Written evidence from Professor Daryl
Copeland, University of Toronto
SUMMARY
- The FCO should serve as the UK government's central
agency for the analysis, coordination and management of all aspects
of globalization.
- The FCO's knowledge of, and connection to people
and places in the world represents its core value proposition
as an instrument of international policy, as well the basis of
its comparative advantage in relation to other government departments.
- The availability of adequate resources represents
the sine qua non for FCO effectiveness; brilliant management,
strict economies and working smarter are necessary, but at the
end of the day cannot substitute for budgetary sufficiency.
ABOUT THE
SUBMITTER
Daryl Copeland is an analyst, author and educator
specializing in diplomacy, international policy, global issues
and public management. He has written over 50 articles for the
scholarly and popular press, and his first book, Guerrilla
Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations, was released
in July 2009 by Lynne Rienner Publishers. That volume features
a chapter on the reform of foreign ministries (pp. 143-60).
Mr Copeland grew up in downtown Toronto, and received
his formal education at the University of Western Ontario (Gold
Medal, Political Science; Chancellor's Prize, Social Sciences)
and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Canada
Council Special MA Scholarship). He has spent years backpacking
on six continents, and enjoys travel, photography, arts and the
outdoors. Mr Copeland serves as a peer reviewer for Canadian
Foreign Policy, the International Journal, and The
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, and is a member of the Editorial
Board of the journal Place Branding and Public Diplomacy.
From 1981 to 2009 Mr Copeland served as a Canadian
diplomat with postings in Thailand, Ethiopia, New Zealand and
Malaysia. During the 1980s and 1990s, he was elected five times
to the Executive Committee of the Professional Association of
Foreign Service Officers. From 1996-99 he was National Program
Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in
Toronto and Editor of Behind the Headlines, Canada's international
affairs magazine. In 2000, he received the Canadian Foreign Service
Officer Award for his "tireless dedication and unyielding
commitment to advancing the interests of the diplomatic profession".
Among his positions at the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa, Mr Copeland
has worked as Senior Intelligence Analyst, South and Southeast
Asia; Deputy Director for International Communications; Director
for Southeast Asia; Senior Advisor, Public Diplomacy; Director
of Strategic Communications Services; and, Senior Advisor, Strategic
Policy and Planning.
Mr Copeland is Adjunct Professor and Senior Fellow
at the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs,
where he has designed and delivers a graduate seminar on Science,
Technology, Diplomacy and International Policy. In 2009 he
was appointed as a Research Fellow at the University of Southern
California's Center on Public Diplomacy.
BACKGROUND AND
INTRODUCTION
1. In today's highly conflicted world, diplomacy
and foreign ministries matter more than ever, but if they are
underperforming and face a crisis of relevance and effectiveness.
Diplomacy, and its institutions and practices, have not adapted
well to the challenges of globalization. A host of substantial
problems have been exacerbated by a negative image. Diplomats?
To the extent that they are thought of at all, they are seen typically
as dithering dandies lost hopelessly in a haze of obsolescence
somewhere between protocol and alcohol.
2. For these reasons and more, in recent years
diplomacy has been ignored, if not scorned by journalists, think
tanks, international relations scholars and, most surprisingly,
by governments. That neglect, however, has proven costly, as international
policy has become increasingly militarized and as many states
have come to rely on armed force as the international policy instrument
of choice. The results—in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—have
been calamitous, while the exploration of alternative ways forward,
including the expansion of trade, investment and technology transfer,
have not received the attention they deserve.
3. Diplomacy's problems can be remedied, but
the necessary transformation will require a fundamental rethinking
of some key elements of international relations, in particular
the notions of "security"—which is not a martial
art—and "development"—which is not to be
confused with aid. Most of all, the entire diplomatic ecosystem,
which consists of the foreign ministry, the foreign service, as
well as the diplomatic business model, requires reconstruction
from the ground up.
4. Diplomacy, the foreign ministry, and the foreign service
are more, respectively, than the animus, the machinery,
and the face of a nation to the world. All are closely related,
and in fact, interdependent—a change in any one of the constituent
parts will have knock-on effects elsewhere. The ecology of
diplomacy represents an interlocking, organic whole, the matrix
of international policy, the place where new ideas live or—too
often and frequently for the wrong reasons—die. Like so
many other ecosystems, this one too is beset by a cascade of adversity.
