4 Turkey as a foreign policy partner |
Turkey's international position
91. The Government wants to strengthen the UK's
relations with Turkey in large part because it sees the country
as a foreign policy partner. The Foreign Secretary announced in
his first major speech in office that the Government would "make
a particular diplomatic effort to work with Turkey".
The FCO identified Turkey as having assets and characteristics
potentially useful in a partner for the UK: membership of international
organisations including NATO, the G20, the Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe; a
"strong network of relationships and influence in regions
where UK interests are significant", including North Africa,
the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Western Balkans;
and a status as a Muslim democracy.
Sir David Logan argued that Turkey was especially well-placed
as a potential partner for the UK in its region, since its "geographical
location, [...] historical (Ottoman) links and [...] shared (Muslim)
religion are assets not otherwise available to the UK among our
NATO allies and EU partners".
Mr Park highlighted Turkey's influence in the Organisation of
Islamic Co-operation (formerly the Organisation of the Islamic
several witnesses said that Ankara had developed a close relationship
with the Arab League.
The Turkish Area Study Group also highlighted Turkey's possession
of significant fresh water resources, suggesting that this could
become a further asset shaping the country's regional role.
92. The FCO also said that it wanted to strengthen
the UK's foreign policy partnership with Turkey because of the
latter's rising international influence. Turkey's emergence as
an international and especially regional force has been one of
the more commented-upon international phenomena of recent years,
above all in the context of the 'Arab Spring' (see paragraphs
104-112). For example, in November 2011 Philip Stephens in the
Financial Times contended that "anyone with half an
eye on the Middle East [...] will have noticed Turkey's emergence
as the pivotal regional power";
and in January 2012 researchers at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy said that Turkey's international outreach meant
the country was best seen as a "Eurasian China".
In terms of Turkey's exposure to international issues and partners,
Dr Robins highlighted the importance of its experience winning
a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2009-10,
for the first time since 1961.
In May 2011, Turkey announced its candidacy for another UNSC term
93. Turkey's rise to international and especially
regional influence has resulted partly from the conscious pursuit
by the post-2002 AKP government of a more proactive foreign policyalthough
several witnesses reminded us that Turkey had started to exhibit
greater international activism from the late 1980s and early 1990s,
as the end of the Cold War opened up new opportunities and risks
for the country.
Witnesses suggested that Turkey's traditional allies had been
of little use in helping it to meet its post-Cold War challenges;
and that a lack of a consistent US/EU strategy towards Eurasia,
the sclerotic nature of many Arab regimes, and the US' loss of
influence in the region after the 2003 Iraq warand latterly
its more conscious retreat from regional leadershiphad
also all enabled, encouraged and obliged Turkey's assumption of
a greater regional role.
94. The policy being pursued by the AKP in government
is associated especially with Professor Ahmet Davutoðlu,
who was Prime Minister Erdoðan's foreign policy adviser before
becoming Foreign Minister
in 2009. Sir David Logan summarised the change in approach under
the AKP as follows:
before the advent of the AKP government, Turkish
governments regarded all Turkey's neighbours as problematical
and potentially hostile. Besides, Ataturk's vision of making Turkey
a part of (European) civilisation left Turkey as a supplicant
on the border of Europe which, however, persistently rejected
it. So Turkey's potential as a partner was limited. The AKP government's
new vision is of a Turkey at the centre of its own region, whose
interests are best served by good relations with its neighbours.
This approach has transformed Turkey's relations with the Arab
world, Iran, the Western Balkans, and to some extent with Russia
and the South Caucasus, not just politically but also economically
The AKP's policy is commonly summarised under Mr
slogan "zero problems with neighbours". Dr Bechev said
that AKP foreign policy aimed to: engage neighbouring countries
to enhance Turkey's security, especially with respect to the Kurdish
question; open new markets for Turkish business; "grandstand"
internationally in order to score points at home; and "advance
Turkey's claim for a place in the new pecking order of emergent
In autumn 2011, Dr Aybet saw Turkish foreign policy as operating
in three spheres:
- "a transatlantic security
community grounded in Euro-Atlantic institutions" including
NATO and the EU, as well as liberal and democratic values;
- "a regional emerging security community
based on values of religious and ethnic identity", a strand
which encompassed strong support for Palestinian statehood and
resistance to Israeli occupation, as well as, for example, support
for Muslim Uighurs in China, and
- "a regional proactive policy based on realpolitik,
devoid of any value based sentiments". Until the 'Arab Spring',
this strand encompassed good relations with regional leaders,
including Syria's President Assad, as well as strong relationships
with Iran and Russia based partly on energy imports.
95. Among features of AKP foreign policy, witnesses
- Mediation efforts, between
and within states, which Dr Robins said Ankara had pursued "tirelessly".
Turkey has engaged in such efforts between Israel and Syria, Syria
and Iraq, Iran and the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Lebanon,
Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Libya, and in the southern
Caucasus and Western Balkans.
Jointly with Spain, Turkey also launched the 'Alliance of Civilisations'
initiative in 2005 under UN auspices, to promote post-9/11 cross-cultural
David Lidington highlighted Turkey's efforts in the Western Balkans
as especially useful for the UK; during President Gül's 2011
State Visit to London, the UK and Turkey agreed on ongoing official-level
contacts and meetings on the region.
- The deployment of 'soft power',
in the form of trade, people-to-people contacts and cultural diplomacy,
as opposed to the previous priority given to military capability
(see paragraph 37).
Several witnesses stressed in particular the extent to which AKP
foreign policy both utilised and was driven by trading relationships
with nearby states. Turkey has abolished entry visa requirements
for nationals of a number of regional countries, including Russia,
Iran and Syria, and has free-trade agreements with states including
Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
Several witnesses suggested that Turkey's efforts to build regional
political relations through trade echoed one of the founding principles
of the EU.
96. Our witnesses said that the FCO was correct
to have identified Turkey's potential value to the UK in foreign
policy terms. Dr Aybet, Sir David Logan and the Turkish Area Study
Group all felt that the ambition and activism which Turkey was
displaying in its international relations increased its value
as a foreign policy partner for the UK.
Conversely, Sir David warned that Turkish opposition to UK objectives
could now represent a "significant handicap".
