League.[204] The Turkish Area Study Group also highlighted Turkey's possession of significant fresh water resources, suggesting that this could become a further asset shaping the country's regional role.[205]

92. The FCO also said that it wanted to strengthen the UK's foreign policy partnership with Turkey because of the latter's rising international influence. Turkey's emergence as an international and especially regional force has been one of the more commented-upon international phenomena of recent years, above all in the context of the 'Arab Spring' (see paragraphs 104-112). For example, in November 2011 Philip Stephens in the Financial Times contended that "anyone with half an eye on the Middle East [...] will have noticed Turkey's emergence as the pivotal regional power";[206] and in January 2012 researchers at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy said that Turkey's international outreach meant the country was best seen as a "Eurasian China".[207] In terms of Turkey's exposure to international issues and partners, Dr Robins highlighted the importance of its experience winning a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2009-10, for the first time since 1961.[208] In May 2011, Turkey announced its candidacy for another UNSC term in 2015-16.

93. Turkey's rise to international and especially regional influence has resulted partly from the conscious pursuit by the post-2002 AKP government of a more proactive foreign policy—although several witnesses reminded us that Turkey had started to exhibit greater international activism from the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the end of the Cold War opened up new opportunities and risks for the country.[209] Witnesses suggested that Turkey's traditional allies had been of little use in helping it to meet its post-Cold War challenges; and that a lack of a consistent US/EU strategy towards Eurasia, the sclerotic nature of many Arab regimes, and the US' loss of influence in the region after the 2003 Iraq war—and latterly its more conscious retreat from regional leadership—had also all enabled, encouraged and obliged Turkey's assumption of a greater regional role.[210]

94. The policy being pursued by the AKP in government is associated especially with Professor Ahmet Davutoðlu, who was Prime Minister Erdoðan's foreign policy adviser before becoming Foreign Minister in 2009. Sir David Logan summarised the change in approach under the AKP as follows:

before the advent of the AKP government, Turkish governments regarded all Turkey's neighbours as problematical and potentially hostile. Besides, Ataturk's vision of making Turkey a part of (European) civilisation left Turkey as a supplicant on the border of Europe which, however, persistently rejected it. So Turkey's potential as a partner was limited. The AKP government's new vision is of a Turkey at the centre of its own region, whose interests are best served by good relations with its neighbours. This approach has transformed Turkey's relations with the Arab world, Iran, the Western Balkans, and to some extent with Russia and the South Caucasus, not just politically but also economically and socially.[211]

The AKP's policy is commonly summarised under Mr Davutoðlu's slogan "zero problems with neighbours". Dr Bechev said that AKP foreign policy aimed to: engage neighbouring countries to enhance Turkey's security, especially with respect to the Kurdish question; open new markets for Turkish business; "grandstand" internationally in order to score points at home; and "advance Turkey's claim for a place in the new pecking order of emergent powers".[212] In autumn 2011, Dr Aybet saw Turkish foreign policy as operating in three spheres:

"a transatlantic security community grounded in Euro-Atlantic institutions" including NATO and the EU, as well as liberal and democratic values;
"a regional emerging security community based on values of religious and ethnic identity", a strand which encompassed strong support for Palestinian statehood and resistance to Israeli occupation, as well as, for example, support for Muslim Uighurs in China, and
"a regional proactive policy based on realpolitik, devoid of any value based sentiments". Until the 'Arab Spring', this strand encompassed good relations with regional leaders, including Syria's President Assad, as well as strong relationships with Iran and Russia based partly on energy imports.[213]

95. Among features of AKP foreign policy, witnesses highlighted:

Mediation efforts, between and within states, which Dr Robins said Ankara had pursued "tirelessly".[214] Turkey has engaged in such efforts between Israel and Syria, Syria and Iraq, Iran and the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Lebanon, Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Libya, and in the southern Caucasus and Western Balkans.[215] Jointly with Spain, Turkey also launched the 'Alliance of Civilisations' initiative in 2005 under UN auspices, to promote post-9/11 cross-cultural understanding.[216] David Lidington highlighted Turkey's efforts in the Western Balkans as especially useful for the UK; during President Gül's 2011 State Visit to London, the UK and Turkey agreed on ongoing official-level contacts and meetings on the region.[217]
The deployment of 'soft power', in the form of trade, people-to-people contacts and cultural diplomacy, as opposed to the previous priority given to military capability (see paragraph 37).[218] Several witnesses stressed in particular the extent to which AKP foreign policy both utilised and was driven by trading relationships with nearby states. Turkey has abolished entry visa requirements for nationals of a number of regional countries, including Russia, Iran and Syria, and has free-trade agreements with states including Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.[219] Several witnesses suggested that Turkey's efforts to build regional political relations through trade echoed one of the founding principles of the EU.[220]

96. Our witnesses said that the FCO was correct to have identified Turkey's potential value to the UK in foreign policy terms. Dr Aybet, Sir David Logan and the Turkish Area Study Group all felt that the ambition and activism which Turkey was displaying in its international relations increased its value as a foreign policy partner for the UK.[221] Conversely, Sir David warned that Turkish opposition to UK objectives could now represent a "significant handicap".[222]

97. We conclude that the Government is correct to have identified Turkey as possessing assets, characteristics and influence that potentially add value to UK foreign policy, and to be seeking a stronger foreign policy partnership accordingly.