5. Hammered by relentlessly diminishing resources, diplomacy
and its supporting institutions are going through a rough patch
most everywhere. The initiative in international policy development
has passed to other actors, mainly defence departments, central
agencies, NGOs and the private sector. Power and influence have
moved upwards, to supranational institutions, outwards, to civil
society actors, and downwards, to other levels of government.
Leadership in foreign ministries has waned and creative international
policy analysis and advice have in recent years given way to a
reactive posture that responds mainly, and not especially well,
to external demands. Grand strategy, a critical pre-requisite
for successful navigation aboard the ship of state, is notable
for its absence.
6. How, then, to bring diplomacy from the margins
back into the mainstream, to get from fighting to talking, from
diktat to dialogue and from coercion and compulsion to negotiation
and compromise? In two words, not easily.
7. Foreign ministries, and the conventional diplomatic business
model which they embody, have not adapted well to the challenges
of the globalization era. They are rigid rather than fluid, hierarchic
rather than networked, authoritarian rather than innovative, and
staffed for the most part by a cadre of employees whose skill
sets no longer fill the bill. Amongst the oldest agencies of government,
the bureaucratic culture within foreign ministries tends to be
change-resistant and risk-averse. Too thin on the ground at home,
and even more severely stretched abroad, an under-financed diplomatic
corps today finds itself in large part without the necessary tools
or capacity required to respond to the rapidly changing environment
in which it operates. The crisis is epidemic and systemic.
8. In this age of uncertainty, formal state-to-state relations
are still necessary, but they are no longer sufficient to obtain
the kinds of international policy outcomes required. If foreign
ministries are to be effective, they can, and in fact must connect
directly with foreign publics—through the new as well as
the conventional media, by opening storefront and temporary operations,
by negotiating joint ventures with civil society… whatever
works. The days of near universal reliance upon standard operating
procedures and diplomatic convention have passed.
9. Diplomacy may still begin and end with interstate relations,
but the effective exercise of influence is related increasingly
to forging partnerships, managing networks and shaping opinions.
Few foreign policy objectives can now be achieved without carefully
crafted initiatives designed to engage, to understand, to advocate
and to influence. Whether a country needs to build international
coalitions, cooperate to protect the ecosphere, or compete to
attract foreign investment, skilled workers and students, the
cultivation of a broad and diverse cross-section of civic support
has become essential to success.
10. For these reasons and more, foreign ministries most everywhere
are concluding that the doctrine and practice of public diplomacy
seems best suited to meeting the challenges inherent in the era
of globalization. How, then, should today's diplomats be spending
their time? Building project-based networks, both conventional
and virtual, negotiating mutual interest alliances with the like-minded,
working on media strategy, leveraging private sector activity…
In sum, using attraction rather than coercion and exercising influence
through dialogue and relationship-building.
11. In the early 21st century, the emerging
world system is looking increasingly heterpolar, which
is to say that competing states or groups of states derive their
relative power and influence from dissimilar sources—social,
economic, political, military, cultural. Unlike the multipolar
world of, for instance, 19th century Europe,
the disparate vectors which empower these heterogeneous poles
are difficult to compare or measure. Stability will therefore
depend largely upon the diplomatic functions of knowledge-driven
problem solving and complex balancing. Participation in those
sorts of meaningful exchange holds forth the promise of effecting
behaviour at both ends of the conversation, and therein lies the
key to diplomacy's enduring utility and appeal.
12. Diplomacy, then, is our best hope, but if it is to be
in a position to deliver, then foreign ministries will need first
to be fixed. While better placed than most, the FCO nonetheless
exemplifies many of the patterns and problems sketched above.
KEY QUESTIONS
AND ISSUES
13. What is the FCO's role in UK Government?
Given the policy framework established by the new National Security
Strategy, the creation of the National Security Council and the
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, what should the FCO's
role now be, and how should the Department relate to other parts
of Government?
14. The FCO should serve as the UK government's
central agency for the analysis, coordination and management of
all aspects of globalization. The FCO's knowledge of, and connection
to people and place in the world represents its
core value proposition as an instrument of international policy,
as well as the basis of its comparative advantage in relation
to other government departments. The availability of adequate
resources represents the sine qua non for FCO effectiveness;
brilliant management, strict economies and working smarter are
necessary, but at the end of the day cannot substitute for budgetary
sufficiency.
15. How should the Foreign Secretary's claim
to be putting the FCO "back where it belongs at the centre
of Government" be assessed?
16. In practice, repositioning the FCO closer
to the centre of government operations will involve a dedication
and commitment to intellectual leadership and policy entrepreneurship,
and the development of a new narrative for the organization as
an international policy catalyst, broker, guide and storyteller.