97. We conclude that the Government
is correct to have identified Turkey as possessing assets, characteristics
and influence that potentially add value to UK foreign policy,
and to be seeking a stronger foreign policy partnership accordingly.
98. In its submission, the FCO made no reference
to potential difficulties associated with the idea of Turkey as
a foreign policy partner for the UK.
Despite their overall support for the idea, our witnesses raised
two. The first was the potential for divergence between Turkish
interests and policy and those of the UK, or of the EU or the
West more widely. In the West, Turkey's intensified regional outreach
has prompted a debate over whether the country is re-aligning
itself 'eastwards', away from the West.
In the US in particular, the debate has extended to sometimes
impassioned argument about whether Turkey has been 'lost', and
if so, who might be responsible.
Dr Bechev set out the evidence as follows:
The crisis in Libya has shown that Turkey's support
for NATO is qualified. Ankara prefers engaging rather than containing
Iran, and is comfortable talking to Hamas, Hezbollah and Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir. Until recently Turkey was amongst Bashar
al-Assad's closest friends as well. Its once warm relations with
Israel are now in tatters. [...] Ties with Russia are thriving.
The stalling of Turkey's EU accession process is
part of the context for this debate (see Chapter 7).
99. Our witnesses were in agreement that, by
definition, the AKP government's focus on Turkey's region and
regional interests meant a downgrading in the relative priority
which Turkey was giving to Western ties.
Dr Bechev, Sir David Logan, Bill Park and John Peet also all agreed
that Turkey's interests in its region could sometimes diverge
from those of the UK, EU or US, and that Ankara was now prepared
to pursue its interests even in opposition to Western preferences.
Mr Park described Turkey as "frequently at odds with the
West" on regional issues, and Dr Aybet identified several
cases where there were "considerable differences" between
Turkey and the UK.
Overall, Mr Park advised that "although the UK should be
relaxed about Turkey's quite natural endeavours to ingratiate
itself with its more immediate region(s), it should also be aware
that this will not invariably lead to policies that London will
Dr Aybet warned of a longer-term risk that Turkish and Western
threat perceptions might increasingly diverge.
100. We heard three considerations to set against
possible concerns about Ankara pursuing a distinct foreign policy
- Dr Aybet said that Turkey continued
to act in good faith as a NATO member (see paragraphs 113-114).
- Sir David Logan argued that,
as an increasingly prosperous democracy, Turkey's fundamental
interests would increasingly converge with those of its Western
- Dr Aybet argued that Turkey
could sometimes add value in foreign policy terms for the UK or
the West precisely because its identity or policy was different.
In her view, "the important thing is Turkey is engaged and
in a position to talk to all sides concerned. At a time when international
or 'western' presented norms are challenged by regional norms,
Turkey's diplomatic ventures as an 'independent actor' from the
West could be crucial in harbouring stability in the region".
This argument was made above all with respect to Iran (see paragraphs
115-119). To set alongside the potential diplomatic value to the
UK of Turkish distinctiveness, Dr Robins did not think that Turkey
would penalise the UK for itself having a different stance on,
for example, Palestinian statehood.
101. Compared to Turkey's previous Western orientation,
several witnesses suggested that Ankara's greater focus on regional
security and prosperity, and its willingness to advance its own
interests, should be regarded as a 'normalisation' of Turkish
Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform described Turkey's
previous Western focus and regional isolation as "weird".
John Peet also suggested that many of the stances taken by the
AKP governmentsuch as on Israel and the Palestinian issueshould
be seen as a consequence of Turkey's democratisation and the more
politically responsive nature of the AKP government compared with
Overall, Dr Bechev advised that the UK Government should assess
Turkish policy on a case-by-case basis, expecting it sometimes
to converge, sometimes to agree on goals but not methods, and
sometimes to clash.
102. Dr Aybet argued that, given the difficulties
which sometimes arose in Turkey's relations with the US, and the
lukewarm nature of Ankara's relations with other leading EU states
such as Germany and France, the UK had a particular role in anchoring
and stabilising Turkey's place in the West.
103. We have encountered no
evidence to suggest that Turkey has made an overarching foreign
policy re-alignment away from the West. Rather, Turkish foreign
policy is best regarded as becoming more 'normal', in the sense
of focusing on Turkey's region, pursuing national security and
economic interests, and better reflecting Turkish public attitudes.
The FCO should not underestimate the extent to which this shift
may generate unavoidable differences between Turkish and UK perspectives
and policies. However, we conclude thatas long as its foreign
policy efforts are directed towards the same ultimate goalsTurkey
may sometimes add value as a foreign policy partner precisely
because it is distinct from the UK.
TURKEY AND THE 'ARAB SPRING'
104. The need to respond to the 'Arab Spring'
from 2011 has been one of the greatest tests so far of the degree
of convergence that exists between Turkey's 'new' foreign policy
and that of the UK and the West. Dr Bechev said that, with respect
to the 'Arab Spring', Turkey faced "the same transformation-vs.-stability
dilemma" with which US and EU policy-makers had long been
Park described Ankara as "delicately poised between its friendships
with many of the region's regimes on the one hand, and its support
for democratisation, economic development, and the people's will
on the other".
Turkey's initial stance was often to be cautious in the face of
the Arab uprisings. However, Dr Aybet said that "once the
leaders become delegitimised [Turkish policy-makers] tend to waver,
but eventually the Government start supporting the other side".
In September 2011, almost coinciding with Prime Minister Cameron
and President Sarkozy's appearance in Libya, Prime Minister Erdoðan
made a high-profile visit to Libya, Egypt and Tunisia to position
Turkey as a key external backer of the post-revolutionary regimes.
We referred in paragraph 55 to the way in which Mr Erdoðan's
statements in Cairo in favour of secularism appeared to be poorly
received by the Muslim Brotherhood.
105. David Lidington told us that the UK and
Turkey had "not agreed at every stage" in their responses
to the 'Arab Spring', but that overall the period had "shown
a coming together of interest and objective".
Dr Robins told us:
What the Turks did in Tunisia and Egypt in particular,
and then later, admittedly after a delay, in Libya, was to instinctively
say, 'The people must decide' [...] Turkey was falling back on
first principles, which shows just how far Turkey has come in
becoming socialised into the values of, maybe not liberal democracy,
but certainly democracy that is somewhere between the liberal
and illiberal ends of the continuum.