Non-Western turn?

98. In its submission, the FCO made no reference to potential difficulties associated with the idea of Turkey as a foreign policy partner for the UK.[223] Despite their overall support for the idea, our witnesses raised two. The first was the potential for divergence between Turkish interests and policy and those of the UK, or of the EU or the West more widely. In the West, Turkey's intensified regional outreach has prompted a debate over whether the country is re-aligning itself 'eastwards', away from the West.[224] In the US in particular, the debate has extended to sometimes impassioned argument about whether Turkey has been 'lost', and if so, who might be responsible.[225] Dr Bechev set out the evidence as follows:

The crisis in Libya has shown that Turkey's support for NATO is qualified. Ankara prefers engaging rather than containing Iran, and is comfortable talking to Hamas, Hezbollah and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Until recently Turkey was amongst Bashar al-Assad's closest friends as well. Its once warm relations with Israel are now in tatters. [...] Ties with Russia are thriving.[226]

The stalling of Turkey's EU accession process is part of the context for this debate (see Chapter 7).

99. Our witnesses were in agreement that, by definition, the AKP government's focus on Turkey's region and regional interests meant a downgrading in the relative priority which Turkey was giving to Western ties.[227] Dr Bechev, Sir David Logan, Bill Park and John Peet also all agreed that Turkey's interests in its region could sometimes diverge from those of the UK, EU or US, and that Ankara was now prepared to pursue its interests even in opposition to Western preferences.[228] Mr Park described Turkey as "frequently at odds with the West" on regional issues, and Dr Aybet identified several cases where there were "considerable differences" between Turkey and the UK.[229] Overall, Mr Park advised that "although the UK should be relaxed about Turkey's quite natural endeavours to ingratiate itself with its more immediate region(s), it should also be aware that this will not invariably lead to policies that London will find comfortable".[230] Dr Aybet warned of a longer-term risk that Turkish and Western threat perceptions might increasingly diverge.[231]

100. We heard three considerations to set against possible concerns about Ankara pursuing a distinct foreign policy path:

Dr Aybet said that Turkey continued to act in good faith as a NATO member (see paragraphs 113-114).[232]
Sir David Logan argued that, as an increasingly prosperous democracy, Turkey's fundamental interests would increasingly converge with those of its Western partners.[233]
Dr Aybet argued that Turkey could sometimes add value in foreign policy terms for the UK or the West precisely because its identity or policy was different. In her view, "the important thing is Turkey is engaged and in a position to talk to all sides concerned. At a time when international or 'western' presented norms are challenged by regional norms, Turkey's diplomatic ventures as an 'independent actor' from the West could be crucial in harbouring stability in the region".[234] This argument was made above all with respect to Iran (see paragraphs 115-119). To set alongside the potential diplomatic value to the UK of Turkish distinctiveness, Dr Robins did not think that Turkey would penalise the UK for itself having a different stance on, for example, Palestinian statehood.[235]

101. Compared to Turkey's previous Western orientation, several witnesses suggested that Ankara's greater focus on regional security and prosperity, and its willingness to advance its own interests, should be regarded as a 'normalisation' of Turkish foreign policy.[236] Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform described Turkey's previous Western focus and regional isolation as "weird".[237] John Peet also suggested that many of the stances taken by the AKP government—such as on Israel and the Palestinian issue—should be seen as a consequence of Turkey's democratisation and the more politically responsive nature of the AKP government compared with earlier administrations.[238] Overall, Dr Bechev advised that the UK Government should assess Turkish policy on a case-by-case basis, expecting it sometimes to converge, sometimes to agree on goals but not methods, and sometimes to clash.[239]

102. Dr Aybet argued that, given the difficulties which sometimes arose in Turkey's relations with the US, and the lukewarm nature of Ankara's relations with other leading EU states such as Germany and France, the UK had a particular role in anchoring and stabilising Turkey's place in the West.[240]

103. We have encountered no evidence to suggest that Turkey has made an overarching foreign policy re-alignment away from the West. Rather, Turkish foreign policy is best regarded as becoming more 'normal', in the sense of focusing on Turkey's region, pursuing national security and economic interests, and better reflecting Turkish public attitudes. The FCO should not underestimate the extent to which this shift may generate unavoidable differences between Turkish and UK perspectives and policies. However, we conclude that—as long as its foreign policy efforts are directed towards the same ultimate goals—Turkey may sometimes add value as a foreign policy partner precisely because it is distinct from the UK.