It will entail a much greater emphasis on forward planning and
the analysis of broad, crosscutting policy clusters such as governance,
sustainable development, the rule of law, and the promotion of
rights and democracy, and coordinating and integrating these issues
across government. Also crucial will be rebuilding the depth and
strength of the FCO's eroded and undervalued geographic expertise,
which has suffered over time as a result of various cost-cutting
exercises and re-organizations. Acquisition of this unique form
of knowledge—of people and place, of history, language and
culture—is a major benefit conferred upon the FCO by virtue
of its missions abroad.
17. What should be the role of the FCO's network
of overseas posts?
18. The FCO's over-arching understanding of,
and connection to the world, arising from and manifest through
its network of missions abroad and geographic divisions at headquarters,
represents its ace in the hole. Nowhere else in government do
we find the capacity to develop a strategic overview of the UK's
place and direction in the world, to examine first-hand the many
facets of globalization, and to assess what they might mean for
the UK and its citizens. Diplomatic posts are crucial in this
respect—neither journalists, nor businesspeople, nor academics
have the mandate or the ability to come to terms with a changing
world through the unique prism of British values, policies and
interests. This assumes, however, that those assigned abroad are
actually doing diplomacy—swimming like fish in the sea of
the people and not flopping around like a fish out of water, or
sitting around inside the chancery talking to like-minded others
about what might be going on outside. Diplomats should not be
reduced to international policy bureaucrats. If that is to be
avoided, much of their time must be spent away from their desks,
making contacts, developing networks, and engaging in dialogue—not
just with the usual suspects, but with strange bedfellows as well.
Maintaining a broad range of interlocutors is essential for both
representational and intelligence-gathering purposes.
19. What is the FCO's role in explaining UK
foreign policy to the British public?
20. The effective conduct of international policy
outreach at home is the domestic equivalent of conducting public
diplomacy (PD) abroad, and as such should be regarded as an essential
element of the FCO's responsibilities. The outreach function,
however, is frequently overlooked—diplomats are notorious
for having their faces to the world but their backs to their own
citizens. Moreover, foreign ministries are typically without the
domestic constituencies more easily developed by government departments
with large national programs—especially those involving
significant local expenditure. In the case of both PD and outreach,
the effective use of new and social media which leverage the interactive
qualities of the internet will be elemental. The FCO has to date
made some significant strides in this respect (FCO bloggers, and
the corporate use of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and so forth).
21. What should be the FCO's role in relation
to non-governmental organisations?
22. The FCO should be the government's key point
of contact for NGOs with interests and activities related to international
policy. Effectiveness can be leveraged through partnerships and
joint ventures where shared priorities and objectives make that
approach sensible. Mutual interest is the mother of the best collaboration.
23. Given the new Government's emphasis on
using the FCO to promote UK trade and economic recovery, how can
the Department best avoid potential conflicts between this task,
support for human rights, and the pursuit of other Government
objectives?
24. At the highest level of analysis, international
policy represents the expression, on the part of those representing
states, of the constantly shifting balance between values, or
that which is seen as important (such as human rights, social
justice or democratic development), and interests, or that which
is sought (such as prosperity, through trade and investment; security,
through development cooperation or peacekeeping; the rule of law,
through the promotion of good governance and international law).
The two are often closely related—the way in which interests
are pursued often reflects values, for instance in a preference
for negotiation over conflict. Similarly, the extent to which
values are considered in decision-making often reflects interests,
for example in the complex trade-offs between international environmental
standards/stewardship and resource development/use, or commercial
relations and human rights. Because of the dynamic balance between
values and interests in a constantly changing world, foreign policy
is vexingly difficult to codify and complete coherence is unusual.
Indeed, one of the mature pleasures of adulthood—and they
are few—involves learning to live with paradox, ambiguity
and unresolved issues. That said, it is the responsibility of
foreign ministries to manage the trade-offs (the broker function)
and to communicate and implement the results.
25. The Committee would welcome submissions
which address, in particular, the FCO's relationships with the
Department for International Development, the Prime Minister's
Office and the Cabinet Office (including the National Security
Council); the role of the security services in relation to the
FCO; and the FCO's role in the management and implementation of
EU business for the UK Government.
26. In Guerrilla Diplomacy I argue that
in the age of globalization, development has become the flip side
of security, and accordingly diplomacy should replace defence
at the centre of international policy. In the 21st century, the
most profound challenges to human survival—climate change,
public health, food insecurity, and resource scarcity, to name
a few—are rooted in science and driven by technology (S&T).