The Foreign Secretary said in October 2011 that,
primarily owing to the 'Arab Spring', he was speaking to Turkish
Foreign Minister Davutoðlu
about as often as to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Libya and the NATO operation
106. In spring 2011 Turkey was cautious about
international military action in Libya, and it appeared initially
to favour trying to broker a ceasefire between the Gaddafi regime
and its opponents. Turkey did not take part in the NATO action
against Libyan targets in implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1973. However, it provided ships and aircraft to NATO
to assist in the enforcement of the UN-mandated arms embargo,
and it allowed NATO use of the flight control centre at Izmir.
Turkey also participated in the DFID-led international stabilisation
team which was deployed to the rebels' base of Benghazi to prepare
for the end of the conflict. Turkey was a member of the Libya
Contact Group from its inception at the London Conference in March
2011, and it twice hosted meetings of the Group in Istanbul, including
on the occasion in July 2011 when the Group recognised the National
Transitional Council (NTC) as Libya's legitimate government.
By summer 2011, it was revealed when Foreign Minister Davutoðlu
made an early visit to Benghazi that Turkey had been channelling
funds to the NTC.
107. Dr Aybet told us thatin addition
to its ties to Libya under GaddafiTurkey's initial stance
on the crisis reflected one of its traditional foreign policy
tenets, of avoiding involvement in regional conflicts or the giving
of support to external military intervention. Once it became clear
that such intervention would take place, however, she said that
Turkey "really pushed" to bring all aspects of the operation
under NATO control, to ensure its own influence, rather than allowing
command to remain with an ad hoc coalition.
In this respect, Turkey's position converged with that of the
UK. Fadi Hakura of Chatham House commended London for bringing
Turkey into the military campaign.
Dr Aybet concluded that Turkey dealt with the Libya crisis "cleverly,
because they were able to contribute to the operation without
becoming militarily involved, as well as having oversight of it
all in the North Atlantic Council".
108. Between February and May 2011, after the
British Embassy in Tripoli was evacuated amidst the fighting between
pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces, and before it closed its own Embassy
in the city, Turkey represented UK interests in Libya.
109. Of the Arab states which have experienced
'Arab Spring' uprisings, Turkey's position is most important with
respect to Syria. After the previous Turkish government achieved
a breakthrough in relations between Ankara and Damascus in 1998
by securing Syrian co-operation against the PKK, Turkey under
the AKP government made a high-profile effort to cultivate Syrian
President Assad. Turkey and Syria had visa-free travel and free-trade
agreements, and cross-border exchanges grew significantly. In
the face of the Syrian uprising in 2011, David Lidington told
us that Turkey retained confidence for longer than the UK in President
Assad's willingness to reform.
Ankara finally called in November for President Assad to step
110. Having broken with President Assad, Turkey
became a leading force in the international effort to encourage
him to leave office. By early 2012, when we prepared this Report,
Turkey was hosting the Syrian National Council, the most prominent
opposition group, composed largely of exiles. Leading personnel
of the Free Syrian Army and other oppositionist military defectors
were also operating from Turkey. In November 2011, Turkey announced
bilateral economic sanctions against Syria. Ankara co-sponsored
the draft UN Security Council resolution backing the Arab League
plan for Syria which was supported by the UK, US and France but
vetoed by China and Russia in early February 2012. Later in February,
Turkey participated in the first meeting of the international
'Friends of Syria' group which was backed by the UK and US following
the failure of the UNSC resolution. Turkey was expected to host
the second meeting of the group in Istanbul, on 2 April 2012.
111. Once Turkey had broken with President Assad,
the strength of its support for the effort to see him step down
seemed partly to reflect the prospective awkwardness of its position
were the Syrian leader to remain in power. John Peet thought that
Turkish-Syrian relations under those circumstances would be "quite
Turkish diplomatic premises in Syria were attacked in November
2011, along with those of France, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, after
the Arab League suspended Syria's membership at a meeting in which
Turkey participated. In March 2012, Turkey was maintaining its
Ambassador in Damascus, unlike the UK and several Arab and other
EU states. We
encountered some unease in Turkey about the idea of the country
becoming heavily involved in a conflict with its neighbour, but
we also heard of rising outrage at the violence which President
Assad's Alawite-dominated regime was inflicting on Turks' fellow
Sunni Muslims across the border. Refugee flows from Syria were
a further consideration for Ankara: in March 2012, the Office
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said that Turkey was
hosting around 13,000 refugees from Syria.
112. We conclude that the process
of responding to the 'Arab Spring' has brought Turkey closer to
its Western allies, including the UK, while also demonstrating
the utility of Ankara's strong relations with the Arab League.
NATO, THE US AND MISSILE DEFENCE
113. In discussing the degree of convergence
between Turkish and Western foreign policies, Dr Aybet highlighted
Turkey's role in NATO.
In March 2012, Turkey was continuing to contribute to other NATO
missions, in addition to the assistance which it extended to the
NATO operation in Libya. For example, Turkey contributed troops
to the NATO operation in Afghanistan since the latter's inception
in 2001; in December 2011 Ankara had 1,845 troops deployed (the
ninth-largest of the 49 national contingents). Turkey was running
two of the 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,
and it was providing training to the Afghan National Army and
was also providing troops to the NATO force in Kosovo, KFOR. Dr
Aybet said that, notwithstanding the decline in the Turkish military's
political power, having the capability to contribute significantly
to NATO operations remained a matter of national pride for Turkey.
114. In September 2011, it was announced that
Turkey would host a land-based early warning radar as part of
the NATO missile defence system agreed at the Alliance's Lisbon
summit in November 2010. In the context of speculation about the
strength of US-Turkey ties, given divergences over Iran (see paragraphs
115-119) and the breakdown of Turkey's relations with Israel (see
paragraphs 126-129), Dr Aybet told us that Turkey's decision to
host the radar was driven primarily by its wish to maintain its
long-term strategic relationship with the US. She said that Ankara
had been made aware of, and responded to, the importance of the
missile defence project to the US Administration in domestic political
terms. For its
part, Turkey was receiving live intelligence from the US on the
PKK in northern Iraq, and was seeking US assistance in the provision
of surveillance drones.