TURKEY AND THE 'ARAB SPRING'

104. The need to respond to the 'Arab Spring' from 2011 has been one of the greatest tests so far of the degree of convergence that exists between Turkey's 'new' foreign policy and that of the UK and the West. Dr Bechev said that, with respect to the 'Arab Spring', Turkey faced "the same transformation-vs.-stability dilemma" with which US and EU policy-makers had long been grappling.[241] Mr Park described Ankara as "delicately poised between its friendships with many of the region's regimes on the one hand, and its support for democratisation, economic development, and the people's will on the other".[242] Turkey's initial stance was often to be cautious in the face of the Arab uprisings. However, Dr Aybet said that "once the leaders become delegitimised [Turkish policy-makers] tend to waver, but eventually the Government start supporting the other side".[243] In September 2011, almost coinciding with Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy's appearance in Libya, Prime Minister Erdoðan made a high-profile visit to Libya, Egypt and Tunisia to position Turkey as a key external backer of the post-revolutionary regimes. We referred in paragraph 55 to the way in which Mr Erdoðan's statements in Cairo in favour of secularism appeared to be poorly received by the Muslim Brotherhood.

105. David Lidington told us that the UK and Turkey had "not agreed at every stage" in their responses to the 'Arab Spring', but that overall the period had "shown a coming together of interest and objective".[244] Dr Robins told us:

What the Turks did in Tunisia and Egypt in particular, and then later, admittedly after a delay, in Libya, was to instinctively say, 'The people must decide' [...] Turkey was falling back on first principles, which shows just how far Turkey has come in becoming socialised into the values of, maybe not liberal democracy, but certainly democracy that is somewhere between the liberal and illiberal ends of the continuum.[245]

The Foreign Secretary said in October 2011 that, primarily owing to the 'Arab Spring', he was speaking to Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoðlu about as often as to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.[246]

Libya and the NATO operation

106. In spring 2011 Turkey was cautious about international military action in Libya, and it appeared initially to favour trying to broker a ceasefire between the Gaddafi regime and its opponents. Turkey did not take part in the NATO action against Libyan targets in implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973. However, it provided ships and aircraft to NATO to assist in the enforcement of the UN-mandated arms embargo, and it allowed NATO use of the flight control centre at Izmir. Turkey also participated in the DFID-led international stabilisation team which was deployed to the rebels' base of Benghazi to prepare for the end of the conflict. Turkey was a member of the Libya Contact Group from its inception at the London Conference in March 2011, and it twice hosted meetings of the Group in Istanbul, including on the occasion in July 2011 when the Group recognised the National Transitional Council (NTC) as Libya's legitimate government.[247] By summer 2011, it was revealed when Foreign Minister Davutoðlu made an early visit to Benghazi that Turkey had been channelling funds to the NTC.[248]

107. Dr Aybet told us that—in addition to its ties to Libya under Gaddafi—Turkey's initial stance on the crisis reflected one of its traditional foreign policy tenets, of avoiding involvement in regional conflicts or the giving of support to external military intervention. Once it became clear that such intervention would take place, however, she said that Turkey "really pushed" to bring all aspects of the operation under NATO control, to ensure its own influence, rather than allowing command to remain with an ad hoc coalition.[249] In this respect, Turkey's position converged with that of the UK. Fadi Hakura of Chatham House commended London for bringing Turkey into the military campaign.[250] Dr Aybet concluded that Turkey dealt with the Libya crisis "cleverly, because they were able to contribute to the operation without becoming militarily involved, as well as having oversight of it all in the North Atlantic Council".[251]

108. Between February and May 2011, after the British Embassy in Tripoli was evacuated amidst the fighting between pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces, and before it closed its own Embassy in the city, Turkey represented UK interests in Libya.[252]

Syria

109. Of the Arab states which have experienced 'Arab Spring' uprisings, Turkey's position is most important with respect to Syria. After the previous Turkish government achieved a breakthrough in relations between Ankara and Damascus in 1998 by securing Syrian co-operation against the PKK, Turkey under the AKP government made a high-profile effort to cultivate Syrian President Assad. Turkey and Syria had visa-free travel and free-trade agreements, and cross-border exchanges grew significantly. In the face of the Syrian uprising in 2011, David Lidington told us that Turkey retained confidence for longer than the UK in President Assad's willingness to reform.[253] Ankara finally called in November for President Assad to step aside.[254]

110. Having broken with President Assad, Turkey became a leading force in the international effort to encourage him to leave office. By early 2012, when we prepared this Report, Turkey was hosting the Syrian National Council, the most prominent opposition group, composed largely of exiles. Leading personnel of the Free Syrian Army and other oppositionist military defectors were also operating from Turkey. In November 2011, Turkey announced bilateral economic sanctions against Syria. Ankara co-sponsored the draft UN Security Council resolution backing the Arab League plan for Syria which was supported by the UK, US and France but vetoed by China and Russia in early February 2012. Later in February, Turkey participated in the first meeting of the international 'Friends of Syria' group which was backed by the UK and US following the failure of the UNSC resolution. Turkey was expected to host the second meeting of the group in Istanbul, on 2 April 2012.

