The Role of the FCO in UK Government - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents


Written evidence from Dr Oliver Daddow, Loughborough University

SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS

1.  The FCO should be the principle repository of experience, information and expertise within Whitehall on the whole gamut of Britain's external relations.

2.  The FCO became marginalised in 1997-2010 by Prime Ministers wishing to exercise more central control over the machinery of government from Downing Street.

3.  The Foreign Office needs to be responsible for providing a clear conceptual basis for British foreign policy, bringing issues of "identity" and "ethics" to the fore.

4.  Britain has more means at its disposal to shape the international agenda than perhaps it realises.

5.  The enduring Churchillian notion that Britain operates in three circles of power and influence was all very well for 1948; it is not so useful for 2011.

6.  We should be wary of William Hague's claim to be putting the FCO "back where it belongs at the centre of Government".

7.  Hague wants to take the FCO down two paths with policy and personal ramifications. Both present major challenges for the department.

8.  The two key departments of state, FCO and Treasury, need to work more closely together to pursue shared goals for Britain.

9.  The FCO's network of overseas posts should provide three things: advice, early warning and insight.

10.  The challenges in explaining foreign policy to the public are twofold: first, devising a coherent message and second, getting the message across effectively.

11.  The Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister should jointly be tasked with presenting the government's vision of British foreign policy.

12.  The question of ethics and wider government objectives is sometimes phrased in a way that implies that attention to the former "gets in the way of" the latter. This need not be the case.

BACKGROUND ON CONTRIBUTOR

Oliver Daddow was educated in PPE at Oxford University and took his MA (with distinction) and PhD from Nottingham University. In 2000-05 he lectured at King's College London at the UK Defence Academy and since 2005 he has worked at Loughborough University where he is currently Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations. In 2010-11 he was a Visiting Research Scholar at the Center for British Studies, University of California at Berkeley.

His research interests are threefold: first, British foreign policy, especially British-EU relations and Euroscepticism; second, the uses of history in making policy; and third, the language of foreign policy. He has published widely across these interests, the most relevant being New Labour and the European Union (Manchester University Press, 2011), Harold Wilson and European Integration (edited, Frank Cass, 2003), Britain and Europe since 1945 (Manchester University Press, 2004) and a co-edited collection based on the proceedings of a two-day conference held at the FCO in February 2010, British Foreign Policy: The New Labour Years (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). In 2009 he co-edited the International Affairs special issue on The War Over Kosovo: Ten Years On, contributing the article on British foreign policy. He is co-editing the British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2013 special issue on new approaches to the study of British foreign policy, based on a conference held at Berkeley in December 2010. He has published over twenty other book chapters and journal articles on these and related issues.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION

1.  The FCO should be the principle repository of experience, information and expertise within Whitehall on the whole gamut of Britain's external relations, broadly defined in political, geostrategic and also economic terms. The difficulties it has encountered in maintaining that role have come from two sources. First, Prime Ministers and their Downing Street teams have taken increasingly high profile roles in making and selling British foreign policy abroad, often over the heads of Foreign Secretaries, or using Foreign Secretaries as mere "ciphers" for policies devised elsewhere within the system. Second, technological and communications changes in a globalised world have meant the FCO's web of embassies and contacts abroad can be by-passed by an interventionist premier wanting to devise policy bilaterally with other leaders, via "flying" visits, conference telephone calls, email and so on. Both factors raise serious questions about the FCO's role and function within the system of government in the years ahead.

2.  The FCO became marginalised in 1997-2010 by Prime Ministers wishing to exercise more central control over the machinery of government from Downing Street. Tony Blair increasingly came to ignore the advice of the FCO because he predicted (correctly) that its natural caution on using military means to achieve foreign policy ends and its attention to taking a UN-sanctioned route (eg, in Kosovo and much more seriously Iraq) was out of step with the PM's more interventionist posture on international affairs. Blair was regularly (and correctly) accused of by-passing Cabinet when making key decisions, but it was his bypassing of the Foreign Office that should be of as much concern if we see the Foreign Office as a source of moderation of some of the potential eccentricities of modern, leader-centred governance (the author has written an interview-based case study on the "Kosovo effect" on British foreign policy-making in International Affairs vol.85, no.3, 2009; further details can be supplied if necessary). This points up the need for the FCO to be working as closely as possible at all times with the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office, and for constructive dialogue on the nature of foreign policy challenges and possible solutions to be as open and frank as possible. Disagreement should not mean that these offices cannot work together effectively as long as the broad picture and desired direction is clear to both. To be seen to be abiding by the tenets of international law can be one way in which the FCO leads on helping Britain once more be seen to be a "good international citizen", which rather got lost after 2001.