TURKEY AND IRAN
115. Turkey's relations with Iran have been the
phenomenon cited most consistently by those who contend that Turkey
has turned decisively away from the West. Such claims were triggered
above all by a sequence of events in late spring 2010, comprising
Turkey's apparently independent nuclear fuel initiative with Brazil
(under which Iran would have shipped low-enriched uranium abroad
for conversion into fuel for its nuclear research reactor), followed
immediately by Ankara's vote on the UN Security Council against
the next proposed round of UN sanctions against Tehran. Dr Robins
told us that the idea that the fuel-swap deal had represented
an anti-Western turn was "overcooked", and that the
episode rather reflected a misunderstanding between Turkey and
Brazil on the one hand, and the US on the other, about the leeway
available to Ankara and Brasilia.
However, Turkey has remained unconvinced about the efficacy of
sanctions against Iran, one of the key planks of UK and international
policy towards the country. Turkey is legally obliged to implement
the relevant UN sanctions, but as of March 2012 it had declined
to join the EU's more extensive sanctions regime, and it was reportedly
requesting a waiver from the latest US penalties on dealings with
the Central Bank of Iran, primarily because of the impact which
they would have on its imports of energy from Iran.
The FCO told us that it was "keen to see Turkey [...] continue
to exert pressure on Iran, through rigorous implementation of
116. More broadly, Dr Robins told us that Turkey's
strategy towards Iran since the Islamic Revolution had been "to
conspicuously try to avoid riling [it]".
For example, Dr Aybet detailed how, while agreeing to host the
missile defence radar for NATO, Turkey had successfully resisted
the identification of Iran as a threat in the new NATO Strategic
Concept document agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.
117. As a result of Ankara's continuing relations
with Iran, the Turkish Embassy said that Turkey was "one
of the very few countries [with] the will and the ability to reinvigorate
the diplomatic negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 about Iran's
Similarly, in his Ankara speech in July 2010, the Prime Minister
described Turkey as the "European country [...] [with] the
greatest possible chance of persuading Iran to change its course
on nuclear policy".
In January 2011, Turkey hosted what were (as of mid-March 2012)
the most recent talks on the nuclear issue between Iran and EU
High Representative Cathy Ashton, representing the international
P5+1 powers; Turkey may again host in Istanbul the next round,
which were in prospect in March 2012 as we finalised this Report.
More broadly, David Lidington told us that Turkey could have contacts
with Iran that were not available to the UK and that, as a predominantly
Muslim state, it carried more weight there.
118. Our witnesses were in agreement that Turkey's
hosting of the NATO missile defence radar, plus its siding with
the opposition to President Assad in Syria, were by autumn 2011
putting its relations with Tehran under severe strain. Dr Robins
Given the very close strategic relationship between
Iran and Syria and that Turkey is becoming a leading state as
far as the condemnation of Syria is concerned, Turkey has put
itself on the other side as far as the fault line of regional
politics is concerned. Assuming that the Syrian situation gets
worse, that will be a big difficulty. It will put a big strain
on the relationship which otherwise has been managed but has always
had a combustible potential to it.
119. We conclude that Turkey
has a particular value for the UK as a friendly state able to
talk to Iran. However, Turkey's alignment with the West and the
Arab League in the Syrian crisis, and Ankara's hosting of an element
of the NATO missile defence system, may put its capacity to continue
to fulfil this function vis-à-vis
Tehran under severe strain. Nonetheless, we further conclude that
Turkey's decision to contribute materially to the implementation
of NATO's new Strategic Concept in respect of ballistic missile
defence is welcome.
120. If the first possible risk in the idea of
Turkey as a UK foreign policy partner raised by our witnesses
was the potential for divergence between Western and Turkish policy,
the second was that Turkey may not have the regional influence
that some commentary would suggest, or that it sometimes appears
itself to assume.
This might reduce the country's attractiveness as a foreign policy
partner. Several of the cases which our witnesses cited when discussing
possible Turkish-Western divergence were also raised with respect
to the strength of Turkey's influence. For example, Ankara's efforts
to instigate a dialogue between the Assad regime and its opponents
in Syria in 2011 represented a case in which Turkish attempts
to mediate through personal engagement at the highest levels met
with a very public rebuff. Turkey's mediation of peace negotiations
between Israel and Syria before they were broken off on Israel's
launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in December 2008 was an
earlier instance. Witnesses listed Bosnia, Lebanon and Turkey's
relations with Armenia as further cases where, as of autumn 2011,
Ankara's settlement efforts had come to little.
Witnesses also suggested that the failure of Turkey's ambitions
had contributed to a situation in which, rather than "zero
problems with neighbours", its relations with Greece, Cyprus,
Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Syria had all deteriorated.
121. Bill Park identified
overstretch as part of Ankara's problem. He said: "Turkey's
diplomacy is over-dependent on [Foreign Minister] Davutoðlu's
ambition and energy. Turkey's
foreign ministry is small, its list of foreign policy issues long
and complex, and it is overcommitted to a range of mediation and
other foreign policy initiatives".
122. Several witnesses argued that Turkey's international
difficulties often reflected tensions between the various strands
of its foreign policyfor example, between the "Transatlantic"
pull towards opposition to the Iranian or (latterly) Syrian regimes,
and the "regional realpolitik" pull towards engagement.
Dr Aybet said that further tensions arose between the "macro"i.e.
government-to-governmentand "micro" levels of
Turkish policy, the latter being based on popular attitudes and
contacts both inside and outside Turkey. For example, she saidlike
Dr Robinsthat Turkey's relations with Israel would not
have deteriorated so far had Turkish public opinion not been engaged.
123. Witnesses also said that Turkey's regional
environment posed difficulties for its ambitions for regional
- Dr Aybet and Mr Park said that
universally good Turkish regional relations were rendered almost
impossible by the existence of unresolved bilateral and regional
conflicts among Turkey's prospective partnerssuch as between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, Israel and the Palestinians,
or Iran and Sunni Arab states. Mr Park noted: "A 'zero problems
with neighbours' approach is not easy in a region that is characterised
by so many rivalries".