111. Once Turkey had broken with President Assad, the strength of its support for the effort to see him step down seemed partly to reflect the prospective awkwardness of its position were the Syrian leader to remain in power. John Peet thought that Turkish-Syrian relations under those circumstances would be "quite fraught".[255] Turkish diplomatic premises in Syria were attacked in November 2011, along with those of France, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, after the Arab League suspended Syria's membership at a meeting in which Turkey participated. In March 2012, Turkey was maintaining its Ambassador in Damascus, unlike the UK and several Arab and other EU states.[256] We encountered some unease in Turkey about the idea of the country becoming heavily involved in a conflict with its neighbour, but we also heard of rising outrage at the violence which President Assad's Alawite-dominated regime was inflicting on Turks' fellow Sunni Muslims across the border. Refugee flows from Syria were a further consideration for Ankara: in March 2012, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said that Turkey was hosting around 13,000 refugees from Syria.[257]

112. We conclude that the process of responding to the 'Arab Spring' has brought Turkey closer to its Western allies, including the UK, while also demonstrating the utility of Ankara's strong relations with the Arab League.

NATO, THE US AND MISSILE DEFENCE

113. In discussing the degree of convergence between Turkish and Western foreign policies, Dr Aybet highlighted Turkey's role in NATO.[258] In March 2012, Turkey was continuing to contribute to other NATO missions, in addition to the assistance which it extended to the NATO operation in Libya. For example, Turkey contributed troops to the NATO operation in Afghanistan since the latter's inception in 2001; in December 2011 Ankara had 1,845 troops deployed (the ninth-largest of the 49 national contingents). Turkey was running two of the 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, and it was providing training to the Afghan National Army and Police.[259] Turkey was also providing troops to the NATO force in Kosovo, KFOR. Dr Aybet said that, notwithstanding the decline in the Turkish military's political power, having the capability to contribute significantly to NATO operations remained a matter of national pride for Turkey.[260]

114. In September 2011, it was announced that Turkey would host a land-based early warning radar as part of the NATO missile defence system agreed at the Alliance's Lisbon summit in November 2010. In the context of speculation about the strength of US-Turkey ties, given divergences over Iran (see paragraphs 115-119) and the breakdown of Turkey's relations with Israel (see paragraphs 126-129), Dr Aybet told us that Turkey's decision to host the radar was driven primarily by its wish to maintain its long-term strategic relationship with the US. She said that Ankara had been made aware of, and responded to, the importance of the missile defence project to the US Administration in domestic political terms.[261] For its part, Turkey was receiving live intelligence from the US on the PKK in northern Iraq, and was seeking US assistance in the provision of surveillance drones.[262]

TURKEY AND IRAN

115. Turkey's relations with Iran have been the phenomenon cited most consistently by those who contend that Turkey has turned decisively away from the West. Such claims were triggered above all by a sequence of events in late spring 2010, comprising Turkey's apparently independent nuclear fuel initiative with Brazil (under which Iran would have shipped low-enriched uranium abroad for conversion into fuel for its nuclear research reactor), followed immediately by Ankara's vote on the UN Security Council against the next proposed round of UN sanctions against Tehran. Dr Robins told us that the idea that the fuel-swap deal had represented an anti-Western turn was "overcooked", and that the episode rather reflected a misunderstanding between Turkey and Brazil on the one hand, and the US on the other, about the leeway available to Ankara and Brasilia.[263] However, Turkey has remained unconvinced about the efficacy of sanctions against Iran, one of the key planks of UK and international policy towards the country. Turkey is legally obliged to implement the relevant UN sanctions, but as of March 2012 it had declined to join the EU's more extensive sanctions regime, and it was reportedly requesting a waiver from the latest US penalties on dealings with the Central Bank of Iran, primarily because of the impact which they would have on its imports of energy from Iran.[264] The FCO told us that it was "keen to see Turkey [...] continue to exert pressure on Iran, through rigorous implementation of UN sanctions".[265]

116. More broadly, Dr Robins told us that Turkey's strategy towards Iran since the Islamic Revolution had been "to conspicuously try to avoid riling [it]".[266] For example, Dr Aybet detailed how, while agreeing to host the missile defence radar for NATO, Turkey had successfully resisted the identification of Iran as a threat in the new NATO Strategic Concept document agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.[267]

117. As a result of Ankara's continuing relations with Iran, the Turkish Embassy said that Turkey was "one of the very few countries [with] the will and the ability to reinvigorate the diplomatic negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 about Iran's nuclear programme".[268] Similarly, in his Ankara speech in July 2010, the Prime Minister described Turkey as the "European country [...] [with] the greatest possible chance of persuading Iran to change its course on nuclear policy".[269] In January 2011, Turkey hosted what were (as of mid-March 2012) the most recent talks on the nuclear issue between Iran and EU High Representative Cathy Ashton, representing the international P5+1 powers; Turkey may again host in Istanbul the next round, which were in prospect in March 2012 as we finalised this Report. More broadly, David Lidington told us that Turkey could have contacts with Iran that were not available to the UK and that, as a predominantly Muslim state, it carried more weight there.[270]

118. Our witnesses were in agreement that Turkey's hosting of the NATO missile defence radar, plus its siding with the opposition to President Assad in Syria, were by autumn 2011 putting its relations with Tehran under severe strain. Dr Robins said:

Given the very close strategic relationship between Iran and Syria and that Turkey is becoming a leading state as far as the condemnation of Syria is concerned, Turkey has put itself on the other side as far as the fault line of regional politics is concerned. Assuming that the Syrian situation gets worse, that will be a big difficulty. It will put a big strain on the relationship which otherwise has been managed but has always had a combustible potential to it.[271]

119. We conclude that Turkey has a particular value for the UK as a friendly state able to talk to Iran. However, Turkey's alignment with the West and the Arab League in the Syrian crisis, and Ankara's hosting of an element of the NATO missile defence system, may put its capacity to continue to fulfil this function vis-à-vis Tehran under severe strain. Nonetheless, we further conclude that Turkey's decision to contribute materially to the implementation of NATO's new Strategic Concept in respect of ballistic missile defence is welcome.