Moreover, underdevelopment and insecurity, far more than religious
extremism or political violence, represent fundamental threats
to world order. In that context, the capacity to generate, absorb
and use S&T could play a crucial role in improving security
and development prospects. By way of comparison, the continuing
pursuit of the Global War on Terror—under whatever new name—tends
to have the opposite effect. International policy has become excessively
militarized, yet the military is both too sharp and too dull an
instrument to deal with the problems of globalization. Simply
put, you can't call in an air strike on a warming planet, or garrison
against pandemic disease, or send out an expeditionary force to
occupy the alternatives to a carbon economy. Bombs and guns, generals
and admirals, and a reliance upon armed force can't provide for
either security or development in the face of complex transnational
issues.
27. From this line of argument it follows that
long-term, sustainable, equitable and human-centred development—addressing
the needs of the poor, and bridging the digital divide—advances
the cause of security, and accordingly should become a pre-occupation
of diplomacy in general, and of science diplomacy in particular.
The FCO's Science and Innovation Network represents an important
start in responding to this observation, but much more needs to
be done to equip British representatives with the S&T skills
and experience required.
28. A word is also necessary about a frequently
misunderstood term, intelligence, particularly in reference
to the FCO's relationship to the security services. Intelligence
is simply information whose value is based on its accuracy, timeliness
and relevance in relation to the objectives, priorities and interests
of the information consumer—in this case, HMG. While intelligence
may be generated through covert or secret means (espionage), it
has been my experience that the most worthwhile and accurate assessments
are based usually upon oral exchanges, first hand observation
and the careful reading of open, unclassified sources. With the
declining importance of formal, state to state relations in the
overall international relations mix, diplomacy is increasingly
about establishing networks of contacts for the express purpose
of collecting information of tactical and strategic importance
to governments, which is to say, intelligence. This will be increasingly
so as the FCO moves towards implementing a model of public diplomacy
which features lobbying, advocacy, and, especially, dialogue,
which is the source of what is referred to in the trade as human
intelligence. In these respects, and resulting from its extensive
network of missions and representatives abroad and system of secure
desktop communications, the FCO is well-positioned to increase
substantially its contribution to the collective intelligence
gathering effort. That, in turn, would bolster the UK's position
in other major allied capitals, where bringing more to the table
will almost always produce tangible dividends.
29. To create a foreign ministry that is relevant
and effective, new forms of representation abroad, and a headquarters
establishment that is flatter, more agile and responsive, and
not least, more influential and powerful, are the order of the
day. An FCO that is more attuned and relevant to the work of other
departments of government, and to the preoccupations of Britons
would be positioned to lead on major international issues across
government instead of scrambling incessantly, chasing a receding
horizon, and fighting often ill-fated, rearguard actions to defend
turf best left to others. Line departments may well have a better
capacity to manage specific international policy files, such as
diminishing biodiversity or international finance and monetary
issues, but the management of the broad threats and challenges
arising from globalization is no one else's job.
30. On the more practical side, and this cannot
be overemphasized, the FCO is at risk of becoming a department
of service dispensers, spending more time and money providing
housing, administration, technological support, and office space—often
for the representatives of other government departments—than
pursuing core international policy objectives. However necessary,
this is not sufficient if the FCO is to avoid becoming a giant
administrative tail wagging a tiny, emaciated international policy
dog barely capable of barking.
31. Translated into action, this will mean reconstructing
a foreign ministry that can interpret, articulate, integrate,
and advocate by assessing what the changing world means for the
UK. In this dispensation, the FCO becomes an international policy
catalyst (across government), a global guide (for Britons) and
an accomplished storyteller (to the world). To do this, it will
be necessary to maximize assets in the field, to connect with
wider networks, to renew professional skills, and to strengthen
policy capacity.
32. Finally it may be asked: if HMG moves to
create a foreign ministry dedicated to harmonizing the UK's international
policy and interests, to acting as a focal point and broker for
global issues and world affairs, to client service (trade, consular,
passports) and to managing the overseas platform (the network
of missions abroad), will this be enough? While reconsideration
and reform are clearly required, neither can improve performance
and produce results in the absence of adequate resources. A fundamental
re-thinking of the FCO's organizational design and business model
must therefore be wed to the promise of re-investment, as the
alternative is continued drift into low-end logistical support,
and, eventually, increased ineffectiveness and irrelevance.
23 November 2010
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