- Mr Park suggested that many
of the regional states with which Turkey was seeking to build
ties had external influences that might be more compelling than
Ankarathe EU, in the case of the Western Balkans; or Russia,
in the case of the South Caucasus or Central Asia. He raised the
prospect that, rather than being a central power, Turkey might
find itself peripheral to a number of alternative regional foci,
and without firm allies.
124. David Lidington said that Turkey could not
be held responsible for the Syrian crisis, the standoff between
the international community and Iran, or the state of the Middle
East Peace Process. He said that Turkey's mediation efforts still
had value, even if they did not always succeed.
Dr Aybet took a similar line.
Dr Robins suggested that Turkey had perhaps "learned a lesson
or two about how difficult" international mediation can be:
"If it was that easy, these things would have been done a
long time ago".
125. We conclude that the fact
that Turkey has experienced foreign policy setbacks, and may not
wield as much influence as is sometimes thought, should not disqualify
it as a foreign policy partner for the UK. Ankara has been addressing
longstanding issues and conflicts that continue to challenge many
other powers, including the UK. We recommend that the FCO should
approach foreign policy co-operation with Turkey positively and
in a spirit of realism.
TURKEY AND ISRAEL
126. The breakdown of Turkey's relations with
Israel since 2010 is one of the leading developments cited by
those who highlight difficulties in Turkey's regional policies,
as well as by those who see Turkey turning away from the West.
Until 2010, Turkey was one of Israel's leading allies among predominantly
Muslim states. In May 2010, Israeli military forces killed eight
Turkish civilians and one US civilian of Turkish descent when
they met resistance when boarding the ship 'Mavi Marmara', owned
by a Turkish NGO, which had left Istanbul carrying humanitarian
supplies intended for Gaza. In response to the incident, Turkey
recalled its Ambassador from Tel Aviv and made the restoration
of relations conditional on Israel apologising and paying compensation
to the families of those killed. Despite Turkey understanding
on several occasions that an apology was to be forthcoming, the
Israeli government has not agreed to make one.
In September 2011, the Palmer panel of inquiry into the incident,
commissioned by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, found that the
Israeli naval blockade of Gaza was lawful, but that the Israeli
action against the Mavi Marmara had been "excessive and unreasonable".
Following the release of the Palmer Report, Turkey downgraded
its diplomatic relations with Israel to Second Secretary level
(a level not seen since 1980) and suspended military co-operation.
127. Dr Robins told us that the kinds of military
contacts and contracts between Turkey and Israel that had been
cancelled were of a sort that would have been maintained during
previous downturns in the two states' bilateral relations. He
said that their cancellation in the present instance suggested
that the 'Mavi Marmara' incident had had a "profound impact".
128. Our witnesses suggested that Turkey's previous
good relations with Israel had been part of its attraction as
a foreign policy partner for the UK, because they enabled Turkey
to talk to 'all sides'.
The FCO told us that "a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
has an important role to play in establishing stability and progress
in the Middle East" and said that it wanted to see the relationship
witnesses were in agreement that Israel and Turkey would probably
both wish to restore their ties, if they could see their way back
from the domestic positions they had adopted over the 'Mavi Marmara'
Lidington admitted that the UK had "limited leverage"
over the issue.
129. We conclude that Turkey
is a more valuable partner for the UK when it has strong relations
with Israel than when it does not.
Turkey as 'model'?
130. The FCO attributed importance to Turkey
as a foreign policy partner partly because of the country's status
as a predominantly Muslim democracy, and its potential international
influence as such.
Our impression is that this was initially less important for the
current Government than it was for its predecessor, in the more
immediate aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the
subsequent claims about a 'clash of civilisations' between Islam
and the West, but that the outbreak of the 'Arab Spring' has given
it renewed weight. However, Sir David Logan cautioned against
over-stressing Turkey's Muslim identity in this context, suggesting
that "many Turks would be offended by the thought that there
might be something distinctive in Turkish governance which appeals
particularly to Muslim countries". 
131. Our witnesses were unanimously cautious
about any idea of Turkey as a 'model' for democratising North
African and Middle Eastern states, for two sets of reasons:
- First, they doubted the extent
to which Turkey could function in this way. For example,
Fadi Hakura of Chatham House said that the historical Western-oriented
role of the Turkish military was quite different from that of
many Arab militaries.
Sir David Logan noted that, unlike newly democratising Arab states,
Turkey had had a functioning multiparty democracy for fifty years.
Mr Hakura also highlighted the fact that the European Convention
and Court on Human Rights, key sources of pressure for human rights
improvements in Turkey, were not available to North African and
Middle Eastern states.
The same point may be made with respect to the lack of any prospect
of EU membership for the 'Arab Spring' countries.
- Second, witnesses argued that
Turkey should not be seen as a 'model', given the continuing
shortcomings in its democratic and human rights practices which
we outlined in Chapter 3. Mr Hakura highlighted Turkey's centralised
and majoritarian nature in this respect, while Mr Park said in
general terms that the unconsolidated nature of Turkish democracy
limited its potential as a model, and Dr Cengiz and Dr Hoffman
said similarly that Turkey should be regarded as a "work
in progress rather than a transferable model".
A number of witnesses said that Turkey's continued failure to
reach an accommodation with its Kurds was the single greatest
obstacle to the country's being recommended as a 'model' to others
in the region.
132. For its part, the Turkish Embassy said that
there could be no single template for democratising states in
the Middle East and North Africa, and that it preferred Turkey
to be thought of as a "source of inspiration" rather
than a "model".
On this point, the FCO followed Turkey's lead.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoðan's visit to North Africa in
September 2011 seemed intended to promote Turkey's 'inspirational'
role (see paragraphs 55 and 104).
133. While rejecting the idea of Turkey as a
specific 'model', several of our witnesses said that there was
evidence that Turkey's example had helped to inspire the Arab
uprisings and was looked to in general terms by citizens in the
region. The FCO
drew our attention to a 2010 survey which it had co-funded, conducted
in seven Arab states and Iran by the Turkish think-tank TESEV,
which found that 66% of respondents felt that Turkey could be
a model for the region, and that Turkey represented a successful
blend between Islam and democracy.
In the 2011 iteration of the survey, conducted in 16 states in
autumn 2011, the proportion seeing Turkey as a model had fallen
slightly to 61%, but the share seeing it as a successful blend
of Islam and democracy had shifted up to 67%.