Exaggerated influence?

120. If the first possible risk in the idea of Turkey as a UK foreign policy partner raised by our witnesses was the potential for divergence between Western and Turkish policy, the second was that Turkey may not have the regional influence that some commentary would suggest, or that it sometimes appears itself to assume.[272] This might reduce the country's attractiveness as a foreign policy partner. Several of the cases which our witnesses cited when discussing possible Turkish-Western divergence were also raised with respect to the strength of Turkey's influence. For example, Ankara's efforts to instigate a dialogue between the Assad regime and its opponents in Syria in 2011 represented a case in which Turkish attempts to mediate through personal engagement at the highest levels met with a very public rebuff. Turkey's mediation of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria before they were broken off on Israel's launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in December 2008 was an earlier instance. Witnesses listed Bosnia, Lebanon and Turkey's relations with Armenia as further cases where, as of autumn 2011, Ankara's settlement efforts had come to little.[273] Witnesses also suggested that the failure of Turkey's ambitions had contributed to a situation in which, rather than "zero problems with neighbours", its relations with Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Syria had all deteriorated.[274]

121. Bill Park identified overstretch as part of Ankara's problem. He said: "Turkey's diplomacy is over-dependent on [Foreign Minister] Davutoðlu's ambition and energy. Turkey's foreign ministry is small, its list of foreign policy issues long and complex, and it is overcommitted to a range of mediation and other foreign policy initiatives".[275]

122. Several witnesses argued that Turkey's international difficulties often reflected tensions between the various strands of its foreign policy—for example, between the "Transatlantic" pull towards opposition to the Iranian or (latterly) Syrian regimes, and the "regional realpolitik" pull towards engagement.[276] Dr Aybet said that further tensions arose between the "macro"—i.e. government-to-government—and "micro" levels of Turkish policy, the latter being based on popular attitudes and contacts both inside and outside Turkey. For example, she said—like Dr Robins—that Turkey's relations with Israel would not have deteriorated so far had Turkish public opinion not been engaged.[277]

123. Witnesses also said that Turkey's regional environment posed difficulties for its ambitions for regional influence:

Dr Aybet and Mr Park said that universally good Turkish regional relations were rendered almost impossible by the existence of unresolved bilateral and regional conflicts among Turkey's prospective partners—such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, Israel and the Palestinians, or Iran and Sunni Arab states. Mr Park noted: "A 'zero problems with neighbours' approach is not easy in a region that is characterised by so many rivalries".[278]
Mr Park suggested that many of the regional states with which Turkey was seeking to build ties had external influences that might be more compelling than Ankara—the EU, in the case of the Western Balkans; or Russia, in the case of the South Caucasus or Central Asia. He raised the prospect that, rather than being a central power, Turkey might find itself peripheral to a number of alternative regional foci, and without firm allies.[279]

124. David Lidington said that Turkey could not be held responsible for the Syrian crisis, the standoff between the international community and Iran, or the state of the Middle East Peace Process. He said that Turkey's mediation efforts still had value, even if they did not always succeed.[280] Dr Aybet took a similar line.[281] Dr Robins suggested that Turkey had perhaps "learned a lesson or two about how difficult" international mediation can be: "If it was that easy, these things would have been done a long time ago".[282]

125. We conclude that the fact that Turkey has experienced foreign policy setbacks, and may not wield as much influence as is sometimes thought, should not disqualify it as a foreign policy partner for the UK. Ankara has been addressing longstanding issues and conflicts that continue to challenge many other powers, including the UK. We recommend that the FCO should approach foreign policy co-operation with Turkey positively and in a spirit of realism.

TURKEY AND ISRAEL

126. The breakdown of Turkey's relations with Israel since 2010 is one of the leading developments cited by those who highlight difficulties in Turkey's regional policies, as well as by those who see Turkey turning away from the West. Until 2010, Turkey was one of Israel's leading allies among predominantly Muslim states. In May 2010, Israeli military forces killed eight Turkish civilians and one US civilian of Turkish descent when they met resistance when boarding the ship 'Mavi Marmara', owned by a Turkish NGO, which had left Istanbul carrying humanitarian supplies intended for Gaza. In response to the incident, Turkey recalled its Ambassador from Tel Aviv and made the restoration of relations conditional on Israel apologising and paying compensation to the families of those killed. Despite Turkey understanding on several occasions that an apology was to be forthcoming, the Israeli government has not agreed to make one.[283] In September 2011, the Palmer panel of inquiry into the incident, commissioned by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, found that the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza was lawful, but that the Israeli action against the Mavi Marmara had been "excessive and unreasonable".[284] Following the release of the Palmer Report, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel to Second Secretary level (a level not seen since 1980) and suspended military co-operation.[285]