3.  The Foreign Office needs to be responsible for providing a clear conceptual basis for British foreign policy, bringing issues of "identity" and "ethics" to the fore. These factors have been sadly and dangerously lacking in recent years. The policy framework established by the NSS, the creation of the NSC and the SDSR all continue trends previously ingrained by the New Labour governments, of what appears to be a reactive approach to foreign and defence policy-making: define the threat and then make the policy accordingly. What happened to devising defence policy from first foreign policy principles (the "baseline" of the 1998 SDR)? Foreign and defence policies now seem to be geared to combating a whole series of "threats" which come in all forms (from international terrorism and environmental degradation) and from all corners of the globe. This approach, valid though it might be in identifying fundamental challenges to the national interest, risks stretching the limited resources at Britain's disposal to breaking point, especially when key allies are facing the same grievous financial constraints. A "threat" focussed approach to creating foreign policy seems, in fact, to be rather missing the point by using up lots of valuable resources listing things which for any rational, thinking person are really rather obvious. It is how Britain deals with them and why they have become perceived as threats that now require urgent attention, and this can only come from a thoroughgoing reconsideration of Britain's role on the world stage.

4.  Britain has more means at its disposal to shape the international agenda than perhaps it realises, but these means are not just military or economic; they are rooted in British values and its sense of identity. Conventional diplomacy, aided by pulling military and economic levers, is undoubtedly useful. However, they need to be operated alongside a more thoroughgoing revision of what it is Britain stands for in the world. New Labour's "Cool Britannia" and Robin Cook's "ethical dimension" to foreign policy (it was not an "ethical foreign policy" per se) might have been lampooned in some quarters, but at least they made a start in that direction. A Foreign Secretary who held the Prime Minister's ear for longer than Cook did might have succeeded in integrating issues of ethics more closely into the foreign policy arena (see paragraph 12 below). His relative failure should not mean the end of the matter for the FCO—there was certainly something in it. Post-Iraq there is a more pressing need than ever to refashion tired images of Britain on the global stage as a means of forging a brighter national and global future. Revivifying the Commonwealth will hardly get pulses racing around the country.

5.  The enduring Churchillian notion that Britain operates in three circles of power and influence was all very well for 1948; it is not so useful for 2011. Those "hard" power relationships (effectively just a list of Britain's key allies at one historical juncture) need to sit alongside subtler, sometimes more cautious diplomacy that takes account of what identity Britain wants to express globally, and the values it wants to lead in promoting on the world stage. Not all academics and think tanks produce useless "theory" divorced from the "reality" of the world situation; much current work is in fact directly targeted at having policy relevance. There is a certain anti-intellectualism within British society in general that pervades also some quarters of government; compare to the US where the doors between policy and academia are revolving constantly. This is not a call for policy-makers to "use" academics to put a gloss or add fake credibility to their policy pronouncements, but for a deep and ongoing debate about British foreign policy in the spirit of constructive engagement on both sides. In reconsidering how to devise practical policy at the nexus of "power", "identity" and "ethics", the FCO could deepen its engagement with thinkers outside the department, especially those critical of recent trends in British foreign policy, including academics, pressure groups and Non Governmental Organisations. Being "critical" does not mean that these "outsiders" are hostile or opposed to "government". They are critical because they care.

6.  We should be wary of William Hague's claim to be putting the FCO "back where it belongs at the centre of Government" if it implies an attempt to recreate the Victorian heyday of Empire via a revivified Commonwealth. Does it matter if the FCO is not at the "centre of government" (whatever that means) if it is helping Britain achieve its national and international objectives? The British obsession with being "central" to everything is starting to seem more than passé, but outright anachronistic. Times have moved on and new thinking is called for; not the solutions of the past. The paradox in making such a claim is that Hague is simultaneously parroting the government's obsession with the "network revolution", picking up all the technological changes discussed in paragraph 1, above. Either things have changed, or they have not. And if they have: what has changed—and how? The nature of the changes need spelling out because they will help us identify possible solutions, and how the FCO can help. And if Hague believes they have changed, then new ways of managing the FCO's role in contemporary government are called for. Hague needs to spell out more clearly, therefore, what he means by "where it belongs". It is not obvious to me what he means by this.

7.  Hague wants to take the FCO down two paths with policy and personal ramifications. Both present major challenges for the department. From a detailed reading of his speeches since 2009 it appears that Hague first of all wants to involve the FCO in supposedly "forgotten" areas of foreign policy, notably relations with China, Russia, India, Brazil and so on (the BRIC powers). I would venture that these were not forgotten at all by New Labour, it is just that attention naturally came to settle on the US, Iraq and other "flashpoints" in Britain's external relations after 2001; note for instance the landmark China Strategy document that was published near the end of the New Labour years. Some organisational memory could help Hague appreciate where New Labour took Britain and then the FCO could, with him, discuss where best to go next and, critically, think about why. Second, Hague wants to create a more equal and effective partnership between Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. An admirable objective as far as he personally is concerned, he also has the political weight and leadership experience to pull it off. Something to consider for the future will be how foreign secretaries with less political "clout" fare when faced by an activist PM wanting to dabble in foreign policy across the board. How can the FCO recognise this propensity in a leader and maintain a constructive input to foreign policy decision-making when faced with that scenario?