Several witnesses highlighted Turkey's influence over popular
culture in Arab states, such as via television soap operas dubbed
134. With respect to Turkey's
potential influence on democratising states in North Africa and
the Middle East, we conclude that the FCO is correct to treat
Turkey as an 'inspiration' in broad terms, rather than as a specific
'model'. We agree with the FCO that Turkey has welcome influence
as an example of a predominantly Muslim secular democracy, albeit
one that remains 'work in progress'. We recommend that the FCO
should make clear to Turkey that it would be able to support Turkey's
'inspirational' role more strongly were Turkey to improve its
democratic and human rights practices, and, above all, to resume
progress towards an accommodation with its Kurds.
135. The FCO regards Turkey's potential role
as an energy transit state for the EU as a further reason to cultivate
relations with the country.
Turkey has no oil or gas of its own, but it is within reach of
roughly 70% of the world's oil and gas reserves.
Turkey would be the key transit state in any 'southern corridor'
bringing piped hydrocarbonsprimarily gasfrom the
Caspian, and potentially the Middle East, to EU markets. The 'southern
corridor' is seen as a key means of reducing the EU's dependence
on Russia, as both a supplier of gas and controller of export
routes. John Roberts
of the independent energy information firm Platts told us:
Turkish co-operation with Azerbaijan on this key
issue helps open the way for a major diversification of both Azerbaijani
gas exports and of European gas imports. The development of a
major new source of imports for Europe in effect ensures that
Europe would now be able to import gas via a sixth major system,
to add to those that serve supplies from its own North Sea sources,
from Norway's 'High North', from Russia, from North Africa and
imports received as LNG. In addition, the arrival of a major new
set of gas suppliescoupled with the all-important development
of a new series of regional gas interconnectors in southern and
eastern Europehas the potential to increase gas-to-gas
competition within Europe, to the benefit of European consumers,
notably by putting increased commercial pressure on Russia's Gazprom
to adopt an increasingly commercial approach to its gas sales
to European customers, particularly those for whom it is, in effect,
currently a monopoly supplier. In time, such commercial pressure
should also help further reform Russia's internal gas market.
So, for Europe, much depends on both the strength and nature of
Mr Roberts said that, if they were realised, Turkey's
ambitions for the amount of gas that might transit its territory
in the long term would "pretty much cover any increase in
demand that we expect in Europe over the next 10 years".
136. The FCO said that the UK would be unlikely
to receive any gas directly via Turkey were the 'southern corridor'
to be developed, but that the UK would benefit from the more stable
gas prices that would be likely to result from a diversification
of European gas suppliers and import routes, and that development
of the corridor would bring opportunities for UK firms in the
downstream sector and pipeline infrastructure.
137. Turkey already hosts a pipeline bringing
Azerbaijani oil via Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast at
Ceyhan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [BTC] pipeline), and a pipeline
bringing Azerbaijani gas via Georgia as far as Erzurum in eastern
Turkey. BP is a leading partner in both projects. Turkey's potential
role in any 'southern corridor' now centres on arrangements for
transporting gas from phase 2 of the giant Shah Deniz field off
Azerbaijan to EU markets. BP operates Shah Deniz on behalf of
the international consortium developing the field. Shah Deniz
phase 1 came on stream in 2006; phase 2 is expected to start production
in around 2017. Shah Deniz-2 is expected to produce 16 billion
cubic metres (bcm) of gas a year, of which Turkey will take 6
bcm for its domestic use and 10 bcm will be exported to continental
Europe. In October
2011, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a long-delayed agreement finalising
delivery and transit terms for Shah Deniz-2 gas in Turkey.
This opened the way for the Shah Deniz consortium to make the
key outstanding decision: on the export route for Shah Deniz gas
to continental Europe. Bids were submitted by the deadline of
1 October 2011 from three projects:
This would be a dedicated pipeline running across Turkey from
east to west and then north through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary
to the hub at Baumgarten in eastern Austria. The pipeline would
be intended to carry 31 bcm a year. The project might cost 14
billion. The project would be implemented by a consortium of Botas
(Turkey), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), MOL (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania),
OMV (Austria) and RWE (Germany), backed by an intergovernmental
agreement between the relevant countries which was ratified in
2010. The project is backed by the EU. Azerbaijan also wants a
dedicated export pipeline for its gas. However, its commitment
to the agreements which have been reached on Nabucco has been
complicated by the prospect thatbecause of delays to Nabuccogas
from fields other than Shah Deniz, on which no export agreements
have been reached, may be on stream by the time that Nabucco would
be operational. The key difficulty for Nabucco has been that the
scale of the project requires more gas than the 10 bcm a year
that Shah Deniz-2 can supply. This raises the prospect that supplies
would need to be secured from other sources (such as Turkmenistan
or Iraq) before Nabucco becomes viablebut further supplies
are difficult to secure before an export line is guaranteed. Commenting
on Nabucco in its 2011 Report on UK energy security, the Energy
and Climate Change Committee concluded that the possible availability
of smaller planned pipeline projects and of LNG, as well as unconventional
gas production, had "the potential to make such very large
pipelines uneconomic and redundant".
- Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).
This would carry 20 bcm a year from Turkey to Italy via Greece
and Albania. The partners are Statoil (Norway), EGL (Switzerland)
and EON Ruhrgas (Germany).
- Interconnector Turkey-Greece Italy (ITGI).
This would link the existing connection from Turkey to Greece
onwards to Italy. The system would aim to deliver three bcm a
year to Greece and eight to Italy, with a spur to deliver a small
amount to Bulgaria. The main drawback of both TAP and ITGI is
that, absent a dedicated pipeline, they would require Turkey's
network to be significantly upgraded to increase capacity.
As the operator of Shah Deniz, BP has also prepared
a fourth, backup, option, known as the South East Europe Pipeline,
whereby the Azerbaijani gas would simply be delivered through
the existing Turkish and Balkan pipeline networks, upgraded.
138. Of these four options, Mr Roberts told us
that Turkey officially backed Nabucco, but that its energy company
Botas in practice favoured ITGI, because it wished to preserve
strong links with Greece and Italy.