127. Dr Robins told us that the kinds of military contacts and contracts between Turkey and Israel that had been cancelled were of a sort that would have been maintained during previous downturns in the two states' bilateral relations. He said that their cancellation in the present instance suggested that the 'Mavi Marmara' incident had had a "profound impact".[286]

128. Our witnesses suggested that Turkey's previous good relations with Israel had been part of its attraction as a foreign policy partner for the UK, because they enabled Turkey to talk to 'all sides'.[287] The FCO told us that "a strong Turkey-Israel relationship has an important role to play in establishing stability and progress in the Middle East" and said that it wanted to see the relationship restored.[288] Our witnesses were in agreement that Israel and Turkey would probably both wish to restore their ties, if they could see their way back from the domestic positions they had adopted over the 'Mavi Marmara' incident.[289] David Lidington admitted that the UK had "limited leverage" over the issue.[290]

129. We conclude that Turkey is a more valuable partner for the UK when it has strong relations with Israel than when it does not.

Turkey as 'model'?

130. The FCO attributed importance to Turkey as a foreign policy partner partly because of the country's status as a predominantly Muslim democracy, and its potential international influence as such.[291] Our impression is that this was initially less important for the current Government than it was for its predecessor, in the more immediate aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent claims about a 'clash of civilisations' between Islam and the West, but that the outbreak of the 'Arab Spring' has given it renewed weight. However, Sir David Logan cautioned against over-stressing Turkey's Muslim identity in this context, suggesting that "many Turks would be offended by the thought that there might be something distinctive in Turkish governance which appeals particularly to Muslim countries".[292]

131. Our witnesses were unanimously cautious about any idea of Turkey as a 'model' for democratising North African and Middle Eastern states, for two sets of reasons:

First, they doubted the extent to which Turkey could function in this way. For example, Fadi Hakura of Chatham House said that the historical Western-oriented role of the Turkish military was quite different from that of many Arab militaries.[293] Sir David Logan noted that, unlike newly democratising Arab states, Turkey had had a functioning multiparty democracy for fifty years.[294] Mr Hakura also highlighted the fact that the European Convention and Court on Human Rights, key sources of pressure for human rights improvements in Turkey, were not available to North African and Middle Eastern states.[295] The same point may be made with respect to the lack of any prospect of EU membership for the 'Arab Spring' countries.
Second, witnesses argued that Turkey should not be seen as a 'model', given the continuing shortcomings in its democratic and human rights practices which we outlined in Chapter 3. Mr Hakura highlighted Turkey's centralised and majoritarian nature in this respect, while Mr Park said in general terms that the unconsolidated nature of Turkish democracy limited its potential as a model, and Dr Cengiz and Dr Hoffman said similarly that Turkey should be regarded as a "work in progress rather than a transferable model".[296] A number of witnesses said that Turkey's continued failure to reach an accommodation with its Kurds was the single greatest obstacle to the country's being recommended as a 'model' to others in the region.[297]

132. For its part, the Turkish Embassy said that there could be no single template for democratising states in the Middle East and North Africa, and that it preferred Turkey to be thought of as a "source of inspiration" rather than a "model".[298] On this point, the FCO followed Turkey's lead.[299] Turkish Prime Minister Erdoðan's visit to North Africa in September 2011 seemed intended to promote Turkey's 'inspirational' role (see paragraphs 55 and 104).

133. While rejecting the idea of Turkey as a specific 'model', several of our witnesses said that there was evidence that Turkey's example had helped to inspire the Arab uprisings and was looked to in general terms by citizens in the region.[300] The FCO drew our attention to a 2010 survey which it had co-funded, conducted in seven Arab states and Iran by the Turkish think-tank TESEV, which found that 66% of respondents felt that Turkey could be a model for the region, and that Turkey represented a successful blend between Islam and democracy.[301] In the 2011 iteration of the survey, conducted in 16 states in autumn 2011, the proportion seeing Turkey as a model had fallen slightly to 61%, but the share seeing it as a successful blend of Islam and democracy had shifted up to 67%.[302] Several witnesses highlighted Turkey's influence over popular culture in Arab states, such as via television soap operas dubbed into Arabic.[303]

134. With respect to Turkey's potential influence on democratising states in North Africa and the Middle East, we conclude that the FCO is correct to treat Turkey as an 'inspiration' in broad terms, rather than as a specific 'model'. We agree with the FCO that Turkey has welcome influence as an example of a predominantly Muslim secular democracy, albeit one that remains 'work in progress'. We recommend that the FCO should make clear to Turkey that it would be able to support Turkey's 'inspirational' role more strongly were Turkey to improve its democratic and human rights practices, and, above all, to resume progress towards an accommodation with its Kurds.

