Written evidence from LSE IDEAS, the Centre
for Diplomacy and Strategy at the London School of Economics
This evidence draws on The Future of UK Foreign
Policy, an IDEAS Special Report, available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR006.aspx.
The traditional view of the FCO as a global diplomatic
network using its local assets and specialised expertise to drive
British foreign policy from the heart of government has been undermined
in recent years by four developments:
(1) The shift towards Prime-ministerial control
of foreign policy decision-making;
(2) The loss of regional expertise due in part
to budget cuts, but also deriving from…
(3) …the shift towards functional structuring
of the bureaucracy around particular issues as opposed to maintaining
a regional focus;
(4) The demotion of the role of the UK's embassy
network in the policy decision-making process.
The current government has sought to reaffirm the
traditional model, and this is to be welcomed. However, the Foreign
Secretary's "prosperity agenda" threatens to cast diplomats
as salesmen for UK Plc, rather than as the guardians of the national
interest, which can. This is particularly worrying given that
priorities of commerce, security and values may clash. Policy
making and policy implementation are not inherently separate undertakings,
and diplomatic expertise should be reinstated to a central position
in formulating foreign policy; the FCO should be more than simply
a coordinating body for HMG interests abroad. It is worrying therefore
that the FCO's research analysts may be decentralised and placed
under the control of individual directorates, depriving them of
central coordination and the ability to engage comprehensively
with the expertise of academia and think tanks.
The relationship between the FCO and DFID is central
to formulating coherent strategy. In certain areas of the world,
and in particular in failed and failing states, it may be appropriate
for DFID, with its expertise in development, to take the lead
role in diplomatic engagement. However, in these areas, FCO and
DFID priorities need to be brought into line with each other on
the basis of the national interest. Development aid and effort,
whilst laudable in its own right, should be predicated on the
long term security interests of the UK.
The cumulative impact of the recent NSS, SDSR and
CSR undermined the capacities available to the FCO in formulating
and implementing UK foreign policy. Whilst the Government's attempt
to review British strategy was laudable, and the new processes
surrounding the National Security Council are to be welcomed,
the financial outcomes have been determined more by political
and bureaucratic drivers than by sustained and coherent strategic
thought, with the result that the ends and means of UK foreign
policy will remain inappropriately matched. In particular, the
continued funding of capital-intensive military systems, predicated
on the unlikely possibility of major military confrontation, is
hard to square with a world where the core threats terrorism and
cyber threats require intelligence and technical capacities far
more than hardware. A more comprehensive strategy review would
have diverted more funds towards the diplomatic assets of the
FCO.
Substantive diplomatic engagement is what underpins
both Britain's hard and soft power, and investment in the UK's
diplomatic capacity is crucial to the success of strategy in a
world that increasingly depends on specific local knowledge born
of strong and sustained relationships. Traditional British diplomatic
strengths of flexibility, pragmatism and egalitarianism are uniquely
suited to the complex world we face; cuts to what is a relatively
inexpensive area of government spending, particularly when compared
directly to defence and international development, threaten that
legacy and Britain's ability to play a truly effective international
role.
29 November 2010
| 