However, in February 2012 the Shah Deniz consortium rejected ITGI
as an option. The consortium is to open negotiations on Nabucco,
TAP and the South East Europe Pipeline.
139. In December 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan
signed a MoU to construct a gas pipeline across Turkey to the
Bulgarian border (the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline [TANAP]). The
line will be able to carry the 10 bcm from Shah Deniz-2 that is
destined for European export plus the 6 bcm due to Turkey, with
a subsequent increase in capacity foreseen to 24 bcm. The line
will be 80% owned by Azerbaijan's state oil and gas company SOCAR,
and 10% each by Botas and Turkish Petroleum, although other partners
are invited to join. The agreement left unclear the onward transit
option from the Turkish-Bulgarian border, and the position of
the BP-led Shah Deniz consortium and its decision on export routes.
The Financial Times said that the agreement "effectively
guarantees the realisation of the EU's long-held policy aim of
creating a 'Southern Gas corridor' into the Union" but "almost
certainly spells the end of the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project",
although there have been reports that the Nabucco consortium may
drastically shorten its planned route and build a pipeline only
onwards from Turkey.
140. The FCO said that EU and Turkish energy
interests were compatible, because both parties wanted to diversify
supplies from Russia.
However, Mr Roberts contended that "Turkey's energy policy
seems to be permanently characterised by ambivalence". He
doubted that Turkey was delivering as much in terms of energy
co-operation as the FCO and EU assumed or wanted.
For example, Russia's 'South Stream' project for a new gas line
to Bulgaria under the Black Sea is commonly seen as a rival to
Nabucco, on the assumption that there would be insufficient Caspian
gas to supply both;
but in December 2011 Turkey gave Russia its consent for the construction
of the relevant section of 'South Stream' in Turkey's territorial
contends that 'South Stream' and Nabucco are compatible.
141. Turkey's position is crucially affected
by its dependence on energy imports for its own use: its energy
import dependence (net imports as a share of energy use) has risen
from around 50% in the early 1990s to around 73%. In 2008, imports
accounted for 91% of Turkey's oil supply and almost 100% of natural
gas. Of Turkey's gas imports, in 2009 52% came from Russia, 16%
from Iran, 15% from Azerbaijan and 14% from Algeria.
142. Mr Roberts suggested that the EU lacked
the power to encourage greater co-operation from Turkey on the
'southern corridor' and other energy issues because of the lack
of progress on Turkey's EU accession. The EU-Turkey accession
negotiations have stalled, amid deadlock on the Cyprus dispute
and opposition from France to Turkish membership. The negotiating
'chapter' on energy is one of those being blocked by Cyprus (see
paragraph 190 and Table 6). Absent further progress on its EU
accession, Turkey is declining to join the Energy Community Treaty
(an EU-sponsored agreement among Eastern and South-East European
states), a step which would involve a similar alignment with the
EU energy regime as negotiating the energy chapter.
Mr Roberts argued that it was difficult for the EU to expect co-operation
from Turkey in pursuing the EU's objective of energy diversification
when the EU was blocking Turkey's objective of EU accession.
143. We conclude that the FCO
is correct to have identified Turkey's crucial importance for
EU access to Caspian gas. However, the stalling of Turkey's EU
accession process is losing the EU influence over Turkey's energy
200 William Hague, "Britain's Foreign Policy in
a Networked World", speech at the FCO, London, 1 July 2010,
via FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk) Back
Ev 52-53 Back
Ev 58 Back
Ev 82 Back
Qq 117 [Dr Aybet], 144 [Dr Robins] Back
Ev 120 Back
Philip Stephens, "A story of Brics without mortar",
Financial Times, 25 November 2011 Back
Soner Cagaptay and others, "Op-Chart: Turkey's Changing World",
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 30 January 2012. Recent
academic and think-tank commentary on Turkey's international rise
includes "Turkey's foreign policy in a changing world",
conference report, South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX),
30 April-2 May 2010; Meliha Benli Altuniºik, Kemal Kiriºci
and Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey: Reluctant Mediterranean Power",
German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011; "Turkey's
policies for engagement in the contemporary world", conference
report WP1031, Wilton Park, 24-27 March 2011; and Dominic Ryan,
"The infallibility of Turkish foreign policy", RUSI
Newsbrief, Vol. 31 No 5, September 2011. On Turkey, the Middle
East and the 'Arab Spring', see "Turkey and the Middle East:
Ambitions and constraints", International Crisis Group Europe
Report No. 203, 7 April 2010; "Turkey's bid to raise influence
in Middle East", IISS Strategic Comments, October 2010; Amanda
Paul and Demir Murat Seyrek, "Turkish foreign policy and
the Arab Spring", European Policy Centre Commentary, 15 July
2011; "Arab Awakening boosts Turkey's confidence", IISS
Strategic Comments, October 2011; Fadi Hakura, "Turkey and
the Middle East", Chatham House Briefing Paper, November
2011; and Sinan Ulgen, "From Inspiration to aspiration: Turkey
in the New Middle East", Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, December 2011. Back
Q 153 Back
Ev 81 [Mr Park], 85 [Dr Bechev] Back
Q 106, Ev 62 [Dr Aybet], 85 [Dr Bechev] Back