Energy security

135. The FCO regards Turkey's potential role as an energy transit state for the EU as a further reason to cultivate relations with the country.[304] Turkey has no oil or gas of its own, but it is within reach of roughly 70% of the world's oil and gas reserves.[305] Turkey would be the key transit state in any 'southern corridor' bringing piped hydrocarbons—primarily gas—from the Caspian, and potentially the Middle East, to EU markets. The 'southern corridor' is seen as a key means of reducing the EU's dependence on Russia, as both a supplier of gas and controller of export routes.[306] John Roberts of the independent energy information firm Platts told us:

Turkish co-operation with Azerbaijan on this key issue helps open the way for a major diversification of both Azerbaijani gas exports and of European gas imports. The development of a major new source of imports for Europe in effect ensures that Europe would now be able to import gas via a sixth major system, to add to those that serve supplies from its own North Sea sources, from Norway's 'High North', from Russia, from North Africa and imports received as LNG. In addition, the arrival of a major new set of gas supplies—coupled with the all-important development of a new series of regional gas interconnectors in southern and eastern Europe—has the potential to increase gas-to-gas competition within Europe, to the benefit of European consumers, notably by putting increased commercial pressure on Russia's Gazprom to adopt an increasingly commercial approach to its gas sales to European customers, particularly those for whom it is, in effect, currently a monopoly supplier. In time, such commercial pressure should also help further reform Russia's internal gas market. So, for Europe, much depends on both the strength and nature of Turkish co-operation.[307]

Mr Roberts said that, if they were realised, Turkey's ambitions for the amount of gas that might transit its territory in the long term would "pretty much cover any increase in demand that we expect in Europe over the next 10 years".[308]

136. The FCO said that the UK would be unlikely to receive any gas directly via Turkey were the 'southern corridor' to be developed, but that the UK would benefit from the more stable gas prices that would be likely to result from a diversification of European gas suppliers and import routes, and that development of the corridor would bring opportunities for UK firms in the downstream sector and pipeline infrastructure.[309]

137. Turkey already hosts a pipeline bringing Azerbaijani oil via Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast at Ceyhan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [BTC] pipeline), and a pipeline bringing Azerbaijani gas via Georgia as far as Erzurum in eastern Turkey. BP is a leading partner in both projects. Turkey's potential role in any 'southern corridor' now centres on arrangements for transporting gas from phase 2 of the giant Shah Deniz field off Azerbaijan to EU markets. BP operates Shah Deniz on behalf of the international consortium developing the field. Shah Deniz phase 1 came on stream in 2006; phase 2 is expected to start production in around 2017. Shah Deniz-2 is expected to produce 16 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas a year, of which Turkey will take 6 bcm for its domestic use and 10 bcm will be exported to continental Europe.[310] In October 2011, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a long-delayed agreement finalising delivery and transit terms for Shah Deniz-2 gas in Turkey.[311] This opened the way for the Shah Deniz consortium to make the key outstanding decision: on the export route for Shah Deniz gas to continental Europe. Bids were submitted by the deadline of 1 October 2011 from three projects:[312]

Nabucco. This would be a dedicated pipeline running across Turkey from east to west and then north through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to the hub at Baumgarten in eastern Austria. The pipeline would be intended to carry 31 bcm a year. The project might cost 14 billion. The project would be implemented by a consortium of Botas (Turkey), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), MOL (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), OMV (Austria) and RWE (Germany), backed by an intergovernmental agreement between the relevant countries which was ratified in 2010. The project is backed by the EU. Azerbaijan also wants a dedicated export pipeline for its gas. However, its commitment to the agreements which have been reached on Nabucco has been complicated by the prospect that—because of delays to Nabucco—gas from fields other than Shah Deniz, on which no export agreements have been reached, may be on stream by the time that Nabucco would be operational. The key difficulty for Nabucco has been that the scale of the project requires more gas than the 10 bcm a year that Shah Deniz-2 can supply. This raises the prospect that supplies would need to be secured from other sources (such as Turkmenistan or Iraq) before Nabucco becomes viable—but further supplies are difficult to secure before an export line is guaranteed. Commenting on Nabucco in its 2011 Report on UK energy security, the Energy and Climate Change Committee concluded that the possible availability of smaller planned pipeline projects and of LNG, as well as unconventional gas production, had "the potential to make such very large pipelines uneconomic and redundant".[313]
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). This would carry 20 bcm a year from Turkey to Italy via Greece and Albania. The partners are Statoil (Norway), EGL (Switzerland) and EON Ruhrgas (Germany).
Interconnector Turkey-Greece Italy (ITGI). This would link the existing connection from Turkey to Greece onwards to Italy. The system would aim to deliver three bcm a year to Greece and eight to Italy, with a spur to deliver a small amount to Bulgaria. The main drawback of both TAP and ITGI is that, absent a dedicated pipeline, they would require Turkey's network to be significantly upgraded to increase capacity.

As the operator of Shah Deniz, BP has also prepared a fourth, backup, option, known as the South East Europe Pipeline, whereby the Azerbaijani gas would simply be delivered through the existing Turkish and Balkan pipeline networks, upgraded.