8.  The two key departments of state, FCO and Treasury, need to work more closely together to pursue shared goals for Britain, especially as its trade relationships are concerned. Brown's years at the Treasury effectively wrested control over Britain's Euro policy from the PM and the FCO, severely curtailing what might have been a more genuinely pro-European policy on the part of the New Labour governments. Friction, mutual suspicion and tension appear to have been the order of the day and this damaged the government's ability to build a national consensus around a European-focussed foreign policy. The FCO seems to work well with DFID, so the two key points of focus for it now should be to get its views heard earlier within Downing Street and greater, more constructive dialogue going with the Treasury on matters of shared importance. Within the FCO, meanwhile, junior ministers should be given the opportunity to genuinely influence the debate. It seems that this was not always the case under New Labour. For example, how much impact did Ministers for Europe have on British EU policy? Were they listened to, or just ignored? If someone is worth a post of that significance, they are surely worth listening to, and being asked to justify foreign policy in their realm of expertise (see paragraph 11 below).

9.  The FCO's network of overseas posts should provide three things. First, advice and updates on the political situation in the respective countries as they affect the British national interest, materially or otherwise. Second, early warning on specific policy challenges that may need meeting in the immediate future in the country or region. Finally, insight into opportunities for greater British involvement in the respective country, but only in so far as that involvement will enhance Britain's clearly conceptualised national interest via its foreign policy goals.

10.  The challenges in explaining foreign policy to the public are twofold: first, devising a coherent message and second, getting the message across effectively. Ultimately, however, it will be the government as a whole, not the FCO specifically, that discharges an effective message about Britain's external relations in their entirety; this requires careful co-ordination across departments and crucially with the Communications unit in Downing Street. Basically, most media attention is focussed on what the PM says, followed—albeit a way behind—by what the Foreign Secretary and Chancellor say. New Labour badly mixed its messages on foreign policy. It presented Britain as a global player but did not define clearly what that meant. It said it was a pro-European government but pandered to the Eurosceptical press in denigrating many key aspects of the EU. It did not present a clear appreciation of the history of the British national story after 1945 and lacked the guts to present a European version consistently and coherently. Fatally, it lost trust on the Iraq issue, particularly after the "dodgy dossier" which undermined the public's faith in the communications machinery. Had that been a first year student undergraduate essay it would have failed, not least on the grounds of part-plagiarism! Achieving a coherent message about British foreign policy can only come when the FCO, Downing Street and other interested parties have thought critically about the conceptual basis of foreign policy, and where the government wants to take Britain in the years ahead. The Churchill model will not do.

11.  The Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister should jointly be tasked with presenting the government's vision of British foreign policy, for example in keynote foreign policy speeches in and around the time of the annual Lord Mayor's Banquet speeches. They should be aided by the relevant junior ministers where necessary (on that: does the public understand the role of junior ministers? Raising their profile might show more collective decision-making at work, as long as it is genuine and not merely for show). On a technical note, in research for my New Labour and the EU book the Foreign Office website during the New Labour years was found to be very badly managed and difficult to navigate. It proved almost impossible to locate speeches by the Foreign Secretary compared to the ease with which they could be located on the Treasury and Downing Street sites. The FCO website should be much less "clunky". It is through the speeches that the visions are communicated, mainly via the media and academics, but also direct to the interested public. Set piece communications events for targeted audiences in and outside the FCO only hit a handful of people; it is the website that most people will encounter on a day to day basis.

12.  The question of ethics and wider government objectives is sometimes phrased in a way that implies that attention to the former "gets in the way of" the latter. This need not be the case, and deeper attention to the conceptual basis of foreign policy can act as a corrective to this simplistic view of the place of ethics in contemporary foreign policy-making. I quote here from the introduction (co-authored with Jamie Gaskarth) to our forthcoming co-edited collection on British foreign policy 1997-2010: "If policymakers are going to pursue policies, from measures against climate change and global terrorism to preventing genocide and supporting economic development, they will have to cooperate with a range of actors beyond the Commonwealth, Europe and the Anglophone states. Some of these actors will have poor human rights records, a different conception of world order and society than the UK, and may be much more powerful than the UK, militarily, economically and politically. Incorporating identity, ethics and power into the decision-making process will allow the decider to appreciate the full implications of policy both domestically and internationally. Each will interact to allow a larger sense of what the costs and benefits are of allying with powerful states that do not share Britain's values, of pursuing 'ethical' interventions abroad, of constructing a role for the UK in the world that places it in a position of leadership and responsibility." In sum, what we are saying in that book is that greater attention to the ethical component of foreign policy is not a distraction from the "real" issues of trade and security, but are fundamental to Britain's ability to pursue its global objectives. Thinking of ethics and the national interest in zero-sum terms does a disservice to the synergistic relations between them and therefore obscures the undoubtedly vital role Britain can play in leading on global values. The problem for the FCO is making that case in an era since Iraq and when the expenses scandal has further damaged the faith of the public in what politicians say and do. Restoring the public's "trust" in public servants could certainly be aided by an upgrading of the ethical component as a driver of British foreign policy because it could help generate a new consensus around Britain's role in the world and help put some of the shine back on Britain's tarnished image on the global stage. A "good international citizen" has more credit in the bank than a "bad" one, and such reputations can be won and lost very easily, as the New Labour years demonstrated all too effectively.

18 November 2010


 
previous page contents next page


© Parliamentary copyright 2011
Prepared 12 May 2011