Ev 58 Back
Ev 86 Back
Ev 63 Back
Q 153 Back
Ev 82 [Mr Park] Back
Ev 82 [Mr Park] Back
Q 181 Back
Q 146 [Dr Robins], Ev 83 [Mr Park], 87 [Dr Bechev], 131 [Economic
Development Foundation] Back
Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey
Ev 86 [Dr Bechev] Back
Q 106 [Dr Aybet], Ev 58 [Sir David Logan], 121 [Turkish Area Study
Ev 58 Back
Ev 52-57 Back
Ev 82 [Mr Park] Back
For example, Nick Danforth, "How the West Lost Turkey",
Foreign Policy, 25 November 2009; Mark Steyn, "Who
lost Turkey?", The Washington Times, 4 June 2010;
Daniel Pipes, "Who lost Turkey?", National Review
Online blog, 10 June 2010; Bernhard Zand, "How the West
Is Losing Turkey", Der Spiegel, 15 June 2010; James
Kitfield, "Who lost Turkey?", National Journal,
21 June 2010; Caroline B Glick, "Who lost Turkey?",
Jerusalem Post, 20 September 2010 Back
Ev 85 Back
For example, Mr Park at Ev 84 Back
Ev 58 [Sir David Logan], 83-84 [Mr Park], 85-86 [Dr Bechev], Q
51 [Mr Peet] Back
Ev 84 [Mr Park], Q 111 [Dr Aybet] Back
Ev 84 Back
Q 113 Back
Ev 62 Back
Ev 58 Back
Ev 63; see also Q 114. Back
Q 152 Back
Q 90 [Ms Barysch], Ev 83 [Mr Park] Back
Q 90 Back
Q 54 Back
Ev 86 Back
Ev 65 Back
Ev 87 Back
Ev 84 Back
Q 116 Back
Q 189 Back
Q 145 Back
Interview, The Observer, 2 October 2011 Back
Ev 52-53 [FCO], 95 [Turkish Embassy] Back
"The Fight for Tripoli: Turkey Reveals Quiet Rebel Payments",
Wall Street Journal, 24 August 2011 Back
Q 122 Back
Ev 111 Back
Q 122; see also Ev 64-65. Back
HC Deb, 28 February 2011, col 23-26; HC Deb, 30 November 2011,
col 959-971 Back
Q 189 Back
"Turkey's message to Assad: you have lost our trust, and
it is time for change", The Guardian, 22 November
2011; "Erdogan calls on Assad to resign after bus attack",
Financial Times, 23 November 2011 Back
Q 53 Back
As we approved this Report in mid-March, Turkey said that it would
suspend its consular services in Syria and advised its nationals
to leave; "4 Gulf states to close Embassies in Syria as Turkey
warns its citizens to leave", New York Times, 17 March
"UNHCR appoints regional refugee coordinator for Syrian refugees",
UNHCR press release, 13 March 2012 Back
Ev 62 Back
Ev 53 [FCO], 82 [Mr Park], 95 [Turkish Embassy]; ISAF 'placemat',
via www.nato.int Back
Q 131 Back
Q 125 Back
"Pentagon officials agree to sell Turkey 3 attack helicopters",
Washington Post, 2 November 2011; "Iraq says US drones
may fly in its skies", Washington Post, 17 December
Q 154 Back
"Iran ready to discuss nuclear program, Turkish official
says", Washington Post, 11 February 2012 Back
Ev 53 Back
Q 155 Back
Q 125 Back
Ev 94 Back
David Cameron, speech in Ankara, 27 July 2010, via Number 10 website
Qq 180, 187 Back
Q 155 Back
Ev 81 Mr Park] , 111 [Fadi Hakura] Back
Ev 64 [Dr Aybet], 87 [Dr Bechev], 131 [Economic Development Foundation] Back
Qq 90 [Ms Barysch], 146, 148-151 [Dr Robins], Ev 63-64 [Dr Aybet];
see also "Dormant power revival", The Economist,
5 November 2011; Peter Harling and Hugh Pope, "Turkey and
the Arab uprisings: from 'zero problems' to losing count",
International Crisis Group, 25 November 2011. Back
Ev 84 Back
Ev 63 [Dr Aybet], 84 [Mr Park] Back
Ev 64 Back
Ev 84 Back
Ev 84; Mr Hakura made a similar point, at Ev 111. Back
Q 188 Back
Ev 61-64 Back
Q 154 Back
"Lieberman deplores Netanyahu for leaning toward apology
to Turkey", www.haaretz.com, 21 July 2011; "Israel and
Turkey were tossed a lifeline and didn't take it", The
Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 September 2011 Back
Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May
2010 Flotilla Incident, September 2011, p 4 Back
"In anger, Turkey ejects Israeli envoy; Turks demand apology
over fatal raid on flotilla trying to break blockade", International
Herald Tribune, 3 September 2011 Back
Q 150 Back
Ev 63-64 [Dr Aybet] Back
Ev 53 Back
Qq 56 [Mr Peet], 100 [Ms Barysch], 151 [Dr Robins] Back
Q 190 Back
Ev 53 Back
Ev 58 Back
Mr Park made the same point, at Ev 83. Back
Ev 58; see also Professor Dodd, at Ev 118. Back
Ev 111 Back
Ev 83 [Mr Park], 101 [Dr Cengiz and Dr Hoffman], 111 [Mr Hakura];
see also Human Rights Watch, at Ev 88. Back
For example, Ev 83 [Mr Park], 111 [Mr Hakura], Q 147 [Dr Robins] Back
Ev 95 Back
Ev 53 Back
Q 104 [Ms Barysch], Ev 83 [Mr Park] Back
Ev 54; see The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2010,
TESEV, February 2011. Back
The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2011, TESEV,
January 2012 Back
Ev 58 [Sir David Logan], 61 [Dr Aybet], 100 [Dr Cengiz and Dr
Ev 55-56 Back
Ev 114 [Mr Hakura], 137 [CBI] Back
Ev 66 [Mr Roberts] Back
Ev 69 Back
Q 18 Back
Ev 55-56 Back
Ev 66-67 Back
"Azerbaijani-Turkish Gas Deal Opens Southern Corridor",
Radio Free Europe, 26 October 2011 Back
Ev 68, Q 12 [Mr Roberts] Back
Energy and Climate Change Committee, Eighth Report of Session
2010-12, The UK's Energy Supply: Security or Independence?,
HC 1065, para 66 Back
Ev 67-68 Back
"Southern Corridor gets narrower", Platts International
Gas Report, 27 February 2012 Back
"TANAP: the seasonal gift of gas", Financial Times
'Beyond Brics' blog, 28 December 2011 Back
"Pilot flame flickers on gas pipeline project; Moves are
afoot to scale back an 8bn plan to reduce Europe's dependence
on Russian energy imports", Financial Times, 1 February
Ev 56 Back
Q 1, Ev 66-67 Back
Ev 67 [Mr Roberts] Back
"Turkey deal boosts Russia's pipeline project", Financial
Times, 29 December 2011 Back
"Turkey approves South Stream construction", Associated
Press, 28 December 2011 Back
International Energy Agency, Turkey 2009 Review (July 2010)
and "Energy balances of OECD countries", August 2011 Back
Q 16, Ev 69-70 [Mr Roberts] Back
Ev 69 Back