138. Of these four options, Mr Roberts told us that Turkey officially backed Nabucco, but that its energy company Botas in practice favoured ITGI, because it wished to preserve strong links with Greece and Italy.[314] However, in February 2012 the Shah Deniz consortium rejected ITGI as an option. The consortium is to open negotiations on Nabucco, TAP and the South East Europe Pipeline.[315]

139. In December 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a MoU to construct a gas pipeline across Turkey to the Bulgarian border (the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline [TANAP]). The line will be able to carry the 10 bcm from Shah Deniz-2 that is destined for European export plus the 6 bcm due to Turkey, with a subsequent increase in capacity foreseen to 24 bcm. The line will be 80% owned by Azerbaijan's state oil and gas company SOCAR, and 10% each by Botas and Turkish Petroleum, although other partners are invited to join. The agreement left unclear the onward transit option from the Turkish-Bulgarian border, and the position of the BP-led Shah Deniz consortium and its decision on export routes. The Financial Times said that the agreement "effectively guarantees the realisation of the EU's long-held policy aim of creating a 'Southern Gas corridor' into the Union" but "almost certainly spells the end of the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project",[316] although there have been reports that the Nabucco consortium may drastically shorten its planned route and build a pipeline only onwards from Turkey.[317]

140. The FCO said that EU and Turkish energy interests were compatible, because both parties wanted to diversify supplies from Russia.[318] However, Mr Roberts contended that "Turkey's energy policy seems to be permanently characterised by ambivalence". He doubted that Turkey was delivering as much in terms of energy co-operation as the FCO and EU assumed or wanted.[319] For example, Russia's 'South Stream' project for a new gas line to Bulgaria under the Black Sea is commonly seen as a rival to Nabucco, on the assumption that there would be insufficient Caspian gas to supply both;[320] but in December 2011 Turkey gave Russia its consent for the construction of the relevant section of 'South Stream' in Turkey's territorial waters.[321] Ankara contends that 'South Stream' and Nabucco are compatible.[322]

141. Turkey's position is crucially affected by its dependence on energy imports for its own use: its energy import dependence (net imports as a share of energy use) has risen from around 50% in the early 1990s to around 73%. In 2008, imports accounted for 91% of Turkey's oil supply and almost 100% of natural gas. Of Turkey's gas imports, in 2009 52% came from Russia, 16% from Iran, 15% from Azerbaijan and 14% from Algeria.[323]

142. Mr Roberts suggested that the EU lacked the power to encourage greater co-operation from Turkey on the 'southern corridor' and other energy issues because of the lack of progress on Turkey's EU accession. The EU-Turkey accession negotiations have stalled, amid deadlock on the Cyprus dispute and opposition from France to Turkish membership. The negotiating 'chapter' on energy is one of those being blocked by Cyprus (see paragraph 190 and Table 6). Absent further progress on its EU accession, Turkey is declining to join the Energy Community Treaty (an EU-sponsored agreement among Eastern and South-East European states), a step which would involve a similar alignment with the EU energy regime as negotiating the energy chapter.[324] Mr Roberts argued that it was difficult for the EU to expect co-operation from Turkey in pursuing the EU's objective of energy diversification when the EU was blocking Turkey's objective of EU accession.[325]

143. We conclude that the FCO is correct to have identified Turkey's crucial importance for EU access to Caspian gas. However, the stalling of Turkey's EU accession process is losing the EU influence over Turkey's energy policy decisions.

200 William Hague, "Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World", speech at the FCO, London, 1 July 2010, via FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk) Back

201 Ev 52-53 Back

202 Ev 58 Back

203 Ev 82 Back

204 Qq 117 [Dr Aybet], 144 [Dr Robins] Back

205 Ev 120 Back

206 Philip Stephens, "A story of Brics without mortar", Financial Times, 25 November 2011 Back

207 Soner Cagaptay and others, "Op-Chart: Turkey's Changing World", Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 30 January 2012. Recent academic and think-tank commentary on Turkey's international rise includes "Turkey's foreign policy in a changing world", conference report, South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), 30 April-2 May 2010; Meliha Benli Altuniºik, Kemal Kiriºci and Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey: Reluctant Mediterranean Power", German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011; "Turkey's policies for engagement in the contemporary world", conference report WP1031, Wilton Park, 24-27 March 2011; and Dominic Ryan, "The infallibility of Turkish foreign policy", RUSI Newsbrief, Vol. 31 No 5, September 2011. On Turkey, the Middle East and the 'Arab Spring', see "Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and constraints", International Crisis Group Europe Report No. 203, 7 April 2010; "Turkey's bid to raise influence in Middle East", IISS Strategic Comments, October 2010; Amanda Paul and Demir Murat Seyrek, "Turkish foreign policy and the Arab Spring", European Policy Centre Commentary, 15 July 2011; "Arab Awakening boosts Turkey's confidence", IISS Strategic Comments, October 2011; Fadi Hakura, "Turkey and the Middle East", Chatham House Briefing Paper, November 2011; and Sinan Ulgen, "From Inspiration to aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2011. Back

208 Q 153 Back

209 Ev 81 [Mr Park], 85 [Dr Bechev] Back

210 Q 106, Ev 62 [Dr Aybet], 85 [Dr Bechev] Back

211 Ev 58 Back